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To OC and all the many former child migrants who have fought hard to 
understand the truth of their early lives…
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CHAPTER 1
‘A Serious Injustice  
to the Individual’: British Child Migration 
to Australia as Policy Failure
Recommendation 61. The emigration of deprived children should be 
subject to the condition that the receiving Government makes 
arrangements for their welfare and supervision comparable to those 
recommended in this report (para. 515).
—Curtis Committee report, 1946
Counsel to the Inquiry: Is there anything that you feel I have not 
covered in your evidence that you wanted to say?
Witness A11: I just—growing up, when I went to Bindoon, you sent me 
to a bloody slave camp… That’s all I could call bloody Bindoon, a 
bloody slave camp. That’s what it was. They just sexually abused you, 
they did what they want to you, they never believed you… What’s the 
worst handicap they’ve given me? Not allowing me to read and write, 
learn… And separating me from my mother, when we were asking time 
and time again, and I class that—my education and keeping my 
family away is worse than the sexual abuse, what they did, what they 
did to us. It was just unbelievable… They just had full control of you 
and nobody believed you, you know. And they made you go to confession. 
I said, “I don’t want to go”, and they make you go, you know. Yeah.
—Witness A11, Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, 
Hearings on Child Migration Programmes, March 2017
2
Over the past 20  years, a number of countries across Europe, North 
America and Australasia have seen the rise of public inquiries and reports 
into cases of historic institutional child abuse.1 This can, in part, be under-
stood as an expression of relatively recent social trends, including greater 
public discussion of the nature and effects of child sexual abuse as well as 
the growing social influence of concepts of trauma and of moral restitu-
tion for past institutional failings.2 Behind these more recent develop-
ments stands a longer and often hidden history of suffering caused through 
psychological, physical and sexual harm in childhood that has left lasting 
marks on individuals’ emotions, relationships and bodies.3
In many of the cases from the past century towards which a critical 
historical gaze has now been turned, such suffering did not occur because 
of an absence of policy or legal prohibition. Surveys undertaken by the 
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse in 
Australia documented 4444 individuals who had claimed to have been 
sexually abused in Roman Catholic organisations as well as 1085 
complainants of sexual abuse concerning Anglican organisations since 
1950.4 This abuse was often the subject of institutional responses that 
1 See, for example, (eds) Johanna Sköld & Shurlee Swain, Apologies and the Legacy of Abuse 
of Children in “Care” (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Johanna Sköld ‘Historical 
abuse—a contemporary issue: compiling inquiries into abuse and neglect of children in out-
of-home care worldwide’, Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime 
Prevention, 2013, 14(1), 5–23; Robin Sen, Andrew Kendrick, Ian Milligan and Moyra 
Hawthorn, ‘Lessons learnt? Abuse in residential child care in Scotland’, Child and Family 
Social Work, 13, 2008, 411–22; Matthew Colton, ‘Factors associated with abuse in residen-
tial child care institutions’, Children and Society, 16(1), 2002, 33–44.
2 See, for example, Jennifer Crane, Child Protection in England, 1960–2000 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Kate Gleeson, ‘The Hero’s Journey: Gender and the Politics of 
Justice for Child Sexual Abuse’ in Gleeson K and Lumby C (eds) The Age of Consent? Young 
People, Sexual Abuse and Agency (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 2019), 
pp. 31–48; Didier Fassin & Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the 
Condition of Victimhood (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); John Torpey, 
Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: On Reparation Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006).
3 See, for example, Robert Orsi, History and Presence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2016).
4 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Analysis of Claims 
of Sexual Abuse Made With Respect to Catholic Church Institutions in Australia (Sydney: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), para 42; Royal Commission into Institutional Responses 
to Child Sexual Abuse, Analysis of Complaints of Child Sexual Abuse Received by Anglican 
Church Dioceses in Australia (Sydney: Commonwealth of Australia, 2017), para 41.
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prioritised protection for organisations’ public standing over criminal jus-
tice for child victims despite legal measures across Australian States pro-
hibiting sexual assault and rape of children.5 Similarly, in Ireland, the Ryan 
Commission concluded that existing legislation and guidelines concerning 
the corporal punishment of children were routinely broken across all of 
the residential institutions that it investigated, leading to violence against 
children that was arbitrary, spontaneous and excessive by standards of the 
time and which had a lasting effect on those exposed to it.6 Rather than 
occurring through the absence of legal protections or policy standards, 
children suffered in these cases in spite of policy and legal frameworks 
intended to prevent it. The policy aspiration to protect children’s well- 
being, reinforced by wider discourses around children’s flourishing as 
both a public and private good, was for varying reasons too often under-
cut by other aims or loyalties, and impeded by institutional cultures, struc-
tures and systems.
This book is a study of another such case of policy failure in post-war 
children’s out-of-home care. The nature of ‘failure’ in policy contexts is, 
as recent studies have argued, at least to some degree in the eye of the 
beholder and depends on the criteria being used.7 There were various ways 
in which organisations involved in child migration felt it to be a failure at 
the time. The numbers of children sent from the United Kingdom to 
Australia never matched either the ambition of, or financial investment 
from, the Australian Commonwealth Government and, by the early 1960s, 
assisted child migration was allowed to fade into obscurity in its immigra-
tion programmes. Others, as we shall see in coming chapters, thought of 
failure in this context primarily in educational terms and expressed  concern 
5 Hayley Boxall, Adam Tomison & Shann Hulme, Historical Review of Sexual Offence and 
Child Sexual Abuse Legislation in Australia: 1788–2013 (Sydney: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2014).
6 Final Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (Dublin: Commission to 
Inquire into Child Abuse, 2009), vol. 4, paras 6.09–6.17.
7 On the wider interest in policy failure in current literature in public policy, including the 
value of fine-grained case studies for developing wider explanatory frameworks for policy 
failure, see, for example, Allan McConnell, ‘What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate 
the maze’, Public Policy and Administration, 30(3–4), 221–42; Cathal FitzGerald, Eoin 
O’Malley and Deiric Ó Broin, ‘Policy success/policy failure: a framework for understanding 
policy choices’, Administration, 67(2), 2019, 1–24. On assessments of policy failure being 
shaped by the interpretative frame through which policy outcomes are viewed see, for exam-
ple, Mark Bovens and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Revisiting the study of policy failures’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 23(5), 2016, 653–66.
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that some receiving institutions were failing to provide a wide enough 
range of training suited to the needs of the individual child. As one admin-
istrator of the Fairbridge Society put it in 1945, the assumption that chil-
dren need only be trained as farm labourers or domestic workers was ‘a 
serious injustice to the individual’.
The particular form of failure with which this book is concerned, how-
ever, is in the gap between the standards for children’s out-of-home care 
set out in the 1946 Curtis report which came to define child-care policies 
in the emerging welfare state and the conditions in Australia which many 
British child migrants experienced. Such a gap between policy aspiration 
and practice was far from unknown in the United Kingdom. The emphasis 
on the use of adoption and foster care over placement in residential insti-
tutions in the Curtis report and 1948 Children Act was still being unevenly 
implemented across Britain well into the 1960s, with services also, in 
many cases, being delivered and monitored by untrained child-care work-
ers.8 However, assisted child migration was, in several important respects, 
a different case to children receiving out-of-home care in the United 
Kingdom. As the Curtis Committee recognised, sending a child thousands 
of miles away from other family members and beyond the jurisdiction of 
British authorities entailed a special responsibility for ensuring both appro-
priate standards of selection and overseas care for child migrants. To imag-
ine that emigration would give a child a better life was much harder, from 
this perspective, if it involved sending children to types of residential insti-
tution that the Curtis Committee felt unable to endorse in the United 
Kingdom. Whilst civil servants and ministers at the Home Office—which 
became the lead government department for children’s out-of-home care 
in 1947—understood and supported this policy perspective on child 
migration, it proved ultimately ineffective in ensuring that this policy was 
applied. By 1956, the gap between these Curtis standards and the realities 
on the ground for British child migrants in Australia had become all too 
clear to British policy-makers and within a few years, civil servants were 
privately hoping that the schemes would wither and die for lack of chil-
dren being made available for emigration rather than face serious 
8 See J.A.G. Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1966); Bob Holman, Child Care Revisited: the Children’s Departments, 1948–1971 
(London: Institute of Childcare and Social Education UK, 1998); Gordon Lynch, ‘Pathways 
to the 1946 Curtis report and the post-war reconstruction of children’s out-of-home care’, 
Contemporary British History, 34(1), 2019, 22–43.
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confrontation with Australian authorities and the voluntary societies still 
supporting this work. Far from being an anachronistic critique of child 
migration programmes by today’s standards, this book therefore seeks to 
provide a case study of how a post-war policy framework intended to safe-
guard children’s emotional and social development failed in practice to 
achieve this. In short, it is an attempt to make sense of how ‘A11’ and 
many others like him experienced childhood trauma through British child 
migration schemes in a policy context in which much better had been 
hoped for them.9
The experience of ‘A11’ was far from unique. Child migrants’ experi-
ences could vary significantly, with some viewing them positively or seeing 
their experiences as both a mix of positive and harmful.10 However, the 
past 20 years has led to much greater documentation of forms of suffering 
experienced through child migration programmes. The recently con-
cluded review of the abuse of child migrants undertaken by the Scottish 
Child Abuse Inquiry is the ninth investigation to have taken place that has, 
in some way, touched on this.11 Child migrants have themselves published 
9 On the wider interest in policy failure in current literature in public policy, including the 
value of fine-grained case studies for developing wider explanatory frameworks for policy 
failure, see, for example, Allan McConnell, ‘What is policy failure? A primer to help navigate 
the maze’, Public Policy and Administration, 30(3–4), 221–42; Cathal FitzGerald, Eoin 
O’Malley and Deiric Ó Broin, ‘Policy success/policy failure: a framework for understanding 
policy choices’, Administration, 67(2), 2019, 1–24. Whilst it is correct to argue that what is 
seen as a policy ‘failure’ is shaped by the interpretative frame through which policy outcomes 
are viewed (see Mark Bovens and Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Revisiting the study of policy failures’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5), 2016, 653–66), it is reasonable to claim that post-
war child migration constituted a failure of UK Government policy in its own terms given 
that one of the Government’s policy goals was to safeguard children’s well-being through 
standards advocated in the Curtis report.
10 See, for example, oral history interviews described in Ellen Boucher, Empire’s Children: 
Child Emigration, Welfare and the Decline of the British World, 1869–1967 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 1–5, 18; Evidence from witness FWS, Scottish Child 
Abuse Inquiry, Transcript of Day 179.
11 See Legislative Assembly, Western Australia, Select Committee into Child Migration, 
Interim Report, (Perth: State Government of Western Australia, 1996); UK Parliament 
Health Committee, Third Report, The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants (London: 
HMSO, 1998); Preliminary Report on Neerkol for the Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of 
Children in Queensland Institutions (Brisbane: Commission of Inquiry, 1998) Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Abuse of Children in Queensland Institutions (Brisbane: 
Commission of Inquiry, 1999) also known as the Forde Report; Australian Senate 
Community Affairs Committee, Lost Innocents: Righting the Record, Report on Child 
Migration (Canberra: Australian Commonwealth Government, 2001); Historical 
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memoirs of their experiences as well as wider accounts of the history of 
particular schemes,12 alongside books by journalists and others with sig-
nificant involvement in this field.13 Oral histories have also been recorded, 
notably through a major project undertaken by the National Library of 
Australia, which explore former child migrants’ memories of their lives 
before migration and in Australian institutions, their adjustment from 
institutions into adult life and their reflections on the history of child 
migration in a period of public apologies.14 These have provided various 
accounts of physical and sexual abuse, the pain of separation from families 
left in the United Kingdom or from siblings also migrated to Australia, the 
psychological effects of life in impersonal institutions and the longer-term 
effects of childhoods spent in some institutions that prioritised use of chil-
dren’s labour over their education. As Margaret Humphreys, the founder 
of the Child Migrants’ Trust has put it, a number of child migrants faced 
multiple traumas in the wider context of a sense of fundamental loss of 
home and identity bound up with their migration from Britain.15
These experiences took place in a post-war policy environment in which 
renewed attention was being given to the administration and standards of 
children’s out-of-home care. The establishment of the Curtis and Clyde 
Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Report of the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (Belfast: 
HIA, 2017); Australian Royal Commission, Case studies 5 (on Salvation Army institutions in 
Queensland and New South Wales), 11 (on Christian Brothers institutions in Western 
Australia) and 26 (on St Joseph’s Orphanage, Neerkol) (Canberra: Royal Commission into 
Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse); Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual 
Abuse, Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report (London: IICSA, 2018). For a 
useful summary of the wider context of critical understandings of child migration pro-
grammes in Australia, see Andrew Murray & Marilyn Rock, ‘Child migration schemes to 
Australia: a dark and hidden chapter of Australia’s history revealed’, Australian Journal of 
Social Issues, 38(2), 2003, 149–67.
12 See, for example, David Plowman, Our Home in the Bush: Tales of Tardun (Como, WA: 
Tardun Old Boys Association, 1994); David Hill, The Forgotten Children: Fairbridge Farm 
School and Its Betrayal of Australia’s Child Migrants (Sydney: Random House, 2008); John 
Hawkins, The Bush Orphanage (Docklands, VIC: JoJo Publishing, 2009); Peter Harding, 
Apology Accepted: A 1950s Kid from Fairbridge (no location: Big Thumb Publishing, 2014).
13 Philip Bean & Joy Melville, Lost Children of the Empire (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); 
Margaret Humphreys, Empty Cradles (London: Doubleday, 1994); Alan Gill, Orphans of the 
Empire: The Shocking Story of Child Migration to Australia (Sydney: Random House, 1998).
14 Former Child Migrants and Forgotten Australians Oral History Project, National 
Library of Australia, completed 2012. See also oral histories available at ML: MLOH 539.
15 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes 
Investigation, Day 8 transcript, pp. 38–40.
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Committees in 1945 to review systems and approaches to children’s out- 
of- home care in England and Wales, and in Scotland, respectively, had 
emerged out of a growing recognition within and outside government 
that the fragmented systems of governance and oversight currently in 
place were inefficient and unsafe.16 With the experience of children’s war- 
time evacuation fresh in the national consciousness, and the rise of popu-
larised ‘child psychology’ continuing to focus attention on children’s 
emotional lives and individual development,17 the Curtis report became a 
means not only of setting in train clearer lines of administration for chil-
dren’s out-of-home care in the emerging post-war welfare state, but a 
marker of standards to be expected for the future. Children’s care was to 
move decisively from older institutional models of containment to a new 
era of more personalised care, attentive to the child’s need to develop 
through play and increasing autonomy, in an environment that resembled 
as closely as possible the ‘normal family home’. Although far from being a 
central concern in its final report, the Curtis Committee recognised that 
assisted child migration was likely to resume soon. Whilst not completely 
opposing this, it recommended that this be restricted to a very limited 
range of children for whom it would genuinely represent the best option 
for their individual future and that it only be undertaken on the basis of 
the standards commended in the Committee’s report for children’s out- 
of- home care more generally. This was the policy agenda that the Home 
Office, as the lead department for children’s out-of-home care was to take 
up and that was meant to frame post-war child migration policy.
In attempting to explain the gap between post-war policy aspirations 
for children’s out-of-home care and the lived experience of many British 
child migrants,18 this book focuses primarily on knowledge, assumptions 
and decisions within the parts of the UK Government most involved in 
the administration of this work: the Dominions Office (which became the 
Commonwealth Relations Office in 1947), the Home Office and the UK 
High Commission in Canberra. These governmental bodies operated in 
the context of wider trans-national administrative networks which involved 
16 See, for example, Lynch, ‘Pathways to the Curtis report’.
17 John Welshman, ‘Evacuation, hygiene, and social policy: the Our Towns report of 1943’, 
The Historical Journal, 42(3), 1999, 781–807; Mathew Thomson, Lost Freedom: The 
Landscape of the Child and the British Post-War Settlement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013).
18 On the uneven implementation of standards encouraged by the Curtis report in England 
and Wales, see, for example, Lynch, ‘Pathways to the Curtis report’.
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UK voluntary organisations and local authorities who provided children 
for migration, eight ‘recognised’ sending bodies (all of whom were volun-
tary organisations),19 UK-based immigration officials at Australia House 
in London and the Australian Commonwealth Government, Australian 
State Governments (particularly their child welfare and immigration 
departments) and voluntary organisations in Australia who received child 
migrants and acted as their custodians.
The decision to focus this analysis primarily on the UK Government is 
not intended to imply that the sources of policy failure in this context lay 
only with British policy-makers. The complex, multi-agency oversight of 
post-war child migration to Australia was an anomaly in the context of the 
emerging welfare state in which greater clarity and integration in the 
administration of children’s out-of-home care were being prioritised. Such 
complexity increased the potential for the delivery of assisted child migra-
tion to be compromised by competing policy priorities (including differ-
ent policy goals for assisted migration and for children’s care), by failures 
in information-gathering and sharing and by caution in over-stepping 
departmental remits or causing overt confrontation with other organisa-
tional stakeholders. Failures to protect the welfare of British child migrants 
therefore occurred across many of the organisations involved in this work 
as well as in the policy and administrative systems through which they 
interacted with each other. In the case of the voluntary societies involved, 
I have shown elsewhere how their particular meso-level structures and 
cultures also contributed to failures to protect the welfare of child 
migrants.20 These included distinctively religious factors, including differ-
ent forms of governance structure within religious organisations, religious 
conceptions of the child and the ways in which actions that proved harm-
ful to children were obscured through different forms of religious 
legitimation.
19 The eight ‘approved’ organisations which received funding from the Dominions Office/
Commonwealth Relations Office for the assisted migration of unaccompanied children to 
Australia were the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, the Church of England 
Advisory Council of Empire Settlement, the Church of Scotland Committee on Social 
Service, Dr Barnardo’s Homes, the Fairbridge Society, the National Children’s Home, the 
Northcote Children’s Trust and the Salvation Army.
20 Gordon Lynch, ‘The Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement and 
post-war child migration to Australia’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 2020, 74:1, 798–826; 
Gordon Lynch, ‘Catholic child migration schemes from the United Kingdom to Australia: 
systemic failures and religious legitimation’, 2020, 44:3, 273–94.
 G. LYNCH
9
Whilst this book provides insights into wider systemic failures in these 
post-war child migration programmes, and within particular voluntary 
societies, its primary aim is therefore to develop a better understanding of 
policy failure in government systems. By providing a close reading of pol-
icy decision-making and administrative processes within the relevant 
departments of the UK Government, it seeks to clarify the specific factors 
which caused the gap between policy-makers’ awareness of appropriate 
standards and the capacity of the machinery of government to ensure that 
these standards were applied. The focus of the coming chapters is there-
fore on archival material which provides evidence of key periods of 
decision- making and the operation of administrative systems for these 
child migration programmes from the early 1920s until the early 1960s, 
by which time unaccompanied child migration to Australia was substan-
tially in decline. The coming chapters do not seek to provide a detailed 
account of former child migrants’ own experiences of those early lives. 
That work has already been undertaken very substantially by the books, 
oral histories and inquiries referred to above. Rather this book has been 
written to provide the most extensive analysis yet undertaken to under-
stand the policy context and systems in the United Kingdom through 
which their childhood experiences took place.
As the coming chapters will show, before child migration to Australia 
resumed in the summer of 1947, there was already a substantial under-
standing within the Dominions Office of both actual failures and potential 
risks associated with this work. Despite this, funding was provided by the 
UK Government to voluntary organisations for around 3200 unaccompa-
nied child migrants sent to Australia in the post-war period. Child migra-
tion resumed and continued in the post-war period not because it was 
assumed to be without problems in the Commonwealth Relations Office 
and Home Office. Rather the post-war schemes operated in the midst of 
continuing negotiations about what conditions for child migrants were 
actually like, what standards could reasonably be expected and how prob-
lems might be mitigated bearing in mind the complex web of organisa-
tional relationships through which interventions needed to be 
implemented. Through this process, British policy-makers increasingly 
saw child migration as, at best, a tolerable system, perpetuated by prece-
dent, rather than something strongly desirable. Organisational invest-
ments in this work and desire to avoid conflict with influential stakeholders 
meant that these programmes ultimately came to an end not through 
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central government intervention but the declining numbers of children 
put forward for migration.
Child migrants were therefore placed at risk not simply through over- 
complex systems of administration and governance, but because of specific 
institutional cultures, interests and decisions. In the case of the UK 
Government, this centred around policy-makers’ sense of what was desir-
able for child migrants balanced against their perceptions of what was 
practical given the actual or imagined limits of their power and the need 
to maintain working relationships with other governmental and voluntary 
organisations. As the coming chapters will demonstrate, such causes of 
policy failure lie not simply in rational choices about policy priorities or 
macro-level political and economic factors, but in the meso-level struc-
tures of, and relations between, specific government departments and 
micro-level factors such as policy-makers’ perceptions of affinity, trust and 
expertise.
In examining this case of policy failure, the book also seeks to contrib-
ute to the growing academic literature on the history of the early post-war 
welfare state. Whilst operating in a period of the consolidation of state 
power over the provision of children’s out-of-home care, the history of 
post-war child migration to Australia further illustrates how the emerging 
welfare state operated not simply as a system of centralised control, but as 
a ‘mixed economy’ between state and voluntary organisations.21 The case 
of post-war child migration to Australia, which involved interactions 
between local and national governments in both the United Kingdom and 
Australia, as well as between a range of voluntary and professional organ-
isations, provides a rich example of this ‘mixed economy’ in action. 
Supported by state funding, and operating at least notionally within sys-
tems of state oversight, these child migration programmes were delivered 
21 See Geoffrey Finlayson, ‘A moving frontier: voluntarism and the state in British social 
welfare, 1911–1949’, Twentieth Century British History, 1(2), 1990, 183–206; Jane Lewis, 
‘Family provision of health and welfare in the mixed economy of care in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries’, Social History of Medicine, 8(1), 1995, 1–16; Julie Grier, ‘A spirit 
of “friendly rivalry”? Voluntary societies and the formation of post-war child welfare legisla-
tion in Britain’, in (eds) Jon Lawrence and Pat Starkey, Child Welfare and Social Action in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: International Perspectives (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2001), pp. 234–55; Katharine Bradley, Poverty, Philanthropy and the State: 
Charities and the Working-Classes in London, 1918–79 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2009); (eds) Matthew Hilton and James McKay, The Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got 
to the Big Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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primarily by voluntary organisations and involved at least five times as 
many children sent from the care of voluntary organisations than from 
local authorities. This system was not one of a straightforward divergence 
of provision by the state and voluntary sectors, however, but of complex 
and evolving interactions between them. Far from constituting an example 
of the growing power of the centralised welfare state, these child migra-
tion programmes provide evidence of policy-makers’ perceptions of the 
limits of their power.22 They also demonstrate that whilst broad principles 
of ‘child psychology’ were becoming increasingly influential in post-war 
public policy on children’s out-of-home care, that influence was not uni-
formly strong and could be diluted by other organisational pressures.23
More specifically, this study adds to knowledge of the role of civil ser-
vants in these processes. Although high-level decisions about assisted 
migration policy and the administration of children’s out-of-home care 
were ultimately made by politicians, the day-to-day operation of the child 
migration schemes was over-seen and managed by civil servants in Britain 
and Australia. Politicians only usually became involved in more detailed 
policy discussions when they either involved serious concerns about child 
migrants’ welfare, substantial policy changes or parliamentary questions 
and debates. In practice, this meant that the evolution of policy on British 
child migration often took place through intra- or inter-departmental dis-
cussions between civil servants. By offering a fine-grained analysis of these 
policy interactions, this study in particular adds greater detail to the 
broader analysis of the working of the Home Office Children’s Department 
provided by previous studies.24
This book also seeks to contribute to the wider literature on the history 
of British child migration schemes. It provides the most extensive account 
yet published of the United Kingdom and Australian Commonwealth 
22 A similar argument has been developed in Julie Grier, ‘Voluntary rights’.
23 This book therefore seeks to develop a more complex understanding of the relationship 
between child psychology and the post-war welfare state than that provided by Nikolas Rose, 
Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Routledge, 1989). Although not 
directly discussed in this book, this history should also be understood as running in parallel 
to the development of ‘problem families’ policies, in which individuals such as Somerville 
Hastings, Mary Rosling and John Ross were also involved (see, e.g., John Welshman, ‘In 
search of the “problem family”: public health and social work in England and Wales, 
1940–70’, Social History of Medicine, 9(3), 1996, 447–65; Michael Lambert, “Problem fami-
lies” and the Post-War Welfare State in the North-West of England, 1943–74, PhD thesis, 
Lancaster University, awarded 30/03/2017.
24 See, for example, Griffiths, Central Government; Holman, Child-care Revisited.
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Government’s involvement in post-war child migration to Australia, add-
ing to existing historiography on British child migration that has focused 
on migration to Canada,25 Southern Rhodesia,26 the work of particular 
voluntary organisations,27 or more specific aspects or periods of policy and 
25 On British child migration schemes to Canada, see Joy Parr, Labouring Children: British 
Immigrant Apprentices to Canada, 1869–1924, 2nd edition (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1994); Roy Parker, Uprooted: The Shipment of Poor Children to Canada, 1867–1917 
(Bristol: Policy Press, 2010); Gillian Wagner, Children of the Empire (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1982); (ed) Phyllis Harrison, The Home Children: Their Personal Stories (Winnipeg: 
Gordon Shillingford, 1979); Patrick Dunae, ‘Gender, generations and social class: the 
Fairbridge Society and British Child Migration to Canada, 1930–1960’, in (eds) Jon 
Lawrence and Pat Starkey, Child Welfare and Social Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries: International Perspectives (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001), 
pp. 82–100, and Marion Diamond, Emigration and Empire: The Life of Maria S. Rye (New 
York: Garland, 1999). A number of references to the Prince of Wales farm school in British 
Columbia are also made in oral evidence about the work of the Fairbridge Society provided 
by Stephen Constantine to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (see Child 
Migration Programmes case study, Transcript of Day 12, 12 July 2017).
26 Katja Uusihakala, ‘Rescuing children, reforming the Empire: British child migration to 
colonial Southern Rhodesia’, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 2014, 22(3), 
273–87; and Ellen Boucher, ‘The limits of potential: race, welfare and the interwar extension 
of child migration to Southern Rhodesia’, Journal of British Studies, 48(4), 914–34. 
Comparatively little has been written about post-war child migration to New Zealand, 
although on this see oral evidence to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse by 
Gordon Lynch on the work of the Royal Over-Seas League (see Child Migration Programmes 
case study, Transcript of Day 11, 11 July 2017). Retrospective views of this scheme by former 
British child migrants to New Zealand were also presented in evidence submitted by the 
British Child Migrants Society (NZ) to the House of Commons Health Committee (see 
Health Committee, Third Report, The Welfare of Former British Child Migrants, Volume II: 
Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (London: HMSO, 1997–98).
27 Geoffrey Sherington and Chris Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, 
(Nedlands, WA: University of Western Australia Press, 1998); Marion Fox, ‘British child 
migrants in New South Wales Catholic Orphanages’, History of Education Review, 25(2), 
1996, 1–17; Barry Coldrey, ‘ “A charity which has outlived its usefulness”: the last phase of 
Catholic child migration, 1947–56’, History of Education, 25(4), 1996, 373–86; Barry 
Coldrey, ‘ “A strange mix of caring and corruption”: residential care in Christian Brothers 
orphanages and industrial schools during their last phase, 1940s to 1960s’, History of 
Education, 29(4), 2000, 343–55; Geofrey Sherington, ‘Fairbridge child migrants’ in Child 
Welfare and Social Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, pp. 53–81; and David 
Hill, The Forgotten Children: Fairbridge Farm School and its Betrayal of Britain’s Child 
Migrants to Australia (Sydney: Random House, 2007). See also Barry Coldrey, The Scheme: 
the Christian Brothers and Childcare in Western Australia (O’Connor, WA: Argyle-Pacific, 
1993). Coldrey’s volume has since attracted controversy, primarily because it later came to 
light that he had submitted a private document to the General Council of the Christian 
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practice.28 Through its discussion of the failings of religious organisations 
in their child-care work, it also seeks to demonstrate a shadow-side of reli-
gious involvement in post-war welfare systems that has not always received 
adequate attention in more positive historical and sociological accounts of 
religious welfare initiatives.29 A related undercurrent within the book, 
reflected in the growing tensions between Curtis standards of care and 
some religious organisations, is the increasing divergence between secular 
concepts of childhood well-being, grounded in broad principles of child 
psychology, and understandings of childhood that prioritised formation 
within particular religious denominations. The emerging tension between 
secular and religious conceptions of the child in the post-war period—
exemplified in diverging views of Curtis Committee members on the rela-
tive importance of religious formation within a particular 
denomination30—remains an important topic for further exploration and 
is one which I hope to return to in more detail in future.
The first part of this book sets out the policy context from which post- 
war child migration schemes to Australia emerged. Chapter 1 examines 
Brothers, titled ‘Reaping the Whirlwind’: The Christian Brothers and the Sexual Abuse of Boys 
1920 to 1994, in which he claimed to have intentionally minimised the extent of the sexual 
abuse of children at these Western Australian institutions in The Scheme.
28 Julie Grier, ‘Voluntary rights and statutory wrongs: the case of child migration, 
1948–76’, History of Education, 31(3), 263–80; Kathleen Paul, ‘Changing childhoods: child 
emigration since 1945’, in (eds) Jon Lawrence and Pat Starkey, Child Welfare and Social 
Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: International Perspectives (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2001), pp.  121–43; Stephen Constantine, ‘Waving goodbye? 
Australia, assisted passages, and the Empire and Commonwealth Settlement Acts, 1945–72’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 26(2), 1998, 176–95; Stephen Constantine, 
‘The British Government, child welfare and child migration to Australia after 1945’, Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 30(1), 2002, 99–132. For broader historical 
accounts, which offer less detailed discussions of the governance of British child migration to 
Australia see Boucher, Empire’s Children; Gordon Lynch, Remembering Child Migrants: 
Faith, Nation-Building and the Wounds of History (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); and 
Geoffrey Sherington, ‘ “Suffer little children”: British child migration as a study of journey-
ings between centre and periphery’, History of Education, 32(5), 2003, 461–76. On child 
migration from Scotland, see Lynn Abrams, The Orphan Country: Children of Scotland’s 
Broken Homes from 1845 to the Present Day (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1998), pp. 122–61.
29 See, for example, Frank Prochaska, Christianity and Social Service in Modern Britain: 
The Disinherited Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); (eds) Anders Backstrom, 
Grace Davie, Ninna Edgardh & Per Pettersson, Welfare and Religion in Twenty-First Century 
Europe: Configuring the Connections, Vol. 1 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).
30 See Report of the Care of Children Committee, cmd.6922 (London: HMSO, 1946), 
pp. 183–4.
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how the gradual growth of child migration work in the inter-war period 
was situated in a broader policy shift towards better co-ordinated and 
resourced imperial settlement, intended to promote more efficient use of 
the British Empire’s natural and human resources. Leading to the passing 
of the Empire Settlement Act in 1922, this policy emphasis created an 
environment in which child migration was initially seen as a small part of 
wider imperial settlement strategies compared to juvenile migration 
schemes which were expected to play a more significant role. With UK 
Government support for most child migration to Canada ending in 1925, 
interest in child migration to Australia began to grow. From 1928, the 
global economic depression was to have a major effect on assisted migra-
tion policy more generally. As the economies of British Dominions 
declined, and unemployment grew, it was no longer politically nor eco-
nomically sustainable for governments to fund adults or juveniles to travel 
overseas to Dominions in which the supply of paid employment was weak-
ening. A major re-evaluation of British assisted migration policy took 
place, through both the Empire Migration Committee of the Economic 
Advisory Council and an Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration 
Policy, in which the belief that assisted migration could stimulate the 
imperial economy was now rejected in favour of the recognition that 
imperial migration was a symptom, and not a driver, of economic growth. 
Whilst ambitions for co-ordinated approaches to adult and juvenile migra-
tion were scaled back, child migration came to be seen as one of the most 
sustainable forms of assisted migration. Children did not pose immediate 
demands on the Australian labour market and the costs of their overseas 
care would not be significantly greater than if they remained in the United 
Kingdom. Further opportunities to send child migrants opened up with 
new farm schools associated with the Fairbridge Society being built in 
Victoria and New South Wales, and approval also being given for children 
to be sent to institutions run by Catholic religious orders in Western 
Australia. By 1939, child migration programmes to Australia had become 
a well-established element in the migration policies of both the UK and 
Australian Commonwealth Governments.
Chapter 2 examines how, during the war years, the Dominions Office 
and UK High Commission in Canberra became far more aware of a range 
of problems in the delivery of child migration work than in the inter-war 
period. Although the Dominions Office had already become involved in 
the 1930s in growing tensions that had arisen in administrative relations 
between Fairbridge committees in London and Australia, a succession of 
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incidents were to raise doubts about several of the institutions to which 
British child migrants were being sent. In 1942, the UK High 
Commissioner, Sir Ronald Cross, sent the Dominions Office a report 
detailing a number of concerns that he had about the living conditions 
and organisational attitudes he had observed during a visit to the Christian 
Brothers’ farm school at Tardun. This was followed, a few months later, by 
a report from another member of staff at the UK High Commission, 
Walter Garnett, describing a series of problems at the Northcote farm 
school at Bacchus Marsh which were largely blamed on the out-going 
Principal. Whilst a follow-up report on Christian Brothers’ institutions in 
Western Australia by a State Government official was judged by Clement 
Attlee to have alleviated some immediate concerns about Tardun, the 
need for a further visit from the UK High Commission was accepted. 
Copies of correspondence about the Northcote farm school forwarded to 
the Dominions Office by the Fairbridge Society in London also revealed 
their knowledge of a range of problems at Northcote, including failures to 
provide regular reports on children sent there, since 1939. Later in 1943, 
the Fairbridge Society in London also raised concerns with the Dominions 
Office about reports about restrictive training and work opportunities 
being provided for child migrants sent to Pinjarra. A few months later, 
Fairbridge forwarded on a dossier detailing a range of criticisms that had 
been made about the Pinjarra’s management and which were supported 
by a critical independent report produced by a consultant, Caroline Kelly, 
for the Australian Commonwealth Government. Whilst Walter Garnett 
challenged many of the claims in the dossier, a fuller report that he pro-
duced in 1944 argued that significant improvements were required in the 
management, staffing, training and after-care at some institutions accom-
modating child migrants if these schemes were to resume successfully after 
the war. By 1945, the Dominions Office was coming to the view that in 
future Australian institutions receiving British child migrants would need 
to receive annual monitoring visits from an official at the UK High 
Commission, even if these were presented more as informal visits than 
formal inspections. Whilst concern was expressed about sending children 
to institutions over which the UK Government, or British voluntary 
organisations, could exercise little or no control, others suggested that to 
attempt control from the United Kingdom smacked of old colonialist atti-
tudes inappropriate to a new era of autonomous government in the 
Dominions. Despite much greater knowledge of the ways in which child 
migration programmes could fail children, and of the lack of effective 
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monitoring in the past, the presumption remained, however, that child 
migration still had a useful if limited role for the future.
Chapter 3 examines the significance of the 1946 Curtis report in shap-
ing the post-war policy landscape of children’s out-of-home care in which 
child migration to Australia was to resume. Arising both out of an aware-
ness within Government of the need to restructure a fragmented out-of- 
home care, and a successful public campaign by Marjorie Allen for an 
inquiry to examine standards in residential institutions, the Curtis report 
put forward a number of recommendations for reforming administrative 
systems that were subsequently implemented in the 1948 Children Act. 
Beyond its influence on the administration of children’s care, the Curtis 
report also offered a substantial review of standards across a range of resi-
dential institutions and foster homes. Whilst recognising that standards of 
material provision were, on the whole, reasonably good, the report was far 
more critical of standards of emotional care in residential homes. Drawing 
on popularised concepts from child psychology, particularly from Susan 
Isaacs, the report argued that too many institutions failed to offer children 
sufficient individual attention, security of affection or adequate resources 
to develop through play. With this in mind, it recommended that children 
in future be cared for in environments that resembled as closely as possible 
the ‘normal family home’, ideally through adoption or failing that through 
boarding out with foster carers. Where residential care continued to be 
used, this should not follow the model of the large, impersonal ‘barrack’ 
institution, but smaller grouped or scattered homes, with no more than 
ten children under the care of a ‘cottage mother’. Whilst aware of the 
existence of child migration schemes, the Curtis Committee chose only to 
receive evidence from central government departments with statutory 
responsibility for different forms of children’s out-of-home care, which 
did not include the Dominions Office. The Committee’s views on child 
migration were influenced by a memorandum from the Fairbridge Society 
which again raised the London Committee’s concern about the problems 
of sending children to institutions in Australia over which it had no con-
trol with regard to standards of care. Whilst giving qualified support to the 
resumption of child migration, the Curtis report emphasised a point made 
by the Fairbridge Society that child migrants sent overseas should not 
receive standards of care that were any lower than those which the report 
recommended should be implemented in England and Wales. Whilst 
ostensibly creating a policy framework in which greater attention would 
 G. LYNCH
17
be given to conditions in Australian receiving institutions, limitations in 
achieving this were to become apparent in the following years.
Part two of the book discusses the processes through which post-war 
child migration to Australia resumed, grew and gradually declined. 
Chapter 4 begins by examining how post-war child migration to Australia 
operated in the context of more ambitious policy goals for child migration 
by the Australian Commonwealth Government, which began to be devel-
oped during the war years. Whilst initially aiming to receive 50,000 British 
child migrants in the first three years after the war, these plans were scaled 
down both in the light of reduced expectations of the numbers of children 
likely to be available for migration and a realisation about the cost of 
building new cottage-home style accommodation under State Government 
control. Whilst child migration was still seen as one important means of 
resisting an anticipated demographic decline in the Australian population 
through the middle decades of the twentieth century, a less expensive 
solution was found by funding the expansion of existing residential insti-
tutions run by voluntary organisations. In the context of this stronger 
interest from the Australian Commonwealth Government, several volun-
tary organisations in Britain and Australia sought to begin or to scale up 
their child migration work. Through a somewhat chaotic planning pro-
cess, the first parties of post-war British child migrants began to arrive in 
Australia in the autumn and winter of 1947, facilitated by a visit by the 
Commonwealth Minister of Immigration, Arthur Calwell, to Britain that 
summer. Around this time, the Home Office, recently identified as the 
lead central government department for children’s out-of-home care, 
began to involve itself more in policy discussions about expected standards 
for child migration work in the light of the Curtis report. Based on very 
limited knowledge, however, the Home Office’s initial interventions were 
treated sceptically by Walter Garnett at the UK High Commission in 
Canberra where they were seen as uncritically mirroring the views of the 
Fairbridge Society in London and adding little to his report in 1944. Poor 
communication between what had become the Commonwealth Relations 
Office and the Home Office meant that the latter had little initial involve-
ment in decisions about the approval of a growing number of residential 
institutions in Australia wishing to receive British child migrants. With 
two years elapsing before any inspection reports by Australian officials 
were forwarded to the UK High Commission, British child migrants were 
in some cases sent to institutions that were ill-prepared to receive them. By 
1949, however, the Home Office was becoming better informed about 
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the organisational systems through which child migration programmes 
operated and making more sustained efforts to influence Australian policy 
in line with Curtis standards. Whilst managing a complex array of admin-
istrative reforms and expanded responsibilities, its Children’s Department 
appeared confident of its ability to develop more effective controls over 
child migration and the process of drafting regulations for the child migra-
tion work of voluntary organisations under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act 
was begun.
Chapter 5 examines how the process of drafting these s.33 regulations 
developed in the context of growing criticisms of the resumption of child 
migration from some professional and political organisations. Beginning 
with initial discussions of the principles for these regulations with its new 
Advisory Council on Child-Care in the spring of 1949, the Home Office 
Children’s Department oversaw a slow consultation process on these draft 
regulations which took almost three years until the Advisory Council were 
presented with an initial draft for their approval. The sensitivity of these 
regulations was demonstrated both by a defensive reaction to them from 
both the Australian Commonwealth Department of Immigration and the 
UK High Commission in Canberra as well the creation of a new body, the 
Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, intended to 
provide voluntary organisations with a stronger representative voice in this 
process. Whilst formally approving the vast majority of the proposed regu-
lations, some constituent members of the Council were far more con-
cerned about whether such regulations might effectively curtail their child 
migration work and the Children’s Department continued to take the 
view that relations with the Council’s members required careful handling. 
More problematic for the drafting process was advice from Government 
legal officers that, whilst in some respects contradictory, broadly indicated 
that it would be impossible for the UK Government to introduce regula-
tions that would bear directly on standards of care received by British child 
migrants after they had arrived overseas. This advice increasingly created 
doubts within the Home Office as to whether the draft regulations would 
have any practical benefit in protecting child migrants’ welfare overseas 
and serve only to create unnecessary additional administrative work. 
Another significant factor influencing this process was the production of a 
report on the systems and standards of child migration to Australia by a 
former member of the Curtis Committee, John Moss. With the Home 
Office still only having relatively limited information about receiving insti-
tutions for child migrants in Australia, the suggestion made by Moss in the 
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summer of 1950 that he combine a personal holiday in Australia with visits 
to receiving institutions was welcomed by the Children’s Department. 
Although initially intended by the Home Office as a low-key, informal 
information-gathering exercise, Moss’s tour attracted growing publicity 
and he began to insert himself into policy debates in which he had no 
formal role. When he eventually presented the Home Office with a broadly 
positive report on child migration to Australia in the summer of 1952, in 
which he recommended further expansion of this work, the Home Office 
had little choice but to agree to arrange for its publication in some form. 
Although Moss’s report attracted comparatively little public interest, its 
suggestions for future policy improvements were broadly endorsed by the 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration, keen to demonstrate its 
willingness to respond to feedback that would enable this work to con-
tinue and grow. With the Home Office Children’s Department reassured 
that Moss’s comments indicated that child migration was working well 
enough, and signs of Australian willingness for further improvements, the 
Home Office took the view that the s.33 regulations were not urgently 
needed and that a policy of gradual, moral persuasion was likely to be 
more productive.
Chapter 6 examines how the optimism of supporters of child migration 
for further expansion of this work in the wake of the Moss report proved 
short-lived. By 1954, the Commonwealth Department of Immigration 
was becomingly increasingly unhappy with the limited numbers of child 
migrants arriving from the United Kingdom given the financial invest-
ment it had made in expanding residential institutions to accommodate 
them, as well as with the ‘quality’ of many of the children sent in the origi-
nal migration parties of 1947. Prospects for increasing the numbers of 
child migrants being sent faced the obstacle of opposition from most local 
authority Children’s Officers, who took the view that it was not a suitable 
option for the vast majority of children in their care. Despite numbers of 
child migrants being sent from the United Kingdom beginning to fall, the 
mid-1950s saw an increasingly intense policy discussion about assisted 
child migration between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home 
Office. Periodic inter-departmental reviews of the wider post-war policy of 
assisted migration to Australia had demonstrated that whilst there was 
limited strategic benefit to the United Kingdom in continuing to contrib-
ute financially to its citizens’ emigration to Australia, a complete with-
drawal of financial support risked a strongly critical response from the 
Australian Commonwealth Government. Assisted child migration, which 
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constituted a comparatively small part of the wider assisted migration bud-
get, could, it was suggested, be continued as a symbolic expression of 
commitment to Anglo-Australian relations whilst the larger budget was 
substantially reduced. A further review of this policy in 1954 led to a con-
sensus position between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home 
Office that further improvements were needed in the care of British child 
migrants in Australia, but that these were best addressed through a process 
of gradual reform rather than any more sudden policy intervention. 
Although it was hoped that this policy could be endorsed and imple-
mented through periodic reports on assisted migration by the government 
advisory body, the Oversea Migration Board, support for child migration 
amongst some of its members delayed this process. The Board was eventu-
ally manoeuvred into proposing that a formal fact-finding mission be sent 
to Australia. When the mission, led by the former head of the Children’s 
Department, John Ross, undertook its work in the spring of 1956, it 
returned a far more critical view of receiving institutions than that given by 
Moss and recommended stronger policy interventions that would have 
made it easier to prevent continued migration of children to a number of 
specific institutions. Fearing the political consequences of the mission’s 
work, and sceptical of the practical value of its proposals for tighter con-
trols, the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office agreed to 
return to the policy of gradual reform, introducing new unofficial inspec-
tions of sending organisations’ work the following year. Whilst events 
around the mission’s work had demonstrated that the Australian 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration was prepared to tolerate 
standards of child-care very different to those advocated in the Curtis 
report, UK Government officials were unable to find a way of addressing 
this policy challenge. Instead, their hope increasingly became that child 
migration would wind down over time through falling numbers of avail-
able children.
Chapter 7 reviews this history and considers the underlying factors 
within the UK Government which led to post-war child migration to 
Australia resuming and continuing against the grain of child-care stan-
dards reflected in the Curtis report. Supporting the argument that such 
policy failures are best understood multi-causally, factors identified include 
the competing timetables and priorities of policy agendas for assisted 
migration and children’s out-of-home care, civil servants’ unwillingness to 
stray into the policy remits of other government departments, policy- 
makers’ perceptions of the limits of their power, the influence of prece-
dence on policy decisions, caution about provoking overt conflict with 
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other organisational stakeholders and the persistence of beliefs about a 
policy’s value despite contradictory evidence. Each of these factors con-
tributed to policy processes in which effective policy interventions were 
delayed and deferred. Although the largest numbers of unaccompanied 
child migrants sailed to Australia over little more than a ten-year period, 
from 1947 until the end of the 1950s, the slow and ineffectual process of 
managing these programmes allowed them to persist over a period of time 
which could constitute an individual’s entire childhood. Much recent 
work on historic abuses of human rights and transitional justice has tended 
to focus on contexts in which rights were violated as a matter of conscious 
policy, or regarded with indifference as acceptable damage in the pursuit 
of other policy goals. The case of the UK child migration schemes to 
Australia shows how, in other cases, vulnerable individuals can be exposed 
to considerable harm in contexts where policy-makers can both express 
concern about their welfare whilst perpetuating a system that harms it. 
Whilst this book therefore seeks to contribute to our understanding of the 
specific history of child migration from the United Kingdom to Australia, 
it also offers insights into the harmful effects of failures in policy systems 
that may prove relevant to a wider range of cases in which governments 
fail their vulnerable citizens.
Although the following chapters provide the most substantial available 
account of policy processes within the UK Government concerning 
assisted child migration to Australia, they do not complete our under-
standing of the history of these programmes.31 Better understanding of 
the organisational conditions through which child migrants experienced 
trauma in institutional care will also be possible through work that situates 
children’s experience of life in residential institutions in both the history 
and social dynamics of specific institutions as well as the wider systems and 
policy context within which they operated.32 Comparatively little has been 
31 Given the focus of this book on UK Government policy discussions, attention is not paid 
here to the same degree to the policy and administrative systems through which an estimated 
310 Maltese child migrants arrived in Australia between 1950 and 1965 (see, e.g., Australian 
Senate Community Affairs Committee, Lost Innocents, 2.120–2.131)
32 This is an issue productively considered by the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Abuse of Children in Queensland Institution and Hill, Forgotten Children; see also Lynch, 
Possible Collusion Between Individuals Alleged to Have Sexually Abused Boys at Four Christian 
Brothers’ Institutions in Western Australia, 1947–1965: A Secondary Analysis of Material 
Collated by Historical Abuse Inquiries, independent report uploaded to Kent Academic 
Repository, 12 December 2019, accessible at https://kar.kent.ac.uk/79274/.
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published from material in Australian State archives on how child migrants’ 
experiences were shaped through the relationships that existed between 
receiving organisations and immigration officials, child welfare officers 
and politicians of the State Governments responsible for over-seeing and 
part-funding their work. As many former child migrants come to the end 
of their lives, this work may become the concern of a new generation, keen 
to understand a history that continues to speak to the ways in which soci-
eties can fail vulnerable members through welfare initiatives which claim 
to improve their lives.
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CHAPTER 2
‘The Risk Involved is Inappreciable… 
and the Gain Exceptional’: Child Migration 
to Australia and Empire Settlement Policy, 
1913–1939
The decision by the UK and Australian Commonwealth Governments to 
support the post-war resumption of child migration to Australia built on 
what had already become a growing field of collaboration between 
government and voluntary organisations before the outbreak of war.
Although child migration work to Australia had taken place on a small 
scale in the nineteenth century,1 the practice of sending child migrants to 
farm schools and other forms of residential institutions began with the 
opening of the Pinjarra farm school in Western Australia by Kingsley 
Fairbridge in 1913.2 After experiencing a series of financial crises, in 1920 
Pinjarra became the first institution of its kind to receive direct financial 
support from the UK Government as a result of Fairbridge’s prodigious 
networking and personal contacts, including with the then Under- 
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, Leo Amery.3
1 See, for example, Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration 
Programmes Investigation Report, p.65.
2 Although an important advocate of the farm school model, previous initiatives had been 
undertaken in both Canada and Australia to establish farm schools for juvenile migrants, see 
Parker, Uprooted; also Sherington and Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, 
pp. 46–7. On early correspondence with the UK Government about the work of the Child 
Emigration Society and the Pinjarra farm school, see TNA: MH102/1400.
3 Sherington and Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, pp. 45–85.
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The slow expansion of child migration work to Australia from this point 
on took place in the wider context of greater integration of imperial migra-
tion policies by the UK Government. This was informed by substantial 
work undertaken between 1912 and 1917 by the Dominions Royal 
Commission in assessing how the human and natural resources of the 
United Kingdom and its five self-governing Dominions could best be 
developed.4 The Royal Commission fully endorsed child and juvenile 
migration as the most advantageous forms of emigration for supporting 
the future development of Britain’s overseas Dominions, given the ‘youth 
and adaptability’ of such migrants. The ‘risk involved’ in such schemes, it 
claimed, ‘is inappreciable, and the gain exceptional’.5 Moreover, the 
Commission argued in its final report that there was scope for far more 
active encouragement for the emigration of those children amongst the 
estimated 35,000 healthy, orphaned and deserted children over five years 
of age who were now in the care of Poor Law authorities, as well as 
amongst the 200,000 children receiving some form of Poor Law assis-
tance for whom parental consent to their migration would be needed.6 
Given this large pool of potential child migrants, the Commission noted 
with disappointment that the annual total of Poor Law children being 
emigrated between the years 1909 and 1913 never exceeded more than a 
few hundred.7 Their criticism of the ‘certain want of imagination’ on the 
part of local Boards of Guardians was to be echoed later in the post-war 
period in complaints by advocates of child migration about the lack of 
understanding within many local authorities of the benefits of emigration 
of children in their care. The Royal Commission concluded that financial 
and administrative arrangements for child migration should be reviewed 
to encourage greater emigration of children, whilst the well-established 
4 See Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and Legislation 
of Certain Portions of His Majesty’s Dominions, cmd.8462, London: HMSO, 1917. On the 
significance of debates between policies of Imperial Preference and free trade as a major 
dividing line in UK national politics in the opening decades of the twentieth century, see, 
e.g., David Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History, 
London: Allen Lane, pp. 10–18.
5 Final Report of the Royal Commission, para 508. On subsequent developments with juve-
nile migration programmes in the inter-war period, see Marjory Harper, Emigration from 
Scotland Between the Wars (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), pp. 157–94.
6 Final Report of the Royal Commission, paras 483–508.
7 Final Report of the Royal Commission, paras 494–495, which show the largest number of 
Poor Law children emigrated in that period to be 617 in 1911.
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model of child migration to Canada should also be extended to Australia 
and New Zealand.8
The Royal Commission’s calls for greater administrative and strategic 
co-ordination of emigration led, in 1919, to the creation of the Oversea 
Settlement Committee which took on both responsibility for the develop-
ment of emigration policy and the allocation of Government funding to 
support it. Under the auspices of the Committee, Viscount Milner and 
Leo Amery convened a discussion with representatives of the Canadian, 
Australian and New Zealand Governments of proposals for the financial 
support of emigration from the United Kingdom within a wider strategy 
of both securing the Dominions and encouraging the development of 
imperial trade.9 It was agreed that assisted migration to the Dominions 
was to be encouraged not to address short-term problems with unemploy-
ment in Britain, but as an element of a wider strategy of encouraging pri-
mary production (particularly of agricultural goods) in order to sustain 
greater economic development and trade within the Empire as well as 
ensuring the most effective use of the imperial labour-force. A provisional 
agreement was reached that the UK Government would establish a sus-
tained policy of assisted migration supported by spending of up to 
£2,000,000 in any given year, with these funds to be allocated to encour-
aging land settlement in the Dominions, more general assisted passages 
for emigration or any other migration scheme that appeared worthy of 
support. Supporting agricultural development in the Dominions was seen 
as particularly valuable as this would be required by any future substantial 
expansion of the Dominions’ secondary industries. Encouraging settle-
ment in rural areas also had the advantage of avoiding rapid increases in 
migration to urban areas which would add competition for limited hous-
ing and jobs and create friction with the Dominions’ organised labour 
movements.
Ratified by the 1921 Prime Ministers’ Conference,10 this arrangement 
was formalised through the passing of the 1922 Empire Settlement Act. 
8 Final Report of the Royal Commission, para 497.
9 Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions 
and India, held in June, July and August, 1921: Summary of Proceedings and Documents, 
cmd. 1474, London: HMSO, 1921, pp. 59–63.
10 Conference of Prime Ministers: Summary of Proceedings and Documents, pp. 8–9. In rati-
fying this agreement, the South African Government indicated that the lack of need for white 
labour in South Africa meant that it was unlikely to participate in this arrangement in this 
form which seemed more suited to the needs of Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
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Presented to the House of Commons by Leo Amery, the Act was a short 
piece of legislation that empowered the Secretary of State, in conjunction 
with Dominion Governments and other approved organisations, to 
develop and fund schemes for assisted emigration. With such funding 
remaining subject to financial agreement from the Treasury, the UK 
Government’s financial contribution was not allowed by the Act to exceed 
half of the total expenses of the scheme. The initial funding to be provided 
for these schemes by the UK Government in 1922 was to not exceed 
£1,500,000 or £3,000,000 in subsequent years, and the commitment to 
provide this funding extended only for a period of 15 years from the pass-
ing of the Act, subject to further renewal of the legislation. The assump-
tion from the 1921 Prime Minister’s Conference was, however, that such 
renewals of the Act should occur as empire settlement was to be regarded 
as a permanent policy in support of the social and economic development 
of the empire and not simply as a policy tool for managing short-term 
needs within the United Kingdom. Despite its slow initial effects,11 the 
numbers of assisted passages funded by the Act had grown to several tens 
of thousands by the mid-1920s and the Act (and its successor legislation) 
became the legislative means through which the UK Government contin-
ued to give financial support for child migration through to the 1970s.
In the wake of this new funding arrangement, and slow initial progress 
in increasing rates of imperial emigration through it, the Oversea 
Settlement Committee sent a delegation to Australia and New Zealand in 
1923–1924 to review existing arrangements for the settlement of British 
emigrants and to consider how the aims of the Empire Settlement Act 
might best be conducted in the future. Led by Sir William Windham, for-
merly of the Ministry of Labour, the delegation produced reports for each 
country in which some attention was paid to issues of child and juvenile 
migration.12
11 Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the year ended 31st December, 1923, 
cmd.2107, London: HMSO, pp. 4–5.
12 Report to the President of the Oversea Settlement Committee from the Delegation appointed 
to enquire into conditions affecting British Settlers in New Zealand, Oversea Settlement 
Delegation to New Zealand, cmd.2167, London: HMSO, 1923, especially pp.  10–13, 
29–31, and pp. 28–29 on consultation with organised labour; Report to the President of the 
Oversea Settlement Committee from the Delegation Appointed to Enquire into Conditions 
affecting British Settlers in Australia, British Oversea Settlement Delegation to Australia, 




With regard to New Zealand, the delegation noted that whilst there 
were few current schemes in existence, excellent prospects potentially 
existed for juvenile migrants and there was clear evidence of interest in 
organisations and individuals wanting to provide agricultural apprentice-
ships. No form of government assistance for child migration was currently 
available, although the delegation did visit a Salvation Army farm school 
that had recently received 20 children from the United Kingdom. 
However, recognising the economic difficulties in encouraging land set-
tlement given currently inflated land values, the delegation made no spe-
cific recommendations for the extension of these schemes.
By contrast, Australia offered far better prospects for juvenile emigra-
tion. Although the delegation recommended that care needed to be taken 
to ensure that any land settlement initiatives proceeded on an economi-
cally sustainable basis, it saw considerable potential for young people even-
tually being able to set up their own farms if given suitable agricultural 
training on arrival. Furthermore, well-established schemes to train boys 
over school-leaving age in farm work such as the Dreadnought Trust were 
already in existence, well supported in Australia and were judged to be 
achieving good results in producing future Australian citizens. The dele-
gation also visited Fairbridge’s farm school at Pinjarra, which was by now 
receiving on-going maintenance grants from the United Kingdom, 
Australian Commonwealth and Western Australian State Governments. 
Whilst warmly commending its work, the delegation expressed doubt that 
the costs and subsidies required for this form of training institution for 
children would make it a practical model to be developed on any large 
scale in the future. Alongside its emphasis on the value of juvenile migra-
tion schemes for giving young emigrants from Britain the chance to learn 
new skills and establish themselves in work, the delegation also acknowl-
edged the potential risk that some might be placed with unsatisfactory or 
exploitative employers. Whilst recognising that some safeguards had been 
put in place, the delegation nevertheless recommended that further steps 
should be made to ensure more regular and effective inspections to check 
their progress and welfare.
In 1924, another Oversea Settlement Committee delegation was sent 
to Canada by James Thomas, the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the 
short-lived minority Labour Government, in response to an invitation 
from the Government of Canada to obtain first-hand information about 
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the system for sending and placing child migrants in Canada.13 Led by the 
Northampton MP, and influential trade unionist, Margaret Bondfield, the 
delegation sailed to Canada in September 1924 and arrived back in early 
November, by which time MacDonald’s Government had fallen and 
Bondfield had lost her seat in the ensuing general election. As with the 
Windham delegation reports, the Bondfield report supported the view 
that emigration could offer good prospects overseas for young people, 
whether or not they ultimately remained in agricultural work, and broadly 
regarded the current system as satisfactory. However, whilst the Bondfield 
delegation generally found that child migrants were well-treated in the 
private homes in which they were placed, it noted some cases where chil-
dren were being expected to undertake more work for the household than 
was reasonable. Furthermore, it expressed concern that younger children 
were, in principle, less able to resist having their labour exploited, and 
educational opportunities curtailed, because of their greater dependence 
on the adults entrusted with their care. As a result it recommended that no 
further support should be given by the UK Government to the emigration 
of children under school-leaving age—unless for children emigrating for 
the purposes of adoption in Canada—but that the emigration of children 
over the school-leaving age of 14 should be actively encouraged.
The Bondfield report was somewhat different in tone to the Windham 
reports on emigration to New Zealand and Australia. Bondfield did not 
evaluate the benefits of child migration to Canada in terms of a wider 
framework of imperial trade and development, but only in terms of the 
benefits to the child themselves, arguably reflecting her long-standing 
concern with individual’s experiences of their working conditions. By 
comparison, the Windham reports, whilst interested in the value and risks 
of migration to young people as individuals, understood this more explic-
itly in terms of wider national and imperial needs. When meeting teenage 
migrants in Australia who complained about the relatively better wages 
earned by other young people not working in agriculture, the Windham 
delegation was at pains to remind them that ‘they were not required in 
Australia for positions of this kind, but only for work on the land, and that 
13 Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, President of the Oversea Settlement 
Committee, from the Delegation Appointed to obtain information regarding the System of Child 
Migration and Settlement in Canada, British Oversea Delegation to Canada, cmd.2285, 
London: HMSO, 1924, especially pp. 9,11–13, 16–17. A Parliamentary Secretary at the 
time to the Minister for Labour, Bondfield was appointed to lead this delegation in her 
capacity as a member of the Oversea Settlement Committee.
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they must fulfil the obligation into which they had entered to undertake 
that work’.14
Despite these differences, the Bondfield and Windham reports never-
theless shared both a recognition of the value of emigration for young 
people and of their potential vulnerability. Given that there was no immi-
nent prospect of significant demand for the increased migration of chil-
dren under school-leaving age to Australia and New Zealand, and juvenile 
migration was considered a more important priority by the Windham and 
Bondfield reports, the policy adjustment of no longer supporting the 
migration of children under school-leaving age to Canada was not consid-
ered to be a contentious one by the Oversea Settlement Committee. As 
the in-coming Conservative Government’s successor to Thomas as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery duly accepted this recom-
mendation in 1925.15 The Canadian Government concurred, conceding 
to a growing campaign against child migration in Canada itself.16 Although 
the figure of 1407 children under 14 that Bondfield reported to have been 
migrated to Canada in 1923 was not insignificant, the Committee took 
the view that the majority of child migrants were now being sent around 
the age of 14 anyway and that any numbers lost through ending support 
for migration under the age of 14 could be compensated for by increased 
juvenile migration in the future.17 Bondfield’s recommendation that no 
further Government funding be provided to support farm schools, given 
14 Report to the President of the Oversea Settlement Committee from the Delegation Appointed 
to Enquire into Conditions affecting British Settlers in Australia, p. 75. The Bondfield Report 
was, by contrast, more relaxed at the prospect of young migrants choosing not to remain in 
agricultural work and drifting towards urban occupations.
15 See Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the year ended 31st December 1924, 
cmd. 2107, London: HMSO, p. 8, in which it is noted that Amery made this decision in 
consultation with the Oversea Settlement Committee and with the agreement of the 
Canadian Dominion Government. Although there were criticisms being made at that time of 
child migration by some organisations in Canada (see, e.g., ‘Canada’s Child Immigrants: 
Grave Charges’, The Manchester Guardian, 12th March 1925, p. 9), Bondfield’s report did 
not generally support these and she herself offered a robust response to them (see ‘Canada’s 
child immigrants’, letter to editor from Margaret Bondfield, The Manchester Guardian, 14th 
March 1925, p. 7).
16 Patrick Dunae, ‘Gender, generations and social class: the Fairbridge Society and British 
child migration to Canada, 1930-1960’, in (eds.) J. Lawrence and P. Starkey, Child Welfare 
and Social Action in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: International Perspectives, 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1989, p. 87.
17 Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the year ended 31st December 1924, p. 8.
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the lack of evidence for their benefits for young emigrants’ employment 
prospects, was not however taken up.
The decision to end Government funding for the future migration of 
children under school-leaving age to Canada, whilst maintaining it for 
children to be sent to Fairbridge’s Pinjarra farm school, might appear 
inconsistent. However, Bondfield’s main objection to the migration of 
younger children related to their vulnerability to being over-worked or 
being taken out of school to undertake household labour. These concerns 
were not assumed to apply to the Fairbridge scheme in which agricultural 
work and training was ostensibly integrated into the farm school’s educa-
tional curriculum and to which the Windham Delegation had given its 
endorsement. Amery’s personal sympathies for Fairbridge’s work may 
doubtless have also helped. On the basis of the evidence it received from 
these delegations, there were therefore no strong grounds for arguing that 
Bondfield’s concerns should lead to the cessation of child migration to 
Pinjarra—not least because there was little expectation on the Oversea 
Settlement Committee’s part at that stage that child migration to Australia 
would grow much beyond Fairbridge’s experimental project in Western 
Australia.18 The fact that, prior to the Bondfield delegation visit, agree-
ments had already been made by the United Kingdom Government under 
the terms of the Empire Settlement Act to contribute to the cost of pas-
sages and overseas maintenance for child migrants in Canada and Pinjarra, 
also created a precedent which made financial support for other Australian 
schemes possible.19
The InTer-war expansIon of ChIld MIgraTIon 
To ausTralIa
The early death of Kingsley Fairbridge in 1924, at the age of 39, could 
have brought this nascent experiment in child migration to Australia to an 
end. By this point, however, the Child Emigration Society that he had co- 
founded whilst a Rhodes scholar at Oxford had well-established committees 
18 See Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the year ended 31st December, 1923, 
p. 9 which recorded that Australian authorities currently regarded juvenile migration as more 
suited to local needs and resources than child migration schemes.
19 See Report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, President of the Oversea Settlement 
Committee, from the Delegation Appointed to obtain information regarding the System of Child 
Migration and Settlement in Canada, p. 3.
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in both London and Western Australia with strong connections to 
politicians and other influential figures in public life (including Geoffrey 
Dawson, who was to serve as the editor of The Times from 1923 to 1941).20 
With more secure funding and governance,21 and the powerful symbolic 
narrative of a founder who had given his life to his vision of saving British 
children for the sake of the Empire,22 the Child Emigration Society 
(renamed Fairbridge Farm Schools Incorporated in 1935) was to become 
a substantial charity, soon enjoying the active support of members of the 
Royal Family. In addition to strong public support from the Prince of 
Wales, and an enthusiastic visit to Pinjarra from the Duke and Duchess of 
York, Fairbridge’s work was also endorsed by Prince Henry who, as Duke 
of Gloucester, subsequently became the charity’s President by 1938.23
The development of the Pinjarra farm school had, by that point, also 
been made more secure by the decision in 1923 by Dr Barnardo’s Homes 
to begin sending child migrants there, following initial difficulties 
Barnardo’s experienced with placing child migrants with its recently 
established branch in New South Wales.24 This collaboration was further 
consolidated by the implementation of Bondfield’s recommendation to 
end UK Government support for the migration of children under 14 to 
Canada, a decision against which Dr Barnardo’s Homes had protested. By 
the mid-1920s, half of the children resident at Pinjarra had been sent there 
by Dr Barnardo’s Homes, with Barnardo’s continuing to send at least a 
20 Under Dawson’s editorship, The Times, printed a range of letters and articles in support 
of the Fairbridge Farm Schools, including the leader articles, ‘British children for Australia’, 
in The Times, 12th June 1930, p. 15, and ‘Children of the Farm School’, The Times, 22nd June 
1933, p. 15.
21 See copies of Empire Settlement Act funding agreements between the UK Secretary of 
State for Dominion Affairs and the Child Migration Society dating from 1923 in NAA.C: 
A659.1945.1.511.
22 See, e.g., the preface and epilogue written by Leo Amery and Sir Arthur Lawley, respec-
tively, to Kingsley Fairbridge, The Autobiography of Kingsley Fairbridge, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1927; also Sherington & Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child 
Migration, p. 167.
23 See, e.g., ‘Prince of Wales and Child Emigrants’, The Times, 9th November 1923, p. 9; 
Prince Henry’s attendance and speech at a lunch hosted by the Society in 1924 (Fairbridge 
Farm Schools: Child Emigration Society, Annual Report, 1924, BL: 362.732 FAI); ‘Australia 
Day: Prince of Wales on Empire Settlement’, The Times, 27th January 1926, p. 8; ‘The Royal 
Tour: Visit to Fairbridge Farm School’, The Times, 20th May 1927, p. 14; Duke of York’s 
statement in support of Fairbridge (Fairbridge Farm Schools: Child Emigration Society, 
Annual Report, 1927, BL: 362.732 FAI).
24 Sherington & Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, pp. 109–111.
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third of those arriving at the farm school between 1925 and 1930.25 From 
1925, two other sending bodies in Britain who had previously been 
involved in the emigration of children under school-leaving age to Canada 
began sending children to Pinjarra as well: the Church of England Waifs 
and Stray Society26 and Middlemore Homes in Birmingham (which later 
began to operate as a national reception centre for children before their 
migration to Fairbridge farm schools).27 The Over-Seas League also began 
to support the Fairbridge Society’s work, initially sponsoring a child to be 
sent to Pinjarra and later (after its own direct involvement in sending child 
migrants overseas ended in the mid-1950s) continuing regularly to donate 
funds to support Fairbridge’s work.28
New organisations that were later to engage in child migration work 
also began to be created in response to empire settlement policies. In 
1923, the Oversea Settlement Committee had recommended that impe-
rial emigration could be increased by greater liaison between overseas 
organisations, who would propose group nominations for immigrants 
whom they would support or help to find work, and organisations in the 
United Kingdom who could publicise and recruit emigrants for these 
opportunities.29 Whilst some voluntary organisations had overseas affili-
ates with whom they could collaborate in this way, the trans-national 
nature of Christian denominations meant that churches were particularly 
well-placed to undertake this work. In response to a direct appeal from 
Dominions Governments, the Church Assembly of the Church of England 
25 See Sherington & Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, pp. 10–131, where 
the total number of children sent by Dr Barnardo’s Homes to Pinjarra between 1925 and 
1930 is said to be 116. John Lane, Fairbridge Kid, South Fremantle: Fremantle Press, 1990, 
provides an autobiographical account of the author’s experience of Pinjarra farm school hav-
ing been sent there by Barnardo’s in 1933.
26 See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes 
Investigation Report, London: IICSA, 2018, p. 98.
27 Sherington & Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, p. 134. Other child-care 
organisations involved in sending very small numbers of children to Pinjarra around this time 
included the Manchester and Salford Boys and Girls Refuge and Homes, and the Whinwell 
Children’s Home in Stirling.
28 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programme, transcript 
of Day 13 hearing, 13th July 2017, pp. 97–99.
29 Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the year ended 31st December, 1923, 
pp. 7–8. The Committee credited this proposal to Major Cyril Bavin, who at that point was 




proposed that a new body, the Church of England Council of Empire 
Settlement, be created to publicise and select people for opportunities for 
emigration. Established in 1925, initially through voluntary subscriptions, 
the Council quickly expanded its work and by 1928 a substantial majority 
of its income came from funding from the UK Government through the 
Empire Settlement Act, as well as from Dominions Governments.30 Whilst 
supporting the emigration of families and single, adult workers, the 
Council also became significantly involved in juvenile emigration as well.31
Concerned at the risk to the faith of Catholics who might emigrate 
through non-Catholic bodies such as the Church of England Council who 
might take little interest in placing them near Catholic churches or priests, 
the Archbishop of Westminster, Francis Bourne, initiated the formation of 
the Catholic Emigration Society in 1927.32 Although lukewarm about the 
value of the emigration of Catholic adults and families from the United 
Kingdom, Bourne argued that such a body was necessary to safeguard the 
Catholic faith of those who would inevitably be drawn to the prospects 
offered by emigration. Focusing on supporting adult and family emigra-
tion, the Catholic Emigration Society was meant to complement the work 
of the Catholic Emigration Association, originally formed in 1904, to co- 
ordinate Catholic child and juvenile migration. In the wake of growing 
tensions between these two bodies, however, discussions began about 
integrating them into a single Catholic Emigration Council in 1935, with 
the Catholic Hierarchy in England and Wales finally approving this in 
October 1938 to form the Catholic Council for British Overseas 
Settlement.33 Child migration work undertaken by the Council was to be 
under the exclusive control of its Children’s Sub-Committee which would 
be made up of representatives from all of the diocesan child rescue societ-
ies in England and Wales, making its membership the same as that of the 
Catholic Child Welfare Council.
30 See, e.g., Annual Reports of the Church of England Council of Empire Settlement, CERC: 
CECES-2.
31 On the complementary work being done by the Church of England Immigration 
Council in Australia in this period, which also received some core funding from the Australian 
Commonwealth Government, see NAA.C: CP211.2.3.104.
32 See Appeal brochure for the Catholic Emigration Society, 1927, ABA.
33 See circular letter from Griffin to bishops, 6th January 1939, ABA; also Griffin to 
Wiseman, 3rd July 1939, enclosing the new constitution of the Catholic Council for British 
Overseas Settlement, TNA: DO35/691/1.
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Whilst continuing to send children to Pinjarra, Dr Barnardo’s Homes 
subsequently opened its own farm school at Mowbray Park, Picton, in 
New South Wales in 1929.34 The UK Government had previously contrib-
uted to the capital development costs of the Pinjarra farm school through 
a £20,000 grant to the Child Emigration Society in 1920. Following this 
precedent, between 1930 and 1939, a total of around £7500 was loaned 
to Dr Barnardo’s Homes by the UK Government under the terms of the 
Empire Settlement Act to support the initial construction and subsequent 
development and expansion of the Picton site.35 Empire Settlement Act 
funding was also provided to cover maintenance costs of child migrants at 
Picton.36 The capital funding was granted on the condition that the site 
would only be used to receive child migrants from the United Kingdom, 
a condition only temporarily suspended between 1944 and 1946 when the 
Dominions Office allowed Barnardo’s to admit Australian children to the 
farm school until child migration had resumed.
By 1931, the global economic depression was having significant effects 
on imperial emigration.37 Rising unemployment and the slump in the mar-
ket for agricultural products in the Dominions led to their Governments 
introducing more stringent immigration controls and substantially reduc-
ing their support for assisted migration.38 Following a review of Pinjarra 
farm school by its Development and Migration Commission that ques-
tioned its cost-effectiveness as a migration scheme, the Australian 
Commonwealth Government also considered whether it could continue 
to contribute to Pinjarra’s on-going costs, not least because other 
organisations including the Catholic Church and Salvation Army were 
pressing for comparable funding.39 In 1932 the Commonwealth 
34 On Dr Barnardo’s Homes’ child migration activities in the inter-war years, see also June 
Rose, For the Sake of the Children (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1978), pp.  105–11, 
which includes an account of one girl’s emigration to Australia against her wishes.
35 A summary of these agreements is provided in Memorandum to Clayden, 17th July 
1959, TNA: DO35/10262.
36 See agreements between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Dr Barnardo’s 
Homes starting from August 1931, at NAA.C: A659.1945.1.511.
37 The Commonwealth Government in Australia had already become reluctant to encour-
age further immigration by January 1929, see, e.g., Memorandum to Minister, 23rd January 
1929, NAA.C: CP211.2.3.104.
38 See, e.g., Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the Period 1st April 1931 to 31st 
March 1932, cmd.4143, London: HMSO, 1932.
39 Although an initial decision was made to end this Commonwealth funding, the Minister 
responsible for reviewing this, John Daly, chose to reverse this because he judged that 
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Government eventually decided to make Pinjarra an exceptional case for 
continued funding against the background of cutting almost all other 
expenditure on assisted migration.40 The United Kingdom Government 
followed suit, substantially reducing its own funding for empire settlement. 
In its seventh annual report in 1932, the Church of England Council of 
Empire Settlement noted that its core funding through the Empire 
Settlement Act had now been completely withdrawn. Rather than 
supporting further emigration, the Council’s work increasingly turned to 
tracing and supporting those it had already helped to emigrate but who 
had moved from their original placements in search of work. By 1934, a 
review commissioned by the Church Assembly recommended that the 
Council be wound down in its current form and replaced by an advisory 
council—a body which in the post-war period was to involve itself in child 
migration.41
The level of both imperial emigration and assisted passages specifically 
funded through the Empire Settlement Act was substantially reduced. 
Whilst the numbers of people emigrating annually to other parts of the 
Empire had averaged around 180,000 in the decade between 1922 and 
1931, by 1933 this had halved.42 Assisted passages funded through the 
Empire Settlement Act, which had ranged from 29,000 to 71,000 
per annum between 1923 and 1930, had, by 1933, fallen to 196.43 In the 
context of this decline, an Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration 
Policy was established to advise on future policy with regard to assisted 
migration, chaired by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Malcolm 
MacDonald, the former Labour MP and son of Ramsay MacDonald.44 Its 
Pinjarra had ‘pre-eminent claims to consideration’. See ‘Report by T.H. Garrett on the Child 
Emigration Society’, 16th March 1928; Beasley to Premier of Western Australia, 16th April 
1930; Daly to Heath, 24th November 1931; NAA.C: A461/C349/1/7.
40 ‘Cancellation of the £34,000,000 migration agreement’, 8th February 1932, NAA.C: 
A659/1945/1/505. Following the decision by the Western Australian Government to 
reduce its maintenance payments to Fairbridge, the Commonwealth Government did subse-
quently follow suit given that the arrangement had been premised on match-funding the 
State’s contribution.
41 Church Assembly, Report of the Church of England Council of Empire Settlement, 1934, 
CERC: CECES-2-CA547.
42 See Report to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Migration Policy, cmd.4689, London: HMSO, 1934, p. 6.
43 Report of the Oversea Settlement Committee for the Period 1st April for the Period 1st April 
1935 to 31st March 1936, London: HMSO, 1936, p. 8.
44 Malcom MacDonald was to soon after visit, and commend, the Fairbridge farm school 
at Pinjarra (Fairbridge Farm Schools: Child Emigration Society, Annual Report, 1934, 
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Report, published in 1934, signalled a significant shift to the policy 
approach to assisted emigration that had led to the Empire Settlement 
Act.45 Building on previous work done by the Economic Advisory 
Council’s Committee on Empire Migration which took a pessimistic view 
of the economic prospects for future emigration to the Dominions,46 the 
report argued the empire settlement policy had previously been premised 
on the flawed economic view that imperial migration was a stimulus for, 
rather than a symptom of, economic growth. It was not feasible, the report 
stated, simply to treat imperial migration as a transfer of human resource 
from a surplus of the white population of the United Kingdom to under-
developed parts of the Dominions without recognising that economic 
conditions in the Dominions needed to be sufficiently strong to support 
immigrants’ livelihoods. The Report therefore recommended a movement 
away from structured planning for imperial emigration—including osten-
tatious and expensive schemes for group settlements—and for future 
assisted migration to provide some support for individuals and families 
who had realistic prospects overseas.47
One of the main exceptions to the report’s aversion to more organised 
assisted migration initiatives was child migration.48 Children who emi-
grated at a young age did not, it noted, place the same immediate social 
and economic demands for work and private accommodation as adult 
migrants. Although the costs of their maintenance overseas could be 
pp. 30–31, BL: 362.732 FAI).
45 See Report to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Migration Policy, pp. 71–75.
46 Report of the Committee on Empire Migration of the Economic Advisory Council, 
cmd.4075, London: HMSO, 1932, which argued that whilst imperial emigration might be 
of short-term benefit to the United Kingdom in addressing unemployment in some declin-
ing industries, the economic depression meant that the Dominions were not well-placed to 
receive, and that by the time the Dominions had experienced economic recovery, it was no 
longer likely to be in Britain’s economic interests to encourage widespread emigration given 
its declining birth-rate. This Committee did also briefly consider the role of farm schools in 
imperial migration, and whilst commending the suitability of the Fairbridge model and 
encouraging its expansion subject to support from Dominions governments also commented 
that the cost of doing so made it unlikely such expansion would be widespread (see paras 
124–126).
47 This emphasis on immigration through personal individual nominations rather than 
group settlement schemes was also endorsed by the Commonwealth Department of the 
Interior, see Paterson to Lyons, 8th February 1937, NAA.C: CP4/2, 57.
48 See Report to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Migration Policy, pp. 45–49.
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 substantial, these costs were in many cases likely to be placed anyway on 
charitable or public funds were these children to remain in the United 
Kingdom. Whilst noting the Bondfield Report’s recommendation about 
the cessation of the migration of children to Canada under school-leaving 
age, the report proposed that this policy would be reviewed and that 
younger children should be sent to be boarded out again in Canadian 
households on the understanding that they were not placed primarily for 
their labour and would receive more regular inspections and better local 
support. In addition to recommending that such boarding out be entirely 
conducted on the basis of fees being paid to private households—which 
might reduce their expectations on the amount of work to be done by a 
child—the report introduced the policy idea that such child migration 
work should only be allowed to be undertaken by voluntary organisations 
approved by both the United Kingdom and Dominions Governments. 
The farm school system, used at Pinjarra and Picton, was praised by the 
report as being ‘beyond question the most satisfactory and successful 
method of establishing young children overseas’. Financial support by the 
UK Government should continue for the overseas maintenance costs of 
child migrants, it recommended, with the creation of new farm schools 
also being supported by capital funding from the UK Government up to 
half of the total costs.
Whilst economic depression had a stultifying effect on most forms of 
imperial migration, for supporters of child migration it reinforced their 
belief in the value of taking children from impoverished homes and future 
unemployment in the United Kingdom to better opportunities in the 
Dominions.49 Alongside the policy encouragement provided by the Inter- 
Departmental Committee’s report, new child migration initiatives began 
to develop. There was no resumption of the boarding out of child migrants 
to Canada. However, a substantial public appeal for donations was made 
in 1934 for the development of three new Fairbridge farm schools, 
endorsed and contributed to by the Prince of Wales. Through funding 
raised through this, and a £10,000 capital grant from the UK Government, 
Fairbridge opened its new Prince of Wales farm school in British Columbia 
the following year.50 In 1934, a bequest of £200,000 was also left by the 
estate of Lady Northcote, the wife of a former Governor-General of 
49 See, e.g., Sherington & Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, pp. 156–158; 
‘The Fairbridge Model’, Rev A.G.B. West, 1936, ML: MLMSS9025, Box 2.
50 See Fairbridge Farm Schools: Child Emigration Society, Annual Report, 1933, p. 2, BL: 
362.732 FAI ; ‘Fairbridge Farm Schools: An Imperial Investment’; The Times, 21st June 
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Australia, specifically to support child migration to Australia following the 
Fairbridge model.51 By October 1936, the trustees had received agree-
ment that the UK Government would contribute £14,000,52 and the 
Australian Commonwealth Government £7000, towards the capital costs 
of setting up a new farm school at Bacchus Marsh, Victoria, as well as 
contributing towards the maintenance costs of child migrants sent there.53 
The Fairbridge Society in the United Kingdom agreed to take on the role 
of recruiting, selecting and arranging passages for the children under this 
programme, and Colonel Heath, who had been Principal at Pinjarra, was 
appointed to take charge of the new Northcote farm school. Setting a 
precedent for post-war child migration, the Commonwealth Government 
undertook an inspection of the farm school site before agreeing to the 
arrival of the first party of boys in July 1937. Whilst agreeing to accept this 
project, the State Government of Victoria indicated that the on-going 
effects of economic depression in the State meant that its resources needed 
to be directed to its existing population and it could offer no financial sup-
port. The political sensitivity of child immigration was further illustrated 
by a strong letter of complaint at the creation of the farm school sent to 
the Commonwealth Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, by the City Council of 
Port Melbourne, which stated that ‘the Council feels that in view of the 
acute unemployment problem which has every indication of being intensi-
fied with the growth of mass production methods in industry, …such 
action is ill-advised and will react to the detriment of Victorian children’.54
New initiatives also began to develop in New South Wales. Support for 
Fairbridge’s work led to a call in 1935 at the biennial conference of the 
fellowship of Rhodes scholars for farm schools to be established across all 
1934, p.  32; ‘Prince of Wales Fairbridge Farm School Capital Contribution’, TNA: 
DO35/691/5; Dunae, ‘Gender, generations and social class’, pp. 88–90.
51 For correspondence relating to the bequest and the subsequent development of the 
Lady Northcote training farm, see NAA.C: A461.B349.1.7.
52 The actual UK Government capital contribution eventually rose to £27,500 when it 
became clear that the Northcote Trustees could not raise additional funds through public 
subscription under the terms of the Trust (see Memorandum by Garnett, 15th February 
1938, TNA: DO35/691/6). Garnett also questioned in this memorandum whether such 
increased capital costs reflected over-lavish aspirations on the part of the voluntary organisa-
tions as to the standard of building being required.
53 Correspondence relating to the establishment and early operation of Northcote is also at 
NAA.C: 436/1945/5/85.
54 Town Clerk to Lyons, 11th August 1937, NAA.C: A461.B349.1.7.
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Australian States.55 This suggestion was taken up with particular enthusiasm 
by former Rhodes scholars in New South Wales, who sought to lobby staff 
of the Fairbridge Society to make New South Wales one of the sites for the 
new farm schools envisaged in the charity’s Prince of Wales appeal in 
1934.56 By mid-1936 they had been sufficiently successful with initial 
fund-raising and lobbying of the State Government to make the creation 
of a Fairbridge farm school in New South Wales a viable proposition. The 
London headquarters of Fairbridge were initially unhappy with this pro-
posal, wishing to concentrate on potential further expansion of their work 
in other countries and fearing unnecessary competition for work place-
ments in New South Wales with Barnardo’s farm school at Picton. 
However, having failed to make progress with the hoped-for establish-
ment of a farm school in New Zealand and having reached an agreement 
that this new Fairbridge farm school would be situated at a site far from 
Picton, Fairbridge’s London office decided to support this proposal. With 
the UK Government providing a £15,000 capital contribution57 and con-
tributing to child migrants’ maintenance costs,58 and maintenance contri-
butions also being made by the Commonwealth and New South Wales 
State governments, the first party of children arrived at the new Fairbridge 
farm school at Molong in March 1938.59 The Australian Commonwealth 
Government refused a request to provide capital funding for the Molong 
farm school on the basis that it was now receiving similar requests from 
other organisations (including the Catholic Church and the Salvation 
55 See Bohan to Prime Minister, 26th January 1935, and Pearce to Bohan, 25th February 
1935, NAA.C: A461/K349/1/7. The Rhodes conference had initially called for the exten-
sion of Fairbridge-style farm schools across Australia to address domestic unemployment by 
training Australian-born children, but the Commonwealth Government indicated it did not 
have the constitutional powers to develop that project.
56 This process is summarised in Green to Plant, 7th June 1937, TNA: DO35/691/5.
57 An attempt by the Fairbridge Society to get the UK Government to increase this amount 
in the light of higher than expected building costs was unsuccessful (see Memorandum by 
C.R.P., 8th September 1938, TNA: DO35:691.6). As with Picton and Nortcote, this funding 
was provided as an interest free loan which was considered repayable to the UK Government 
if the Molong farm school stopped being used as a training institution for British child 
migrants, see correspondence in TNA: DO35/692/1.
58 See TNA: DO35/691/4.
59 On the initial development of Molong, see Sherington & Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and 
Child Migration, pp. 167–172; minutes of meetings of Fairbridge Farm Schools New South 
Wales, ML: MLMSS9025, Box 4.
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Army), and did not want to consolidate a precedent through which these 
would also have to be approved.60
From 1936, attempts were also made to send child migrants to the 
Burnside Homes run by the Presbyterian Church in Parramatta, New 
South Wales. Efforts to recruit children through the Church of Scotland, 
however, proved unsuccessful with insufficient numbers of children being 
put forward.61 In a letter to Walter Garnett, Assistant Secretary to the UK 
High Commissioner in Canberra with particular responsibility for immi-
gration, the Dominions Office civil servant, G.E. Crutchley, commented 
that this failure called into question whether there would be sufficient 
children to recruit for the expanding number of Fairbridge farm schools 
and noted that the reluctance of parents and guardians to send children 
overseas was ‘not uncommon’.62 With recruitment to Burnside continuing 
to prove difficult, the Presbyterian Church turned to Cyril Bavin, the 
Migration Secretary of the YMCA, to attempt to find suitable children 
from the United Kingdom—although as Garnett noted the YMCA had 
‘no previous experience in connection with the migration of young 
children’.63 A party of 17 children was eventually sent to Burnside in 1939 
from the Quarriers Orphan Homes of Scotland in 1939. These relation-
ships between Bavin and the Presbyterian Church in Australia were to be 
revived in the early 1950s when similar problems arose with the recruit-
ment of child migrants through the Church of Scotland for the Dhurringile 
Rural Training Farm in Victoria.
Towards the end of the 1930s, plans were also successfully introduced 
to begin child migration to Catholic residential institutions run by the 
Christian Brothers in Western Australia. An earlier attempt had been made 
in 1928 to secure government funding for 50 boys per annum to be sent 
to the Christian Brothers’ orphanage at Clontarf on the basis that this 
would function in a comparable way to the work of the Fairbridge farm 
school at Pinjarra. The proposal for Clontarf reflected other attempts by 
voluntary organisations in both the inter-war and post-war to secure 
60 Minute presented by Deputy Minister of Interior, 15th July 1938, NAA.C: A461/
K349/1/7. The Salvation Army appear to have concentrated more on juvenile than child 
migration to Australia in this period, see Empire Settlement and Migration, NAA.C: 
A1/1937/10056.
61 Correspondence relating to this and a brochure for Burnside Homes is at TNA: 
DO35/686/7.
62 Crutchley to Garnett, 3rd February 1937, TNA: DO30/686/7.
63 Garnett to Costar, 8th June 1938, TNA: DO35/686/7.
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government funding by arguing that their proposals were comparable to 
schemes and institutions which were already receiving public money. This 
initiative was rebuffed, however, coming as it did at a time when the 
Commonwealth Development and Migration Commission had recently 
challenged the cost-effectiveness of the Pinjarra scheme and argued that it 
no longer be funded as a migration scheme.64
In 1937, however, renewed proposals for child emigration to Catholic 
residential institutions in Western Australia were initiated through contact 
between Canon George Craven, Secretary of the Catholic Emigration 
Association and the Principal of the Tardun farm school, Brother Conlon. 
With the prospect of increasing levels of assisted migration in the future, 
and continued concern about the risk of loss of faith if Catholics emi-
grated through non-Catholic organisations, this proposal developed 
alongside one for the creation of a more general co-ordinating body for 
Catholic immigration in Australia. Concern about the loss of Catholic 
child migrants to non-Catholic receiving institutions had also been made 
more acute by the recent opening of the new Northcote and Fairbridge 
farm schools.65 By January 1938, the Catholic Archbishop of Perth, 
Redmond Prendiville, had secured the financial support of the 
Commonwealth and Western Australian governments for the immigration 
of children to Catholic institutions in Western Australia, now successfully 
using the precedent of funding for the Pinjarra farm school to argue for 
this. Brother Conlon was appointed to administer this process. Whilst for-
mally operating as an initiative undertaken under the patronage of the 
three Catholic bishops with dioceses in Western Australia, Conlon’s role as 
its Australian administrator and the placement of boys at Christian 
Brothers’ institutions at Castledare, Clontarf, Tardun and Bindoon meant 
in practice that it was delivered on the ground through the Brothers’ 
organisational structures. Publicised more generally in the United 
Kingdom by the auxiliary bishop of Birmingham, Bernard Griffin, as 
Secretary of the Catholic Emigration Association,66 Conlon recruited 110 
64 See correspondence in NAA.C: CP211/2/74/28.
65 For correspondence on this initiative with Australian Commonwealth and State govern-
ments, see NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499, and on the Child Emigration Society initiative, see, 
e.g., Lyons to Rankeillor, 8th April 1938 in this file. On concerns about the loss of children’s 
Catholic faith if sent to Fairbridge institutions, see Conlon to Craven, 13th February 1937, 
TNA: DO35/690/4.
66 See, e.g., Griffin to Doull, 19th September 1938 with accompanying brochure, The 
Christian Brothers’ Associated Schemes for the Training of Poor Boys in Western Australia, 
NRS: ED11/384.
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boys for these migration parties in 1938 and 1939 mainly through direct 
contact with institutions run by the Sisters of Nazareth.
Despite having gained approval for this scheme from the Australian 
Commonwealth Government on the basis that child migrants would ben-
efit from the advanced agricultural training available at Tardun,67 Conlon 
subsequently informed the Dominions Office that boys could only be 
placed there if government capital funding were made available to increase 
its accommodation. The total cost of this, Conlon proposed, would be 
£20,000: £10,000 in cash costs and £10,000 in costs of labour and ser-
vices provided by the Brothers (which in practice was made up to large 
degree by the labour of teenagers resident at Tardun). Conlon later added 
to this the cost of £4000 to construct a convent for a small group of Sisters 
of Nazareth at Tardun to provide domestic care of boys placed there.68 
The Dominions Office took the view that these costs appeared high and 
included elements, such as a chapel and classrooms, for which Empire 
Settlement Act funding would not normally be provided.69 Some concern 
was also expressed at funding a large building that felt like putting children 
into an institution resembling a ‘huge “Concrete Block”’, not in keeping 
with recent trend of favouring ‘cottage’ style accommodation for overseas 
training farms, and with providing a substantial capital contribution 
towards a building which would remain under the permanent control of 
an independent religious organisation.70 Despite reservations from the UK 
High Commission in Canberra about the necessity of providing this sup-
port, there was a strong endorsement of the Tardun scheme from Walter 
Garnett, now based at the Dominions Office.71 A comparatively cautious 
67 See Conlon to Lyons, 20th January 1938, also Memorandum by Garrett, Department of 
Interior, 20th June 1938, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499 (copy of Conlon letter also at 
NAA.C: A461/M3491/1/7). Conlon later presented the request for additional funding for 
accommodation at Tardun as arising from the particular interest showing by Catholic 
authorities in the United Kingdom in sending children there, whilst also acknowledging that 
no space at all was available at Tardun without further expansion (see Lyons to Minister for 
the Interior, 16th June 1938, in same file).
68 Lyons to Minister for the Interior, 29th June 1938, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499; 
Conlon to Wiseman, July 3rd 1938. TNA: DO35/690/5.
69 Costs of constructing and staffing classrooms were understood to be the financial 
responsibility of Australian State governments; on high costs see notes by Wiseman, 6th May 
1938, and by Ives, 12th May 1938, TNA: DO35/690/4.
70 Notes by Ives, 7th May 1938, and by Wiseman, 14th May 1938, TNA: DO35/690/4.




financial offer was made to Conlon in which the UK Government would 
pay A£250 per annum to cover the interest costs of a £5000 overdraft that 
the Brothers would be able to take out to fund this construction work. 
The Dominions Office informed the Australian Commonwealth 
Government that they were making this offer to Conlon with the tentative 
condition that some comparable capital funding be provided by the 
Commonwealth and Western Australian State governments. Rather than 
simply reflecting an expectation for some matched funding, this condition 
was unusually introduced in this case as a means of obtaining ‘confirma-
tion from the local authorities that the methods of training at Tardun are 
on the right lines and to enable us to refer for advice to authority on the 
spot independent of Christian Brothers on any point of difficulty that 
might arise’.72 The agreement that maintenance funding would last for no 
longer than five years for any individual child was also seen as a disincen-
tive for the Brothers to arrange the emigration of very young children.73
This request for a contribution towards capital funding for Tardun was 
actively supported by Prime Minister Joseph Lyons, a devout Irish- 
diasporan Catholic. The Commonwealth Department for the Interior 
refused capital funding for Tardun, however, having just refused a similar 
request for the farm school at Molong on the basis that it would create a 
precedent that would make it difficult to refuse any other future requests 
by voluntary organisations wishing to accommodate child migrants. By 
the time this refusal was confirmed to the UK High Commission in 
Canberra in July 1938,74 the first party of 37 Catholic child migrants had 
already left Britain for Western Australia with a further 31 sailing just four 
days later. On the advice of Walter Garnett, the Dominions Office took 
the view that having agreed to provide capital funding for the Molong 
farm school despite no contribution from Australian Commonwealth or 
State governments, it would not be reasonable to refuse similar capital 
assistance with regard to Tardun.75 Garnett was supported by Robert 
Wiseman, Assistant Secretary in the Dominions Office, who argued that 
the Commonwealth and State governments’ commitment to pay mainte-
nance for child migrants placed at Tardun could be considered sufficient 
72 See Acting High Commissioner to Secretary, Department of the Interior, 18th May 
1938, with enclosed telegram, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499.
73 Note by Ives, 19th April 1938, TNA: Do35/690/4.
74 Garrett to Acting High Commissioner, 12th July 1938, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499.
75 Note by Garnett, 11th July 1938, TNA: DO35/690/5.
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indication of their endorsement and continued commitment to that 
scheme.76 Despite the failure to secure any specific reassurance of the 
calibre and oversight of the Brothers’ migration scheme from the 
Commonwealth and Western Australia State governments, the Dominions 
Office therefore proceeded with its proposed annual capital funding con-
tribution for Tardun in addition to its maintenance payments.77
The benefit of the doubt extended to Conlon’s work at Tardun quickly 
proved unwarranted. A civil servant from the Commonwealth Department 
of the Interior, Reuben Wheeler, visited Tardun with the Bishop of 
Geraldton in mid-July and expressed concern that child migrants should 
not be sent there until more permanent accommodation was completed. 
The Bishop reassured him that Brother Conlon would not allow any child 
migrants to be sent to Tardun without satisfactory accommodation being 
provided.78 However, Conlon subsequently wrote to Lyons on 22nd 
August indicating that 50 of these child migrants had indeed been placed 
immediately at Tardun and that whilst accommodation was in the process 
of being built for them this would place an unbearable financial burden on 
the Brothers without further capital funding support.79 This request was 
again refused by the Commonwealth Department of the Interior.80 A fur-
ther 42 boys sailed to Western Australia under this scheme in 1939. 
Despite concerns about the exploitation of labour of child migrants to 
Canada, and the value of Tardun being premised on child migrants’ 
receiving secondary education and agricultural training, the Dominions 
Office raised no concerns when Conlon confirmed that trainees and staff 
at Tardun were undertaking most of the building work of the site, 
including making concrete blocks, quarrying stone, transporting materials 
from the nearest railway siding (ten miles away), laying foundations, 
76 Note by Wiseman, 21st July 1938, TNA: DO35/690/5.
77 See Memorandum, Department of the Interior, 17th January 1939, NAA.C: 
A659/1945/1/499, and Wiseman to Hale, 29th July 1938, TNA: DO35/690/5; also cor-
respondence and agreement in TNA: DO35/691/1 and DO35/1138/M1020/2.
78 See extract from report by R.H. Wheeler, 21st July 1938, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499.
79 Conlon to Lyons, 11th August 1938, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499. Conlon also later 
notified the Dominions Office that the 50 boys had been placed immediately at Tardun to 
‘keep them away from the city and with a view to make them country-minded’ (Conlon to 
Wiseman, 30th September 1939, TNA: DO35/691/1).
80 Garrett to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 30th September 1938.
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brick-laying, and installing electric lighting and plumbing.81 Whilst other 
residential institutions accommodating child migrants undertook signifi-
cant expansion and renovation of their buildings as more children arrived, 
the unpreparedness of the site at Tardun—and use of child migrants to 
rectify this –contrasted with the Northcote training farm where sufficient 
accommodation was available to receive child migrants whilst new cottage 
homes were being built.82
The migration of children to Christian Brothers’ institutions stimulated 
further proposals for child migration to other organisations in Western 
Australia. In 1939, approval was given for assisted passages and mainte-
nance funding for child migrants to be sent to the Methodist Homes for 
Children, in Victoria Park, Perth, and a newly built residential institution 
to be run by the Sisters of Nazareth in Geraldton.83 In both cases, how-
ever, no children were sent before the suspension of assisted migration 
with the outbreak of war that September—a decision made by the UK 
Government on grounds of both the anticipated security risks of long sea 
journeys and the significantly increased cost of shipping berths.84 Methodist 
involvement in child migration to Australia in this period was not limited 
to the Victoria Park proposal, however, as 38 children were also sent to 
the Northcote farm school by the National Children’s Home.85
81 See Conlon to Wiseman, 2nd April 1939 and Wiseman to Conlon, 3rd May 1939, TNA: 
DO35/691/1. See also Secretary to Under-Secretary, 26th August 1927, in which the open-
ing of the farm at Tardun had earlier been noted with some concern unless boys being sent 
there were paid proper wages to develop it, also Director of Education to Secretary, Child 
Welfare Department, 21st January 1943, and Meacham to Minister, 2nd March 1943, on 
other concerns about funding requests made by Keaney, WASR: 1031/AN/145/1/913/27.
82 See ‘Report on Visit to Fairbridge Victoria Farm School’, 23rd February 1937, and 
‘Department of Interior report on visit to Northcote’, 15th November 1938, NAA.C 
A436/1945/5/85.
83 On the Methodist scheme see correspondence in NAA.C A461/N349/1/7; on the 
approval of the Geraldton initiative see Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department to Conlon, 
27th January 1939.
84 Carrodus to Jackson, 29th September 1939, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499; Wiseman to 
Hambro, 29th September 1939, TNA: DO35/703/5.
85 See Hambro to Grey, 15th October 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
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polICy ConsolIdaTIon and The IMplICaTIons 
of InsTITuTIonal dIversITy
By the outbreak of war in 1939, child migration to residential institutions 
in Australia had evolved from a precarious experiment at Pinjarra to 
become an established part of United Kingdom empire settlement policy. 
Between 1913 and 1939, 3029 children had been sent to residential insti-
tutions in Australia through such schemes.86 In some respects, the policy 
motivation for empire settlement was unchanged from the period imme-
diately after the First World War. Under-populated Dominions were seen 
as constituting a significant risk to the security of the Empire, a concern 
renewed with increased global military spending through the 1930s. 
However, whilst empire settlement had previously been undertaken in 
terms of a transfer of human resources to stimulate imperial trade and 
economic development, the economic depression of the 1930s had dem-
onstrated that policies of empire settlement were highly vulnerable to eco-
nomic conditions in receiving countries. The passing of the 1931 Statute 
of Westminster, which made the national governments of the Dominions 
legally autonomous from the United Kingdom,87 reflected a wider pattern 
of change in which the United Kingdom’s Dominions could no longer 
simply be understood as part of an integrated political entity. In one sense, 
this growing political and legal autonomy made imperial emigration even 
more important as a means for maintaining a sense of shared identity 
between the United Kingdom and its Dominions, which it was hoped 
would find expression in continued political and economic co-operation.88 
86 See Chairman of Council to High Commissioner, n.d., ML: MLMSS9025, Box 13 
which stages that 1431 children were migrated to New South Wales by Dr Barnardo’s 
Homes between 1922 to 1939, with a further 409 sent by Barnardo’s to Pinjarra. The num-
ber of other child migrants sent to Pinjarra by the Fairbridge Society and other agencies in 
the period 1913–1939 was 766, and the numbers sent to Molong and Northcote in the 
inter-war period were 135 and 161 respectively (see Sherington and Jeffrey, Fairbridge: 
Empire and Child Migration, pp. 264–5. Adding to these numbers the 110 boys sent to 
Christian Brothers’ institutions in Western Australia in 1938/39 and the 17 children sent to 
the Burnside Homes in New South Wales, the total number of UK child migrants sent to 
Australia in the inter-war period appears to be 3029.
87 Although never used in practice, s.9(2) of the Statute of Westminster did allow the UK 
Government to make legislation in relation to States of Australia on any matters which did 
not fall under the authority of the Australian Commonwealth Government.
88 See, e.g., this argument about the importance of emigration for a future sense of collec-
tive imperial identity being made in Report of the Committee on Empire Migration of the 
Economic Advisory Council, pp. 64–65.
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In practice, however, it made overarching policy initiatives—such as 
population transfer through empire settlement schemes—more difficult to 
enact. Although the Empire Settlement Act was renewed in 1937, it was 
in the context of more chastened aspirations for empire settlement 
planning despite signs of economic recovery in the Dominions. It was 
hoped by some organisations that the Imperial Conference of 1937 would 
lead to a renewed commitment and strategy for assisted migration, not 
least because of the perceived need to strengthen imperial ties with the 
acceleration of international rearmament.89 However, assisted migration 
did not even become a matter of substantive discussion at the Conference.90 
Group settlement schemes had been shown not always to be successful, 
and adult emigration had been found to be subject both to economic 
constraints and political pressures in receiving countries. But child migra-
tion—even on a relatively modest scale—appeared by 1939 to be one form 
of assisted imperial emigration that had a more viable and stable future.91
The number of voluntary organisations sending child migrants to 
Australia were to increase in the post-war period, and policy encourage-
ment for these schemes from the Australian Commonwealth Government 
was to become much stronger. However, the fundamental administrative 
architecture of the schemes was clearly established in the pre-war period. 
Operating with the framework of assisted migration policy, funding and 
administrative systems, child migration functioned on the basis of organ-
isational collaboration between a range of voluntary organisations and the 
United Kingdom, Australian Commonwealth and State governments 
(with contact between the national governments mediated through the 
UK High Commission in Canberra and immigration officials at Australia 
House in London). The different ethos, social networks, systems of 
governance and economics of voluntary organisations participating in this 
work meant, however, that child migration was never a homogenous form 
of welfare intervention.
89 See, e.g., the Salvation Army, Empire Settlement and Migration, pp.  14,16, NAA.C 
A1.1937.10056.
90 See, e.g., Booth to Lyons, 14th May 1937 and accompanying copy of Empire Migration 
and Settlement by the Salvation Army, NAA.C: A1/1937/10056, and Imperial Conference, 
1937, Summary of Proceedings, cmd.5482, London: HMSO, 1937.
91 On the issue of cost-effectiveness, note Leo Amery’s argument that it cost the same to 
support eight to ten child migrants overseas as it would to support one adult through a land 
settlement scheme (Fairbridge Farm Schools: Child Emigration Society, Annual Report, 1927, 
pp. 7–8, BL: 362.732 FAI).
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This point can be illustrated, briefly, through a comparison of the 
Christian Brothers and the Fairbridge Society. As a trans-national religious 
order focused primarily on the provision of Catholic education, and with 
its roots in Irish nationalism, the Christian Brothers occupied a significant 
role in an Australian Catholicism still dominated at that time by Irish dia-
sporic social networks.92 Support for the British Empire within Irish- 
Australian Catholicism was far from solid. The influential Archbishop of 
Melbourne, Daniel Mannix, had been both a leading opponent of con-
scription during the First World War and faced attempts by the UK 
Government to prevent him from addressing public gatherings in Ireland 
and Britain in 1920 following his appearance at Irish nationalist rallies 
across the United States.93 For many Irish-Australian Catholics, their sense 
of relationship to the British Empire was refracted through opposition to 
the effects of British colonialism in Ireland—as Mannix put it, ‘the Ireland 
that England was to do justice to was not merely the Ireland at home, but 
also that Ireland of men and women who were scattered to the ends of the 
earth’.94 Such sentiments towards the British Empire were further rein-
forced by Catholic experiences of Australian society as dominated by an 
Anglo- Protestant elite. Against this background, Catholic immigration 
from Britain was perceived as having the potential to increase the Catholic 
population in Australia, thus strengthening its position not only against 
Protestant hostility but also against the threat of the anti-Christian senti-
ments of both sections of the political left in Australia and the powerful 
non-Christian countries of East Asia.95
In the wider context of Catholic education that sought greater social 
mobility for a predominantly working-class Australian Catholic population, 
92 See Ronald Fogarty, Catholic Education in Australia, 1806-1950, (2 vols), Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1959; Patrick O’Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community 
in Australia: A History, West Melbourne: Nelson, 1977; Barry Coldrey, Faith and 
Fatherland: the Christian Brothers and the Development of Irish Nationalism, 1838-1921, 
Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1988; Naomi Turner, Catholics in Australia, (2 vols), North 
Blackburn, VA: DoveCollins, 1992; Thomas O’Donoghue, Upholding the Faith: The Process 
of Education in Catholic Schools in Australia, 1922-1965, New York: Peter Lang, 2001. On 
earlier, complex patterns of Irish involvement in British colonialism, including in Australia, 
see Hilary Carey, God’s Empire: Religion and Colonialism in the British World, c.1801-1908 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 114–47, 287–304.
93 Brenda Niall, Mannix (Melbourne: Text Publishing Co, 2015), pp. 146–75.
94 O’Farrell, The Catholic Church, p. 341.




the Christian Brothers practised a disciplinarian and instrumentalist 
educational approach focused on achieving strong examination results. 
This was underpinned by an organisational ethos of emphasising the 
corporate mission of the order over the importance of personal attachments. 
As the Brother’s rules of the order stated, their communal life sought to 
‘reduce within the bounds of Christian charity all those sentiments for 
relations with which flesh and blood would inspire them’ as it was ‘not 
sufficient that the body quits the world, the heart also must break off all 
attachment thereto’.96 Although the Catholic Church’s interests were 
rarely prioritised in the policy platforms of the main Australian political 
parties, there were strong links between Catholic working-class voters and 
the Australian Labor Party, as well as influential Catholic politicians in 
other parties. Bonds of religious affinity between Catholic leaders and 
Australian politicians—exemplified in direct correspondence on child 
migration matters between Br Conlon, Archbishop Prendiville and Prime 
Minister Joseph Lyons—underpinned attempts by the Brothers to utilise 
the resources of the State to support their organisational goals. This could 
also lead to an assumption that State systems would simply facilitate these 
goals without close attention to the administrative processes through 
which those systems operated—exemplified by Conlon’s arrival in the 
United Kingdom to recruit child migrants in 1938 without the required 
group nomination for them having previously been submitted to Australian 
immigration officials.97
The possibility of leveraging such resources had particular economic 
significance in an Australian policy context in which Catholic schools had, 
by 1893, no longer been eligible to receive public funding. Religious 
orders such as the Brothers benefitted from periodic donations and 
bequests—including the donation of the land on which Bindoon and 
Tardun were built. But the fact that much financial resource was expended 
by Catholic families on supporting the costs of fee-paying Catholic pri-
mary and secondary schools—considered a pressing religious duty by the 
Australian Catholic hierarchy—meant that private donations would always 
offer a limited source of income. Conlon’s correspondence with Australian 
and British government officials in the early years of Catholic child migra-
tion to Western Australia was therefore characterised with repetitive 
requests for additional funding to an extent not evident with any of the 
96 O’Donoghue, Upholding the Faith, p. 43.
97 Lyons to Prendiville, 18th May 1938, NAA: A659/1945/1/499.
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other voluntary organisations undertaking similar work.98 The Brothers’ 
approach to child migration also reflected an arguably wider Catholic 
understanding of children in their out-of-home care as corporate resources 
of the shared body of Christ with limited agency and individuality.99 
Publicity images of children in Christian Brothers’ institutions, produced 
to support Conlon’s recruitment work, showed boys in ordered groups—
disciplined, studious, productive and serious—embodying the principle in 
the order’s rule that the good student was one who understood both the 
importance of obedience and that ‘religious life is a life of labour and 
devoutness’.100
The Fairbridge Society, by contrast, functioned on the basis of two 
inter-locking social networks—the British upper-class of colonial adminis-
trators (often also bound through shared contacts in the officer classes of 
the armed forces) and the trans-national network of the Rhodes Trust, 
with its hub at the University of Oxford. As noted above, these networks 
enabled contacts and support both amongst serving politicians and the 
Royal Family in the United Kingdom, as well as to a certain extent with 
senior politicians in Australia. Although its support extended beyond this, 
the social class of Fairbridge’s leading figures led naturally to affinities with 
the Conservative Party, with Kingsley Fairbridge himself regarding rural 
settlement of British emigrants an important means of preventing their 
assimilation into undesirable socialist masses in urban areas. This proxim-
ity to government circles in the United Kingdom—with a civil servant 
from the Dominions Office, G.F. Plant, serving on Fairbridge’s Council 
for most of the inter-war period101—was reflected in a comparatively stron-
ger appreciation of state administrative systems compared to the Christian 
Brothers. The mutual recognition and shared social networks of govern-
ment, civil service and the social circles from which Fairbridge’s leaders 
98 See, e.g., Conlon to Curtin, 9th November 1941 and 3rd March 1942, NAA.C: 
A659/1945/1/499. On similar attempts to leverage public funds to support the Brothers’ 
work in the pre-war period by Br Keaney, see Director of Education to Under-Secretary, 29th 
December 1929, Trethowan to Redmond, 28th March 1930, WASR: 1031/
AN/145/1/913/27. See also numerous cases of discounted claims by the Dominions 
Office for individual boys made under the capital funding agreement for Tardun in TNA: 
DO35/1138/M1020/2.
99 Lynch, ‘Catholic child migration’.
100 The Christian Brothers’ Associated Schemes for the Training of Poor Boys in Western 
Australia, NRS: ED11/384; O’Donoghue, Upholding the Faith, p. 64.
101 See Green to Wiseman, 23rd February 1938, TNA: DO35/703/5.
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were drawn made Fairbridge’s operations feel, culturally, more like an 
extension of the work of the colonial British State102 and appears to have 
been reflected in the more generous capital funding extended to its work 
by the Dominions Office than that given to Dr Barnardo’s Homes or the 
Christian Brothers.103 Its organisational sense of being embedded with the 
broader British policy structures of assisted migration was reinforced by 
the repeated praise given to its work in Government reports, praise that 
was re-circulated through Fairbridge’s annual reports. The inter-twining 
of inter-personal relations between Fairbridge and the State was exempli-
fied in Sir Ronald Cross’s recruitment of Charles Hambro as a senior offi-
cer in the Special Operations Executive at the start of the Second World 
War, whilst Cross was Minister of Economic Warfare. Hambro was already 
at that point the chairman of Fairbridge’s London Committee, a role he 
continued into the post-war period. By 1941, Cross had been appointed 
UK High Commissioner to Canberra.
Although Kingsley Fairbridge had initially envisaged his farm school 
proposal as a stand-alone experiment that could be taken up more widely 
within a government-managed system,104 the Child Emigration Society 
quickly evolved into a charity with its own organisational logics of self- 
publicity, consolidation and growth. Its close association with elite social 
networks both created the potential for significant individual donations 
and helped to build up a wider national network of local supporters for its 
work. Although suffering greater financial pressure through the depres-
sion in the 1930s, Fairbridge’s income from supporters and the UK 
Government had enabled it to build a comfortable surplus through the 
1920s that the economic slump did not substantially deplete. Its requests 
for additional government funding were, thus, far less frequent than those 
made by the Christian Brothers. The fact that its work at Pinjarra relied to 
a large degree on charitable funds raised through donations in Britain was 
also to create tensions between the London and Western Australian 
102 On the over-representation of people from upper-middle-class backgrounds in the 
upper ranks of the civil service in both the inter-war and early post-war periods, see 
R.K.  Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain: From 1870 to the Present Day (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), p. 157.
103 See, e.g., note by Wiseman, 22nd August 1938, TNA: DO35/690/5, pp.  34–-35, 
which notes the view that Fairbridge constituted ‘an exceptional case’ in terms of decisions 
about capital funding.
104 See Juvenile Emigration and the Farm School System, pamphlet produced by the Child 
Emigration Society, 1910, TNA: MH102/1400.
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Committees about what such funding implied in terms of the degree of 
control the London Committee might expect to exert over Pinjarra.
Although at times presenting its activities as a form of non- 
denominational religious work, the ethos of the Fairbridge Society was 
grounded more in an emphasis on the importance of settling Britain’s 
dominions with British stock and a belief in the power of the open spaces 
of the Dominions to release the inherent health and vitality of children 
removed from the enervating effects of British slums. In contrast to the 
disciplined group photographs of boys in Christian Brothers’ publicity 
materials, Fairbridge annual reports contained romanticised images of 
children at work and play in their farm schools, focusing on the individu-
al’s effort, pleasure and pride at their achievements.105 The effect of this 
understanding of the atomised child—just as with the Brothers’ view of 
the child as corporate member of the Church—was to downplay any 
enduring emotional significance of bonds that the child might still have 
with family members left behind in Britain. The self-presentation of its 
work as bringing civic and moral flourishing to the individual child-settler, 
and thus to the British Empire, was intrinsic to its capacity to attract public 
support, and provided an attractive philanthropic narrative that glided 
over the more complex, and often more painful, lives of the children in its 
farm schools.
The policy framework and administrative architecture of assisted child 
migration to Australia therefore created a context in which voluntary 
organisations with very different social networks, modes of operating and 
organisational cultures, could pursue their different organisational aims 
within a common funding framework. Whilst delivered as an element of 
wider empire settlement policies, voluntary organisations undertaking this 
work did not necessarily share a common commitment to the political 
project of building up the empire through the transfer of white, British 
stock to Australia—exemplified in the unsuccessful attempt by Archbishop 
Prendiville and Brother Conlon to recruit child migrants from the Irish 




Free State.106 Regardless of these organisational differences, by 1939 poli-
ticians and civil servants in the Dominions Office saw the general policy of 
child migration as a wholly positive development. However, the war years 
were soon to bring a greater awareness of the potential shortcomings of 
these schemes.
106 Although the Australian Commonwealth Government had, in principle, agreed to con-
tribute towards travel and maintenance costs of child migrants from the Irish Free State 
(Lyons to Prendiville, 18th February 1938, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499), the Irish 
Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, informed Conlon that he was not prepared to sanction the 
emigration of Irish children. See also note by Garrett, 15th July 1937, NAA.C: 
A1/1937/10056, which commends the immigration work of the Salvation Army in Australia 
but describes it as being more primarily concerned with ‘social uplift’ of individuals than the 
wider social and economic benefits of imperial migration.
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CHAPTER 3
Flawed Progress: Criticisms of Residential 
Institutions for Child Migrants in Australia 
and Policy Responses, 1939–1945
The archival records of the Dominions Office relating to child migration 
to Australia before 1939 are characterised by an almost complete absence 
of any sense of the need for any formal monitoring of the welfare of chil-
dren sent overseas. In 1911, officials at the Local Government Board had 
stated that annual reports would need to be sent on the welfare and prog-
ress of individual child migrants up to the age of 16, if local Boards of 
Guardians were to be allowed to pay for children under their care to be 
sent to Fairbridge’s proposed farm school at Pinjarra.1 To the extent that 
such reports were subsequently provided there are no indications that civil 
servants in the Dominions Office were aware of their contents. Instead, 
the belief that organisations involved in child migration were undertaking 
good work appears to have been reinforced more in the Dominions Office 
by formal visits to Pinjarra by public figures—including Leo Amery and 
Malcolm MacDonald—which were carefully prepared public events. At 
the start of 1937, the Fairbridge farm schools were regarded in the 
Dominions Office as one of the most successful forms of assisted migra-
tion since the passing of the Empire Settlement Act.2
Before the outbreak of war, however, the Dominions Office was start-
ing to become aware of operational challenges that suggested a more 
1 See Notes, 17th August 1911, and other correspondence and reports in TNA: 
MH102/1400.
2 See note to Machtig, 22nd January 1937, TNA: DO35/686/4.
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complex picture to the idealised stories and pictures of children’s transfor-
mation presented in the Child Emigration Society’s annual reports. In 
February 1937, G.F. Plant, the Dominions Office civil servant who had 
served as a member of the Fairbridge Society Council, met with Winifred 
Cullis, Professor of Physiology at the University of London. Although 
publicly supportive of the Fairbridge scheme, Cullis wished to raise con-
cerns she had about children of ‘bad stock’ being sent to Pinjarra who had 
no realistic hope of becoming productive citizens overseas.3 Plant rebuffed 
her criticisms internally in the Dominions Office, sharing the Fairbridge 
view that the whole point of the Society’s work was to effect transforma-
tion in children by changing their environment.4 After having met Cullis 
himself, however, the Secretary of State, Malcolm MacDonald was said to 
have been alarmed by her accounts of two individual children sent to 
Pinjarra—one epileptic, the other said to have homicidal tendencies. Eric 
Machtig, then an Assistant Under-Secretary of State, noted MacDonald’s 
view that Fairbridge’s London office would need to be more careful in its 
selection of children if it were to avoid negative publicity for its work, an 
issue that MacDonald raised directly with Fairbridge’s London office.5
Criticisms of Fairbridge’s selection policy were made by other people 
around the same time. Little more than a week after Cullis’s meeting with 
MacDonald, a conversation was recorded by Dominions Office officials 
with the then principal of Pinjarra, Dallas Paterson, who was visiting 
England. Paterson was soon to resign from his position after conflict with 
the London Society over his views that poor selection of children were 
leading to too many cases of former residents at Pinjarra failing to settle 
in work, becoming involved in criminality, falling pregnant or having 
other forms of emotional difficulty.6 The note of Paterson’s conversation 
at the Dominions Office only recorded his proposal that the Fairbridge 
Society should change its selection policy to recruit ‘the finest raw mate-
rial’. However, later private communication between Charles Hambro, 
Chair of the Fairbridge London Society and Edward Cavendish, the 
3 Winifred Cullis, ‘Fairbridge School in W. Australia’, The Times, 23rd February 1937; note 
of conversation with Cullis, 15th February 1937, TNA: DO35/686/4.
4 On this ethos, see Juvenile Emigration and the Farm School System, pamphlet produced 
by the Child Emigration Society, 1910, TNA: MH102/1400.
5 Note by Machtig, 24th February 1937, and MacDonald to Lumley, 17th February 1937, 
TNA: DO35/686/4.
6 Note of conversation with Paterson, 25th February 1937, TNA: DO35/686/4; see also 
Sherington and Jeffrey, Fairbridge: Empire and Child Migration, pp. 145–147.
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Under- Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, suggested that the 
Dominions Office were aware that Paterson was making wider criticisms 
of Pinjarra and were apparently reassured by Hambro that, where valid, 
his criticisms were already being dealt with.7 The view that Fairbridge 
should concentrate on sending a better class of child, more suited to lead-
ership roles in Australia, was also put to Plant at the Dominions Office by 
Miss Gertrude Drayton, Secretary of the Victoria League. Drayton also 
claimed that dissatisfaction with Fairbridge’s current work was also felt by 
Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, the UK High Commissioner in Canberra, and 
Lord Gowrie, Governor-General of Australia.8 The view of the Dominions 
Office, expressed both to Paterson and Drayton, was that organisational 
policy matters were a decision for the Fairbridge Society itself, and not 
something in which the Dominions Office could become involved. It was 
also noted within the Dominions Office that such a radical change to the 
type of children recruited by the Society would constitute a significant 
shift away from the original vision of Kingsley Fairbridge and might cause 
problems amongst those who had already made substantial donations to 
the Society on the basis of that.
Whilst these criticisms about Fairbridge’s selection methods, and its 
mixed results at Pinjarra, did not appear to create any significant doubts in 
the Dominions Office about the fundamental value of the Society’s work, 
further problems were soon to present themselves. In June 1937, Gordon 
Green, the Secretary of Fairbridge’s London Society, and Charles Hambro 
alerted the Dominions Office to emerging difficulties in the trans-national 
governance of their organisation.9 Kingsley Fairbridge had incorporated 
the organisation’s Western Australian committee prior to the incorpora-
tion of its London committee. This formally allowed the Western 
Australian body to act as an entity independent of the London society, 
although in practice it was dependent on it both financially and for the 
recruitment of children. A similar organisational division had now more 
recently occurred with the development of the Fairbridge farm school in 
New South Wales, where the local committee also established itself as an 
7 Hambro to Cavendish, 6th December 1937, TNA: DO35/686/4. Hambro’s letter, 
addressed to ‘My dear Eddie’, was sent to Cavendish’s private address rather than formally to 
him at the Dominions Office.
8 See note of meeting with Drayton, 16th March 1937, and Plant to Drayton, 20th March 
1937, TNA: DO35/686/4.
9 See, e.g., Memorandum by Green, 26th June 1937, and note of meeting on 28th June 
1937, TNA: DO35/691/5.
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incorporated body for tax reasons and had been able to initiate the devel-
opment of the Molong farm school through substantial local donations. 
Whilst in principle the Fairbridge child migration programme could oper-
ate in a spirit of mutual collaboration between its London and Australian 
committees, in practice operational tensions that had always existed in 
these arrangements were becoming increasingly strained. The Western 
Australia committee was resisting attempts by the London office to 
develop the after-care of children leaving Pinjarra. In New South Wales 
the organisation’s proposed articles of association gave the London soci-
ety no representation on its committee and decisions had been made 
about the final location of the farm school without agreement from 
London. Issues between the London and New South Wales committees 
were ultimately resolved by the end of the summer, with the latter agree-
ing to having up to four members of its committee nominated by London, 
as well as giving the London committee the power to make the appoint-
ments of Molong’s Principal and after-care officer.10 During this process, 
however, staff in the Dominions Office had expressed considerable reluc-
tance to take any formal role in mediating between the London and the 
New South Wales committees, even less to be seen as the ‘official big stick’ 
which could be used by sending organisations in the United Kingdom to 
try to control the activities of receiving organisations in Australia.11 
Instead, they sought more informally to encourage conciliatory efforts 
from London. The potential organisational difficulties of managing child 
migration as a trans-national initiative were, however, becoming clear.
Knowledge of problems with child migration was by no means limited 
to the UK Government. The report on the future of Pinjarra, compiled by 
T.H.  Garrett of the Commonwealth Migration and Development 
Commission in 1928 had already noted significant conflict between the 
Child Emigration Society’s London and Western Australian committees 
to the extent that the London committee had threatened not to send any 
more children unless it could exert more control over the work being 
done in Australia.12 In 1937, the Premier of New South Wales wrote to 
the Commonwealth Prime Minister, Joseph Lyons, to confirm his approval 
10 See Reid to Whiskard, 12th August 1937, and Agreement between Fairbridge Farm 
Schools Incorporated, and the Fairbridge Farm Schools of New South Wales, 30th September 
1937, TNA: DO35/691/5.
11 Note by Plant, 8th July 1937, TNA: DO35/691/5.




of the sending of assisted child migrants to Molong on the condition that 
effective medical checks be undertaken on child migrants before departure 
at Australia House given that his State Department of Labour and Industry 
had previously raised concerns about the health and fitness of children sent 
to Dr Barnardo’s farm school at Picton.13 Questions about the quality of 
after-care at Pinjarra were further raised, in 1939, by an immigration offi-
cial at Australia House who suggested to Gordon Green that the recent 
case of a teenager repatriated back to the United Kingdom by Fairbridge 
on grounds of unsatisfactory behaviour reflected less on the character of 
that boy than on inadequate after-care that had been provided to him.14 As 
was to be the case after the war, such knowledge held by Australian 
authorities was not always, as a matter of course, passed back to the 
Dominions Office or UK High Commission.
Child Migration, the onset of War 
and failing institutions
The outbreak of war caused considerable disruption to child migration 
programmes. Fairbridge’s London office initially supported the UK 
Government’s decision to suspend assisted migration, reportedly in part 
because it was concerned at the reputational damage to its work that 
would be suffered if a ship carrying children it had sent overseas was tor-
pedoed.15 By 1940, the financial challenges of reduced numbers of chil-
dren being received by its farm schools, and the start of overseas evacuation 
of British children through the Children’s Overseas Reception Board 
(CORB),16 led Fairbridge to lobby the Dominions Office to allow it to 
send children overseas whom it had recruited before the start of the war. 
The Dominions Office agreed to this request in April, 1940, and then in 
September 1940, sought to apply pressure on the Children’s Overseas 
Reception Board when it initially refused to give up some of its allocated 
13 Premier of New South Wales to Prime Minister, 2nd April 1937, NAA.C: A461/
K349/1/7.
14 Stables to Green, 18th July 1939, A659/1945/1/505.
15 See note to Duke of Devonshire, TNA: DO35/703/5.
16 On the emigration of children to Australia by the CORB, see Edward Stokes, Innocents 
Abroad: The Story of British Child Evacuees in Australia, 1940-45 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen 
& Unwin, 1994).
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berths for Fairbridge children.17 However, the torpedoing of the City of 
Benares on 18th September, en-route to Canada, resulting in the deaths of 
77 CORB evacuees, soon led to the wider CORB programme being sus-
pended. Despite this the Dominions Office indicated that it was still will-
ing to allow children previously recruited by Fairbridge to be sent overseas, 
but was prevented in doing so on grounds of the children’s safety by the 
Treasury, before Fairbridge themselves indicated that it also wished to 
suspend migration of further children for the time being.18 This led to 
continued financial pressures on its farm schools, mitigated in the case of 
the Northcote farm school by the decision to allow children of Australian 
soldiers to be accommodated temporarily there during the war.19 Children 
remaining at Northcote were eventually transferred to Molong in 
1944.  Declining numbers also put increasing pressure on the work at 
Pinjarra.20 Before the suspension of the CORB programme, Brother 
Conlon sought to persuade the Australian Commonwealth Government 
to place CORB evacuees at Catholic institutions in Western Australia 
which he claimed, without any obvious grounds, could receive at least 250 
boys and 250 girls.21 This request was refused by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government on the basis that CORB evacuees had been 
sent on the understanding that they would be placed in private house-
holds, and not residential institutions.22 Even after the sinking of the City 
of Benares Conlon continued to press for 200 girls to be sent to Nazareth 
House, Geraldton and 300 boys to Christian Brothers’ institutions in 
17 MacLeod to Green, 8th April 1940, Kimber to Wiseman, 14th August 1940, and Wiseman 
to Syers, 18th September 1940, TNA: DO35/703/5.
18 See note by Wiseman 5th October 1940, note by Wiseman 7th October 1940, note by 
Machtig, 10th October; and Syers to Wiseman, 3rd October 1940; Fairbridge was subse-
quently able to send a small group of five children to its farm school in British Columbia in 
the autumn of 1941 through contacts in the Admiralty, MacLeod to Hardie, 11th September 
1941, TNA: DO35/703/5.
19 For notes and correspondence on this arrangement, and other proposals for mitigating 
costs from the loss of income with the suspension of child migration, see DO35/692/1. 
Dwindling numbers at Northcote led to the 42 remaining children there being transferred 
to Molong in December 1944 to save costs, Green to Secretary, 31st January 1945, TNA: 
DO35/1138/M1019/1.
20 Given the lack of opportunities for child migration during the war, Fairbridge also 
decided not to take up the offer of the donation of a property and land for it to establish a 
new farm school in New Zealand, TNA: DO35/698/5.
21 Conlon to Foll, 2nd July 1940, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499.
22 Minister of the Interior to Conlon, 24th July 1940, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499.
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Western Australia, but was refused again by the Australian Commonwealth 
Department of the Interior on grounds on the unsafe shipping 
conditions.23
At the same time as the Dominions Office was trying to persuade the 
Children’s Overseas Reception Board to give some of its allocated berths 
to Fairbridge recruits, tensions arose again between Fairbridge’s London 
and New South Wales committees. The latter decided to present the then 
Principal at Molong, Richard Beauchamp, with an ultimatum of resigning 
his post or face being suspended, acting without the prior agreement of 
the London Committee. When Beauchamp contacted the London office 
to complain he was resigning under duress, the London committee ini-
tially asserted its power by indicating that it was not prepared to accept 
this resignation. The London committee soon reversed this decision under 
encouragement from the UK High Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, 
and regretfully accepted Beauchamp’s resignation.24 Whilst the Dominions 
Office understood that this action had been taken because of long- standing 
disagreements between Beauchamp and the New South Wales committee, 
it does not appear to have been informed by Fairbridge that its immediate 
cause was that the committee had received information indicating that 
Beauchamp was failing to maintain appropriate standards of sexual moral-
ity at the farm school by failing both to prevent sexual contact between 
boys and girls and to ensure appropriate punishment for ‘homosexual 
offences’.25
On the basis of the information it had received, the Dominions Office 
responded to Beauchamp’s resignation as another incident in which it 
needed to undertake an informal mediating role between Fairbridge’s 
London and New South Wales committees, rather than as an issue that 
had a bearing on child migrants’ welfare. Clearer concerns about some of 
the other residential institutions were soon to emerge, however.
In December 1942 Whiskard’s replacement as UK High Commissioner 
in Canberra, Sir Ronald Cross, submitted a report to the Dominions 
23 Conlon to Honeysett, 1st December 1940, Carrodus to Conlon, 20th December 1940, 
NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499.
24 Telegram, UK High Commissioner to Dominions Office, 11th September 1940, and 
telegram, Dominions Office to UK High Commissioner, 20th September 1940, TNA: 
DO35/692/1. Beauchamp had a long-standing relationship with the Fairbridge Society, 
having previously ran its field office in Glasgow.
25 See Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes 
Investigation, Day 12 transcript, 12th July 2017, pp. 94–99.
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Office of his impressions of informal visits to the Pinjarra and Tardun farm 
schools during a more general tour that he was making of Western Australia 
the previous October.26 Cross had relatively little to say about Pinjarra 
other than to compare it favourably to conditions at Tardun which, he 
noted, had not been visited by any representative of the UK Government 
since boys first arrived there in the summer of 1938. Cross’s account of 
conditions there differed substantially from the positive account given by 
Conlon.27 Whilst the boys at Tardun generally appeared healthy, he was 
‘somewhat taken aback… to see a number of boys who had the appearance 
of ragamuffins, being barefooted and dressed in extremely old, untidy and 
dirty looking shirts and shorts’. Although smarter outfits were used when 
the boys later gave a concert in honour of their visitors, Cross speculated 
how the poor condition of their work clothing could be reconciled with 
the on-going maintenance funding being received by the Christian 
Brothers particularly as the labour used in the up-keep of the farm school 
was provided free of charge by both the Brothers and the boys and food 
costs would also be limited. The farm school was suffering from consider-
able over-crowding, as boys from the Christian Brothers’ residential insti-
tution at Clontarf had been transferred there earlier that year when it was 
seconded for use by the Royal Australian Air Force. Accommodation at 
Tardun was described by Cross as being ‘extremely rough’ and often 
unclean, and still in one part only just nearing completion. Cross was par-
ticularly concerned by the Principal, Br Sandes, whom he found to be very 
vague on a range of administrative issues ranging from the financial bud-
gets of the farm school, the effects of over-crowding on the boys’ educa-
tion and the Christian Brothers’ approach to after-care. When pushed on 
future careers, the Principal speculated that many of the boys would prob-
ably want to remain working for the Brothers, which Cross found hard to 
reconcile with the principle that boys were being trained at Tardun as 
agricultural settlers. Whilst Cross commented that it was unlikely that 
another visit from a representative of the UK Government could be made 
to Tardun in the near future, given its isolated location more than 300 
miles from Perth, he nevertheless felt that periodic visits of this kind would 
be ‘in every way desirable’. In the absence of any such visit in the near 
26 ‘Notes on visit to Tardun’, 15th December 1942, TNA, DO35/1138/M1020/1.
27 See, e.g., Conlon to Wiseman, 21st March 1941, TNA: DO35/691/1 which stated the 
child migrants at Tardun ‘are doing well and have made a most favourable impression on all 
visitors, including the Government inspectors who visit the school at regular intervals’.
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future, however, Cross recommended that Catholic sending organisations 
be notified of these concerns with a view to them raising these  issues 
with the Christian Brothers. He also proposed  that the Australian 
Commonwealth Government be approached to obtain a report by Western 
Australian State officials on the welfare of the child migrants  in the 
Brothers’ institutions.
Cross’s report was passed up through civil servants at the Dominions 
Office to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Paul Emrys Evans. 
Emrys Evans concurred with Cross’s recommended course of action whilst 
also accepting his civil servants’ suggestion that Bishop Griffin be made 
aware of the report’s criticisms but discouraged from contacting the Christian 
Brothers until the Australian State report had been received. It was also 
noted that as the five-year maintenance agreement had nearly expired for 
most of the boys sent to Tardun, there might be little scope for effecting 
change at the institution before these finally ran out.28 Part of the value of the 
report from Western Australia State officials, it was assumed, would be that 
it would include some assessment from an official experienced in evaluating 
educational institutions who could offer an informed view on Br Conlon’s 
claims about the value of Tardun as a vocational training institution.29
After a request for a State inspection report was passed on to the 
Western Australian Government via the Commonwealth Prime Minister’s 
office, a senior official in the Western Australian Lands and Immigration 
Department, Francis McAdam, undertook an inspection of the Christian 
Brothers’ institutions at Tardun, Bindoon and Castledare in April, 1943.30 
McAdam, who actively supported the work of the Christian Brothers 
College in Perth,31 and who had no expertise on educational matters, pro-
duced reports that focused primarily on the material infrastructure and 
holdings of each institution, and offered only brief comments on the edu-
cation and welfare of children. In addition to giving assurance that the 
terms of the UK Government’s maintenance agreements for Castledare 
and Tardun were being ‘carried out to the letter’, McAdam offered 
28 See notes dated 5th February, 8th February, 9th February, 10th February and 16th February 
1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/1.
29 In 1944, Walter Garnett appeared to think that the training in trades at Tardun was rela-
tively limited compared to Bindoon, see ‘Farm Schools in Australia’ in October 1944, TNA: 
DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
30 Correspondence and copies of the reports are held at NAA.C: A659/1945/1/499 and 
TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4.
31 Obituary of McAdam, Annual of Christian Brothers College, Perth, 1946.
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particularly effusive praise for Bindoon about which he commented that 
‘the present ambitious scheme of making practical provision for the future 
of migrant boys and state wards at Bindoon reflects credit on the commu-
nity of Christian Brothers and its lion-hearted Superior, Br Keaney’. 
Attached to the copies of McAdam’s reports sent to the UK High 
Commission in Canberra was a list of the child migrants who had been 
sent to Western Australia in 1938 and 1939, indicating their chosen occu-
pation (including ‘Farmer’, ‘Baker’, ‘Plumber’, ‘Farmhand’ and 
‘Electrician’). No further information was given about the adequacy of the 
vocational training that would be provided to prepare the other boys for 
their indicated future occupation.
In his covering letter when forwarding these documents on to the 
Dominions Office, Sir Ronald Cross noted that McAdam’s report did not 
address points that had concerned him from his own visit to Tardun, such 
as over-crowding, inadequate sanitary arrangements or lack of clarity 
about after-care arrangements.32 He also commented that there was insuf-
ficient evidence that the settlement of boys on the land as farmers in their 
own right was being attempted to the same degree as had been indicated 
when Conlon had initially sought UK Government funding support. At 
the same time, Cross acknowledged, McAdam had not specifically been 
asked to report on the issues raised by him, and the fact that a new Principal 
had been appointed at Tardun might represent a change from its previous 
poor management.
Clement Attlee, as the new Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
replied to Cross offering a more positive assessment and commenting that 
the reports indicated improvements at these institutions (although no 
information had been received by the Dominions Office about Castledare 
or Bindoon prior to this).33 As 25 of the child migrants were reported to 
being trained up as farmers and with land being cleared for them, Attlee 
commented that ‘I feel doubtful whether more could have been done to 
settle the boys on the land’. Cross suggested that a follow-up visit to 
Tardun by an experienced official representing the UK Government 
should be made as soon as a convenient opportunity arose, and Attlee 
concurred. Other internal disagreements were also recorded within the 
Dominions Office. The Assistant Secretary, Robert Wiseman, commented 
that ‘it is satisfactory that the Inspector should have found things in so 
32 Cross to Attlee, 24th June 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4.
33 Attlee to Cross, 30th July 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4.
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good a condition’; in response, the Under-Secretary of State, Paul Emrys 
Evans, wrote that ‘I do not think that Sir R. Cross feels that the situa-
tion is satisfactory although he thinks there has been an improvement’.34 
Wiseman had already by then met with Bishop Griffin and Canon 
Craven to make them aware of Cross’s initial criticisms and discouraged 
Griffin from contacting the Christian Brothers directly until the 
Australian State report had been received.35 He met with Griffin again 
in August 1943 to indicate that the Australian report had been satisfac-
tory and that a follow- up visit to the Christian Brothers institutions 
would be made by a representative of the UK High Commission.36 
Wiseman also took the opportunity to discuss the possibility of the 
resumption of assisted migration in collaboration with the Catholic 
Council for British Overseas Settlement after the war, noting that it 
might be a year or two after the war’s end before assisted migrants could 
again be sent to Australia.
Three weeks before Cross forwarded on McAdam’s reports, the 
Dominions Office also became aware of significant problems at the 
Northcote farm school at Bacchus Marsh. A letter from Evelyn Baring, a 
Northcote trustee then working at the Foreign Office, had previously com-
mended the excellent staff at Northcote led by the Principal, Colonel 
Heath.37 In early June 1943, however, Walter Garnett, now returned to the 
UK High Commission in Canberra as Official Secretary, wrote to Robert 
Wiseman about a number of problems that he had recently learned about at 
Northcote.38 By then, Garnett had a long history of involvement in migra-
tion matters, having served as the secretary to the 1924 Bondfield delega-
tion whilst working for the Oversea Settlement Department and as one of 
the joint secretaries to the Economic Advisory Council’s Committee on 
Empire Migration.39 From 1943 onwards, he was to become a pivotal figure 
34 Note by Wiseman, 19th July 1943, and note by Emrys Evans, 26th July 1943, TNA: 
DO35/1138/M1020/4.
35 Note by Wiseman, 23rd March 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/1.
36 Note by Wiseman, 24th August 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/4.
37 Baring to MacLeod, 28th May 1942, TNA: DO35/692/1. Baring was later to become 
the UK’s Governor in Kenya at the time of the Mau Mau uprising.
38 Garnett to Wiseman, 4th June 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
39 See Garnett’s account of the Bondfield delegation and report in Report on Child 
Migration (British and white alien), 17th March 1944, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5.
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in representing the UK Government in Australia on what were to become 
increasingly difficult issues concerning child migration.40
Garnett had been alerted to possible problems at Northcote after one 
of the cottage mothers had written with a series of complaints to Lady 
Gowrie, wife of the Australian Governor-General. Having seen this letter, 
Garnett decided to go to Melbourne where he met the Secretary of the 
Northcote Trustees and was able to establish more information about 
recent events. He learned that after two teachers at the neighbouring State 
school had been charged with sexually assaulting three girls from the 
Northcote farm school, the Principal, Colonel Heath, had been asked to 
resign towards the end of 1942. Complaints had also been received about 
a high proportion of the 56 children who had so far been placed out in 
employment from Northcote and, when pressed about this before his res-
ignation, Colonel Heath had reportedly said that when he was Principal at 
Pinjarra the results of the training provided were not as good as Fairbridge 
publicly claimed there either and that a number of former residents at 
Pinjarra had ended up in reformatories.
Garnett was also told that the Trustees had been increasingly sceptical 
about the value of a child migration programme in which children were 
accommodated in separate institutions with limited ability to mix with the 
wider community until they left the farm school. The Trustees also felt 
that agricultural training could well be of limited value for the boys at the 
school given the poor opportunities for career progression in agricultural 
work. Bad management at the dairy farm had led both to sickness amongst 
the children and the production of poor-quality dairy products. External 
dairy farm inspectors had indicated that problems had resulted in part 
from the farm school’s attempt to run too large a dairy herd with poorly 
trained boys, where the work involved in simply managing the herd had 
prevented staff having enough time to train the boys properly. When 
ascertaining whether the State Child Welfare Department had inspected 
Northcote during this period, Garnett was also surprised to discover that 
State Child Welfare inspectors only had jurisdiction over State wards and 
so did not have any supervisory powers over child migrants.
40 Garnett had also become involved in child migration issues soon after his appointment 
as an assistant to the British Government Representative in Canberra in 1931, trying to 
intervene to prevent the reduction of the Commonwealth Government subsidy for children 
at Pinjarra after this had been reduced by the Western Australian State Government, Garnett 
to Secretary, Dept of the Interior, 1st September 1932, NAA.C: A659/1945/1/505.
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Overall, Garnett suggested, failings at Northcote might be less as a 
result of systemic problems within the Fairbridge scheme and more a 
result of a combination of local factors where Heath had both managed 
the farm school inadequately and received insufficient support and over-
sight from a relatively inexperienced local committee. In this regard, 
Garnett noted, similar problems could also be seen with the running of 
the farm school at Molong. Although, after making a return visit to 
Northcote in July 1943, Garnett gave a more optimistic report about 
prospects for the farm school under its new Principal, he added that prob-
lems with placing children in employment might well have been the result 
of poor initial selection by Fairbridge which led to Northcote being over- 
loaded with ‘difficult’ cases.41 Garnett was later to revise this view, suggest-
ing that these problems arose more from problems in management and 
after-care at Bacchus Marsh rather than the quality of children sent.42
When Wiseman shared the results of Garnett’s report with the 
Northcote trustees in London, it became clear that there were problems 
with the sharing of information about conditions at the farm school.43 The 
Australian trustees had not apparently known about the critical reports 
about conditions at the dairy which had gone only to Heath, nor the fact 
that the new Principal had already been absent through a long period of ill 
health. Not only was communication between the different trans-national 
arms of this organisation poor, but those involved tended to attribute fail-
ings to parts of the system other than those in which they were directly 
involved. Whilst the Australian trustees blamed problems on poor selec-
tion of children in Britain, the British trustees blamed the difficulties with 
children’s work placements on bad teaching at the local State school. 
Blame was also attributed, diplomatically, to those removed from the sys-
tem—notably the retiring, Colonel Heath—rather than to those with 
whom different actors in the scheme still needed to co-operate.44 When 
approached with Garnett’s report, Gordon Green initially acknowledged 
that he had already been aware of the case of the teachers prosecuted for 
sexual assault, but not about other problems at the farm school. He saw 
no problems in Fairbridge’s selection of children and blamed failings at 
41 Garnett to Wiseman, 16th August 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
42 ‘Report on Farm Schools in Australia’, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
43 See both Note by Wiseman on meeting with Gordon Green, 2nd July 1943, and notes 
following letter from Wiseman to Lord Grey, 3rd July 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
44 See, e.g., Grey to Luxton, 29th December 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
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Northcote on Heath being kept in post for too long. Although Green 
thought that the British trustees had full confidence in the Australian 
trustees, the British trustees reported to Wiseman that they thought too 
many of the Australian trustees had been appointed because of their pre- 
eminence and not necessarily because of their suitability or active interest 
in the farm school.
Criticisms of Fairbridge’s selection methods created tensions between 
Fairbridge’s London office and Northcote’s British trustees, as a result of 
which Gordon Green passed Wiseman a file of previous correspondence 
between Fairbridge and Northcote’s trustees in Britain and Australia 
which documented a series of problems at the farm school over a number 
of years.45 In January 1939, Charles Hambro had written to Lord Grey to 
make him aware of criticisms made of Northcote by Helen Bentwich, 
then serving as Honorary Secretary for the United Kingdom Committee 
for the reception of refugee children from Germany. After visiting 
Northcote, Molong and Pinjarra, Bentwich told Hambro that she felt the 
system was failing by isolating children from local Australian communi-
ties, segregating boys and girls to too great a degree and not having 
enough opportunity to learn to manage a regular pocket money allow-
ance. Northcote gave Bentwich particular concern because the future 
employment prospects for girls after leaving there seemed particularly 
poor—worse than if they had remained in the United Kingdom—and the 
girls were sufficiently unhappy there to tell her that they wanted to come 
back  home from Australia. This problem, Hambro noted, might have 
resulted in part from the lack of sympathy towards the girls from the 
Principal’s wife, Mrs Heath, which had also previously been a source of 
difficulty at Pinjarra.
In June 1941, Gordon Green had also written to Evelyn Baring noting 
both that he had just received half-yearly reports on children at Northcote 
a year late and that Northcote did not have any administrative officer in 
Britain who could deal with any queries from parents or guardians about 
the welfare of their child after emigration to Bacchus Marsh. Hambro fol-
lowed this up a month later with a letter to Baring asking for more prompt 
half-yearly reports, monthly updates on any illness or movement of a child 
and annual after-care reports on children placed out in employment.




A letter from Green to Hambro in March 1942 indicated both that 
Fairbridge were already aware by then that Heath was to be removed as 
Principal of Northcote and that, whilst not ideal as a Principal, he had 
previously been able to serve for eight years at Pinjarra because he had 
been able to keep the local committee in Perth happy. A copy of a letter 
from December 1942 from the Australian trustees to Lord Grey, held in 
Fairbridge’s file, noted the problems with finding work placements for 
children given their behaviour, the fact that Heath’s tenure as Principal 
had been marked by discipline based on fear rather than affection, and that 
whilst the trustees appreciated Heath’s efforts, he lacked any understand-
ing of child psychology. As a consequence, many of the old boys of the 
farm school had no desire to return to it in their holidays.
In January 1943, Green wrote to Northcote’s Australian trustees point-
ing out that as Fairbridge were not prepared to take the organisational 
responsibility of becoming the full legal guardians of children when they 
were sent to Australia—because of the potential liabilities involved—it was 
essential that sufficient regular information be provided from Northcote 
back to Fairbridge’s London office for this to be passed back to children’s 
parents and guardians in Britain. Despite it being hoped that Heath would 
continue the practice of regular reporting back that he had maintained at 
Pinjarra, Fairbridge’s London office had received no information at all 
about the welfare and progress of children at Northcote for periods of 
between 18 months and two years since his appointment. Green was also 
concerned to discover that girls had been sent out to work from Northcote 
at the age of 14, despite Fairbridge’s undertaking that they would not be 
placed into work from the farm school until nearly the age of 16. Green 
had followed this up with a letter to Lord Grey in February 1943 indicat-
ing that before further children be sent to Northcote, once shipping 
routes were open again, a formal agreement would need to be made 
between Fairbridge and Northcote to ensure that such regular reporting 
was maintained. Such concerns were accentuated, Green noted, by cases 
such as a mother who had contacted Green after receiving a letter from 
her son indicating that he had become a labourer after leaving Northcote 
despite it being recognised in earlier school reports that he was capable of 
more advanced agricultural education. As the mother pointed out, if she 
had known that he was not to receive better education and training she 
would not have allowed him to go to Australia. The last letter in the file, 
dated 22nd September 1943, concerned a boy from Northcote who had 
ended up before a Magistrate after the appointment of Heath’s 
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replacement, and where the Magistrate’s criticisms indicated the need for 
after- care from Northcote to be more effectively organised.
Fairbridge’s correspondence with Northcote therefore demonstrated 
both that Fairbridge’s London office and Northcote’s British trustees had 
knowledge of substantial problems at the farm school pre-dating Garnett’s 
report in the summer of 1943. The file also suggested that there had been 
long-standing problems with standard of care, post-migration reports and 
after-care at Northcote which had not previously come to the attention of 
the Dominions Office and which had also occurred to some extent at 
Pinjarra. When Wiseman wrote to Garnett in December 1943 to make 
him aware of the file—although not its full contents—he remained sup-
portive of the broad Fairbridge model.46 Wiseman also noted, however, 
that whilst the Fairbridge ideal of transforming children’s lives through 
moving them to new environments was undoubtedly valid, this ideal could 
be undermined by poor conditions in receiving institutions which needed 
to be run on principles of ‘constant supervision, constant care and con-
stant scrutiny’. In response, Garnett sought to defend Northcote’s opera-
tions in Australia—a stance he was to take up on other occasions in the 
future when criticisms were made from London.47 It was not fair, he 
wrote, to expect Northcote staff in Australia to deal with problematic chil-
dren of whom they had been given insufficient detail about their back-
grounds. But even faced with this challenge, Garnett commented, the 
local Northcote trustees were ‘justly proud’ of the improvement in chil-
dren placed at their farm school, as they upheld the Fairbridge principle 
that the right kind of environment could enable a child to progress regard-
less of their previous background.
the ‘Pinjarra dossier’ and the garnett rePort
At the same time as Garnett and Wiseman were engaging in this corre-
spondence, further problems arose in relation to the Fairbridge farm 
schools. In late November 1943, Sir Charles Hambro met with the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Viscount Cranbourne, expressing 
concern at rumours about the management of Pinjarra including its appar-
ent insistence that children at the farm school be prepared for agricultural 
46 Wiseman to Garnett, 7th December 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
47 Garnett to Wiseman, 22nd January 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1.
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work regardless of their preferred future career.48 In view of the concern 
being raised by these rumours, Hambro felt it would be beneficial if Walter 
Garnett be asked to make an inspection visit to Pinjarra as soon as possi-
ble. Robert Wiseman took a sympathetic view of this request, noting that 
it had always been intended that a follow-up inspection visit to Western 
Australia be undertaken in view of Sir Ronald Cross’s comments on 
Tardun and that ‘any difficulty which has so far been felt in sending him 
to Western Australia has been the difficulty of sparing staff from the High 
Commissioner’s Office at Canberra’.49 Planning for this inspection visit 
soon became mired in discussions about the relative importance of this 
visit given other demands on the High Commission’s time and the extent 
to which the Dominions Office should take responsibility for over-seeing 
conditions at receiving institutions in Australia. Whilst Eric Machtig took 
the view that it was not possible to spare Garnett’s time for such a visit, the 
Secretary of State, Viscount Cranbourne over-ruled him, stating that the 
circulation of unsatisfactory rumours about Pinjarra merited further inves-
tigation by representatives from the High Commission and the Australian 
Commonwealth Government—albeit one that required no ‘tearing 
hurry’.50
With staff shortages delaying any arrangements for Garnett’s inspection 
visit the following spring, Gordon Green sent Robert Wiseman a dossier 
of documents in April 1944 detailing problems at Pinjarra from both for-
mer staff members and residents.51 Although compiled by Fairbridge prior 
to Hambro’s meeting with Cranbourne the previous November, 
Fairbridge’s London officers had been cautious about circulating a copy of 
it before taking legal advice on whether its contents might be libellous. 
The dossier itself contained a series of detailed complaints about the ways 
in which the Fairbridge committee in Western Australia had created an 
environment at Pinjarra in which children were given little or no opportu-
nity to develop interests, education or training beyond agricultural and 
domestic work, had been transferred to a local reformatory for minor 
infractions and were placed out in exploitative work placements with little 
opportunity for advancement. Concerns were also raised about the ability 
48 See note 26th November 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
49 Note by Wiseman, 29th November 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
50 Note by Machtig, 1st December 1943, and note by Cranbourne, 2nd December 1943, 
TNA; DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
51 Extract from letter from Garnett, 9th March 1944, and Green to Wiseman with enclo-
sures, 21st April 1944, TNA: DO35/1330.
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of cottage mothers to provide individual attention to children when caring 
for more than 12 children in their ‘cottage’ home, and the ways in which 
children were transferred between cottages with little or no concern for 
helping them to maintain relationships with siblings or friends. Allegations 
of verbal and physical abuse by cottage mothers at Pinjarra were passed on 
to the Dominions Office a year later.52 Lack of effective sex education was 
also seen by one former member of staff as a significant cause of problems 
in the mixed school environment and had led to early pregnancies for 
some former girls from the farm school. One letter in the dossier, from a 
god-parent who was sponsoring a boy at Pinjarra, expressed disillusion-
ment with the farm school’s ethos, seeing in its refusal to encourage his 
wider interests an attitude of not wanting ‘to give the children ideas above 
their station’.53 As the author put it, in language that was to be reflected 
in the 1946 Curtis Report, whilst children at Pinjarra ‘have been better 
housed, fed and clothed than they would have been in their conditions 
here [in the United Kingdom], I very much wonder whether they have 
been happier except as regards their material condition’.
Wiseman noted that the dossier revealed ‘a most distressing state of 
affairs’ and arranged for a copy to be sent as quickly as possible to Garnett 
in Canberra to inform decisions about the planning of his inspection visit 
to Western Australia.54 Soon after this, however, the Dominions Office 
became less confident of the wisdom of such a visit, as Wiseman was 
informed by Sir Roger Dalton, a member of Fairbridge’s New South Wales 
committee, that the local committees for Molong, Northcote and Pinjarra 
were now in communication with each other about their dissatisfaction 
with on-going attempts by Fairbridge’s London office to exercise control 
over the running of their farm schools.55 Whilst Wiseman and Machtig 
52 See Tempe Woods to Wiseman with enclosures, 5th April 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/
M1007/1/2, which notes that although the current cottage mothers at Pinjarra were of a 
better kind, in the recent past ‘very unsuitable cottage mothers have been allowed to remain 
on the farm. They have spoken very roughly to the children and hit them. Girls in their teens 
have been beaten. Children have been locked in rooms’.
53 Merryless to Hart, 28th January 1944, TNA: DO35/1330.
54 Note by Wiseman, 9th May 1944, and Wiseman to Garnett, 20th May 1944, TNA: 
DO35/1330.
55 Notes by Wiseman, 26th May 1944 and 7th June 1944, TNA: DO35/1330. The 
Dominions Office believed that Dalton, the UK Government’s Senior Trade Commissioner 
in Australia, represented the London Society on Fairbridge’s New South Wales Committee 
but Gordon Green later claimed that Dalton was not put forward for that role by London 
nor had they had much contact with him (see ‘Report on Farm Schools in Australia by Mr 
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supported Dalton’s view that the Dominions Office should be cautious 
about undertaking any imminent inspection, given the risks of becoming 
caught up in the conflict between Fairbridge’s London and Australian 
committees, Paul Emrys Evans argued that if conditions at Pinjarra were 
as bad as had been claimed then the Dominions Office had ‘definite 
responsibilities’ to investigate.56 Viscount Cranbourne suggested that 
Fairbridge’s London office send a representative to Australia to resolve the 
conflict as quickly as possible so that no controversy would arise during a 
forthcoming planned visit to Australia by the Duke of Gloucester.57 The 
decision to send Garnett to Western Australia in the midst of this internal 
dispute within Fairbridge was supported by Sir Ronald Cross. It was also 
given further weight by a visit to the Dominions Office from Reuben 
Wheeler, who met with Emrys Evans, Wiseman and C.W.  Dixon, an 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State, to pass on his impressions from visits 
to the farm schools at Bacchus Marsh, Picton and Molong. Wheeler told 
this meeting ‘that both the Commonwealth and the U.K. Governments 
must be held in some way responsible for not realising how things had 
been going wrong at Northcote and he thought also at Pinjarra’. Wheeler 
argued that it was the duty of each Government to be aware of conditions 
at these institutions and that ‘each school ought to be inspected at least 
once a year on behalf of each Government’.58 Paul Emrys Evans agreed 
that Wheeler’s recommendation should be implemented, and Sir Ronald 
Cross concurred with this on the basis that this take the form more of an 
informal annual visit than a formal inspection.59 As Wiseman noted, 
though, for a member of staff at the UK High Commission in Canberra 
to undertake annual inspections of Northcote, Pinjarra, Molong, Tardun 
and Picton would represent a significant investment of administra-
tive time.60
W. Garnett and Comments of the General Secretary of the Fairbridge Farm Schools, Inc’, 
TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2).
56 See notes by Machtig, 7th June 1944 and Emrys Evans, 9th June 1944, TNA: 
DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
57 Note 9th June, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
58 See minute of meeting with Wheeler, 6th July 1944, also confidential reports by Wheeler 
on visits to Bacchus Marsh, 8/9th May 1944, Molong, 19th May 1944,and Picton, 21st May 
1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
59 Note by Wiseman, 12th July 1944, and by Emrys Evans, 5th September 1944, TNA: 
DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
60 Note by Wiseman, 18th August 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
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Before Garnett undertook his visit to Western Australia, further criti-
cisms about standards at Pinjarra were also received by the UK High 
Commission in Canberra. In 1943, the Australian Commonwealth 
Government had established an inter-departmental committee to explore 
the prospects for post-war immigration, which in turn established a sub- 
committee specifically to examine the potential for resuming child migra-
tion.61 The sub-committee approached Caroline Kelly, an anthropologist 
who had previously undertaken government advisory work on welfare and 
immigration matters, to produce a report examining both existing organ-
isational support for child migration and prospects for future develop-
ment. Kelly produced a national survey of current child migration schemes 
in 1944, from which an extract on Pinjarra was sent to Garnett confiden-
tially by the Commonwealth Department of the Interior.62
In this confidential report, Kelly made significant criticisms of the gov-
ernance of Pinjarra, which she said needed completely overhauling if the 
farm school were to continue to receive Commonwealth Government 
funding. She began by noting that the current Acting Principal (who had 
originally joined the staff as a gardener and then been appointed to this 
post from being the former Principal’s clerk) did not have appropriate 
training for this senior role. At least, Kelly commented, the Acting Principal 
could be commended for his honesty, unlike other members of the 
Committee that she met. Kelly found the Perth Committee elusive and 
uncooperative, and was later informed indirectly that this was because they 
had assumed that she was ‘a minion of London doing a little more spying’.
Despite difficulties in eliciting information from the Perth Committee, 
Kelly was able to visit Pinjarra itself. There she noted that there was a high 
turnover of staff, and an uneven approach to the care of children amongst 
the cottage mothers. Staff that the London committee described as sup-
porting children’s vocational training at the farm school were not in post, 
and the wife of the chairman of the Western Australia committee told 
Kelly that there was little point in providing bursaries for children at 
Pinjarra to pursue grammar school education as they would only feel out 
of place when mixing with their ‘social superiors’. Time after school that 
61 See Carrodus to Director-General, Ministry of Post-War Reconstruction, 30th November 
1943, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2864; also Kelly’s work on European refugees in New South 
Wales at NAA: A1336, 39459.
62 See note by Peters with enclosures, 26th June 1944, NAA: A436, 1945/5/54. The 
Caroline Kelly archives are held at the University of Queensland Library.
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children living in their own homes might normally use for homework was 
taken up with chores. After leaving school at the age of 14, boys were kept 
on at Pinjarra as trainees and Kelly noted that there was pressure to keep 
them there after the age of 16—when they would normally be placed out 
in external labouring jobs—in order to keep Pinjarra’s farm running. 
Similarly, after the age of 14, girls were retained as trainees, which in prac-
tice involved them in undertaking domestic tasks to support the farm 
school rather than receiving any further training in domestic science. As a 
consequence, their skills when placed out in work after the age of 16 were 
limited to general ‘housework’. Kelly also found the committee negligent 
with regard to limiting sexual contact between boys and girls. An on-site 
hostel for former residents of the school offered little management of its 
accommodation for older boys and girls. Whilst there were many cases of 
Fairbridge girls becoming unmarried mothers, the committee reportedly 
dealt with this only through expelling these girls and placing them in local 
Foundling Homes rather than responding more pro-actively to prevent 
such cases. Kelly also cited, supportively, a psychiatric assessment under-
taken of several children at Pinjarra in 1936 which claimed that far too 
many children were being sent from the United Kingdom who were either 
‘mental defectives’ or had some other problematic hereditary psychologi-
cal trait.
Sir Ronald Cross telegrammed the Dominions Office confirming the 
receipt of this extract from the Kelly report and noting that it confirmed 
that ‘all charges referred to in the [Fairbridge] dossier are within knowl-
edge of the Commonwealth Government’. Cross also summarised 
Garnett’s impressions from visits he had made to Picton, Bacchus Marsh 
and Molong with Wheeler earlier that spring before Wheeler had travelled 
to London, which suggested problems both with the composition of the 
local Fairbridge committees, the lack of effective after-care at Northcote 
and Molong and the possible need to end co-education at the Fairbridge 
schools (as had already happened at Picton).63 In view of the Kelly report, 
Cross concluded, Garnett should now definitely proceed to visit Pinjarra 
and Tardun, where for the former the issues of problems with its local 
management and the training provided to children seemed far more press-
ing than on-going struggles between the London and Western Australian 
63 See also ‘Confidential report on visit to Northcote Children’s Farm School, 8/9th May 
1944’, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2, which Wheeler had handed over to the Dominions 
Office at his London meeting.
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committees.64 A copy of Cross’s telegram was also shown, by Paul Emrys 
Evans, to the acting chairman of Fairbridge’s London committee, the 
Conservative MP, Sir William Brass, who had also served as a former 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Leo Amery.65
Garnett visited Pinjarra, and the Christian Brothers’ institutions in 
Western Australia in the late July and early of August of 1944. The first 
substantial document that he sent to the Dominions Office after this was 
a lengthy rebuttal—endorsed by the High Commissioner—of allegations 
made in the ‘Pinjarra dossier’.66 Garnett recognised that there were aspects 
of Fairbridge’s Western Australian committee which needed revising. Like 
the committees for the farm schools at Bacchus Marsh and Molong, the 
Western Australian committee largely consisted of elderly men, appointed 
on the basis of their preeminent public positions, but without specific 
qualifications for over-seeing farm schools of this kind. In Western 
Australia, this had led the committee to take some rigid views and not 
always to be as helpful to promising children in its care as it could have 
been. At the same time, however, Garnett commented, the London com-
mittee’s anxiety to monitor the work being done in Australia had led to 
threats of withholding children or funds from the Australian institutions 
which had bred mistrust and resentment towards the London Society. 
Many of the specific allegations in the dossier, Garnett noted, were made 
by two disgruntled former employees (although one of them had in fact 
paid his own fare back to England to raise concerns with the London com-
mittee) and he questioned the accuracy of some of their claims having 
reviewed records at Pinjarra itself.67 Much of the weight of their com-
plaints, Garnett observed, was that children were not being given a wide 
enough range of vocational opportunities even though this was something 
64 Cross to Dominions Office, 28th June 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
65 Note by Wiseman, 12th July 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
66 Garnett to Wiseman, with enclosures, 23rd August 1944, TNA: DO35/1330; also tele-
gram from High Commission to Dominions Office, 15th August 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/
M1007/1/2..
67 The Dominions Office subsequently received a letter from the Chair of the Society for 
the Oversea Settlement of British Women, vouching for the credibility of one of the com-
plainants, a former after-care worker at Pinjarra, Miss Tempe Woods (Thompson to Wiseman, 
9th April 1945), Wiseman’s handwritten note on the letter is ‘Please don’t bother to reply’. 
Tempe Woods had herself written to Wiseman summarising her previous concerns with 
Pinjarra on 5th April 1945: TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
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that the Fairbridge farm schools in Australia never set out to achieve. That 
one of these complainants had lamented the lack of opportunities for chil-
dren at the school to be taught music was, in Garnett’s view, indicative of 
a failure to understand the purpose and limits of the education being pro-
vided at a farm school. To avoid placing young girls in vulnerable positions 
in isolated rural placements, or the occasional failure to ensure employers 
paid trainees’ wages, would require a substantial re-working of the whole 
scheme. Whilst Garnett felt that the scheme could only work better in the 
future with a more constructive relationship between the London and 
Australian committees, implicit in his comments was a sense that interfer-
ence from the United Kingdom in the affairs of Australian organisations 
reflected an unreconstructed attitude which failed to recognise the grow-
ing autonomy of Australia as a Dominion. This sentiment was regarded 
with some sympathy in the Dominions Office.68
In October, Garnett submitted his full report on the farm schools, 
including an Appendix on the Christian Brothers’ institutions in Western 
Australia, which followed the instruction that he should give particular 
attention to the issue of child migrants’ training.69 Noting that numbers at 
these institutions (other than those run by the Christian Brothers which 
also admitted Australian children) had declined significantly as a result of 
the cessation of child migration during the war, Garnett presented his 
report both as an assessment of current practice and an evaluation of 
potential for the future resumption of these schemes.
In terms of evaluating the effectiveness of the schemes so far, Garnett 
noted that 1071 children had been sent to Pinjarra since its opening with 
825 being assessed as having ‘made good’ (i.e., being in stable employ-
ment and/or married). The remainder were variously categorised as ‘defi-
nite failures’, ‘doubtful failures’, ‘still at school’, ‘lost touch’ or ‘no record’. 
Of these, 25 had been sent to reformatories from Pinjarra. Although the 
State Child Welfare Department found that most of their misdemeanours 
arose either from misunderstandings with staff or lack of sympathetic 
management by employers, Garnett interpreted this more in terms of 
Pinjarra sometimes lacking staff who could deal with ‘difficult children’. 
68 See note by Dixon, 2nd November 1945, also Garnett’s acknowledgement (in ‘Report 
on Farm Schools in Australia’) of grounds for grievance of Fairbridge’s Western Australian 
Committee and his recommendation that the London Society no longer seek to have the 
final say on senior appointments in the farm schools, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
69 William Garnett, ‘Report on Farm Schools in Australia’, para 35, TNA: DO35/1138/
M1007/1/2.
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Only 76 children had so far been placed out in employment from the 
Northcote farm school and a high proportion of them had left their place-
ments without notifying the school. Garnett noted that many of those 
considered unsuccessful in their work placements had received excellent 
reports whilst at the farm school itself. Of the 59 children placed in 
employment from Molong, around half had joined the armed forces and 
it was generally said that the children were reluctant to continue in agri-
cultural work and showed little loyalty to their employers. In the case of 
Picton, 940 boys had so far been placed out in employment, either joining 
the armed services or mainly remaining in agricultural work. The 700 
female child migrants who had left Dr Barnardo’s Homes’ institutions in 
New South Wales were, in the majority of cases, married, with the rest 
mainly in domestic service or the armed services.
A clear assessment of the farm schools’ effectiveness was made harder 
by war-time conditions, Garnett argued, both because of the growth of 
better-paying war-time industries that were more attractive than farm 
work and because of the option of joining the armed services themselves. 
The focus on these farm schools on training children for agricultural 
labour or domestic service constituted the core mission on which they had 
been founded and claims, for example, by the Fairbridge’s London Society 
that children would receive vocational training according to their talents 
had been misleading. The fact that Dr Barnardo’s Homes in New South 
Wales seemed to have less difficulty with their children than the farm 
schools associated with Fairbridge was attributed potentially to Barnardo’s 
longer organisational experience with child-care and the fact that its child 
migrants were already under the charity’s care and training in the United 
Kingdom before coming to Australia.
Despite the clear mission of the farm schools to provide training for 
rural life, Garnett noted that the evidence of the inter-war period in 
Australia had been that it was generally economically unviable to attempt 
to settle immigrants on their own land as farmers unless they had their 
own capital. The Windham delegation’s optimism about the potential for 
settling young British farmers in Australia had therefore not been borne 
out by economic reality and very few of those leaving farm schools had 
gone on to establish themselves as farmers in their own right. Given that 
these economic conditions were unlikely to change, Garnett argued, it was 
more realistic in the future to think of the farm schools as providing train-
ing for children for a range of occupations for rural life in addition to 
agricultural labour. This would also help to address the evident 
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dissatisfaction of child migrants who found the agricultural work that they 
were directed towards unattractive. Better training in agricultural theory 
should nevertheless be given, however, as farm managers at Bacchus Marsh 
and Molong had been unqualified to do this and too often the need for 
children to support the day-to-day running of the farm was prioritised 
over more advanced training. More generally, educationally able children 
should be given more opportunities to advance beyond the primary level 
of education typically provided at the farm schools, supported where nec-
essary by hostels that could accommodate trainees who were receiving 
secondary or technical education away from the farm school. Whilst this 
would constitute a shift away from the farm schools’ original mission, 
Garnett argued that this was a necessary response to anticipated new wel-
fare provisions in the United Kingdom which would reduce the number 
of children available for emigration and ‘raise the standard of treatment 
which public opinion will expect of them’. ‘It will be difficult’, he wrote, 
‘to justify a scheme which determines the careers of children for them 
before they are of an age to have developed any predilections of their own’ 
and ‘public opinion in the United Kingdom will be unlikely in the future 
to favour schemes under which children are sent overseas… to undertake 
work which Australians themselves are reluctant to perform’.70
Garnett recommended that to deliver this revised mission, greater 
attention needed to be paid to the appointment of Principals in future, 
who at the farm schools associated with Fairbridge too rarely had any pre-
vious experience of child-care work. Poor relations between Fairbridge’s 
London and Australian committees could be addressed by more effective 
representation of the London Society on the Australian committees and 
the possible appointment of a liaison officer who would be able to give 
first-hand accounts of child migrants’ treatment to the London office. 
Australian committees should also have a greater representation of mem-
bers (including women) with experience of working with children, includ-
ing at least one child psychologist. The recruitment of appropriate cottages 
mothers had proven to be an increasing problem, with both the high turn-
over of staff in these roles and poor appointments known to have a harm-
ful effect on children. A possible solution to this would be to make such 
posts more attractive to better qualified women who would be relieved to 
70 On seeing Garnett’s report, Dr Barnardo’s Homes also sought to broaden training 
offered in New South Wales beyond agricultural work, see Kirkpatrick to Hart, ML: 
MLMSS.9025, Box 13.
3 FLAWED PROGRESS: CRITICISMS OF RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS… 
80
a large degree of domestic duties normally associated with the role. In the 
absence of more appointments of workers with child-care training due to 
limited financial resources, the farm schools should seek to have at least 
one member of staff with suitable child-care training who could supervise 
the cottage mothers. After-care officers were in post at Pinjarra and Picton. 
But at Bacchus Marsh and Molong, reliance was still primarily placed on 
checking children’s welfare by correspondence—a system which the 
Windham delegation had considered inadequate more than 20 years 
before. Garnett recommended that after-care officers should be appointed 
if not already in post, and that their work should be extended to include 
interviews with prospective employers and inspection of their work places 
prior to children being placed with them. Effective record-keeping of chil-
dren after arrival in Australia was essential and was generally being well 
done by the farm schools, however there was a notable lack of these at the 
institutions run by the Christian Brothers. Garnett remained uncertain 
about the value of sending too much case information with a child to 
Australia, as he saw the danger of this information being used inappropri-
ately by staff directly involved in the child’s care outweighing the likely 
benefits of such information being shared. More generally, Garnett was 
critical of the tendency of the farm schools to operate as isolated institu-
tions that provided too few opportunities for child migrants to mix with 
local children and communities and which therefore prepared them poorly 
for life beyond the institution. More effort, he wrote, should be put into 
helping child migrants participate in local activities and attend local schools 
outside of the farm school.
Garnett’s assessment of the Christian Brothers’ institutions in Western 
Australia was mixed. On the one hand, the provision of a wider range of 
training in trades at Bindoon and the training of Christian Brothers as 
teachers (mainly at the order’s Strathfield College in Sydney) offered 
advantages over the more limited training and largely unqualified staff at 
the other farm schools. He also noted the Brothers’ claim that a third of 
the boys who had completed secondary school had gone on to complete 
the early secondary level qualification, the Junior Certificate, a rate which 
was said to compare favourably with other state schools. The involvement 
of boys in the construction of new buildings at Bindoon was also seen as a 
useful part of their vocational training. At the same time, Garnett had 
strong reservations. The standard of accommodation at Castledare and 
Tardun was particularly poor (in stark contrast to the recently built 
Nazareth House at Geraldton), and the lack of female help at Castledare 
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made it particularly unsuitable as an institution for receiving young chil-
dren. Without further improvement Castledare was not, Garnett con-
cluded, an appropriate place for further British child migrants to be sent—a 
view with which Redmond Prendiville, the Archbishop of Perth, report-
edly concurred. Accommodation at Tardun remained ‘primitive’ and was 
still incomplete and insufficient for the number of boys being kept there. 
Garnett also observed that the retention of boys without pay at Tardun up 
to the age of 18 offered little educational benefit to them. More generally, 
their training seemed to be subordinated to the use of their labour to gen-
erate income from the farm to alleviate the considerable overdraft built up 
during its development.71 The particularly isolated location of Tardun, 
and the fact that the quality of its land meant that it would not have been 
used for this purpose had it not been gifted to the Brothers, also made it 
far from ideal as a place to receive child migrants before school-leaving 
age. Very few records of individual children appeared to be kept, and the 
quality of after-care—devolved to local parish priests—was unclear.
When forwarded a copy of Garnett’s report, Gordon Green replied that 
the problems described at Pinjarra reflected the Western Australia’s com-
mittee resistance to pressure from London for appropriate staff to be 
appointed. He also noted that the Salvation Army reformatory fortunately 
appeared to be a more ‘kindly place’ for the Fairbridge children that had 
been expelled there.72 Similar dissatisfaction in New South Wales at the 
results of children placed out in work from Molong was, Green claimed, 
again a result of failure to accept appropriate oversight from London.
Green was unhappy with the notion that boys should be placed in farm 
work, and girls in domestic service, simply as a benefit to Australian soci-
ety. He argued that ‘to coerce Fairbridge boys and girls, whatever their 
tastes or capabilities, into agricultural or domestic work, would certainly 
mean a serious injustice to the individual and would invalidate the benefi-
cence of Fairbridge care and custody of the child’. He added that contact 
with Old Fairbridgeans who had returned to the United Kingdom with 
the armed services had confirmed that in very many cases, those leaving 
Pinjarra had gone on to very poorly paid farm jobs in isolated areas in 
71 See also note by Ives, 31st May 1943, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/2 which observes 
that claims for maintenance payments for boys at Tardun suggested that fewer were leaving 
there than was the case at Picton or the farm schools connected to Fairbridge.
72 Green to Wiseman, 31st August 1945, and Report on Farm Schools in Australia by Mr 
W. Garnett and Comments of the General Secretary of the Fairbridge Farm Schools, Inc., 
TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
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which ‘the despised farm labourer had little contact with the master and 
the master’s family’. When asked by an after-care officer from Pinjarra why 
a Fairbridge trainee was being paid nearly half the wage of Australian-born 
workers at the same farm, the employer reportedly replied, ‘Ah, but he is 
only a Fairbridge boy’.
Given such experiences, Green noted, it was unsurprising that those 
leaving Pinjarra would seek to move away from farm work. Too many 
children had been taken from poor backgrounds in Britain only to become 
an ‘underprivileged class’ in Australia ‘out of which only those with excep-
tional ability have been able to climb into a happier economic climate’. 
The farm schools at Bacchus Marsh and Molong were also problematic in 
their expectation of ‘docility and uniformity’ amongst the children in their 
care, and without greater control over operations in Australia, the London 
Society would be unable to ensure that the best interests of children were 
being served. The model of more diverse training in trades reportedly 
provided by the Christian Brothers would, Green suggested, be best taken 
up as a model by Fairbridge in the future.
Whilst he concurred with Garnett’s assessment about the likely reduc-
tion in the supply of children from extremely poor backgrounds after the 
war, Green nevertheless anticipated that there would still be a ready supply 
of ‘illegitimate children’ who ‘have no place in a normal family’ and for 
whom emigration to the Dominions would offer ‘a shelter against the 
harsh disadvantages of illegitimacy’. Green did, however, challenge a claim 
made by Garnett that the Western Australian committee were justifiably 
unhappy with the London committee for failing to provide expected num-
bers of children for Pinjarra once the other farm schools opened. Contrary 
to the suggestion that Pinjarra had been starved of expected recruits 
because the London Society had over-stretched itself with the opening of 
new farm schools, Green countered that recruitment to Pinjarra had fallen 
because the London Society was unhappy with standards and after-care 
there and that the Western Australian committee had, by that stage, built 
up sufficient financial reserves for reduced recruitment not to cause them 
financial difficulty.
Garnett’s encouragement of better relations between the London and 
Australian committees failed to take account, Green argued, of the fact 
that the Australian bodies seemed largely able, on past history, to refuse 
direction from London. This left  Fairbridge’s London committee with 
responsibility for the children it sent overseas but no power over their care. 
This could only be resolved with a re-drawing of the legal basis of 
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Fairbridge operations in Australia which would make the London Society 
the legal centre for their work. In the absence of any resolution of this 
unsatisfactory situation, Green argued that both the UK and Australian 
Governments should play a more active role in ensuring proper protection 
of children at these farm schools. Without more control from London, 
Green also questioned whether any more child migrants should be sent to 
the Fairbridge farm schools in Australia to suffer at the hands of ‘obscu-
rantist committees’ with placing children out in foster care a preferable 
option to this. Garnett, when forwarded a copy of Green’s comments, 
expressed scepticism about a number of his claims and recalled a submis-
sion from the Fairbridge Society to the Economic Advisory Council whilst 
he acted as a secretary for it, stating that the Society’s aim was for the 
training up of agricultural workers and there was no need to supply chil-
dren for other kinds of work.73 It would be more gracious, Garnett sug-
gested, if the London Society recognised that its original mission was 
out-of-date rather than placing all the blame for the narrow vocational 
training at the farm schools on the Australian committees.
Composing a memorandum on Green’s response, Wiseman took the 
view that it offered an unduly negative view of the Australian committees 
whom, he noted, the UK High Commission believed were responsive to 
improving the farm schools.74 Whilst a common charter of principles 
agreed by all the Fairbridge committees could be a useful initiative, this 
could only be based on a principle of the committees being equal bodies 
and any attempt by London to exert control over Australian bodies would, 
he thought, be disastrous. Much of the poor outcomes with placing child 
migrants in agricultural work could be attributed to war-time conditions, 
and if in future shortcomings were identified at the farm schools by visits 
such as those undertaken by Garnett and Wheeler, or by State welfare 
officials, ‘it is likely that the Australian committees would respond to the 
suggestions without difficulty’. It was not entirely clear, however, on what 
evidence Wiseman’s optimistic view was based.
The view that greater control from London over the Australian com-
mittees was impractical was endorsed by a meeting between John Parker 
MP, the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Dominions 
Affairs in the Attlee Government, Sir John Stephenson, Deputy 
73 Garnett to Wiseman, 15th January 1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
74 Memorandum by Wiseman, 31st October 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
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Under- Secretary of State, Wiseman and Miss Wall,75 a representative from 
the Children’s Branch of the Home Office.76 The Home Office became 
drawn into these discussions after Fairbridge’s London committee had 
formally requested advice from the Home Office on revising its charter 
and constitution in line with current standards of child welfare. This meet-
ing was the first occasion in which the Home Office was to become 
involved in direct discussions with the Dominions Office about child 
migration policy, reflecting the fact that, up to that point, this had been 
understood primarily as a part of central government policy on assisted 
migration rather than on children’s out-of-home care.
In preparing for the meeting, Sir John Stephenson wrote an internal 
note indicating that whilst the proposal that Fairbridge’s London Society 
should have legal control over the Australian committees was not feasible, 
he nevertheless sympathised with their argument that they needed to be 
satisfied that their obligations to children and their guardians were being 
properly discharged once the children were overseas. The difficulty that 
Fairbridge’s London committee had in exerting control over child migra-
tion was, Stephenson commented, indicative of a similar challenge facing 
the UK Government:
In fact, these particular issues raise a wide general issue of policy. In present 
conditions, is it right that the Government here should not exercise greater 
responsibility? In other words, is it right that the migration of children from 
this country should be handed over to a private society to organise without 
any complete power of control by the Government beyond their power to 
make occasional investigations and call for reports from the Society? There 
can be no doubt that the original idea of the Scheme… is sound. But it is for 
consideration whether the maintenance of a plan of this kind should now be 
left to charitable private enterprise, the part of Government being limited to 
75 The role of Miss Wall, and later Mary Rosling, at higher administrative levels in the 
Home Office in work relating to the care of children should be understood in the context in 
which women made up a very small proportion of higher administrative staff within the civil 
service in this period (see Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants, p. 175).
76 Minute of meeting at the Dominions Office, 18th December 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/
M1007/1/2. Prior to this meeting, the Home Office Children’s Branch had seen copies 
both of Garnett’s original report and Green’s response and held a short summary of this on 
file (TNA: MH102/1401). As this file was on proposals for future arrangements for 
Fairbridge, the summary of Garnett’s report held by the Home Office did not make any 
reference to the Christian Brothers.
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certain financial contributions and a general but not very effective power of 
supervision.77
Such concerns were, by then, not merely raised by the Australian expe-
rience, but also by critical reports that the Dominions Office had received 
about the Fairbridge Prince of Wales farm school in British Columbia.78
In response, Parker wrote that he agreed that the Fairbridge case raised 
wider policy questions relating to the governance and oversight of institu-
tions receiving child migrants.79 This was particularly the case given indi-
cations from the Australian Commonwealth Government that it was 
interested in a considerable expansion of child migration following the 
end of the war. Without specifying what form it might take, Parker sup-
ported the creation of a ‘more formal machinery’ in the United Kingdom 
to ‘keep a watch on all of the child migration schemes to Australia’ which 
would involve representatives from the Dominions Office, the Australian 
High Commission in London and those organisations sending child 
migrants. In Australia, State Government representatives should be 
appointed to management committees of receiving institutions, along 
with representatives of other welfare organisations, and periodic inspec-
tions should also be made by staff from the Commonwealth Government 
and UK High Commission in Canberra. Whilst seeing child migration as 
having served a useful purpose which would continue, for a limited num-
ber of children, for many years to come, Parker proposed that UK 
Government funding support for Fairbridge farm schools be brought to 
an end if they did not broaden their training. Sending organisations should 
recognise the ‘Dominion status’ of receiving bodies, however, and should 
not direct control over them, just as the UK Government no longer 
sought control over her Dominions. Given the likely pressures to resume 
child migration in the near future, Parker recommended that 
77 Note by Stephenson, 29th November 1945, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
78 Criticisms about the ‘administration, methods and outcomes’ of the Prince of Wales 
farm school were initially raised in a review of the CORB evacuation scheme to Canada (see 
‘General Review of the CORB Scheme in Canada, 1940-1944’, TNA: DO35/1140/
M1156/36). This led to further inquiries through the UK High Commission in Canada 
which established that recent reviews had identified serious failings at the farm school in 
terms of staff appointments and behaviour, its isolation and approach to training and prob-
lems with the sexual behaviour of those leaving the farm school (see note by Dixon, 14th 
November 1944, TNA: DO35/1137/M894/1).
79 Note by Parker, 18th December 1945, DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
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arrangements for the proper governance, oversight and delivery of child 
migration work needed to be put in place as quickly as possible. ‘It will 
create a very bad impression’, he noted, if child migration were delayed 
‘because of difficulties which up to now have been kept out of public view’.
In the event, though, limited staffing resources at the UK High 
Commission in Canberra meant that no regular inspections of receiving 
institutions were made by its staff when assisted child migration resumed 
in the post-war period. In the absence of such direct inspections, British 
policy-makers were to remain largely reliant on institutional approval and 
inspection reports generated by Australian State officials—information 
which was often shaped by the particular interests and working relation-
ships operating between State officials and voluntary societies on the 
ground. In one sense, reliance on reports from ‘regional’ inspectors 
reflected existing practice within the Home Office, in which civil servants 
undertaking administrative and policy work in its Children’s Department 
rarely, if ever, undertook any direct visits to local authorities and voluntary 
societies and based their decisions on reports from the Home Office 
Inspectorate.80 It was only some years into the post-war period, however, 
before it became clear that Australian State inspectors might be interpret-
ing institutional conditions for child migrants quite differently to  stan-
dards used by Home Office inspectors.
‘the original idea of the sCheMe… is sound’: 
interPretative fraMes and PoliCy-Making
The war years therefore heralded a significant shift in understanding in the 
Dominions Office of the need for better governance and more careful 
monitoring of the institutions to which child migrants were being sent in 
Australia. From the generally positive presumptions made about the deliv-
ery of child migration schemes in 1939, the notes by Stephenson and 
Parker in the winter of 1945 showed that there had been a significant 
move towards recognising the need for more careful monitoring of the 
training and after-care of child migrants, including an active role for the 
United Kingdom and Australian Commonwealth and State governments. 
Despite this change in attitude, a wider assumption of the beneficial effects 
of child migration remained.




Given evidence of failings in the schemes that had gathered in the war 
years, the persistence of this assumption might seem remarkable. Although 
no settled view seemed to have been reached as to whether difficulties in 
Australia arose from poor selection of children in the United Kingdom, 
the Dominions Office had seen repeated evidence of problems within 
organisational structures, in the selection and oversight of staff, in stan-
dards of institutional care and after-care, in the range and quality of train-
ing given and of the experiences of child migrants when placed out with 
employers.
Despite this, the long-standing assumption of the benefits of child 
migration, reinforced through the past 30 years of reviews of empire set-
tlement policy, provided a framework through which these problems were 
not seen as fundamentally undermining the value of this work. Rather, 
they were, perceived as temporary problems, arising from particular cir-
cumstances or the failings of particular individuals, rather than endemic in 
the system of child migration itself. Optimism for its future was thus main-
tained. Both the reports by Caroline Kelly and Walter Garnett had sug-
gested that whilst there had been past failings at farm schools, these should 
be treated on the principle of ‘what’s past is past’. Such a willingness to 
write off past shortcomings made sense if it was assumed that the funda-
mental principle of child migration was sound and that such shortcomings 
need not be repeated in the future. Garnett’s willingness to accept that 
there would inevitably be failures with individual child migrants again was 
understandable if the schemes were, in general, seen as beneficial. In this 
same spirit, policy-makers’ concerns were eased by assurances from trusted 
figures that conditions for child migrants would improve and hope for the 
future of the work was renewed whenever failing managers of receiving 
institutions were replaced. Such confidence tended to be reinforced by 
British policy-makers’ reliance on written inspection reports produced in 
Australia, whose authors (including State immigration officials with an 
institutional interest in maintaining assisted migration) provided their 
own interpretative gloss on the inherent value of these schemes. The sys-
temic problems inherent in such a trans-national welfare initiative were 
therefore interpreted as contingent quirks in a policy in which those in 
government continued to keep their faith.
Such positive presumptions towards child migration work foreclosed 
more critical inferences that could obviously have been drawn from the 
material already at hand for policy-makers. No one in the Dominions 
Office or UK High Commission appears to have been led by the Fairbridge 
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file on Northcote to ask how such problems had persisted there for so 
many years without their knowledge. Attlee was happy to believe that 
things were reasonably well at the Christian Brothers’ institutions despite 
the evidently limited value of McAdam’s reports and the minimal informa-
tion provided about child migrants’ vocational training. Although confi-
dence in Fairbridge’s work appeared to have been shaken temporarily in 
the Dominions Office following its receipt of the Fairbridge dossier in 
May 1944, this was soon restored by the rebuttal of much of the dossier 
by the UK High Commission. Whilst Garnett’s rejection of these criti-
cisms was argued in some detail, there remained grounds for remaining 
unsure whether all was entirely well given that Garnett had not personally 
visited former Pinjarra residents placed out in work and had too easily 
attributed complaints to staff falling out with the Western Australian com-
mittee. The claim in his 1944 report that a substantial number of former 
residents had ‘made good’ by finding stable employment was not sub-
jected to any critical scrutiny in the light of Green’s claims of what former 
Pinjarra residents had told him about how they were marginalised and 
under-paid by the farmers who took them on. Although there was a hard-
ening of opinion in the Dominions Office about the need for more regular 
government monitoring of institutions in Australia, this was seen as a safe-
guard for ensuring the effective delivery of a programme still assumed to 
have a useful social role. Generalised notions of the potential benefit of 
child migration thus provided the frame within which specific evidence of 
its failures was understood. As John Parker put it, where problems had 
clearly been established, these needed to be rectified so that public confi-
dence in the value of this work was not lost. The reputation of this work—
given that it was fundamentally a social good—needed to be protected.
The importance of the interpretative frames through which civil ser-
vants and politicians understood the information they received about child 
migrants in Australia can also be seen in terms of what they believed con-
stituted problems in this context. The fundamental understanding of child 
migration as an opportunity for education and training that would fit a 
child for a productive life as an imperial citizen meant that evidence of 
shortcomings in this training in the Fairbridge dossier and reports by Kelly 
and Garnett aroused strong concern in the UK High Commission and 
Dominions Office. Child migration was, in Gordon Green’s words, thus 
understood as a ‘serious injustice to the individual’ if it acted against the 
ability of the child to make some decision about their future career in 
accordance with their ability or led to British children effectively being 
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forced into menial roles that Australians were not prepared to take. The 
strength of feeling about this was evident in both Green’s and Parker’s 
willingness to withdraw support for children being sent to Fairbridge farm 
schools after the war unless training was broadened and allowed children 
greater scope to follow their interests and aptitudes. Similarly there was a 
consensus in the Dominions Office and the UK High Commission that if 
child migrants were to be assimilated effectively  as citizens of British 
Dominions they could not live most of their childhoods in self-contained 
institutions with little contact with local communities, families or other 
children. By comparison, although Garnett recognised the need to address 
the problem of retaining appropriately skilled cottage mothers, there was 
little or no internal discussion within the Dominions Office of the likely 
effects on children of a high turnover of cottage mothers or the appoint-
ment of cottage mothers unsuited to providing appropriate emotional 
care for children. This emphasis on child migration as a form of vocational 
and civic training, and the comparative lack of emphasis on the quality of 
care of children, was to continue to be a feature of thinking about child 
migration amongst some supporters of empire settlement work well into 
the post-war period.
The other interpretative frame that proved significant for how child 
migration was perceived by British policy-makers was the wider movement 
towards greater political freedom for Britain’s Dominions. In contrast to 
a backward-looking colonialism, valuing the autonomy of Australian gov-
ernmental and voluntary bodies and trusting in their good-will to achieve 
appropriate standards seemed a far more progressive position to policy- 
makers in the Dominions Office and UK High Commission. Aversion to 
strict oversight and control from Britain was evident not only in responses 
to attempts by the Fairbridge Society in London to act as the effective 
centre of operations for the farm schools, but in Cross’s suggestion that 
annual inspections to receiving institutions in Australia be re-cast more as 
friendly visits. It is interesting to note that whilst such discomfort with any 
hint of continuing colonial control from Britain may have been felt 
amongst some British civil servants and politicians, it was not necessarily 
shared by their Australian counter-parts. Reuben Wheeler—in 1944—was 
perfectly happy to propose that the British Government undertake formal 
inspections of institutions for child migrants.
Whilst presumptions about the inherent value of child migration, and 
the need to respect the autonomy of the Dominions, still fundamentally 
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underpinned British policy-makers’ attitudes, the experiences of war-time 
failures had at least begun to make them more aware of the need to main-
tain some form of oversight of this work. The policy environment in which 
this was to take place, though, was about to change significantly as a result 
of the transformation of the structures of children’s out-of-home care aris-
ing from the work of the Care of Children Committee led by Myra Curtis.
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CHAPTER 4
‘Providing for Children… Deprived 
of a Normal Home Life’: The Curtis Report 
and the Post-war Policy Landscape 
of Children’s Out-of-Home Care
The Report of the Care of Children Committee was presented to Parliament 
on 13th September 1946.1 Chaired by Myra Curtis, a retired senior civil 
servant and Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, the report consti-
tuted the most substantial review of the out-of-home care of children to 
have been undertaken in England and Wales for a generation. Neither the 
war-time coalition Government, nor the in-coming Labour administration 
of 1945, had originally intended that such a Committee of Inquiry be 
established. Although it was well-recognised within the Ministry of 
Health, the Home Office and the Board of Education that the fragmented 
legislative and administrative system that had evolved for children’s out- 
of- home care was inefficient and in need of reform, it was assumed that 
reform could be managed through a private governmental inter- 
departmental committee.2 In 1944, however, a public campaign for an 
inquiry into standards of care in residential children’s homes, led by 
Marjorie Allen, created the political conditions in which the Labour 
Government felt obliged to create an over-arching review of children’s 
out-of-home care that would produce a public report relating both to its 
1 Report of the Care of Children Committee, cmd.6922 (London: HMSO, 1946).
2 On the process by which the Care of Children Committee came to be established, see 
Lynch, ‘Pathways to the 1946 Curtis report’.
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administrative structures and to appropriate standards of care.3 Although 
its creation was formally announced by the Home Secretary, Herbert 
Morrison, in the House of Commons in December 1944, the membership 
of the Committee was not announced until the following February. By 
then, Morrison was under growing pressure to expedite the Committee’s 
work with public attention further focused on failings in children’s out-of- 
home care as the case of Dennis O’Neill, who was beaten to death by his 
foster-father, attracted sustained press attention.
The work involved in the production of what became known as the 
Curtis report was substantial. Between March 1945 and June 1946, the 
17-member committee received oral and written evidence from represen-
tatives of 51 governmental, professional and voluntary organisations and 
18 individuals, as well as a further 31 written memoranda from other 
interested organisations and individuals.4 In addition to collating compre-
hensive statistics about the different forms of out-of-home care in which 
children were currently accommodated, and the various public authorities 
responsible for their care, members of the Curtis Committee also divided 
into sub-groups that undertook inspection visits to 451 residential institu-
tions and an unspecified number of foster homes across 41 counties. On 
the basis of these inspections, the Committee claimed that from a total of 
124,900 children currently ‘deprived of a normal home life’, they had 
been able to form direct impressions of the standards of care for around 
30,000. In addition, members of the Committee reviewed children’s case 
files and institutional inspection reports held by relevant public bodies 
both to compare these with their own impressions and to establish the 
extent to which systems of inspection were proving effective in identifying 
and changing poor standards of care.
Recognising the limitations of what could be learned from single visits 
to institutions, the Committee acknowledged that they were unlikely to 
become aware of specific cases of children being subjected to harsh or 
cruel treatment by staff and that their exposure to individual institutions 
lacked sufficient depth to identify any by name for particular praise or 
3 On Allen’s campaign, see Lynch, ‘Pathways to 1946 Curtis report’, pp. 28–32. As well as 
being well-known to the UK Government, cuttings from The Times of correspondence relat-
ing to Allen’s campaign were also held on file by the Australian Commonwealth Department 
of Post-War Reconstruction in the context of policy discussions about the resumption of 
post-war child migration (see NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589).




censure. Nevertheless, this range of underpinning evidence made it pos-
sible for its report to identify what the Committee understood to be a 
wide range of examples of both current good and bad practice in child- 
care, as well as the shortcomings of a fragmented policy framework.5
The report’s recommendations played a central role in shaping the 
administration, ethos and oversight of post-war out-of-home care for chil-
dren and were substantially implemented in the 1948 Children Act. These 
recommendations were not wholly innovative and in many respects 
reflected changes to administrative structures which had been proposed in 
an internal report produced by the Ministry of Health in 1944.6 Its cri-
tiques of impersonal residential children’s homes, discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter, also reflected views already familiar to those respon-
sible for different aspects of children’s out-of-home care in the Ministry of 
Health, Home Office and Board of Education,7 and, as Marjorie Allen’s 
campaign illustrated, had wider public and professional support.8 The fact 
that the Curtis report built on well-established ideas meant that it was able 
to exert considerable influence over both the policy framework for chil-
dren’s out-of-home care in the emerging post-war welfare state and public 
understandings of appropriate standards of child-care. Although some of 
5 For a summary of the Committee’s methodology in relation to these inspection visits, see 
Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 2, 100–105, 397; on the point about single 
visits being unlikely to identify any children ‘being cruelly used in the ordinary sense’ see 
para 418.
6 See The Break Up of the Poor Law and the Care of Children and Old People, TNA: 
MH102/1378.
7 Similarities between the 1944 Ministry of Health report on ‘The break-up of the Poor 
Law’ and the Report of the Care of Children Committee are discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter. By 1944, staff in the Home Office, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education 
also recognised that there was widely held critique of the psychologically damaging effects of 
impersonal institutional care for children and of the benefits of forms of care more closely 
resembling family life, such as adoption or foster care (‘Draft of a Joint Memorandum which 
it is suggested might be submitted to the Reconstruction Committee by the Home Secretary, 
the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Education’, 
30th November 1944, MH102/1161).
8 See, for example, the leader article in The Times, 31st July 1944, p. 5, which noted the 
‘virtual unanimity with which children’s magistrates, child psychologists, education experts, 
workers in, and officers responsible for, children’s homes’ had written, supporting Allen’s 
concerns. The letters pages of The Times over the previous month actually suggested more 
diverse views, but The Times editorial sought to emphasise the views of those supporting 
Allen from these professions over the views of correspondents from voluntary organisations 
who had sought to defend current standards in residential care.
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the report’s aspirations were slow to be realised—notably in terms of 
improving levels of training for child-care workers and the proportion of 
children placed in foster care rather than residential institutions9—it nev-
ertheless shaped the policy landscape of children’s out-of-home care in the 
early post-war period, providing the background within which child 
migration to Australia was resumed, managed and contested.10
The CurTis reporT and The adminisTraTive 
resTruCTuring of Children’s ouT-of-home Care
The Report of the Care of Children Committee focused on three main areas 
of concern: the administrative structures for government oversight and 
management of the out-of-home care of children, the ethos of child-care 
needed to provide an appropriate compensation for the lack of a family 
home, and the framework of staffing, training and inspection needed to 
ensure that these standards were maintained. With some minor variations, 
these concerns and key recommendations were also shared by the Report 
of the Committee on Homeless Children, or Clyde Report, that had submit-
ted its review of the out-of-home care of children in Scotland at the end 
of July 1946.11
9 See, for example, a survey showing that in 1964, 61% of local authority child-care officers 
were still not fully qualified, with significant regional variations in the proportion of local 
authority staff with suitable training (J.A.G.  Griffith, Central Departments and Local 
Authorities, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966, p.  364). In some cases, Children’s 
Officers were still in post in the early 1960s because of their more general administrative 
abilities rather than any specific qualifications in child-care, the quality of Children’s Officers 
was uneven and local authority child-care could still be influenced by elected members of 
Children’s Committees having more direct involvement in children’s case-work and other 
operational matters than was appropriate for their experience and training (ibid., 
pp. 383–6, 392).
10 On the process and significance of the Curtis report, see also Gordon Lynch, ‘Pathways 
to the 1946 Curtis report and the post-war reconstruction of children’s out-of-home care’, 
Contemporary British History, 34(1), 2019, 22–43; Gladys Kammerer, British and American 
Child Welfare Services (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962); Janet Fink, ‘Inside a 
hall of mirrors: residential care and the shifting constructions of childhood in mid-twentieth 
century Britain’, Paedagogica Historica, 44(3), 2008, 287–307.
11 Report of the Committee on Homeless Children, cmd.6911 (London: HMSO, 1946), see 
also Holman ‘Fifty years ago’ and John Stewart, ‘The most precious possession of a nation is 
its children: the Clyde Committee on homeless children in Scotland’, Scottish Economic and 
Social History, 21(1), 2001, 43–66. The main differences in the recommendations of the 
Clyde and Curtis reports were that the former did not see a need for an inspectorate to be 
distinct from existing community-based professionals (such as medical practitioners and min-
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In relation to issues of administration, Myra Curtis had already been 
told on appointment to her role that her Committee was not to make any 
specific recommendations about which central government department 
should assume primarily responsibility for children’s out-of-home care.12 
Whilst observing this request (even though most of its members appear to 
have favoured giving this responsibility to the Home Office),13 the 
Committee’s report nevertheless made the more general case for adminis-
trative reform by observing the failings of the current fragmented system 
within central government. These problems were exarcebated by the fact 
that the central government department responsible for a child’s out-of- 
home care varied depending on the particular legal measure through which 
they had come into care.14 Some institutions could receive multiple inspec-
tions from different public bodies if children had been placed in them 
through different statutory processes, whilst some children (e.g., in 
endowed voluntary children’s homes not reliant on public subscriptions or 
children aged nine and above who were boarded out for payment) received 
no inspections at all.15 Of particular concern to the Committee were frag-
mented local authority structures, where it found evidence of both incon-
sistent systems and of poor standards of care and record- keeping resulting 
from dysfunctional relationships between different committees within the 
same local authority.16 These problems became even more acute in the 
isters) who currently undertook inspections in Scotland and was more prepared than Curtis 
to accept the value of institutional care for children (whilst recognising the need for skilled 
staff in this role and the avoidance of institutional rigidity). The Clyde report made no refer-
ence or recommendation explicitly relating to child migration.
12 See ‘Homeless Children’ memorandum, 1st April 1946, TNA: MH102/1387.
13 See ‘Memorandum to Secretary of State’, 13th December 1946, TNA: MH102/1393 
on private contact between a Home Office official with Henry Salt, and Rosling to Allen, 
24th October 1946, MRC: MSS.121/CC/3/7/1-17.
14 Lynch, ‘Pathways to the Curtis report’; F.M.G. Willson, The Organization of British 
Central Government, 1914–64, 2nd edition (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968).
15 See, for example, Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 98–99. Examples of 
correspondence between the Home Office and Ministry of Health about their separate 
inspection interests in a single institution can be found in TNA: MH102/1399 in relation to 
the Middlemore Emigration Homes.
16 Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 106–120, 123, 129–35. On occasion 
there even appeared to be some confusion between committee members about what system 
of local inspection was being discussed (see, e.g., Notes of a meeting held at the Home 
Office, Whitehall, SW1, on Monday 26th March 1945, pp.  15–17, TNA: 
MH102/1451D/C1).
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cases of children, like Dennis O’Neill, who were boarded out by one local 
authority in private homes within another local authority. The lack of con-
sistent notification of the ‘receiving’ local authority meant that children 
could sometimes be placed in foster homes by the ‘sending’ authority that 
the ‘receiving’ authority had previously rejected as unsuitable. Such failings 
arising from fragmented structures in local authorities posed an even 
greater risk to vulnerable children, the Committee concluded, than those 
in central government.17
One of the most important emphases in the report’s recommendations 
was therefore a series of measures to develop a simpler and more compre-
hensive administrative structure within central and local government.18 
The lead department in central government was to take responsibility not 
for all aspects of the lives of children ‘deprived of a normal family home’, 
but specifically for those aspects of their lives where the lack of this family 
environment needed to be compensated in some way. This department 
would establish a central register of all children’s residential institutions 
and have the right both to inspect these and to de-register them if their 
standards of care were unacceptable. It would set out consistent standards 
for boarding out to be adhered to by all local authorities and voluntary 
organisations. This lead department would also develop an inspectorate 
with sufficient resources both to undertake direct inspections of residen-
tial institutions and to oversee local systems of inspections for boarded out 
children. These recommendations were subsequently implemented after 
the Labour Cabinet decided, in March 1947, to make the Home Office 
the lead department for children’s out-of-home care in England and 
Wales, and the Home Department within the Scottish Office, the lead 
department for Scotland.19 This led both to the creation of Advisory 
Councils on Child Care in England and Wales, and in Scotland, to offer 
guidance to their respective Secretaries of State on how their new 
17 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para 438.
18 Recommendations about these administrative structures occur in Report of the Care of 
Children Committee, paras 423–26, 429–34, 438–46, 452, 454, 472, 475, 492.
19 See ‘Cabinet, Responsibility for the Care of Deprived Children’, Memorandum by the 
Lord Privy Seal, 12th March 1947, TNA: MH102/1393, and ‘Extract from Conclusions of 
a Meeting of the Cabinet 29(47)’, held on Tuesday 18th March 1947, TNA: MH102/1393. 
The exception to this new administrative arrangement was with the Ministry of Pensions 
retaining responsibility for children who had having lost one or both parents during the war, 
and who were regarded as special cases with regard to public sympathy and support 
(Cunnison to Barlow, 12th March 1945, TNA: MH102/1381).
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responsibilities might be discharged in line with current thinking on child- 
care. An expanded  Home Office Children’s Department Inspectorate 
with regional offices across England and Wales was also established.
The Committee could have recommended that responsibility for the 
out-of-home care of children would be allocated to just this one central 
government department, following Lady Allen’s suggestion that local 
authorities be removed from this work altogether.20 However, it rejected 
this approach as likely to generate too impersonal a system. Instead it 
made a series of recommendations about local authorities’ continued 
involvement, working within the wider framework set down by the central 
government department. Recognising that a number of local authorities 
were already moving towards having a single committee responsible for 
the out-of-home care of children, the Curtis Report recommended that 
this take the form of newly created Children’s Committees. Through 
these new committees, local authorities would discharge a more integrated 
and expanded range of duties, including taking responsibility for all chil-
dren currently maintained under the Poor Law, the Children and Young 
Persons Act, the Public Health Act and the Adoption Act. In addition, the 
local authority would no longer be able to refuse the duty of care for a 
child placed with it by a juvenile court under the Children and Young 
Persons Act. The local authority would maintain oversight of all residen-
tial children’s homes within its area and continue to develop and manage 
its own residential institutions. It would also maintain oversight of foster 
homes within its area, keep a register of approved foster homes, ensure 
regular inspections of these and develop new policies to encourage regis-
tration of privately arranged foster placements. The work of these 
Children’s Committees was to be led by the newly created posts of 
Children’s Officers, comparable in standing to local Directors of Education 
and Medical Officers of Health, and who would become the de facto 
guardian of all children placed in the local authority’s care. Communication 
over the transfer of children between local authorities would also be 
improved by responsibility for this also being placed on the respective 
Children’s Officer of each authority.
20 Home Office staff consulted with Myra Curtis in early 1946 to check her views about 
Lady Allen’s proposal that all local government involvement in children’s out-of-home care 
should be ended. Curtis indicated that the Committee definitely favoured retaining local 
authority involvement and that Curtis personally preferred the model of having children’s 
officers appointed at a comparable level to directors of education (Note, 15th February 
1946, TNA: MH102/1385).
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Whilst the report offered significant continuity with ideas already dis-
cussed in Government,21 there was one policy initiative amongst these that 
Curtis did press forward despite significant opposition. The Ministry of 
Health’s internal report on The Break-Up of the Poor Law had suggested 
the creation of Children’s Committees within local authorities and the 
creation of Children’s Officers as senior local government posts subsumed 
to neither health nor education. This was an idea to which Curtis herself 
was also strongly committed.22 These ideas were highly controversial, 
however, particularly for those who were used to local authority education 
officers and committees taking leading roles in children’s out-of-home 
care (e.g., through their responsibility for oversight of children placed 
under ‘fit person’ orders with local authorities through the Children and 
Young Person’s Act).23 Before the Committee’s report had even been sub-
mitted to the Home Secretary, Ellen Wilkinson, the Minister for Education 
had already raised objections on this issue during discussions at the gov-
ernment’s inter-departmental committee on the break-up of the Poor 
Law.24 After the publication of the Curtis report, Wilkinson continued to 
press the case for local education committees being given responsibility for 
children’s out-of-home care, finding support in this from the National 
Union of Teachers, the Association of Educational Committees, some 
local authorities and Lady Allen herself.25 In the face of this opposition, 
the Home Office and Ministry of Health found themselves less willing to 
21 See Ministry of Health, The Break-Up of the Poor Law; see also ‘The future of the home-
less child: outlines of a suggested scheme’, 11th March 1946, TNA: MH102/1387, which 
sets out proposals that are very close to the eventual recommendations of the Curtis Report.
22 See the summary of Curtis’s views on this in Maxwell to Pimlott, 14th March 1946, 
TNA: MH102/1386.
23 See, for example, Report by Sir Walter Monckton, pp. 4–5, although Monckton also dem-
onstrated local variations to this with LEA responsibility for boarded out CYPA children 
being delegated to Public Assistance Committee in Shropshire as they had more experience 
of over-seeing foster placements.
24 ‘Minutes of meeting on Thursday 18th July’, recommendation 26(g), TNA: 
MH102/1390.
25 See ‘Draft Cabinet Paper, Administrative responsibility for the care of deprived children’, 
Memorandum by the Minister of Education, 19th November 1946, TNA: MH102/1390. 
File MH102/1395 is a collection of papers relating to the NUT’s intervention in this debate. 
See also ‘The Curtis Report – A.E.C. Memorandum’, Times Educational Supplement, 16th 
November 1946, TNA: MH102/1396, and ‘Some criticisms of the Curtis Report, by Lady 
Allen of Hurtwood’, MRC: MSS.121/CC/3/7/1-17. This view was not shared by every-
one associated with the field of education, however, and an editorial in the Times Educational 
Supplement supported the creation of separate Children’s Committees working under the 
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give outright backing to the Curtis recommendation on the separation of 
Children’s Committees from local authority education or health commit-
tees, suggesting instead that local authorities could be allowed to make 
whatever administrative arrangements for over-seeing children’s out-of- 
home care they felt appropriate, subject to final approval by the Home 
Secretary.26 It was only as discussions of the implementation of the Curtis 
report continued in spring 1947, that Arthur Greenwood, the Lord Privy 
Seal, was able to argue successfully in Cabinet that Children’s Committees 
should be established as separate entities from health or education com-
mittees. He was able to secure this agreement on the grounds that the 
special issues relating to the out-of-home care of children should not be 
subsumed within committees that had responsibilities for all children liv-
ing in that area.27 Although the creation of Children’s Committees and 
Children’s Officer posts formed part of the distinctive legacy of the Care 
of Children Committee, the implementation of this continued to face 
opposition in some local authorities for a number of years afterwards.28
CriTiCisms of exisTing sTandards of Care
In addition to its attention to administrative structures, the Curtis report 
also had much to say about approaches to child-care on the basis of the 
hundreds of visits to residential institutions and foster homes that its 
members had undertaken. Whilst its recommendations about the future 
administration of the out-of-home care of children played a pivotal role in 
shaping the architecture of post-war children’s services, its vignettes about 
standards of care arguably played a more important role in shaping public 
reception of its findings. In its call for urgent government action on the 
oversight of the Home Office (‘Who Shall be the Guardian?’, 16th November, 1946, Times 
Educational Supplement, TNA: MH102/1396).
26 See ‘Report of the Curtis Committee, Memorandum by the Minister of Health’, 23rd 
November 1946, ‘Children Deprived of a Normal Home Life, Memorandum by the Home 
Secretary’, 21st November 1946, and ‘Note to Secretary of State’, 11th November 1946, all 
TNA: MH102/1392. See also papers discussed at a Cabinet sub-committee meeting on the 
Curtis Report, 12th December 1946, in TNA: CAB130/15.
27 ‘Cabinet, Responsibility for the Care of Deprived Children, Memorandum by the Lord 
Privy Seal’, 12th March 1947, TNA: MH102/1393. Curtis herself later re-stated her sup-
port for this idea having been consulted again by the Home Office, see Memorandum to 
Secretary of State, 27th March 1947, TNA: MH102/1396.
28 Roy Parker, ‘Getting started with the Children’s Act: What do we learn?’, Adoption and 
Fostering, 35(3), 2011, 17–29.
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report’s recommendations, The Spectator, for example, quoted at length 
from one of its most critical accounts of a children’s ward in a workhouse 
in which Committee members had found:
an eight-year-old defective child who sat most of the day on a chair- 
commode… There were two babies with rickets clothed in cotton frocks, 
cotton vests and dilapidated napkins, no more than discoloured cotton rags. 
The smell in this room was dreadful. A premature baby lay in an opposite 
ward alone. The ward was very large and cold. The healthy children were 
housed in the ground-floor corrugated hutment which had once been the 
old union casual ward… They slept in another corrugated hutment in old 
broken iron cots, some of which had their sides tied up with cords. The mat-
tresses were fouled and stained… The children wore ankle-length calico or 
flanellette frocks and petticoats and had no knickers. Their clothes were not 
clean. Most of them had lost their shoes… Their faces were clean; their bod-
ies in some cases were unwashed and stained.29
Whilst adopting a more measured tone than The Spectator’s call to 
action, an editorial in the Economist also commented that the report’s 
accounts of standards of care in residential homes had clearly demon-
strated the need for ‘a complete change of attitude on the part of many 
local government officials and others… and a great many more of the right 
sort of workers’.30
The report itself was, in some respects, more cautious than this in its 
general statements about standards of care. With apparent reference to 
Lady Allen’s campaigning work based mainly on second-hand testimony, it 
observed that its own direct research into current practices in residential 
homes ‘has given us a firmer basis for conclusions about actual present day 
conditions’.31 On the basis of this, the Committee found little direct 
29 ‘The Government and the Children’, The Spectator, 22nd November 1946, TNA: 
MH102/1396, see also Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 136–156. In this 
respect, the Curtis report mirrored criticisms of the conditions for the care of children in 
workhouses made in the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission: Part I, the Break-Up 
of the Poor Law (London: National Committee to Promote the Break-Up of the Poor Law, 
1909), pp. 83–135.
30 ‘Common-sense on Curtis’, The Economist, 30th November 1946, TNA: MH102/1396. 
On accounts of children’s experience of residential care in the inter-war period, see, for 
example, Laura Tisdall, ‘ “That was what life in Bridgeburn had made her”: reading the 
autobiographies of children in institutional care in England, 1918–46’, Twentieth Century 
British History, 24(3), 2013, 351–75.
31 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para 418.
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evidence of very serious cases of ‘neglect or harsh usage’ in children’s 
homes, suggesting that accounts of abusive forms of discipline that had 
recently received public attention might be a reflection of conditions ten 
years ago or more, and that a ‘gentler and more sympathetic’ approach was 
more pervasive now. Serious allegations had been made about some institu-
tions that Committee members judged, on the basis of their visits, to be 
excellently run. On this basis, the report refrained from censuring any sin-
gle organisation for its standards of care. However, it noted that even in 
well-run organisations that had admirable policies, individual staff ‘may 
develop harsh or repressive tendencies or false ideas of discipline’ and that 
effective systems of inspection needed to be maintained to ensure appropri-
ate forms of care were being delivered.32 The report’s account of the work-
house children’s ward cited at length by The Spectator was, in fact, very 
much the exception rather than the rule, and whilst there were considerable 
variations in standards across residential institutions, ‘by far the greater 
number of Homes were, within the limits of their staffing, accommodation 
and administrative arrangements, reasonably well run from the standpoint 
of physical care, and in other ways the child has more material advantages 
than could have been given to him in the average poor family’.33
The report’s strongest criticisms were aimed less at the basic standards 
of physical care provided to children, however, and far more at the unsuit-
ability of the physical and emotional environment of many institutions for 
supporting children’s development. Underpinning its comments on what 
it saw as both good and bad standards of child-care, the report placed a 
consistent emphasis on the importance of nurturing children’s individual-
ity with particular attention to the emotional and imaginative dimensions 
of their inner lives. To become emotionally healthy and socially capable 
adults, children needed security of affection, opportunities to develop 
their individuality through play, and an environment which provided them 
with a sense of belonging, self-respect and a growing awareness of per-
sonal responsibility. This required continuity of staffing; the ability of staff 
to give children individual attention; suitable spaces and materials for play 
including access to gardens and green outdoor spaces; environments that 
were light, colourful and visually stimulating; and the ability for children 
to acquire and keep personal possessions. The ultimate goal of children’s 
32 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para 417.
33 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para 418; see also paras 170, 180/181, 189, 
242, 243.
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out-of-home care should be their successful integration into wider society 
as adults. To this end, children needed opportunities to interact with oth-
ers in activities and settings beyond the residential institution or foster 
home. Maintaining their bonds with siblings, and where possible other 
relatives, also constituted an important element of both their present sense 
of emotional security and their future sense of belonging. Their capacity 
to act as responsible and autonomous future citizens also needed to be 
nurtured through them being given regular pocket money that they could 
learn to manage, save and spend, respecting others’ private property, 
learning how to undertake domestic chores (to the extent that might rea-
sonably be expected of any child of their age), and acquiring relevant skills 
of self-caring. The latter, for girls, included the motivation and ability to 
care for and repair their own clothes. Discipline of the child should be 
understood in the context of the emotional significance that it would have 
for them in terms of their wider psychological development. In this con-
text, the report stated that enuresis should be managed as an issue that 
disclosed underlying problems with a child’s sense of emotional security, 
and not a matter for which a child should be humiliated or punished.34
In too many cases, residential homes run by both local authorities and 
voluntary organisations failed to provide these conditions, with children 
instead being ‘brought up by unimaginative methods, without opportu-
nity for developing their full capabilities and with very little brightness or 
interest in their surroundings’.35 In some cases, local authorities were 
found still to be using old barrack-style accommodation for children, 
because they judged that to leave them unused would constitute too great 
a cost for local rate-payers. Management of large numbers of children in 
such environments inevitably led to a regimented and impersonal ethos. 
Even in cases where children were placed in grouped homes (i.e., a num-
ber of ‘cottage homes’ gathered on a single site), the Committee found 
instances where the high numbers of children accommodated in each ‘cot-
tage’ precluded anything like individual attention. A number of examples 
were found of both larger institutions and grouped homes in which chil-
dren lacked outdoor spaces for play other than empty, walled asphalt yards, 
and had either no indoor playrooms or playrooms that were dark, drab 
34 See, for example, Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 207, 208, 214, 217, 
247, esp. 427, 485, 493.viii; on failures to administer discipline with appropriate emotional 
sensitivity, or the punitive or stigmatising treatment of enuresis, see paras 261–63, 265.
35 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para 418.
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and equipped with little or nothing by way of play materials. Insufficient 
play materials could lead to children fighting over or breaking what little 
they had, leading staff to complain that they could not be trusted to look 
after them. Poor play resources were not simply attributable to war-time 
deprivation however, the Committee noted, as varying levels of provision 
could be observed in different residential homes run by the same local 
authority. In many homes run by local authorities, children were unable to 
keep personal possessions because no lockers were provided. In homes run 
by voluntary organisations where lockers were provided, children were 
often not allowed to have personal possessions in their bedrooms which 
consequently lacked ‘comfort and individuality’.36
Individual attention to children was made harder by low ratios of staff 
to children, caused often by difficulties in recruiting even untrained staff 
and in some cases by over-crowding of children. Whilst some staff were 
praised for their evident ability to create a sense of personal relationship 
with children in their care, the report noted that this was often difficult to 
achieve either because of lack of time, lack of training, or lack of staff apti-
tude for this work. In the case of many voluntary organisations, non- 
managerial staff often had training of a specialist religious nature rather 
than training relevant to the care of children. The challenges of recruiting 
staff—often because of the poor conditions of employment—meant that it 
was rarely possible to appoint staff on the basis of their suitability to work 
with a particular age group of children. Lack of individual attention to 
children marred not only their time in residential institutions (including 
their educational attainment), but planning for their lives beyond it. 
Vocational training and after-care were found often to pay little attention 
to the specific interests of the individual child. Training and after-care were 
found to be very poor in around two-thirds of all children’s homes run by 
voluntary organisations, with a third simply directing boys in their care to 
manual labour and girls to domestic work.37 In this respect, standards at 
many residential homes in Britain were not significantly better than those 
36 See, for example, Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 141, 159, 195, 208, 
234–36, 252–4.
37 See Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 151, 169–71, 173, 176–79, 222, 
237, 270, 329, 331; on recommendations regarding more individualised attention in after-
care see paras 502–07. On the pressures and difficult working conditions of female staff in 
residential child-care, see also Katherine Holden, ‘Other people’s children: single women 
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which the Dominions Office and UK High Commission had come to view 
critically at Pinjarra.
Low levels of staffing in some institutions could also lead to an over- 
reliance on children’s domestic labour to maintain the running of the 
institution. High expectations could also be placed on children’s labour in 
residential homes in which there was a culture of spotlessness, which the 
report described as a ‘fetish of tidiness and high polish’. Whilst children in 
well-run residential homes might be expected to undertake a total of half 
an hour of domestic work per day, in other institutions Committee mem-
bers noted that children were doing to do up to four hours per day. It was 
observed that this was not always because of under-staffing and that filling 
children’s time with domestic work was sometimes used as a means of 
controlling their behaviour. Such over-use of children’s domestic labour 
was problematic, the Committee noted, not only for its effects on their 
ability to concentrate on schooling, but on their capacity to cultivate their 
individual interests and imaginative lives through free leisure time. In 
terms of their formation as future citizens, the report also commented that 
over-exposure to domestic chores would have the deleterious effect of 
reducing children’s sense of intrinsic value in tasks they would need to 
undertake when running their own households.38
Whilst standards varied considerably, many residential homes also failed 
to provide children with sufficient contacts and experiences outside of the 
institution that would support their sense of social belonging and their 
future social integration. Siblings were commonly separated from each 
other when accommodated in grouped homes in which individual cottage 
homes were segregated on lines of age or gender. Whilst the principle of 
maintaining relationships between siblings appeared to be recognised 
more often in the context of boarding out, in practice foster placements 
continued to be made in which siblings were split up and had varying 
degrees of on-going contact. Although some voluntary homes fared bet-
ter in this regard, staff often made little effort to maintain contacts between 
children in their residential homes and relatives in the wider community, 
assuming that these relatives would have little interest in these children. 
Involvement with wider community activities were, if they happened at all, 
and residential childcare in mid-20th century England’, Management and Organizational 
History, 5(3–4), 2010, 314–330.




found to take place in structured ways that gave children little opportunity 
to build significant relationships beyond the institution. Informal friend-
ships with children outside the institution were rarely supported or 
encouraged. Lack of prams in some residential nurseries suggested that 
infants accommodated in them rarely left the institution. Although some 
homes run by voluntary organisations had instituted ‘aunts and uncles’ 
schemes in which children would be enabled to visit or stay with local 
families, this could lead in some instances of favouritism in which better 
opportunities were given to children that receiving families considered 
‘attractive’. The geographical isolation of some residential homes obvi-
ously hindered children’s opportunities for constructive engagement with 
the wider community. Constraints on children’s external contacts could be 
particularly acute in residential homes run by religious organisations in 
which the children’s schooling also took place within the same institution. 
Pocket money in some homes was paid at such a low level or pooled to 
spend on group activities so that children had little experience of personal 
management of their own money.39
Whilst claiming to be cautious about claiming any causal relationship, 
the Committee nevertheless commented that children in institutions in 
which they received little individual attention either craved attention from 
visitors (including complete strangers) or seemed listless and withdrawn. 
Concern was particularly expressed that children in many homes run by 
voluntary organisations appeared to become progressively more with-
drawn as they grew older. Social skills that might be expected of children 
at different ages were, in such homes, often missing. By contrast, the 
report observed that children who benefitted from individual attention 
were far more likely to interact with visitors in engaged and spontaneous 
ways, or indeed show complete indifference to visitors if they had no inter-
est in interacting with them. Children raised in more attentive environ-
ments were found to be more likely to engage with adult visitors on the 
assumption that adults would show interest, sympathy and the capacity for 
a common sharing of amusement. Such varying outcomes for children 
appeared to be more the result of the quality of staff relationships with 
children than institutional policy with examples found, for instance, of 
39 See Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 161, 167, 199, 201–03, 206, 213, 
250, 256–58, 375.
4 ‘PROVIDING FOR CHILDREN… DEPRIVED OF A NORMAL HOME LIFE’… 
106
children’s homes run by the same authority offering very different emo-
tional environments.40
‘Child psyChology’ and The eThos of Child-Care
The Committee’s emphasis on the emotional conditions for healthy child 
development can be understood in the context of growing interest in the 
inter-war period in the psychology of children.41 This included theoretical 
developments in psychoanalytic, behavioural, educational and develop-
mental psychology, as well as initiatives including the child guidance 
movement, play centres, progressive education and a growing interest in 
new psychological understandings of child-care amongst both profession-
als and the wider public.42 Although some histories of child-care have situ-
ated the influence of an awareness of the psychological importance of the 
child’s relationship with the parent primarily from the late 1940s onwards 
(often in association with the work of John Bowlby),43 these inter-war 
developments indicate earlier origins than this.44
40 See Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 210–11, 239, 241, 264.
41 The Committee’s concerns about the unsuitability of workhouses as environments for 
the care of children, about which Myra Curtis herself had particularly strong feelings, also 
had a clear precedent in the kinds of criticisms made in the Minority Report of the Poor Law 
Commission, pp. 83–211.
42 See the excellent discussion of these developments in Mathew Thomson, Psychological 
Subjects: Identity, Culture and Health in Twentieth-Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), pp. 1–16, 109–39. See also Christina Hardyment, Dream Babies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) and Harry Hendrick, Narcissistic Parenting in an 
Insecure World: A History of Parenting Culture 1920s to Present (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016). 
See also Maureen McAleer, Freedom to Grow: Sister Marie Hilda’s Vision of Child Guidance 
(Glasgow: John S. Burns & Son, 1981) on the opening of the first Catholic child guidance 
centre in Scotland in 1931.
43 See, for example, Eileen Younghusband, Social Work in Britain: 1950–1975, A Follow-Up 
Study, Vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 36–7.
44 For example, Susan Isaacs, Childhood and After: Some Essays and Clinical Studies 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), pp. 208–36, cites a range of pre-war and war-
time studies demonstrating the importance of family bonds for children’s physical, emotional 
and cognitive development. Of the 159 studies cited by John Bowlby in his influential report 
for the World Health Organisation on the psychological effects of separation from home and 
parents, Maternal Care and Mental Health, 55 had been published before the end of 1945 
and 19 of which had been published before 1939. Examples of pre-war and war-time litera-
ture on child psychology used in early post-war child-care training courses include J.R. Rees, 
The Health of the Mind (London: Faber & Faber, 1929); Mary Burbury, Edna Balint and 
Bridget Yapp, An Introduction to Child Guidance (London: MacMillan & Co, 1945); 
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Care should be taken, however, in drawing precise lines of influence 
between this growing field and the Committee’s claims about the condi-
tions for children’s healthy psychological development.45 Child psychol-
ogy was not a homogenous movement, but riven by conflicts over 
theoretical concepts, clinical practices and the roles of different profes-
sional groups as well as by complex relationships between ‘elite’ and popu-
larised uses of psychology.46 The Committee’s emphasis on the nurturing 
of children’s individuality through stable, warm and attentive care reflected 
particular approaches within the wider field of child psychology, very dif-
ferent to behavioural emphases on discipline, order and the careful man-
agement of affection.47 These ideas can be traced to the growing interest 
in the meaning of children’s emotional worlds and the significance of 
parental, particularly maternal, bonds for children that were associated 
with psychoanalysis. Care again needs to be taken in tracing this 
D.E.M. Gardner, The Children’s Play Centre (London: Methuen & Co, 1937); Rogerson, 
C.H., Play Therapy in Childhood (London: Oxford University Press, 1939); Charlotte 
Buhler, From Birth to Maturity (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1943); 
Emanuel Miller, The Growing Child and Its Problems (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co, 1937); (ed) John Rickman, On the Bringing Up of Children – By Five Psycho-Analysts 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1936), Phyllis Blanchard, The Child and 
Society (New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1928), and W.  David Wills, The Barns 
Experiment (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945) and (ed.) Cyril Burt, How the Mind 
Works, 2nd edition (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945). Psychological models used 
within these ranged across behavioural, psychoanalytic and eclectic approaches. Muriel 
Payne’s Oliver Untwisted (London: Edward Arnold & Co, 1929), which gave a fictionalised 
account of more empathic approaches to child-care in a poor law residential institution, 
remained popular throughout this period and had, by 1949, gone into its seventh reprinting.
45 For example, the account of the influence of psychological theory on post-war child-care 
in Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Routledge, 
1990), pp. 151–77, fails to take sufficient account of the ways in which the popularization of 
child psychology re-shaped psychological theories or the use of ‘child psychology’ as a place-
holder term rather than reference to particular theorists, or the wider assumptions about 
gender, class, domesticity and the formation of the civic subject within which ideas of child 
psychology were taken up. Rose, like others (see Hendrick, Children, Childhood and English 
Society, p. 56) also places more emphasis on the importance of John Bowlby’s work on early 
post-war child-care policy than is warranted (see notes 107, 114 below).
46 See, for example, Stewart, Child Guidance in Britain, pp. 123–4, 132–7 on conflicts 
over whether child guidance clinics should always be run by psychiatrists rather than psy-
chologists, as well as disagreements over clinical practice such as Donald Winnicott’s dis-
missal of the value of play therapy. Also Thomson, Psychological Subjects, passim.
47 See, for example, Michal Shapira, ‘“Speaking Kleinian”: Susan Isaacs as Ursula Wise and 
the Inter-War Popularisation of Psychoanalysis’, Medical History, 61(4), p. 532.
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psychoanalytic influence. Although Melanie Klein’s work on the psycho-
dynamic processes of early infancy attracted much attention in the psycho-
analytic world, popularised forms of psychoanalysis bore little relation to 
her vivid technical language for the conflicts of the infant’s internal object 
relations. In part, this reflected a view amongst some psychoanalysts that 
their theoretical concepts and clinical practices should be reserved for the 
relationship between analyst and patient and could not simply be trans-
ferred, in diluted form, to the ways in which parents or teachers might 
engage with children.48 As a consequence the psychoanalytic interest in a 
child’s emotional world and formative relationships did not lead so much 
to the direct transmission of specific psychoanalytic ideas to other social 
and professional contexts as contribute to a wider cultural ‘psychological 
mindedness’ in which the importance of a child’s emotional security and 
individual development were recognised. The term ‘child psychology’, as 
it appeared, for example, in The Times correspondence in response to Lady 
Allen’s campaign or in public reception of the Curtis report, therefore 
referred less to a specific body of psychological theory but functioned as a 
placeholder term for a more general understanding of the role of care and 
attention to the individual child in promoting their personal and civic 
development.
A key figure, in developing this wider public interest in child psychol-
ogy, was Susan Isaacs, whose influence was more widespread and well- 
established by the time that the Curtis Committee sat than either Donald 
Winnicott or John Bowlby.49 Isaacs was a pioneering female psychoanalyst, 
48 Thomson, Psychological Subjects, pp. 130–31.
49 See Philip Graham, Susan Isaacs: A Life Freeing the Minds of Children (London: Karnac, 
2009); Michal Shapira, ‘“Speaking Kleinian”: Susan Isaacs as Ursula Wise and the Inter-War 
Popularisation of Psychoanalysis’, Medical History 61(4), 2017, 525–47. Unlike Isaacs, 
Bowlby’s work was generally not referenced in reading lists for child-care training courses in 
the early post-war period, unsurprisingly given his more popular work was not published 
until the 1950s (see, e.g., training course reading lists in TNA: MH102/1420 and TNA: 
MH/1435). Even then the reception of Bowlby’s work was far from being universally sup-
portive (see, e.g., Riley, War in the Nursery, pp. 106–8; Pat Thane & Tanya Evans, Sinners? 
Scroungers? Saints? Unmarried Motherhood in Twentieth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp. 96–8). Although Winnicott was more recognised than Bowlby 
as an authority in the psychological development of children by the time the Committee sat 
(see, e.g., war-time papers later published in his 1957 collected papers, published as The 
Child and the Family and The Child and the Outside World), his influence on the Committee’s 
conclusions appears to have been very limited (see n.114) and his more influential work 
again post-dated the Committee’s report. Isaacs’s own memorandum to the Care of Children 
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having joined the British Psychoanalytical Society only two years after its 
formation in 1919. From 1924 to 1927, Isaacs was appointed head of the 
Malting House School in Cambridge, an experimental initiative in pro-
gressive education, and during that period became increasingly committed 
to Kleinian theory.50 After leaving the school, Isaacs went on to write two 
popular books based on that experience, The Nursery Years and The 
Children We Teach, which were widely read by parents, nurses and teach-
ers. She also began to write for a number of magazines aimed at middle- 
class parents as well as a weekly advice column (under the pseudonym 
‘Ursula Wise’) for the magazine, Nursery World.51 Through the 1930s, 
Isaacs continued to publish a number of books for professional and public 
audiences and develop her influence on educational professionals through 
her appointment as head of the newly created Department of Child 
Development within the Institute of Education at the University of 
London. Her professional activities included her leadership of a major 
study of the early war-time evacuation of children from London to 
Cambridge, to which the Curtis Committee member, Sibyl Clement 
Brown, and John Bowlby, also contributed.52
Isaacs’s work exemplifies the complex relationship between psychoanal-
ysis and popular conceptions of ‘child psychology’. Despite her early 
attachment to the emerging psychoanalytic movement in Britain, her psy-
chological ideas were initially also significantly influenced by Piaget’s the-
ory of child development as well as John Dewey’s work on progressive 
education. Although her theoretical interests became increasingly Kleinian, 
she rarely made any direct reference to technical Kleinian language in her 
Committee cited a wide range of psychological and clinical studies which provided evidence 
of better developmental and emotional outcomes for children raised within the family, or 
‘family-like’ environments, than for those living in institutions. None of this literature 
included work by Winnicott. Isaacs did make reference to Bowlby’s study of the family back-
grounds of 44 juvenile thieves, but this was only 1 of 12 studies she cited with her memoran-
dum giving more prominence to the work of Charlotte Buhler, Jean Piaget and (implicitly) 
Melanie Klein.
50 Case material from her time at the Maltings was written up by her in Susan Isaacs, 
Intellectual Growth in Young Children (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1930) and Social 
Development in Children (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1933).
51 For edited collections of these columns, see Susan Isaacs, Troubles of Children and 
Parents (London: Methuen & Co, 1948) and Caroline Vollans, Wise Words: How Susan 
Isaacs Changed Parenting (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
52 Susan Isaacs, ed., The Cambridge Evacuation Survey: A Wartime Study in Social Welfare 
and Education (London: Methuen & Co, 1941).
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public work and instead tried to find accessible ways of referring to Kleinian 
concepts such as the inherently aggressive instincts of the infant.53 Similarly, 
at other points, her work was far less concerned with the explicit commu-
nication of psychoanalytic concepts than a psychoanalytically inflected 
rejection of children’s exposure to behaviourism or other forms of rigid 
moral training. As she wrote in 1929 in The Nursery Years:
If we can really get into our bones, so to speak, the sense of slow growth of 
the infant’s mind through these various bodily experiences, and the knowl-
edge that each phase has its own importance in his development, we are 
more likely to give him [sic] the gentle care and patient friendliness which 
he most needs to carry him on successfully from one phase to the next, and 
to avoid the harsh and hasty methods which may make him fear and hate us. 
For this is the surest way to bind him in his infantile ways. The child who 
goes in fear of scoldings and naggings cannot expand freely and happily into 
social life. He is thrown back on the infant’s mode of gaining love by his 
helplessness, or driven into the blind protest of rage and tantrums. It is now 
common knowledge among humane parents that fear of whippings or severe 
punishments has this evil effect, but it is not yet widely realised that the fear 
of carpings and harsh criticism may be just as paralysing to the sensitive 
child. He can most easily learn to fit himself into the social world if he is free 
from undue anxiety about possible mistakes, and has a sense of affectionate 
unity with those around him.54
As letters to her Ursula Wise advice column also showed, Isaacs’s role 
for her readers was not simply one of conveying technical information 
about child development but in giving practical advice in how to practise 
a ‘humane’ form of parenting with which many of those readers already 
sympathised.55
Although the Care of Children Committee received evidence from 
Isaacs, Winnicott and Bowlby, the nature of their influence on the 
Committee’s final conclusions was also complex. Given the Committee’s 
interest in the conditions necessary to compensate a child for the loss of a 
‘normal’ home life, it is unsurprising that these three specialists in the 
psychology of children’s emotional development should have been invited 
to present evidence to it. Other current aspects of psychology, such as 
53 See, for example, Isaacs, The Nursery Years, pp. 81–83; also Isaacs, Childhood and After, 
pp. 217–224.
54 Isaacs, The Nursery Years, p. 31.
55 Shapira, ‘“Speaking Kleinian”’, pp. 535–47.
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intelligence testing, which became increasingly important in other policy 
contexts relating to children,56 fell beyond the Committee’s concerns.
It was far from the case, however, that the Committee were simply per-
suaded by the strength of psychological insight or research presented by 
these witnesses. When Winnicott appeared before the Committee with the 
then psychiatric social worker, Clare Britton, nearly all of the questions 
focused on Britton’s experience of managing a group of hostels for chil-
dren in Oxfordshire.57 Winnicott was not asked any questions about his 
psychoanalytic work, and in a rare exchange focusing on Winnicott’s wider 
opinions, he presented a far more accepting view of the use of corporal 
punishment for children in care than that eventually taken in the 
Committee’s report.58
Bowlby’s evidence to the Committee focused primarily on his claims of 
the association of separation from a mother-figure for a pre-school child 
and that child’s later delinquency, based on a study he had undertaken 
before the war at the London Child Guidance Clinic.59 However, Bowlby 
appeared quite diffident about generalising from this study, noting the 
need for more research and his lack of further work with children during 
the war. His evidence, in several respects, ran with the psychological grain 
of the Committee’s Report. He emphasised the importance of continuity 
of care with a foster-mother and of the emotional demands this could 
place on carers, noting that early separation from an established foster- 
mother could be as traumatic for a child as separation from the birth 
mother. He also recognised the value of continuity of care within the 
wider family in the case of the loss of the mother, saw value in the use of 
play therapy, and supported the use of trained workers in assessing and 
inspecting foster carers. However, Bowlby’s caution in straying beyond his 
own research led him to say less about the importance of emotional bonds 
for older children or even to express a clear view on the relative merits of 
institutional versus foster care. His view that children were best removed 
from unmarried mothers in order to provide them with a greater 
56 See, for example, Thomson, Psychological Subjects, pp. 110–13.
57 See TNA: MH102/1451D/C48. The Committee had previously received a copy of an 
article co-authored by Britton and Winnicott for the New Education Fellowship on lessons 
learned from these hostels, TNA: MH102/1451B/69, which included the claim that a sta-
ble home life with accepting parents was a key basis for children’s psychological development 
and those children who lacked this proved harder to maintain in evacuation billets.
58 See also Winnicott’s memorandum on corporal punishment, TNA: MH102/1451B/96.
59 See TNA: MH102/1451B/22 and MH102/1451D/C18.
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opportunity for a stable family life was one which the Committee’s final 
report clearly did not share. Whilst the Committee seemed sympathetic to 
his psychological insights, these were largely reduced to basic, core prin-
ciples. As Myra Curtis asked him at one point, ‘Your prescription, if I may 
so call it, of affection and stability is really what all the children with whom 
we are concerned need, is it not?’
Isaacs’s evidence before the Committee focused primarily on a memo-
randum she had submitted to it60 advocating for the use of foster care 
rather than institutional care, on the basis that the former was more likely 
to provide the consistency of individual attention, flexibility and opportu-
nities for wider social activities essential for children’s healthy develop-
ment.61 The significance of family bonds, or life in a ‘family-like 
environment’, for meeting children’s essential needs was emphasised as 
was the developmental importance of children’s access to play materials 
and opportunities for broader forms of learning through engaging in 
domestic tasks.62 Myra Curtis in particular pressed Isaacs on whether insti-
tutions were absolutely unable to provide these conditions, and whether 
trends in institutional care were already taking more progressive direc-
tions. In response, Isaacs clarified that she did not wish to proscribe the 
use of institutional care altogether—‘a first class institution can be better 
than an indifferent or even second class foster home… I do not want to 
idealise the foster home’. She also acknowledged that effective inspection 
of children’s care might be easier in well-run institutions than in trying to 
supervise a larger number of dispersed foster homes. However, her views 
on what would constitute tolerable institutional care were substantially 
60 See TNA: MH102/1451B/33. This memorandum was reprinted in full in Susan Isaacs, 
Childhood and After, pp. 208–36.
61 See TNA: MH102/1451D/C32.
62 Much of the psychological literature cited by Isaacs on the importance of children’s 
affective bonds with parents focused particularly on the developmental importance of these 
for pre-school children. Isaacs pointed to evidence in the Cambridge Evacuation Study that 
older children similarly experienced considerable distress at parental separation (Childhood 
and After, p. 209), although Thomson has argued that the Cambridge Study gave this issue 
relatively less attention than subsequent studies of evacuation which indicated that many 
children appeared to fare better if kept with their families even if they remained in areas under 
bombardment (Thomson, Lost Freedom, pp. 59–64). This suggests that the principle of the 
importance of family bonds throughout childhood, supported by the Committee’s report, 
may have been as much influenced by the experience of evacuation as psychological and 
psychoanalytic studies of the significance of emotional relationships with parents for chil-
dren’s early years’ development.
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reflected in the Committee’s eventual findings. Isaacs argued that if insti-
tutional care were to be used it should be organised around groups of no 
more than 10–12 children (reflecting the old, ‘large’ family), should not 
be segregated around age or gender, should engage children in appropri-
ate domestic tasks whilst not allowing this to impede on their education or 
leisure time and should use staff with some training in child psychology. 
The tendency of large institutions to fall into an ‘institutional atmosphere’ 
and fail to provide a ‘simple, friendly, homely atmosphere’ had to be ‘care-
fully guarded against’. As her evidence progressed, Curtis and Isaacs con-
curred on the central point in the Committee’s final conclusions that 
appropriate institutional care might be needed in cases where there were 
insufficient numbers of the ‘best foster homes’.
Isaacs’s, and to a lesser extent Bowlby’s, broad psychological perspec-
tives were therefore accepted by the Committee. This acceptance arose, 
however, not simply because the Committee deferred to their professional 
experience, but out of the apparent desire of at least some Committee 
members to make sense of what they had already observed by that stage 
from their inspection visits to residential institutions. As the Committee’s 
final report made clear, their experience of undertaking these inspections 
had made them uncomfortably aware of the emotionally unsettled behav-
iour they had experienced from children in many large residential institu-
tions. Their public hearings with Isaacs and Bowlby included interactions 
in which Committee members tried to make sense of what they were 
observing in these visits:
Curtis: I should like to put a different point, arising of our recent experience 
when we visited a very large Children’s Home in which young children were 
concentrated, not in what you would call the cottage home but in a large 
house of two units, with thirty in each. Those children were merrily playing 
and talking in their play-hour and when we went into the room they were 
obviously most anxious for any kind of sign of physical affection; they 
wanted to handle one and touch one and press one’s hand and climb all over 
one. Do you think this is a normal symptom?…
Bowlby: Again I feel that we would like more information, but I would 
like to stress that these chronic delinquents, if you meet them, very often 
appear normal, lively, even affectionate children. If you meet them, you say 
“What a nice child”, but it is all superficial; in some curious ways there are 
absolutely no roots to their relationships.63
63 TNA: MH102/1451D/C18.
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Harford: May I ask what your main tests of whether an institution is 
satisfactory… when you go to see it? Might I ask whether there is any signifi-
cance in whether the children particularly the younger ones, come very 
much to the visitor, anxious to touch and handle bags and anything belong-
ing to the visitor…? What would you advise people to look out for?
Isaacs: …It is awfully difficult to lay down a rule, but I would judge 
much more by the way [emphasis original] in which the child came—if he 
looked greedy, unsatisfied, anxious or frightened, or came in a way you felt 
meant there was something missing in his life…. You can tell when people 
are feeling happy and free and active and interested. I think that is a very 
important indication.64
The Committee’s views on the appropriate ethos of child-care can 
therefore be traced not simply to an abstract interest in principles of ‘child 
psychology’, nor to deference to the work of particularly well-regarded 
psychologists or clinicians, but to a desire amongst at least some Committee 
members to make sense of children’s behaviour that they had found 
disturbing.65
The influence of ideas from ‘child psychology’ on the Committee’s 
report was also refracted through wider assumptions about gender, class 
and domesticity. Whilst it is doubtless the case that the notion of the 
mother’s bond with a child took on particular public significance in the 
context of women’s post-war withdrawal from the work-place,66 gendered 
understandings of adult child-care roles were already well-established by 
then67 and had operated concurrently with women’s increased involve-
ment in the work-place during the war years. These assumptions firmly 
placed primary responsibility for the child’s emotional care, and attention 
to their internal world, on the mother rather than the father. In the round-
 up of letters written in response to Lady Allen’s, published in The Times on 
1st August 1944, one correspondent commented that vulnerable children 
‘needed, above all else, one person throughout the day whom they could 
64 TNA: MH102/1451D/C32.
65 See also Younghusband, Social Work in Britain, Vol. 1, p. 39.
66 Riley, War in the Nursery, pp. 80–196; though see Thane, ‘Family life and “normality”’, 
pp. 208–9, on the more complex patterns of encouragement and discouragement for differ-
ent groups of women to participate in the post-war work-place.
67 See, for example, Jane Lewis, The Politics of Motherhood: Child and Maternal Welfare in 
England, 1909–1939 (London: Croom Helm, 1980); Laura King, Family Men: Fatherhood 
and Masculinity in Britain, c.1914–1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); also 
Helen McCarthy, Double Lives: A History of Working Motherhood (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).
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trust and on whom they could depend: in other words, someone who 
would act in the capacity of a mother’. Another argued that children’s 
homes should be run by a ‘man and wife’, not just a house mother, whilst 
adding the qualification that ‘I do not suggest that the man should make 
it his life work, any more than any father makes the care of his children his 
only interest’.68 Such gendered assumptions about women’s inherent suit-
ability for the emotional care of children were reflected in the Committee’s 
view that Children’s Officers were more likely than not to be women and 
that evidence of an improvement in quality of inspection reports could be 
attributed to the recent employment of more female inspectors.69 Whilst 
its Interim Report on Training in Child Care, recognised that ‘house 
fathers’ should be expected to be interested in, and understanding of, 
children in his care, it also commented that ‘his domestic work will lie on 
the side of out-of-door and recreational activities rather than the physical 
care of the child’. Training for men in this role should focus on areas such 
as gardening, poultry keeping, care of grounds, and household mainte-
nance, in place of content for women on cooking, housework and care for 
clothing.70
If concepts of ‘child psychology’ were over-laid on existing assumptions 
about the domestic and work roles of men and women, the same was also 
true of structures of class. Based on the evidence it received, including its 
own inspection visits, the Committee took the view that the majority of 
direct child-care being provided through foster care or cottage homes was 
by working-class women.71 With this in mind, it recommended that train-
ing for house mothers should avoid being ‘too academic’. Content on 
child development should be ‘non-technical’ (i.e. devoid of abstract psy-
chological theory), and would form just one element of the training 
alongside practical household management, childhood health and disease, 
children’s play, wider forms of social service provision and basic record- 
keeping. Some attention should also be given to content that would 
improve ‘the general standard of culture’, developing house mothers’ 
taste in areas such as literature, music, art and drama.72 Training that 
68 The Times, 1st August 1994, p. 2.
69 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para.414, 444; see also paras 477, 478.
70 Training in Child Care, paras 10, 14. On the more complex realities of gendered labour 
within the home, see Claire Langhamer, ‘The meanings of the home in post-war Britain’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, 40(2), 2005, 341–62.
71 See, for example, Report of the Care of Children Committee, para. 465.
72 Training in Child Care, paras 4, 14.
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explicitly engaged with theories of child psychology was to be reserved for 
middle-class workers, such as senior managers or boarding-out visitors.73 
Whilst it was hoped that this psychological ethos would permeate through 
the provision of children’s out-of-home care, for the working-class women 
undertaking this work this ethos was generalised to the broadest principles 
of recognising the child’s individuality and providing stability of care and 
affection.
The notion that emotionally healthy development through childhood 
was important for an individual’s formation as a citizen was also situated 
in an emphasis on the civic importance of domestic life.74 As noted above, 
the Committee’s report did not see out-of-home care as simply needing to 
support the child’s emotional development, but as needing to provide 
them with the essential skills and attitudes to manage their own household 
in the future. The underpinning assumption of the social importance of 
the home, structured around a stable family life, was itself an expression of 
demographic trends established by the 1930s towards reductions in both 
early parental deaths and the average number of children within a family.75 
This notion of the smaller, nuclear family as a social norm continued to be 
consolidated demographically in the early post-war period. In this context 
the home was seen as an important building block for society which func-
tioned not simply as a place of privacy and leisure, but of various forms of 
emotional and physical labour and acts of self-responsibility upon which 
decent communal life rested. As one respondent to a Mass Observation 
interview put it, in 1943, ‘a happy home and family life is the bulwark of 
a Nation’.76 Parents, too, increasingly came to recognise the home as a 
place in which greater investment could be made in the care and develop-
ment of their children, such that their children could go on to enjoy more 
73 Training in Child Care, para 23; Report of the Care of Children Committee, Appendix 1, 
Section 4.
74 On the concept of the child as constructed in relation to concepts of adult citizenship in 
this period, see, for example, Laura Tisdall, ‘Education, parenting and concepts of childhood 
in England c.1945 to c.1979’, Contemporary British History, 31(1), 2017, 24–46, and Laura 
King, ‘Future citizens: cultural and political conceptions of children in Britain, 1930s-1950s’, 
Twentieth-Century British History, 27(3), 2016, 389–411.
75 Pat Thane, ‘Family life and “normality” in post-war British culture’, in (eds) Richard 
Bessel & Dirk Schumann, Life After Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of 
Europe During the 1940s and 1950s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
pp. 193–210.
76 Langhamer, ‘The meanings of the home’, pp. 344–5; see also Wendy Webster, Imagining 
Home: Gender, ‘Race’ and National Identity, 1945–64 (London: UCL Press, 1998).
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opportunities and a better standard of living than they had experienced 
themselves.77
This underpinning ethos, of broad notions of ‘child psychology’, 
refracted through assumptions about gender, class and domesticity, was to 
inform the report’s view on forms of out-of-care for children that should 
now be prioritised.
a fuTure Beyond residenTial insTiTuTions
If the Committee’s recommendations about administrative structures 
reflected ideas that had already been circulated in government, its recom-
mendations about appropriate forms of out-of-home care appear to have 
gone significantly beyond what was being considered in draft policy state-
ments within the Ministry of Health and Home Office. Whilst the 
Government anticipated recommendations addressing standards in resi-
dential care, the Report of the Care of Children Committee presented a set 
of conclusions that sought to move child-care provision significantly away 
from residential children’s homes altogether. Whilst recognising that resi-
dential institutions could provide better standards of material care than in 
family homes that were significantly affected by poverty, it concluded that 
the lack of individual attention, unimaginative and unstimulating environ-
ments, and problems with staffing of such institutions meant that their 
standards of emotional care could be far worse. Although a child’s family 
home might not be a good one in all respects, it might nevertheless pro-
vide more in terms of affection, individual interest, support and belonging 
than an impersonal residential home. As a consequence, the presumption 
should be that a child should be kept within the family home (including 
remaining with unmarried mothers), wherever that home could be made 
‘reasonably satisfactory’. To remove the child from that home, the report 
concluded, implied a very serious responsibility on those organisations 
involved to ensure that the substitute home provided a better, ‘indeed 
much better’, standard of care.78
With this in mind, the Committee presented a hierarchy of forms of 
substitute care which, if managed with appropriate safeguards, might pro-
vide the social and emotional benefits that would be associated with the 
‘normal’ family home. The most preferable option, they argued, was 
77 Thane, ‘Family life and “normality”’, p. 207.
78 Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 427, 447.
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adoption, in which the child would have new parents and the adoptive 
parents would have full rights and responsibilities, becoming the ‘real par-
ents so far as human nature allows’. The Committee recommended 
improving existing safeguards by ensuring that all children placed for 
adoption had a probationary period of at least three months (and not usu-
ally more than six months) during which time they would fall under the 
supervision of the relevant local authority’s Children’s Officer. In cases 
where an adoption placement proved to be unsatisfactory, juvenile magis-
trates should be empowered to place the child with the local authority as 
a ‘fit person’, other than adoptions arranged by recognised adoption soci-
eties who were obligated to take children back during their probation 
period if their placement failed.79
The second best option, in the Committee’s view, was boarding out.80 
The report recognised that foster placements (as the O’Neill case had 
demonstrated) had the potential to cause acute unhappiness for children, 
were vulnerable to vagaries of circumstance affecting the individual foster 
home and could have problems that were not always easily observable on 
superficial inspection. Nevertheless, the Committee concluded, ‘we found 
in the children in foster homes we visited almost complete freedom from 
the sense of deprivation which we have described among the children in 
Homes’. In one of its strongest censures, the report particularly deplored 
what it regarded as the perverse policy of one unnamed organisation, 
which boarded children out as infants before taking them back from set-
tled foster placements once they reached school age.81 Whilst anonymised 
in the report, this appears to refer to the work of the Catholic Child 
Welfare Council, on behalf of whom George Craven had given evidence 
that children over school age were taken from Catholic foster homes into 
institutions both to create space for more children in those foster homes 
79 Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 448–59.
80 Whilst the Curtis Committee, and the Home Office Children’s Department, emphasised 
the value of boarding out purely in terms of the social and emotional well-being of the child, 
it was also substantially cheaper than residential care. In the post-war period the Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Estimates periodically encouraged the Home Office to increase the 
proportion of children boarded out on grounds on economic efficiency (see Griffith, Central 
Departments and Local Authorities, pp. 393–4).
81 Report of the Care of Children Committee, para 451.
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and to ensure institutional protection of those children’s Catholic faith 
and practice.82
Given the potential value of this form of substitute home, the Committee 
expressed concern that of the total of 125,000 children they had identified 
as living in different forms of out-of-home care, only 31,000 of these were 
boarded out, and of these only 11,000 had been placed in foster homes by 
a public authority. Divergent policies within voluntary organisations were 
also noted, with Dr Barnardo’s Homes and the Church of England 
Children’s Society supporting boarding out, whilst the National Children’s 
Home and Catholic Child Welfare Council averse to doing this as a matter 
of policy. Even so, those voluntary organisations that supported boarding 
out in principle were still found to be maintaining most of their children 
in residential institutions.
Local authorities were therefore encouraged to embark on initiatives to 
identify new foster homes. Significant expansion in foster-care provision 
should not be made, the Committee warned however, at the expense of 
approving homes that were less than satisfactory. Prospective foster homes 
that were a source of concern for any reason should not be used because 
rigorous supervision and the ability to remove the child were insufficient 
in mitigating the emotional harm caused to a child through being put 
through one, or indeed several, failed placements. Stronger and more con-
sistent safeguards for boarding out should be established by having a sin-
gle set of boarding-out regulations produced by the lead central 
government department for all placements made both by local authorities 
and by voluntary organisations. Children’s Officers should maintain an 
informal register of approved foster homes for use by their own or any 
other local authority as well as any voluntary organisation. Homes on this 
list should be subject to supervision from boarding-out visitors, working 
under the direction of the Children’s Officer, who would be provided with 
new training specific to that role. Suitably trained workers could also 
undertake this role for voluntary organisations. Such safeguards would, 
the Committee hoped, constitute a significant improvement on current 
weaknesses in the quality and frequency of visits to boarded-out children, 
particularly by volunteer workers. The lack of more cases nationally such 
as Dennis O’Neill’s was, it noted, probably more an indication that 
82 Evidence of Catholic Child Welfare Council, 26th May 1945, TNA: MH102/1451D/
C14, p. 6.
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boarding-out care was generally good rather than that existing inspection 
systems were adequate in detecting problems.83
Whilst the Committee hoped that these proposals would lead to greater 
use of boarding out, it also recognised that any such expansion would 
take considerable time to accommodate the numbers of children currently 
‘deprived of a normal home life’. Although the introduction of new fam-
ily allowances and social insurance were likely over time to reduce the 
numbers of children needing out-of-home care, the Committee antici-
pated that a third option—institutional care—would still be needed for at 
least the next 10–15 years and beyond.84 The Committee recognised that 
large residential homes could have advantages for children, including 
greater recreational facilities, a wider social circle within which to form 
friendships, more activities and ‘often the society and friendship of more 
cultivated and educated people’. However any such benefits were out-
weighed by their impersonal atmosphere that left children continually 
feeling ‘the lack of affection and personal interest’. To mitigate against 
this, institutional care would best be delivered through children being 
looked after by a house mother, or house mother and father, in small 
units. Whilst the model of the ‘scattered home’ (first pioneered by public 
assistance officers in Sheffield) was best placed to offer individualised care 
and access to the wider community, the Committee also recognised that 
this entailed risks of isolation for the house mother. As an alternative 
‘grouped homes’ might also be used. The numbers of children accom-
modated in these units should be kept low, however, to allow as ‘family-
like’ an atmosphere to develop as possible. The maximum number of 
children in any individual home should not exceed twelve, and would 
ideally be around eight, with a staff ratio of one house mother per ten 
83 Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 420–22, 460–75; on existing problems 
with boarding out inspections, see paras 349, 371–2, 376, 394. Home Office staff had 
acknowledged in oral evidence to the Committee that they had no central guidelines on the 
criteria by which foster homes should be selected, and although they had the right of inspec-
tion of individual foster homes this was in practice wholly delegated to local authorities. The 
Home Office had no comprehensive overview about local authorities’ approach to inspec-
tions, although had the view from inspections of a substantial number of local authorities 
that the suitability of those undertaking inspections varied significantly (Notes of a meeting 
held at the Home Office, Whitehall, SW1, on Monday 26th March 1945, TNA: 
MH102/1451D/C1).
84 Report of the Care of Children Committee, paras 157/8, 161, 163, 462, 476–96.
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children. Children would be mixed by age and gender within these homes, 
allowing siblings to remain together, and would ideally remain in the care 
of the same house mother until school-leaving age at 15. A national pro-
gramme of specialist training for house mothers had already been pro-
posed in the Interim Report published by the Care of Children Committee 
back in March 1946,85 which the Committee recommended be intro-
duced alongside appropriate support and conditions of employment. The 
residential environment for children should also have all the qualities—
homeliness, space for private possessions, materials for reading and play—
that the Committee found lacking in many larger institutions. It should 
also provide children with regular pocket money, good opportunities to 
develop interests and friendships outside of the home and on-going con-
tact, where not harmful, with other relatives. Whilst local authorities 
should look to develop their own scattered and grouped homes in appro-
priate ways, there was also no reason why children should not be placed 
in voluntary homes that offered suitable care. Indeed, there could be 
value in continuing to maintain a ‘friendly rivalry’ between voluntary and 
public provision.
The Care of Children CommiTTee and posT-war 
Child migraTion
The attention given to the issue of child migration in the Curtis report was 
far briefer than other forms of children’s out-of-home care and was entirely 
unaddressed in the Clyde report. In the case of the Curtis Committee, this 
appeared to reflect its assumption that any post-war resumption of child 
migration would only take place on a relatively small scale, an assumption 
reinforced by the limited evidence that the Committee received on 
this issue.
Of those voluntary organisations who involved themselves in post-war 
child migration work, only the Fairbridge Society and Dr Barnardo’s 
Homes presented any formal evidence on this subject to the Committee. 
Neither the Church of England Waifs and Stray’s Society (soon to become 
the Church of England Children’s Society), the National Children’s 
Home, nor the Catholic Child Welfare Council, gave any indication of 
85 Training in Child Care: Interim Report of the Care of Children Committee, cmd.6760 
(London: HMSO, 1946).
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their interest in developing this work in their evidence.86 For several of 
these organisations no plans were being developed to resume their migra-
tion work until the Australian Commonwealth Government had con-
firmed its arrangements for financial support. By the time this confirmation 
was given, in August 1946, the Committee’s work had been completed. 
The decision by the Catholic Child Welfare Council, in June 1946, to sup-
port the resumption of child migration to Catholic institutions in Western 
Australia also post-dated its oral evidence to the Committee the previous 
month,87 although the confidential nature of the Council’s June meeting 
makes it unclear that disclosures about its migration plans would have 
been made to the Committee at that point anyway.
A memorandum submitted to the Committee from Dr Barnardo’s 
Homes set out the history of its child and juvenile migration work, focus-
ing particularly on its work in Canada, as well as the recent policy context 
and a brief note on its future plans.88 Parental consent, it acknowledged, 
was being given less frequently for the emigration of children because of 
parents’ ‘very natural desire not to be separated [from their children], and 
secondly, the knowledge that the type of child suitable for migration is 
precisely the type of child for whom [our] Homes are able to find excellent 
openings in technical trades in this Country’. The decreasing population in 
Britain, continued parental reluctance, greater job opportunities in techni-
cal trades and lack of encouragement from overseas Dominions meant that 
the post-war resumption of child migration faced significant challenges. 
Nevertheless, Barnardo’s claimed that the clear benefits of their past migra-
tion work both to the children involved and to the countries receiving 
them meant that its resumption should be encouraged. The memorandum 
stated that Barnardo’s Council intended its future migration work to be 
concentrated in Ontario, Canada, following its long- established practice of 
boarding out younger children and placing juveniles in employment. The 
work envisaged was to be on a small scale, with groups of only 30 children 
and juvenile migrants sent to Canada per annum, similar to the numbers of 
juvenile migrants sent by the charity to Canada through the 1930s.
As a summary of its organisational history and future plans, the memo-
randum said curiously little about the charity’s child migration work to 
86 The Waifs and Strays Society did make a very brief reference to their past migration work 





Australia. Although it noted that Dr Barnardo’s Homes had sent children 
both to the farm schools at Picton and Pinjarra, no reference was made to 
Empire Settlement Act funding for their child migration work to Australia, 
including the loan from the Dominions Office towards the costs of devel-
oping the Picton site. The lack of any reference to future plans for resum-
ing child migration to Australia also appeared to be a significant omission 
as Dr Barnardo’s Homes General Superintendent, Mr P.T. Kirkpatrick, 
had been corresponding with the Dominions Office since June 1944 on 
various administrative matters relating to the Picton farm school on the 
assumption that it would continue to receive more children from Britain 
after the war.89 Kirkpatrick had also indicated to an Australian 
Commonwealth Government sub-committee in the spring of 1944 that it 
would be possible, with three months’ notice, to fill the Picton farm school 
(accommodating 100 boys and 50 girls) to capacity again.90 Given that 
Kirkpatrick was the most senior administrator of Dr Barnardo’s Homes at 
that time and led the Barnardo’s group that gave evidence to the Curtis 
Committee,91 it seems unlikely that the omission of the intention to send 
children to Australia in this memorandum would have happened simply 
through error.
A memorandum from the Fairbridge Society was also sent to the Curtis 
Committee following a fact-finding visit on behalf of the Committee to 
Fairbridge’s London office by Letitia Harford.92 Harford, who was well 
aware of Fairbridge’s work partly through her sister who had previously 
89 See Kirkpatrick to Wiseman, 8th June 1944, 17th December 1945, and 6th March 
1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M996/1. See also Kirkpatrick to Hart, 26th April 1945, ML: 
MLMSS9025, Box 13, enclosing a draft letter to the Australian High Commissioner from 
Barnardo’s Chairman of the Council indicating that they hoped to resume sending children 
to New South Wales but that given greater resistance to child migration in view of demo-
graphic trends in Britain this would be made easier if their child migrants could be given 
better resources and opportunities in Australia in future. Reference is also made to Barnardo’s 
extensive plans for sending children to Australia in the post-war period in ‘Australia as Home 
for War Orphans’, Daily Telegraph, 3rd November 1943, and ‘Plans for British Orphan 
Migrants’, Canberra Times, 4th November 1943, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716, and its 
General Manager wrote a public letter offering Barnardo’s help when the Australian 
Commonwealth Cabinet announced its plans for the immigration of 50,000 children in the 
immediate post-war years (‘Child Immigrants’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8th December 
1944, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716).
90 See Report on Child Migration (British and white alien), 17th March 1944, NAA.C: 
A689, 1944/43/554/2/5.
91 See TNA: MH102/1451D/C11.
92 See Note for Mr Green, 5th October 1945, ULSCA(F): H6/2/14.
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worked for Fairbridge, was briefed on the concerns which the London 
office had about its ability to ensure that proper standards of care were 
maintained for children it had sent to Australia. In a note on this meeting, 
Harford was said to have recognised clearly ‘how serious a matter it is that 
“London” has responsibilities which in law (emphasis original) it is power-
less to honour’. Harford also reportedly told a member of staff at the 
London office that the Curtis Committee had also received two critical 
reports about child migration work, one from an unnamed ‘responsible 
source’ and the other from Miss Tempe Woods, whose criticisms of 
Pinjarra had formed an important part of Fairbridge’s dossier which had 
been submitted to the Dominions Office. These critical accounts were 
never published by the Curtis Committee, or publicly acknowledged, and 
formed part of the wider body of information received by the Committee 
that was treated as informal and confidential material. It was also noted 
during this visit that there had initially been problems in securing adequate 
monitoring of CORB children who had been placed out with families in 
Australia and that this had only been put in place after successful lobbying 
of the Commonwealth Minister of the Interior by social workers and State 
child welfare officers.
On the basis of this briefing, Harford recommended that Fairbridge 
submit a formal memorandum outlining its future plans and the powers 
it had to achieve them. This memorandum, submitted to the Curtis 
Committee in January 1946, briefly outlined the extent of the involve-
ment of the Australian Commonwealth and State governments in approv-
ing the selection of children for migration and providing a financial 
contribution to their maintenance until school-leaving age.93 It noted, 
however, that there was no compulsory government inspection of the 
farm schools, nor of after-care, by the Australian authorities. As a conse-
quence, the sending of children to incorporated bodies in Australia, over 
which the London society had no control, meant that these children 
‘forfeit the shelter of what is (and further, will be) provided by the State 
93 Memorandum, 25th January 1946, ULSCA(F): H6/2/14. Fairbridge also provided the 
Committee with a copy of a memorandum originally submitted by them to the Dominions 
Office on 25th January 1945 which described both the rationale and working methods of 
the organisations, and re-iterated its view of the need to ensure appropriate protections for 
child migrants in Australia (see copies in both ULSCA(F): H6/2/14 and TNA: 
DO35/1139/M1118/1). The Dominions Office was also notified that this memorandum 




in the United Kingdom for the care and protection of homeless children 
and are then yielded to the discretion of the Executive Committees of 
the Incorporated Fairbridge Societies in Australia’. Given that these 
overseas committees effectively functioned as ‘closed societies’, there was 
no way of ensuring that members who could provide appropriate advice 
and oversight of standards of care  were appointed to them. This had 
proven particularly problematic, it was noted, in relation to conditions at 
Pinjarra.
The aspiration, the memorandum argued, should be to ensure that 
standards of care for British child migrants were no worse overseas than 
they would have been had they remained in the United Kingdom. As it 
observed:
Recently, agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom 
Government and the Australian Commonwealth Government whereby 
migrants will not forfeit by their translation to Australia their rights of pen-
sions and other social benefits which would have been theirs had they 
remained in the United Kingdom. We suggest that child migrants in like 
manner should find in Australia no less effective State protection, no lower 
standard of education, no inferior opportunity for work and equipment for 
citizenship than they would have enjoyed had they remained in this coun-
try—in the category of “children without families” in the care of voluntary 
societies answerable to the State.
Part of the solution to this, it was suggested, might be for the UK 
Government to approach the Australian Commonwealth Government 
to ensure that the guardianship of child migrants was transferred to the 
Commonwealth Government on their arrival in Australia. Whilst this 
would not necessarily ensure that the local committees in Australia 
would necessarily always maintain proper standards, such a measure 
would at least mean that the farm schools in Australia would be subject 
to more formal government scrutiny to ensure ‘care and protection no 
less effective than that ensured for children in this country and also for 
Australian children’. The assumption that standards of care expected in 
future by the state would be comparable in both the United Kingdom 
and Australia was, as the following chapters will demonstrate, to prove 
unwarranted.
After receiving this memorandum, the Curtis Committee invited repre-
sentatives of Fairbridge’s London office to give evidence at a full meeting 
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of the Committee on 14 May 1946. Mr Kirkpatrick was also invited to 
appear on behalf of Dr Barnardo’s Homes, whose main hearing before the 
Committee had taken place eight months before Fairbridge’s memoran-
dum had been received. This meeting which, according to Fairbridge’s 
records, focused particularly on sensitive issues around the governance of 
child migration programmes, appears to have been conducted as a closed 
session.94 Whilst Kirkpatrick reportedly emphasised that Dr Barnardo’s 
Homes in the United Kingdom exercised effective control over its branch 
in New South Wales and that this arrangement had proven to be an 
‘unqualified success’, Gordon Green and his assistant, Miss Hart, re- 
iterated the concerns set out in Fairbridge’s memorandum. They were also 
questioned by Committee members who were evidently concerned that 
after-care be conducted in an effective way.
Despite having some knowledge of problems associated with child 
migration work, the Curtis Committee did not seek any evidence from the 
Dominions Office, concentrating instead only on the four government 
departments which it knew to have any form of statutory responsibility for 
children’s out-of-home care—the Ministry of Health, the Home Office, 
the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Pensions. Whilst it had 
some understanding of problems both with standards and systems of gov-
ernance, it does not appear to have been aware of the extent to which the 
Dominions Office had already invested financially in farm schools in 
Australia nor of the aspiration of the Australian Commonwealth 
Government (known within the Dominions Office) for child migration to 
be significantly increased when assisted migration resumed. In the absence 
of this knowledge, the Committee appears to have seen child migration as 
a relative minor challenge compared to the other problems it sought to 
address with regard to children’s out-of-home care.
There was no consensus amongst the Committee’s members as to whether 
child migration was, in principle, an appropriate form of welfare intervention. 
John Litten had already visited Australia before the outbreak of war to explore 
possibilities for child migration and took a leading role in establishing the 
child migration work of the National Children’s Home after the war.95 Other 
94 See ‘Curtis Committee – Care of Children, 14th May 1946’, ULSCA(F): H6/2/14. 
This session is not listed in the index of transcribed hearings at TNA: MH102/1451D.
95 See ‘Children as migrants: proposals for Australia’, Argus, 2nd November 1937, & 
Melbourne Herald, ‘Home Principal’s Visit’, 1st November, NAA.C: A436/1945/5/85; 
Boucher, Empire’s Children, pp. 180–3.
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Committee members, such as John Moss (who was to undertake an informal 
review of receiving institutions in Australia in 1951/2) and Letitia Harford, 
do not appear to have had any absolute objections to child migration. Given 
the Committee’s rather tepid support for the resumption of child migration, 
it appears other members were less convinced of its value. There was, how-
ever, clear concern amongst the Committee about what they had learned 
from Fairbridge about the challenges of maintaining appropriate standards of 
care for child migrants in Australia. The single paragraph in its report that 
dealt with child migration re-iterated Fairbridge’s point about the need for 
parity of treatment for children whether remained in the United Kingdom or 
were migrated overseas. As the report put it:
We understand that organisations for sending deprived children to the 
Dominions may resume their work in the near future. We have heard evi-
dence as to the arrangements for selecting children for migration, and it is 
clear to us that their effect is that this opportunity is given only to children 
of fine physique and good mental equipment. These are precisely the chil-
dren for whom satisfactory openings could be found in this country, and in 
present day conditions this particular method of providing for the deprived 
child is not one that we specially wish to see extended. On the other hand, 
a fresh start in a new country may, for children with an unfortunate back-
ground, be the foundation of a happy life, and the opportunity should 
therefore in our view remain open to suitable children who express a desire 
for it. We should however strongly deprecate their setting out in life under 
less thorough care and supervision than they would have at home, and we 
recommend that the arrangements made by the Government of the receiv-
ing country for their welfare and after care should be comparable to those 
we have proposed in this report for deprived children remaining in 
this country.96
This statement was condensed into the report’s single recommendation 
explicitly concerning child migration that ‘the emigration of deprived chil-
dren should be subject to the condition that the receiving Government 
makes arrangements for their welfare and supervision comparable to those 
recommended in this report’.97
96 Care of Children Committee Report, para 515.
97 Care of Children Committee Report, recommendation 61.
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The qualification that the Curtis report placed on the resumption of child 
migration work was significant. By recommending that unaccompanied chil-
dren only be sent overseas if standards of care were comparable to those it 
had advocated for future implementation in Britain, the Committee set out 
expectations that were to be repeatedly referred to in policy and operational 
discussions about this work in the coming years. As noted in the previous 
part of this chapter, progress in implementing the report’s recommendations 
in existing areas of child-care provision such as staff training and greater use 
of foster care was gradual in many parts of England and Wales. However, the 
proposed resumption of child migration was effectively regarded by the 
Committee as a new initiative on which the report’s standards could be 
imposed from the outset. What was to prove more difficult in the coming 
years was the process of establishing measures that would effectively ensure 
that these Curtis standards would be maintained for child migrants.
The Committee’s concern about ensuring appropriate standards of care 
for child migrants was subsequently taken up in the 1948 Children Act. In 
s. 17(1–3) of the Act, local authorities were empowered to seek the migra-
tion of any child in their care—thus extending existing powers available to 
a local authority who served as a ‘fit person’ for a child under the terms of 
the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act (s.84:5). As had been the case 
under the 1933 Act, the migration of a child in the care of the local author-
ity was, however, subject to the consent of the Home Secretary, with the 
1948 Act noting that:
The Secretary of State shall not give his consent under this section unless he 
is satisfied that emigration would benefit the child, and that suitable arrange-
ments have been or will be made for the child’s reception and welfare in the 
country to which he is going, that the parents or guardian of the child have 
been consulted or that it is not practicable to consult them, and that the 
child consents,
[p]rovided that where a child is too young to form or express a proper 
opinion on the matter, the Secretary of State may consent to his emigration 
notwithstanding that the child is unable to consent thereto in any case were 
the child is to emigrate in company with a parent, guardian or relative of his, 
or is to emigrate for the purpose of joining a parent, guardian, relative or 
friend. (s.17:2)98
98 The second paragraph of this clause was interpreted differently in Scotland compared to 
the rest of the United Kingdom (see Opening comments of Senior Counsel to the Inquiry, 
Transcript of Day 42, Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, pp.  40–43). Whereas in 
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The Act also empowered the Secretary of State to introduce regulations 
controlling the emigration of children by voluntary organisations, which 
would require those organisations to provide satisfactory information 
about their operational approach to child emigration as well as the arrange-
ments made for the reception and welfare of children overseas (s.33:1–2).
The 1948 Act therefore appeared to create a statutory framework for 
child migration in keeping with the recommendations of the Curtis 
Committee. However, in reality, the measures introduced in the Act, and 
their subsequent interpretation by civil servants, created significant varia-
tions in the processes through which children came to be emigrated from 
the United Kingdom. Whilst the 1948 Act empowered the Home Secretary 
to introduce regulations for the child migration work of voluntary organ-
isations, such regulations were never introduced in the post-war period in 
which these schemes actually operated.99 The reasons for this will be dis-
cussed further in Chap. 5, but it is important to note at this stage that this 
lack of regulation of voluntary organisations created a dual-track system 
for post-war child migration. Whereas children emigrated by local authori-
ties required the consent of the Home Secretary (in practice, a procedure 
that was delegated to staff in the Home Office Children’s Department),100 
those emigrated by voluntary organisations required no such consent. In 
the case of children emigrated by voluntary organisations the only consent 
effectively required for their migration was that of the signature of a par-
ent, or someone signing as their guardian, on the application form used by 
immigration officials of the country receiving them. Whilst, in principle, 
the Home Secretary was able to refuse a child’s migration from the care of 
a local authority on grounds of their personal circumstances or the suit-
ability of arrangements for their care overseas, the lack of regulation of 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the requirement of a younger child being migrated 
with a parent or guardian was interpreted loosely to allow voluntary organisations migrating 
and receiving children overseas to be recognised as their ‘guardians’, in Scotland the term 
‘guardian’ was understood strictly to refer to a specific individual. In practice, this meant that 
the migration of children under 12 years of age from local authority care in Scotland was 
significantly curtailed as such cases were only allowed by the Scottish Home Department 
where the child was migrating with an individual parent or guardian, and not simply under 
the auspices of a voluntary organisation.
99 Grier, ‘A spirit of “friendly rivalry”?’, pp.  241–3 argues that the failure to introduce 
regulations for the voluntary sector in the original 1948 Act reflected what some saw at the 
time as the under-regulation of the voluntary sector in the Act more generally.
100 See, for example, the discussion of the cases of children to be emigrated from the care 
of Cornwall County Council to Fairbridge Farm Schools in Australia in TNA: MH102/1954.
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voluntary organisations meant that the UK Government had no compa-
rable powers for children migrated by them. Measures intended to rectify 
this discrepancy were not introduced until the spring of 1957, nearly ten 
years after the first British post-war child migrants had arrived in Australia.
The policy influence of the Curtis report therefore provided a complex 
background to the post-war child migration. Its acceptance of the possible 
benefits of migration in the cases of some children created a permissive 
policy framework in which child migration programmes were able to 
resume on a larger scale than at least some of the Committee’s members 
had anticipated. At the same time, the Curtis report had articulated a set 
of expectations about standards in child-care which the Committee 
expected to be met for those children being sent overseas. By insisting on 
particular standards of care for child migrants, the Curtis report shaped a 
policy context in which child migration resumed after the war in the midst 
of increasing scrutiny of its effects on children and new discussions about 
standards involving voluntary organisations and government departments 
in both Britain and Australia. Managing the gap between Curtis standards 
and the reality of child migration programmes was to become one of the 
defining challenges for post-war child migration policy.
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CHAPTER 5
‘Australia as the Coming Greatest Foster- 
Father of Children the World Has Ever 
Known’: The Post-war Resumption of Child 
Migration to Australia, 1945–1947
When the first parties of British child migrants sailed to Australia in 1947, 
they did so in the context of a significantly changed policy context. A re- 
evaluation of immigration needs by the Australian Commonwealth 
Government during the war years led to it developing far more ambitious 
policy goals for assisted immigration supported by the creation of a new 
senior ministerial post. Following the decision to make the Home Office 
the lead department for children’s out-of-home care, its Children’s 
Department which began to involve itself far more in policy discussions 
about child migration with staff in what had been the Dominions Office 
and was (from the summer of 1947) renamed the Commonwealth 
Relations Office. The break in child migration work during the war years 
provided an opportunity for voluntary organisations to make new deci-
sions about their continued involvement in it and, in the face of a more 
co-ordinated policy from the Australian Commonwealth and State 
Governments, other organisations began to involve themselves in child 
migration for the first time. The experience of the war years, particularly 
in relation to the effects of mass evacuation on children, also led to a num-
ber of voluntary and professional bodies raising concerns about the effects 
of emigration on children, creating a more contested public environment 
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for child migration schemes than had existed during the inter-war years.1 
All of this took place in the broader policy landscape of children’s out-of-
home care in Britain which was beginning to be re-shaped in response to 
the publication of the Curtis report.
The Commonwealth Government’s evolving policy for assisted child 
migration had a profound effect on the systems and conditions that post- 
war British child migrants experienced and played a crucial role in shaping 
the policy environment in which British civil servants and politicians oper-
ated. A review of the role in child migration in supporting Australia’s future 
immigration needs had been initiated by the Australian Commonwealth 
Government well in advance of the end of the war. In 1943, an Inter-
Departmental Committee to consider post-war immigration needs estab-
lished a sub-committee specifically to review prospects for the resumption 
of child migration. The sub-committee was created in the context of wider 
public discussion about future prospects for child migration and increased 
war-time anxiety about Australia’s insecurity through the under-population 
of its large land mass.2 A memorandum recording the sub-committee’s 
formation noted that assisted child migration was as a potentially valuable 
element of wider immigration policy given that children could be more 
easily assimilated into Australian society than adults and that their intro-
duction soon after the end of the war would not divert housing and 
employment from de-mobilised servicemen and women.3 Child migration 
could even create new employment opportunities, for example, for war 
widows who could be enlisted as paid carers.4 Ben Chifley, the Minister for 
Post-war Reconstruction, who was to become Prime Minister from 1945 
to 1949, was also noted as being particularly enthusiastic about making 
early arrangements for the resumption of child migration.
1 See, for example, TNA: DO35/1133/M803/41.
2 See, for example, the range of press cuttings in NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716. These 
include a critical account of policy failures to ensure that child and juvenile migrants were 
properly assimilated and supported on arrival in Australia from a man who had migrated to 
Australia under the Dreadnought scheme in 1925 (‘English Boy Migrant Tells of Trials in 
Friendless Land’, Melbourne Herald 21st December 1943). On similar concerns on the 
insecurity of under-populated Dominions, see also the Royal Empire Society, Empire 
Emigration and Overseas Settlement Report, 29th December 1943, TNA: DO35/1139/
M1124/1.
3 Memorandum by Peters, 29th November 1943, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684.
4 Secretary, Department of the Interior to Official Secretary in Great Britain, 20th 
December 1943, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684.
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An initial audit of voluntary organisations that had been, or might in 
future be, involved in child migration was undertaken by the sub-
committee, leading to fuller reports being commissioned from Caroline 
Kelly.5 Reuben Wheeler was tasked with trying to obtain more information 
about the level of interest in voluntary organisations whilst he was based 
as Chief Migration Officer at Australia House in London,6 and Walter 
Garnett was also briefed about and consulted on the sub- committee’s 
work.7 The Dominions Office were also aware of the sub- committee’s 
work and eventually provided, on repeated request from Wheeler, a non-
committal memorandum indicating that no firm view could be taken 
about likely prospects for post-war child migration until broader inter-
governmental policies around assisted migration had been agreed.8
The issue of the available supply of child migrants remained a matter of 
concern for the sub-committee. It learned that there were probably no 
more than 2000 war orphans in the United Kingdom and that public sen-
timent towards them made it more likely that they would be considered 
priorities for adoption or foster care in the United Kingdom rather than 
being made available for emigration.9 As before the war, child migrants 
5 See Memorandum by Peters with enclosures, 29th November 1943; Notes on Child 
Migration, 10th December 1943; Confidential Report on Sydney Non-Government 
Migration Agencies (no date); Public Opinion (no date); Survey of Child Migration Agencies 
in Sydney, January 1944, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684.
6 Peters to Wheeler, 20th December 1943, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684.
7 See Memorandum on Child Migration by Peters, 22nd December 1943; also Notes on 
Meeting of Sub-Committee on Child Migration, 24th January 1944, attended by Garnett, 
NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684
8 Memorandum prepared in the Dominions Office, London, for the Information of the 
Sub-Committee on Child and Juvenile Migration, 31st March 1944, NAA.C: A689, 
1944/43/554/2/5; also note by Wheeler, 12th February 1944, and Garnett to Wheeler 
with enclosure, 31st March 1944, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
9 See Report on Child Migration (British and white alien), 17th March 1944, NAA.C: 
A689, 1944/43/554/2/5; on similar reservations about the migration of children who had 
lost parents in war-time service for Britain, see the opinion piece ‘Future of Britain’s War 
Orphans’, Melbourne Herald, 1st November 1943, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716. After the 
publicising of the Commonwealth Government’s ambitious post-war child migration plans, 
the UK Minister of Pensions, Sir James Womersley, made it clear that he would not sanction 
the migration of any war orphans under his care until they were aged at least 15 or 16 and 
able to express a meaningful opinion about their migration (‘Emigration to Australia—
Decision Left to War Orphans’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5th February 1945, see also 
cablegram High Commissioner’s Office to Prime Minister’s Department, 3rd October 1944, 
and cablegram Wheeler to Peters, 23rd August 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716). The 
likelihood that there would be few, if any, children under the care of the UK Ministry of 
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were seen as most likely to come from residential children’s homes or poor 
families. Walter Garnett also made it clear that the decreasing birth-rate in 
Britain and the prospect of improved family allowances meant that the 
supply of post-war child migrants from Britain was unlikely to be substantial 
and that consent to children’s emigration would only happen in future if 
those responsible for them were ‘persuaded that very great advantages will 
accrue’ to the children.10 Whilst an interest was also taken in the possibility 
of immigration of children from continental Europe as an extension of the 
‘white Australia’ immigration policy, it was also understood that this might 
involve overcoming some popular prejudice against immigration from 
southern Europe as well as anti-Semitic sentiment against the immigration 
of Jewish children.11 Although the immigration of non- British European 
children was regarded as inevitable, given the likely limitations on the 
supply of children from the United Kingdom, attracting children of 
‘British stock’ remained the preferred policy. In spite of repeated warnings 
about the limited numbers of children available from Britain, however, the 
gap between the Commonwealth Government’s aspirations for the level 
of post-war child migration from the United Kingdom and the actual 
numbers of children it received was to become a recurring theme in the 
post-war period.
An initial assumption made by Chifley was that post-war child migration 
would become a more formalised element of Commonwealth immigration 
policy. Rather than leaving this work to interested voluntary organisations, 
Pensions available for migration to Australia was again emphasised by the UK Government 
in Hankinson to Forde, 23rd July 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.
10 Notes on Meeting of Sub-Committee on Child Migration, 24th January 1944, NAA: 
A441, 1952/13/2684. On the recognition of the limited numbers of children likely to be 
available from the United Kingdom, see also Meeting of Prime Ministers, 12th May 1944, 
Appendix 2 Australian Post-War Migration Policy, TNA: PREM4/42/1.
11 See, for example, Extract from Report to the High Commissioner’s Office, London, by 
Sir Herbert Emerson, 2nd February 1944, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5; Public 
Opinion (no date), also views of a Protestant Minister on the immigration of Jewish children 
only being acceptable if they were dispersed through the community and not supported with 
any continued Jewish affiliation and practice in Confidential Report on Sydney Non- 
Government Migration Agencies (no date), NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684. See also Amery to 
Curtin, 25th July 1944, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716, in which Leo Amery suggested that 
immigration of children from Germany would be a sensible initiative, given that ‘there is 
nothing wrong with the German race, which after all is closely akin to ours’ in contrast to 
‘Southern Europeans’. On similar reluctance to take Jewish child refugees in South Africa, 
see Turner to Goode, 14th September 1946, TNA: MH102/1549.
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the Government would, he proposed, establish receiving institutions for 
child migrants with suitably trained staff so that child migration could be 
encouraged and managed on a much larger scale.12 The idea that child 
migration be used as a means of addressing Australia’s pressing need for an 
increase in its population in the coming decades marked this proposal as 
somewhat different in emphasis to other suggested settlement schemes for 
refugee children which had a more primarily humanitarian intent of rescu-
ing children from ‘their bombed and battered homelands’.13 The 
Commonwealth Government’s ambition was to take advantage of the 
social upheaval across post-conflict Europe to try to attract 50–60,000 
child migrants within two or three years of the end of the war.14 Suitable 
accommodation could be provided through repurposing buildings 
previously used by the armed services and other organisations.15 The 
Director-General of the Department of Post-war Reconstruction further 
modified this idea by arguing that large-scale camps would not be 
appropriate places to house children on a long-term basis and that after no 
more than two years in these reception camps, children would be moved to 
smaller hostels in urban areas under the care of cottage mothers.16
12 See Minute of Child Migration Sub-Committee, 15th December 1943; also Howarth to 
Peters, 26th January 1944 on voluntary organisations’ apparent lack of capacity to immigrate 
children on the scale required NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684; also Memorandum by 
Coombes, 19th October 1943, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5. On the decline of 
boarding out as a method of child-care in Australia in the inter-war period, see Nell Musgrove 
and Deirdre Mitchell, The Slow Evolution of Foster Care in Australia: Just Like a Family? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
13 See, for example, ‘Civilian relief for and rehabilitation of children from war stricken areas 
by emigration’, 8th February 1944, Owen to Evatt, 5th February 1944, Keik to Curtin, 9th 
September 1944, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5; on wider public discussion of such 
humanitarian migration schemes see, for example, Plan for Child Migrants Urged’, Daily 
Telegraph, 2nd November 1943, and ‘Australian Homes “Owed to European Orphans”’, 
Daily Telegraph, 17th November, 1943, ‘NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716’.
14 See Child Migration (Secret), Department of Post-war Reconstruction, 18th January 
1943, NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589.
15 Report on Child Migration (British and white alien), 17th March 1944; also confidential 
request for information about possible availability of army sites as accommodation for large 
numbers of child migrants, Coombs to Secretary, Department of the Army, 5th November 
1943, and list of possible sites (including former internment and prisoner of war camps) in 
Sinclair to Coombs, 8th January 1944, and in Coombs to Davis, 1st November 1944, 
NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589.
16 Coombs to Chifley, 30th December 1943, NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589.
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Support for this plan was not universal, however.  Officials in the 
Department of the Interior suggested that, at least in the short term, it 
would be better to continue to undertake this work through interested 
and experienced voluntary organisations albeit with greater government 
support.17 The Department of the Interior was also more sceptical that 
children would be available for migration from Britain to the extent that 
supporters of the mass government scheme believed and instead took the 
view that it would be more productive to direct funding to incentivise 
immigration from widows with children or families with young children.18 
The sub-committee on child migration also supported the option of work-
ing through approved voluntary organisations and initially excluded any 
reference to the idea of a government-managed scheme in its report to the 
main Inter-Departmental Committee on Immigration.19 Walter Garnett 
also expressed the view that working through voluntary organisations 
would be preferable because they were better placed to identify suitable 
children for migration in the United Kingdom, were more experienced in 
this work, provided suitable care and their religious or philanthropic ethos 
made them more acceptable to parents and guardians in the United 
Kingdom.20 Garnett’s preference for the ethos of voluntary organisations 
rather than the impersonal and ‘soulless’ services provided by the state 
continued despite his knowledge, by the end of 1943, of problems at both 
Tardun and Northcote. Evidence of failings at these receiving institutions 
also did nothing to affect Garnett’s confident reassurance to the Australian 
sub-committee on child migration that the UK Government remained 
committed to increasing the British stock of the Dominions and would 
continue encourage child migration as part of this wider policy.21
Despite the sub-committee’s recommendation that child migration 
should continue to operate primarily through supporting the work of vol-
untary organisations, the Department of Post-war Reconstruction contin-
ued to advocate for its more ambitious, government-managed proposal. 
Although Chifley’s enthusiasm for child migration as an element of 
17 Peters to Wheeler, 20th December 1943, NAA: A441, 1952/13/2684.
18 Peters to Wheeler, 10th October 1944, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
19 Report on Child Migration (British and white alien), 17th March 1944, NAA.C: A689, 
1944/43/554/2/5; Child Migration (confidential), no date, NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589.
20 Memorandum on Child Migration by Peters, 22nd December 1943, NAA: A441, 
1952/13/2684.




post-war Australian reconstruction was initially kept confidential—for fear 
that other Dominions might seek to steal a march on the possible supply 
of children from Europe—it began to be aired publicly as a policy proposal 
by the middle of 1944. At a speech to the Trade Union Conference in 
Melbourne in June, the acting Prime Minister Frank Forde argued that 
without substantial immigration to increase its population the future secu-
rity and viability of Australia was at risk. Encouraging immigration on the 
basis of cheap labour was, Forde told his audience, an anathema to the 
Labor Party and child migration offered an alternative and more sustain-
able means for substantial population growth.22 By the autumn of 1944, 
Chifley’s Department of Post-war Reconstruction had successfully lobbied 
the Cabinet to ensure that its proposals would be considered again by the 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Immigration and then by the 
Cabinet.23 In addition to setting out the demographic case for acting in a 
concerted way to draw on the short-term supply of children displaced 
through the war, it offered some specific suggestions about this scheme’s 
implementation. It was proposed that legislation be introduced to bring 
child migrants under the guardianship of the Minister for the Interior 
(following the model used for Children’s Overseas Reception Board 
[CORB] evacuees). An outline budget for this work was also suggested, 
estimated to be in excess of A£26 million over eight years not including 
any building costs.24 Whilst the Treasury recognised this to be a very 
significant financial commitment, it also argued that if substantial funding 
were to be directed towards population growth in Australia then child 
migration represented a more cost-effective and secure means of achieving 
this than funding schemes designed to encourage Australian families to 
have more children.25
22 Draft notes for part of speech by the Hon. F.M. Forder to Trade Union Conference, 
June 1944, NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589; also coverage of the speech ‘Europe’s War Orphans 
as Migrants’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7th June 1944, cutting in NAA.C: A689, 
1944/43/554/2/5.
23 Chifley to Collings, 20th September 1944, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716; Child 
Migration (confidential), no date, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5; Departments of the 
Interior and Post-War Reconstruction, Child Migration with appendices, no date, NAA.C: 
A9816, 1944/589.
24 The inclusion of the budget appears to have been strongly encouraged by the Department 
of the Interior in the hope that its scale might reduce support for the proposals, Peters to 
Wheeler, 31st October, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
25 Department of the Treasury Minute Paper, Child Migration, 28th November 1944, 
NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589.
5 ‘AUSTRALIA AS THE COMING GREATEST FOSTER-FATHER OF CHILDREN… 
138
After receiving widely publicised Cabinet approval in principle for these 
proposals in December 1944,26 a consultation meeting was arranged with 
representatives of State Governments the following month.27 Presenting 
this scheme to the meeting, the Director-General of the Department of 
Post-war Reconstruction suggested that this should be seen as a national 
initiative that sought to avoid stigmatising child migrants as ‘charity cases’. 
Whilst recognising the administrative challenges of this work, State 
representatives were generally supportive of the proposal, including the 
suggestion that children be placed in cottage homes in urban areas as soon 
as possible after their arrival to avoid institutionalisation in reception 
camps (although some preferred adoption or foster placement to cottage 
homes).28 A pre-circulated memorandum from the Departments of the 
Interior and Post-war Reconstruction also suggested that some cost sav-
ings could be found, for example, by involving child migrants in growing 
their own vegetables—as long as this did not extend into an exploitative 
use of their labour. It was also recognised, however, that recruiting and 
retaining suitable cottage mothers would require attractive rates of 
remuneration.
On the basis of this positive response, State Governments were then 
asked to provide proposed budgets for the delivery of this scheme in their 
State. A provisional agreement between the Commonwealth and States 
was also drafted in which the Commonwealth offered a relatively generous 
financial provision (compared to the pre-war period) of funding children’s 
26 17,000 Child Migrants a Year—Australian Plan Announced, 7th December 1944, TNA: 
DO35/1134/M822/85; see also ‘Child Migrant Goal in Post-War, 50,000’, Melbourne 
Herald, 7th December 1944, NAA.C: A689, 1944/43/554/2/5; ‘Government Plans to 
Bring Out 17,000  in Each year’, Daily Telegraph, 7th December 1944, ’17,000 Child 
Migrants in New Plan’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7th December 1944, ‘Child Migration Plan 
Adopted by Cabinet’, Canberra Times, 7th December 1944, ’17,000 Child Migrants a Year’, 
The Argus, 7th December 1944, and ’34 Shiploads a Year of Child Migrants’, 8th December 
1944, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716. In cablegram London Representative to Acting Prime 
Minister and Department, 8th December 1994, same file, disappointment is expressed that 
insufficient publicity for this decision was organised in Britain.
27 Notes Taken at Conference of Commonwealth and State Officials, 9th January 1945, 
NAA.C: A9816, 1944/589; see also Child Migration, draft 11th December 1944, NAA.C: 
A446, 1960/66716. This meeting also attracted national press coverage, see, for example, 
‘Fed. State Talks on Migration’, Canberra Times, 10th January 1945, ‘Early Moves in Child 
Migrant Plan’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10th January 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
28 A few months after the meeting, however, the Acting Premier of Queensland indicated 
the State was unlikely to support the scheme as its costs would significantly outweigh any 
limited future benefits (Nutt to Carrodus, 16th May 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
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selection, emigration, maintenance to the age of 16, and half of capital 
building costs, with States expected to bear the cost of children’s educa-
tion and the other half of capital costs. By August 1945, estimated costs 
from State Governments had been received and collated by the Department 
of the Interior.29 These indicated that the total cost of the immigration of 
51,000 children would be in the range of A£64 million to A£71 million,30 
for which the Commonwealth Government would be liable for around 
70% of this and State Governments the remainder. This did not include 
projected costs for children’s overseas recruitment, outfitting, passages 
and escorts for shipping which could rise to a further A£4 million if all the 
51,000 children were migrated. The main reason for the substantial rise in 
projected costs was that this new budget now included costs for the con-
struction of new cottage homes, hostels and additional school buildings 
(estimated to be just over A£32  million), for which cottage homes 
accounted for most of this budget. After the cost of the construction of 
new cottage homes, the staffing of those homes was the next most expen-
sive item in the total budget, estimated to be around A£31 million. Even 
if financially practical, it was doubted that a building programme on this 
scale would be possible given wider national pressures on building materi-
als at the end of the war. Given the uncertainty as to whether child migrants 
on this scale would even be available, it was suggested that another alter-
native might be to set up a pilot scheme for 440 child migrants to be 
received across four States as a means of assessing the viability of a larger 
scale initiative at a cost of around A£700,000.
Although the likely costs of these proposals were much greater than 
had initially been anticipated, they remained under consideration by the 
Commonwealth Government.31 This policy appeared set to receive further 
support with the creation of a new Commonwealth Department of 
Immigration in July 1945. Arthur Calwell, its first minister, had just 
published a short book outlining the serious demographic challenges 
facing Australia in the coming decades and supporting the child migration 
29 Nutt to Acting Secretary Department of the Interior with enclosures, 8th August 1945, 
NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
30 Figures were given as a range because neither Queensland nor Western Australia had by 
then returned projected costs, and estimates made on their behalf by the Department of the 
Interior were calculated on the basis of likely minimum and maximum amounts.
31 See, for example, Evatt to Calwell, 24th July 1945, NAA.C: A1066/ER45/6/8/7/7; 
Calwell to Morel, 1st February 1946, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.
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plan as an integral part of the national response to this.32 Even though, 
Calwell acknowledged, there might be fewer children available for 
emigration than some hoped, it was nevertheless gratifying to see that a 
London newspaper had declared Australia to be ‘the coming greatest 
foster-father of children the world has known’. Calwell further endorsed 
the plan to bring 50,000 war orphans to Australia in his first major 
ministerial speech to the Australian Parliament that was released as a 
separate Government publication.33 Whilst maintaining the ‘white 
Australia’ immigration policy and preferring ‘good British stock’, Calwell 
was, however, increasingly willing to accept that the numbers of white 
immigrants that Australia needed—including child migrants—would need 
to be taken from continental Europe as well as the United Kingdom.34
By this point, the Dominions Office had already begun drafting free 
and assisted passage schemes, including support for child migration, in 
consultation with the Commonwealth Government.35 However, it paid 
relatively little attention to Calwell’s proposals for child migration and 
took more interest in the implications of Calwell’s policy announcement 
relating to free passages for discharged British servicemen and, later on, 
the possible inaccuracies of subsequent Commonwealth Government 
publicity material for potential immigrants on the costs of living in 
Australia.36 Whilst the aim of supporting British emigration to its 
32 Arthur Calwell, How Many Australians Tomorrow? (Melbourne: Reed & Harris, 1945), 
especially pp. 52–53 where Calwell both aspires to introducing up to 50,000 child migrants 
to Australia per annum whilst also recognising that the supply might be far more limited than 
that. See also his autobiographical account of his work as Minister for Immigration in Arthur 
Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not: ‘The Fearless Memoirs of a Great Labor Leader’ (Perth: Rigby, 
1978), pp. 96–110.
33 ‘Migration to Australia – New Minister Explains Government Plans’, 2nd August 1945, 
TNA: DO35/1135/M822/29/1.
34 On the initiatives to attract white immigrants of different nationalities encouraged by 
Calwell and later Ministers for Immigration see, for example, Eric Richards, Destination 
Australia: Migration to Australia since 1901 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 
2008), pp. 166–203; also Geoffrey Sherington, Australia’s Immigrants, 1788–1978 (North 
Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp.  127–51. On these post-war immigrants’ 
experiences, see Catherine Panich, Sanctuary: Remembering Post-War Immigration (North 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988).
35 See, for example, Dixon to Wheeler, 23rd December 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/
M1014/1. On wider policy discussions with Dominions governments about post-war 
migration, which had been initiated by the UK Government in 1924, see TNA: 
PREM4/42/1.
36 See correspondence and other documents in TNA: DO35/1138/M822/29/1.
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Dominions was still seen as valuable in terms of maintaining social,  cultural 
and strategic bonds across the Commonwealth (with Australia seen as the 
most proactive Dominion government with regard to arrangements for 
post-war migration), the prospect of the loss of British citizens during a 
period of a falling birth-rate and need to maintain a strong work-force for 
economic recovery was regarded with concern.37 Support for widespread 
emigration was therefore not as strong in the Dominions Office as it had 
been with the original passing of the Empire Settlement Act. As one offi-
cial commented rather tepidly, ‘if the Dominions wished for immigrants 
from the United Kingdom, and if emigrants wished to go, the United 
Kingdom Government would not be disposed to stand in the way’.38
Doubts were growing, however, about the viability of the policy which 
was now taken up by Calwell. By the summer of 1945, it was publicly 
recognised that even if potential child migrants were available in the 
United Kingdom and continental Europe, the lack of available shipping 
for possibly at least two years constituted a significant logistical challenge.39 
Further discouragement for the Department of Post-war Reconstruction’s 
ambitious plans came from a report commissioned by Calwell from a 
Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee that he convened 
from delegates attending an International Labour Office conference in 
Paris.40 Within its wider remit of investigating attitudes and prospects for 
emigration to Australia from the United Kingdom and continental Europe, 
the Advisory Committee was also tasked specifically with assessing the 
feasibility of the plans for recruiting 50,000 child migrants. The 
Committee’s views, set out in its report submitted in February 1946, were 
dismissive. It commented that wide publicity for these proposals were pre-
mature, had been made without any adequate survey of children’s avail-
ability and, as a consequence, had been the source of ‘a certain amount of 
embarrassment’. The countries they surveyed had few war orphans, apart 
37 On this point see also Conclusions of War Cabinet, 16th April 1945, TNA: 
PREM4/42/1.
38 Duff to Hosking, (day unclear) February 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1124/2.
39 This shipping shortage was acknowledged by Calwell himself in his Parliamentary speech 
on 2nd August 1945; see also ‘Shipping Bar to Child Migration’, The Melbourne Herald, 
25th May 1945, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716. Calwell (Be Just and Fear Not, p. 99) later 
noted that around two thirds of all ships sailing under British Commonwealth flags at the 
start of the war had been sunk during it.
40 Report of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee, Presented 27th February, 
1946, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66716.
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from Norway who claimed this status for the special case of children 
fathered by German soldiers, and former enemy countries were not 
considered suitable places for recruitment. Suitable countries also generally 
wished to make their own provisions for the limited numbers of war 
orphans they had and did not want to consider emigration for them. As 
the recruitment of children on the scale envisaged was highly unlikely, the 
Committee recommended that the substantial investment that such a 
scheme required would be better spent on assisting adult and family 
migration. Given the lack of grounds for pursuing the proposed 
Commonwealth Government scheme, it also concluded that it would be 
more sensible to provide encouragement to voluntary organisations 
already interested or involved in child migration work and who appeared 
‘to have done a reasonable job in the past’. Their views about the chal-
lenges facing the policy of mass child migration came as no surprise to 
Calwell as he himself had acknowledged in the Australian Parliament the 
previous autumn that the prospects for recruiting war orphans from Britain 
or continental Europe did not look strong in the near future.41 A memo-
randum from the UK High Commission in Canberra to the Dominions 
Office summarising the Committee’s report also commented that ‘the 
non-availability of children is, however, possibly the least of the difficulties 
with which this scheme would have been faced. Its promoters had little 
appreciation of the problems connected with the transfer of children and 
had principally been attracted to this form of migration by what they 
thought to be its simplicity’.42
In view of these evident challenges, Calwell sought to revise the 
Commonwealth Government’s policy on child migration away from the 
ambitious Government-controlled plan and back to the policy of support-
ing the work of voluntary organisations that had originally been favoured 
by the Department of the Interior.
Before these proposals were finalised at the Premiers’ Conference in 
August 1946, Calwell also introduced new legislation that made the 
Commonwealth Minister of Immigration the legal guardian of all child 
immigrants to Australia who were unaccompanied by their parents. The 
Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Bill was presented to Parliament 
by Calwell in July in part because the National Security (Oversea Children) 
41 Migration to Australia—Further Statement by Minister, 3rd October 1945, TNA: 
DO35/1135/M822/29/1.
42 See extract from minute, 9th August 1946, TNA: DO35/1134/M822/85.
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regulations which had brought CORB evacuees under the legal 
guardianship of the Commonwealth Government was due to expire at the 
end of December 1946 and successor legislation was required to cover 
more than a hundred CORB evacuees still resident in Australia.43 The Bill, 
which received Assent in August and came into effect on 30th December, 
placed all child evacuees and child migrants under the Minister’s guardian-
ship until they reached the age of 21.44 The Minister was empowered both 
to delegate his powers and responsibilities as guardian to State officials (in 
practice usually State Child Welfare departments) and to place child 
migrants under the custodianship of organisations which had been 
approved by the Minister for such work.45 The Act also allowed for the 
drawing up of regulations regarding principles guiding the placement of 
children with custodian organisations and the standards to be upheld by 
custodian organisations, although in practice such regulations were never 
brought forward.
The Premiers’ Conference in 19th August 1946 finalised the proposed 
financial and administrative arrangements by which the Commonwealth 
and State Governments would support child migration.46 Rather than per-
sist with the ambitious government-managed scheme—passed up by the 
Conference, according to a note from the UK High Commission, because 
43 Statement by the Prime Minister, Migration—British Migrants, Children, 2nd July 
1946, TNA: DO35/1134/M822/85.
44 Commonwealth of Australia, Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act, No. 45 of 
1946, see, for example, copy held on DO35/1134/M822/85.
45 The communication about these processes and responsibilities does not always appear to 
have been clear with, for example, R.H. Hicks, the Director of Child Welfare for New South 
Wales, complaining to Heyes in 1949 that he had not formally been notified that Fairbridge 
or Dr Barnardo’s Homes had been formally approved under this legislation and on what 
grounds such approval had been made (see Hicks to Heyes, 1st March 1949, also Heyes to 
Best, 11th May 1949, Heyes to Hicks, 19th May 1949, and Wall to Heyes, 2nd September 
1949, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/50). As this particular correspondence shows, organisations 
such as Fairbridge and Dr Barnardo’s Homes who had been involved in child migration 
before the war were not required to go through a renewed approval process by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government and were assumed to be fit to continue to undertake child 
migration work (see note by Metcalffe, 19th May 1949, same file). See note 9th September 
1947, TNA: DO35/3435, which suggests that the Commonwealth Relations Office felt that 
confirmation was needed that conditions were satisfactory at Molong, Bacchus Marsh and 
Benmore before post-war child migrants proceeded to them.
46 On the wider policy context of the Assisted Passage Agreement that was formalised 
between the Australian Commonwealth and UK Governments in March earlier that year, see 
TNA: DO35/1138/M1014/8.
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of its ‘exorbitant cost’47—it was agreed that child migration would be 
pursued ‘under the auspices of approved voluntary migration organisa-
tions’.48 The Commonwealth Government’s proposal was not abandoned 
but officially suspended until conditions were such that the scheme might 
be revived. States agreed to fund up to a third of capital costs for building 
work that voluntary organisations required for child migrants—with the 
Commonwealth Government being left to decide how much of the 
remaining costs would be paid for by itself and the voluntary organisation 
concerned. States also agreed to pay 3/6d per week maintenance for child 
migrants (with significant differences emerging in later years between this 
level of funding between States)49 to the age of 16, in addition to mainte-
nance funding from the UK Government and from the Commonwealth 
Child Endowment scheme. State Governments would be responsible for 
the reception and after-care of migrants, with the Commonwealth 
Government responsible for all work relating to immigration matters con-
ducted overseas. If States did not already have Immigration Departments, 
they agreed to establish one or ensure that a branch of another depart-
ment would take responsibility for immigration matters.  The 
Commonwealth Government also agreed to establish a small office in each 
State run by a regional Commonwealth Migration Officer to support 
effective liaison between State and Commonwealth immigration bodies. 
These arrangements were confirmed, on 10th September, by the Inter- 
Departmental Committee on Migration,50 with the Commonwealth 
contribution to voluntary organisations’ capital grants set at one third to 
match that of the State. The Commonwealth’s contribution was also 
agreed as being repayable, without interest, should the voluntary 
organisation to which it was paid cease to receive and accommodate child 
migrants. Given concerns about the difficulties of safely placing child 
migrants directly into foster care, the Committee agreed that additional 
maintenance funding would not be paid for child migrants in private 
households for the time being, unless no further places were available at 
receiving institutions. Whilst the clear policy preference was to encourage 
child migrants from the United Kingdom, a conference of Commonwealth 
47 Extract of minute, 23rd August 1946, TNA: DO35/1134/M822/85.
48 See Immigration: Decision of Premiers’ Conference, 20th August 1946, TNA: 
DO35/1134/M822/85.
49 See, for example, Australian Senate Community Affairs Committee, Lost Innocents, paras 
2.77–2.81.




and State officials the following December confirmed that similar terms of 
support would apply to child migrants from other European countries.51
The effective abandonment of Chifley’s original vision of a national 
child migration plan was to have significant implications. For some of its 
advocates, this policy was intended to mark a significant shift away from 
the charitable management of child migration—in which children might 
be cast as objects of pity and suspicion—to a collective project of nation- 
building which should elicit civic pride. Whilst this emphasis was softened 
in some public statements by the Commonwealth Government, which 
suggested that the government-managed scheme was intended to supple-
ment rather than replace voluntary organisations’ child migration work,52 
the scale of the proposed Commonwealth scheme was such that it is dif-
ficult to imagine that its implementation would not have led to children 
being diverted away from residential institutions run by voluntary organ-
isations in Australia. However, the costs of building and staffing new 
government- run homes meant that the Commonwealth Government’s 
continued interest in child migration was ultimately outsourced back to 
voluntary organisations for its delivery. Although Arthur Calwell had pre-
viously claimed that post-war child migrants would not be placed in 
institutions,53 the Commonwealth Government’s plan of accommodating 
them in scattered cottage homes in urban areas with carefully selected and 
well-remunerated staff was never realised. Instead, for many post-war 
child migrants, their living conditions were to take institutional forms that 
some advocates of the government-run scheme had previously criticised as 
unfitting for this new national project.
The ResumpTion of AssisTed Child migRATion in 1947
The confirmation of the Commonwealth Government’s financial support 
for child migration in September 1946 created conditions in which practi-
cal arrangements for the migration of parties of British children during the 
51 Extract from Summary of Proceedings of Conference of Commonwealth and State 
Officers, 16th and 17th December 1946, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.
52 See Australian News and Information Bureau, Child Migration, 7th December 1944, 
TNA: DO35/1134/M822/85.
53 Migration to Australia—Further Statement by Minister, 3rd October 1945, TNA: 
DO35/1135/M822/29/1.
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following year began to be made.54 In many cases, voluntary organisations 
had already by then been developing plans in anticipation of the post-war 
resumption of child migration, either to resume their pre-war activities or 
to enter the field of assisted child migration for the first time.
The numbers of children involved reflected the more pessimistic 
assessments that had been made about the availability of children from the 
United Kingdom. With sailings of child migrants to Australia beginning in 
the autumn of 1947, by 31st March 1948 group nominations from volun-
tary organisations for 749 child migrants had yielded only 472 arrivals.55 
This pattern of slow recruitment was to persist in coming years. In his 
1944 report, Walter Garnett had estimated that a realistic figure of 200 
children would need to be sent each year for five or six years merely to fill 
existing spaces in institutions already receiving child migrants by then, let 
alone allowing for the approval of new receiving institutions. Between 
1947 and departure of the last known unaccompanied child migrants in 
1970, there were only six years in which the numbers of child migrants 
leaving the United Kingdom reached that level.56
From the autumn of 1947, the Fairbridge Society began to send small 
numbers of children to its farm school at Molong, with 70 having arrived 
there by the end of August 1948.57 Despite pressure from the Western 
Australian Government to expedite the migration of up to 300 children to 
Pinjarra, neither the Commonwealth Relations Office nor the London 
54 A helpful table of numbers of assisted child migrants sent by each sending organisation 
approved by the United Kingdom Government between 1947 and 1965 is provided in 
Stephen Constantine, ‘The British Government, child welfare, and child migration to 
Australia after 1945’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 30, no. 1, Jan 
2002, appendix, 126–7. See also the anonymised table of details of child migrants sent from 
1947 to 1949 inclusive, on TNA: MH102/2337, which although detailed does not appear 
to include all children migrated in that period. No statistics were reportedly kept by the 
Home Office for the number of children migrated in this period who required Secretary of 
State consent (TNA: MH102/2330). The issue of the failure of the Home Office to maintain 
statistics in relation to child migration was also raised as a question in the House of Commons, 
Hansard, column 1458, 22nd February 1951 (copy held on TNA: DO35/3434).
55 ‘Position at 31st March 1948’, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/24.
56 From figures in Constantine, ‘The British Government’, these were 1947, 1950, 1952, 
1953, 1954 and 1955 (where 199 children were sent), and these years usually coincided with 
higher numbers of children being sent by Catholic organisations and/or the Fairbridge 
Society.
57 ’28 Children Are Sailing to a New Life’, Evening Standard, 15th August 1947; 
‘Developing the Fairbridge Farm Schools’, Birmingham Post, 21st October 1947, and name 
unclear to R.L. Dixon, 31st August 1948, TNA: DO35/3402.
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branch of the Fairbridge Society were happy to countenance this until the 
conflict between the Fairbridge organisations in London and Western 
Australia had been resolved.58 As Garnett observed, though, the UK 
Government had little power to prevent the emigration of children to 
Pinjarra if they were accepted by immigration officials at Australia House, 
other than ending its maintenance agreement for their upkeep.59 Following 
a resolution to this conflict in the autumn of 1947, agreement was reached 
for 20 children to sail to Pinjarra in December 1948, on the basis of some 
evidence of progress in renovating the farm school after dilapidation 
caused by its limited use during the war.60 The scale of operations at 
Pinjarra was also reduced, with the pre-war capacity of 400 children now 
halved to 200. By the end of 1949, 155 children had been sent to the two 
Fairbridge farm schools in Australia. Despite its hopes to provide substantial 
support to the Australian Commonwealth Government’s ambitions for 
increased child migration, Dr Barnardo’s Homes had only sent 104 
children to its institutions in New South Wales from the autumn of 1947 
until the end of 1949.61 The Northcote farm school re-opened in June 
1948 with the arrival of 20 British children, but only a total of 47 had 
been sent by the end of 1949.62 This fell considerably short of the Trustees 
hopes to receive 50 child migrants a year, leading it to make an unsuccess-
ful request to Arthur Calwell for a grant to bridge the shortfall in its 
58 See Smith to Heyes, 14th October 1946, Panton to Williams, 7th November 1946, 
TNA: DO35/3402; Memorandum, July 1946, TNA: DO35/3395; note by R.L. Dixon, 
10th January 1947, DO35/1139/M1118/1.
59 Garnett to Head, 29th October 1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
60 Garnett to Bankes Amory, 5th February 1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2; 
Logan to Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office, 15th November 1948, Youth 
emigration’, Birmingham Post, 15th December 1948, Garnett to Costley-White, 10th 
December 1947, TNA: DO35/3402.
61 On Barnardo’s post-war resumption of child migration see documents and 
correspondence on TNA: DO35/3379 and MH102/1893.
62 On policy proposals for the resumption of child migration to the Northcote farm school 
by its Principal, see TNA: DO35/1138/M1019/1. The UK Secretary of the Northcote 
Trust, Vera Grenfell, consulted with the Home Office about appropriate standards for the 
farm school, the Principal reportedly met with members of the Curtis and Clyde Committees 
whilst on a fact-finding mission to Britain, and the Home Office also arranged for Miss 
Tempe Woods, one of the lead complainants in Fairbridge’s 1944 dossier, to attend new 
post-war training for house mothers in London conducted by Claire Britton before taking up 
the position of head of training at Northcote, see documents and correspondence, see 
documents and correspondence TNA: MH102/1591.
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income until more children, and their accompanying maintenance funding, 
became available.63
As noted in Chap. 1, the Church of England Advisory Council for 
Empire Settlement had, in its pre-war organisational form, been involved 
in adult, family and juvenile migration. Although now constituted primar-
ily as an advisory body on imperial migration matters under the chairman-
ship of the former Governor-General of Canada, the Earl of Bessborough, 
it now began to involve itself in child migration.64 The first children 
emigrated under the Council’s auspices were sent to the Swan Homes in 
Western Australia in response to a nomination from the Secretary for 
Anglican Orphanages for the Diocese of Perth.65 Again, however, the ini-
tial numbers sent through the Council’s work were minimal compared to 
the Commonwealth Government’s ambitions, with only 67 children sail-
ing between the autumn of 1947 and the end of 1949.66 The Salvation 
Army and Presbyterian Church also successfully submitted nominations to 
receive 40 and 25 child migrants respectively, but no children had been 
sent under either of these nominations by the end of 1949.
Another new organisation to enter this field after the end of the war was 
the Over-Seas League.67 Its newly appointed honorary migration secre-
tary, Cyril Bavin, had a long-standing interest in juvenile migration 
through his work with the YMCA and been an active exponent of the 
group nomination system for immigration to Australia which had given 
greater opportunities for churches and voluntary organisations to involve 
63 See Beilby to Armstrong 9th Oct 1947; Coles to Calwell with enclosure, 28th October 
1948, Calwell to Coles, 9th November 1948, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/24. Correspondence 
and documents on this file also describe the process through which Northcote was able to 
negotiate capital funding for renovations and improvements to the Bacchus Marsh farm 
school but was unable to proceed with this work because it was unable to provide the match- 
funding in conjunction with the funding offered by the Commonwealth and State 
Governments.
64 Lynch, ‘The Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement’.
65 See correspondence and documents on TNA: DO35/3388 and NAA.C: K403, 
W59/114. See also documents and correspondence relating to the approval of the Clarendon 
Children’s Home in Australia in 1948, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/10.
66 See also the co-authored letter to The Times, 18th May 1950, by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Geoffrey Fisher and the Earl of Bessborough, appealing for funds for the 
Council and emphasising its child migration work (copy held on TNA: DO35/3389).
67 On the League’s wider history, see Adele Smith, The Royal Overseas League: From Empire 
into Commonwealth, A History of the First 100 Years, London: IB Tauris, 2010. An 
organisational history celebrating the League’s centenary, this book makes no reference to its 
involvement in child migration.
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themselves in assisted migration work.68 Bavin also served, during the war, 
as the YMCA’s representative on the Children’s Overseas Reception Board 
before taking on his honorary position with the Over-Seas League. In 
February 1948, officials from London County Council sought an inter-
view with Bavin after the League had publicly advertised a scheme by 
which children would be emigrated to Australia for adoption.69 Bavin 
described a scheme in which the League collected both the names of pro-
spective adopters in Australia and the names of children being put forward 
for adoption by families in the United Kingdom. Prospective adopters 
were, Bavin claimed, vetted by the Australian Government. In addition to 
undertaking the usual selection and medical interviews at Australia House, 
children emigrated in this way also required licences from the Bow Street 
Magistrates Court under the terms of s.11 of the 1939 Adoption of 
Children (Regulation) Act before leaving the country. The costs of their 
passage to Australia were shared between the Australian Government and 
the child’s new adopters. As this scheme did not receive any funding under 
the terms of the Empire Settlement Act, no notification of it appeared to 
have been given to the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the UK 
Government had no formal role in relation to it at all. Compared to other 
nascent post-war child migration schemes, the League appeared more suc-
cessful in sending larger numbers—with Bavin claiming that 130 children 
had been sent since September 1947. The unease that London County 
Council officials felt about Bavin’s broad outline of the scheme was soon 
compounded by information received by its Education Officer’s 
Department about two boys recruited for emigration to Australia by the 
League who were judged by the Council to have difficulties that might 
make their adoption placement likely to break down.70 These concerns 
were passed on by the Council’s Education Officer to the Children’s 
Department in the Home Office.71
An element of mystery surrounds this work, however. The Over-Seas 
League submitted formal proposals the kind of scheme described by Bavin 
for approval by the Australian Commonwealth Government Department 
68 Bavin also held an honorary position, apparently for a relatively short time, as a member 
of the Church of England Advisory Council on Empire Settlement, when it was established 
in 1937, see Report of the Church of England Advisory Council for Empire Settlement for the 
year 1st September 1937 to 31st August 1938, CERC: CECES-2-CA618.
69 See Interview with Mr Bavin, 5th February 1948, TNA: MH102/1560.
70 See Mann to Cram, 19th March 1948, TNA: MH102/1560.
71 Lowndes to Lyon, 23rd March 1948, TNA: MH102/1560.
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of Immigration in July 1948. These were rejected by a conference of 
Commonwealth and State officials the following month because the 
League’s proposals did not allow face-to-face contact between children 
and adopters prior to the adoption, did not enable sufficient transfer of 
records to relevant State authorities and did not allow for a probationary 
period in which the child would live with their new adoptive family before 
their adoption was finalised. Furthermore, the League was judged to have 
an insufficient organisational presence in Australia to support adoption 
placements that were in difficulty or had broken down, with children no 
longer cared for under failed adoption placements then becoming an addi-
tional demand on State Child Welfare departments.72
The refusal of this proposal by the Commonwealth Government raises 
questions about the basis on which the League had apparently already sent 
at least 130 children to Australia before its proposal had been sent to 
Australian authorities. The League also appears to have continued this 
practice to some extent after the official refusal of its scheme.73 One pos-
sibility is that, given Bavin’s prior association with the Children’s Overseas 
Reception Board, these children were classified as returning to Australia to 
households in which they had previously been placed during the war 
through the Board’s work. Bavin certainly later claimed that all the chil-
dren sent to households in Australia were returning CORB evacuees, 
something for which the Australian Commonwealth Government had 
given its approval.74 However, both the case of the two boys noted by 
London County Council Education officials and Bavin’s account of a 
more widely publicised-scheme suggested that even if some of those chil-
dren being sent to Australia by the League were returning CORB evacu-
ees, certainly not all were.
There are some other indications that ‘CORB status’ may have been 
applied to children being sent to Australia in order to facilitate their emi-
gration. In June 1949, a State immigration official for New South Wales 
72 Proceedings of conference of Commonwealth and State Immigration Officials, 26/27th 
August 1948, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717. Whilst the League’s later child migration 
scheme to New Zealand involved the placement of children in foster homes, and only rarely 
full adoption, their proposed scheme to Australia therefore appears to have involved full 
adoption immediately on the child’s arrival in Australia.
73 See Over-Seas League, ‘Statement of Our Migration Activities’, TNA: DO35/6377, in 
which Bavin recorded that the League had sent 194 children to Australia between August 
1947 and the end of 1949.
74 Royal Over-Seas League, ‘Statement of Our Migration Activities’, TNA: DO35/6377.
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wrote to Noel Lamidey, the Chief Migration Officer at Australia House, 
to ask about a group of seven children about to arrive on the SS Mooltan 
who were marked on the shipping list as a CORB children’s party despite 
the fact that ‘very few of these children, if any, were originally members of 
the CORB party evacuated to Australia’.75 In his reply the following 
month,76 Mr Lamidey commented that:
The Overseas League in London has taken an interest in CORB children 
who wish to return to Australia and this arrangement has worked satisfacto-
rily particularly as the League is in a position to provide the children with 
entertainment at the various ports of call. Usually however, there are insuf-
ficient children to make the formation of a separate party and the appoint-
ment of escorts worth-while. For this reason, therefore, approved children 
who require the services of an escort have been included in the party.
Noting that some nominators in Australia (presumably individuals 
rather than organisations) would find the process of making shipping 
arrangements for children they were due to receive difficult, Lamidey 
commented that ‘various voluntary bodies have proved most helpful in 
this connection’ and states that ‘the Overseas League, whilst not an 
approved organisation for the reception of children in Australia, is never-
theless active in the migration field and it would perhaps be unwise to 
discourage their efforts’. The implication of this letter was that the League, 
with the support of immigration officials at Australia House, was using the 
status of returning CORB evacuees as an administrative mechanism to 
enable the emigration of children for whom arrangements of securing 
berths or finding escorts might otherwise be difficult. Later that year, 
around the time that the League’s use of this system appears to have 
ended, Sir Tasman Heyes wrote to Noel Lamidey indicating that he had 
become aware of CORB status being applied to two juvenile migrants 
with no actual connection to the war-time scheme and that this practice 
should end, with child and juvenile migrants only being sent under the 
actual names of their approved sending organisations.77 Whilst the failure 
of the Over-Seas League to retain any administrative records about its 
post- war child migration activities makes it difficult to clarify in any more 
detail how their migration of children to Australian households operated, 
75 Best to Chief Migration Officer, 2nd June 1949, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.
76 Lamidey to Wall, 5th July 1949, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.
77 See Heyes to Chief Migration Officer, 1st November 1949, NAA.C: A446, 1960/66717.
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it therefore appears that Bavin had found an administrative process 
through which he could arrange the emigration of children to Australia 
without the League being formally approved as a child migration organ-
isation by the UK or Australian Commonwealth Governments.78
The CATholiC Child migRATion pARTies 
of AuTumn 1947
The most ambitious post-war plans for child migration were developed by 
Catholic authorities in Australia. In April 1945, the Bishop of Geraldton 
wrote to the Commonwealth Prime Minister, John Curtin, to request that 
the nomination for 50 girls to be sent to Nazareth House, which had been 
suspended at the start of the war, be re-opened along with a new proposal 
for a further 50 boys to be sent to Tardun.79 Some British child migrants 
were still living at Tardun at that point. Although they were no longer 
eligible for UK Government maintenance funding, their continued 
presence at the farm school meant that the Christian Brothers were still 
eligible for receiving UK Government funding towards the interest 
payments of their overdraft for Tardun.80 John Dedman, as acting Prime 
Minister, replied that as no formal arrangements for assisted passages had 
yet been agreed with the UK Government, no action could be taken on 
78 On this see also Bass to Heyes, 9th August 1949, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/50, in which 
approval of the migration of children under a group nomination put forward by the United 
Protestant Association was refused by the UK Government on the grounds that the Over-
Seas League was not considered a suitable for approval as a sending organisation from the 
UK. The League continued, unsuccessfully, to press for Australian authorities to accept a 
scheme analogous to the League’s arrangements with the New Zealand Government, see 
Letter from Henderson, Daily Telegraph, 20th February 1951, copy held on TNA: 
MH102:2037).
79 Gummer to Curtin, 11th April 1945, NAA.C: A461/M349/1/7.
80 The continued presence of British child migrants at Tardun had been helped by the 
transfer of 20 boys from Clontarf in January 1945 (see Wiseman to Quirke, 16th February 
1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/2). This continued to be the case in 1946, when the 
Brothers were still continuing to claim UK Government payments towards overdraft interest 
at Tardun for 15 boys still resident there who were over the age of 16 (see ‘British Migrants 
Resident’, 1st October 1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M1020/2). This financial arrangement 
appears to have created an incentive for the Brothers to maintain British child migrants at 
Tardun until new ones could be received from 1947, in order to continue this income stream.
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this request for the time being, but that the Bishop should raise the matter 
again in six months’ time.81
With the Commonwealth Government’s proposal for a government- 
managed scheme receiving further publicity, these plans were significantly 
expanded. The prospect of children being received in State-run hostels 
and cottage homes may also have had a galvanising effect on Catholic 
authorities anxious about the loss of children to Catholic institutions. 
Correspondence between the Commonwealth Department of Immigration 
and the United Protestant Association around the same time suggests that 
the issue of large numbers of war orphans being admitted to State-run 
rather than denominational homes was not only a matter of concern for 
the Catholic Church.82 In September 1945, Canon Craven informed the 
Dominions Office that Redmond Prendiville, the Archbishop of Perth, 
had written to Bernard Griffin, now Archbishop of Westminster, to request 
the resumption of child migration to Catholic institutions in Western 
Australia as soon as possible, with a view to receiving 2500 children over 
the next 18 months.83 In response, Griffin had asked the Catholic Child 
Welfare Council to give this matter urgent consideration at its annual 
meeting in October.
The previous December, the Dominions Office had sent Craven a copy 
of the appendix from Garnett’s report on Christian Brothers’ institutions 
in Craven’s capacity as a representative of the Catholic Council for British 
Overseas Settlement.84 Garnett’s views about Castledare were also passed 
on to Archbishop Prendiville, who had written back to Garnett to say that 
he had conducted ‘exhaustive enquiries’ about conditions there and was 
now satisfied that these were now acceptable.85 Craven subsequently met 
with Ronald Wiseman at the Dominions Office in February 1945 to 
81 Dedman to Gummer, 2nd May 1945, NAA.C: A461, M349/1/7.
82 See Agst to Nutt, 12th February 1945, Nutt to Agst, 26th March 1945, NAA.C: A445, 
133/2/50.
83 See Craven to Wiseman, 21st September 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/2. 
Immigration was a significant source of growth for the Catholic population of Western 
Australia in the inter- and early post-war periods, with census data in 1954 and 1961 showing 
around 30% of all Catholics in Western Australia having been born overseas (see D.F. Bourke, 
The History of the Catholic Church in Western Australia, 1829–1979, Perth: Archdiocese of 
Perth, 1978, p. 251).
84 Wiseman to Craven, 14th December 1944, TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2.
85 Prendiville to Garnett, 1st December 1944; see also assurances from Br Quirke that 
conditions at Tardun would be improved following the imminent return of Clontarf to the 
Brothers’ use, Quirke to Garnett, 29th November 1944, DO35/1139/M1126/1.
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 discuss the criticisms that Garnett had made in relation to the Brothers’ 
work.86 Craven told Wiseman that it had always been the intention that 
the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement would send 
representatives to Western Australia to inspect the Brothers’ institutions 
directly, but that this had been interrupted by the war. Craven was noted 
as saying that the Council was dissatisfied with conditions at the Brothers’ 
institutions—particularly at Castledare and Tardun—and would not allow 
any further children to be migrated there until such an inspection had 
taken place and any shortcomings rectified. In response to Garnett’s 
observation about boys being retained at Tardun to the age of 18 without 
receiving meaningful training or wages, Craven reportedly commented 
that ‘he was quite aware that Father Conlon required watching and that it 
was necessary to see that the Christian Brothers did not try to absorb the 
children into their own Institutions, rather than allow them to choose 
their own vocation’. Despite these cautionary observations about the 
Brothers’ work, Craven asked Wiseman if there were any likely prospects 
of opportunities to send child migrants to New Zealand, as there were 
likely to be more children available for emigration through the Council 
than could be accommodated at Brothers’ institutions in Western Australia 
alone. The emigration of children to Canada, Craven said, was proving 
unsatisfactory as child migrants were subsequently able to save enough for 
return journeys to Britain whereupon they ‘drifted back to their old 
surroundings and all the care spent on their training was lost’. New 
Zealand, like Australia, appeared to Craven to be an attractive destination 
for child migrants as it was so much further away.
This conversation provided the context for Craven’s discussion with 
Wiseman in September 1945 about Prendiville’s proposals for the immi-
gration of 2500 children. Craven was cautious about Prendiville’s sugges-
tion, writing to Wiseman that ‘it is quite easy to talk in figures of this 
size … but as you well know, in practice such migration is a very difficult 
and delicate matter involving heavy responsibilities for those who have it 
in their power to arrange such migration’.87 Whilst emphasising that the 
key matter to be borne in mind was ‘the interests of the children them-
selves’, Craven also sought to establish whether the Dominions Office 
would support the resumption of migration to Christian Brothers’ institu-
tions, whether training provided in Australia would be flexible to meet the 
86 Note by Wiseman, 13th February 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/1.
87 Craven to Wiseman, 21st September 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/2.
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interests of children, and whether Government funding and shipping were 
likely to become available.
Wiseman sent a non-committal response to Craven about these 
questions regarding future policy. It was clear, however, that subject to 
agreements on assisted migration being reached with the Australian 
Government, the Dominions Office were in principle willing to support 
future schemes if it judged that arrangements for the care, education, 
training and after- care of child migrants would be suitable.88 In response 
to an enquiry from the Dominions Office about his views on Prendiville’s 
proposals, Walter Garnett replied that if more children were to be sent to 
the Brothers’ institutions they should only be sent initially to Clontarf 
until their primary education was complete before being sent either to 
Bindoon (for trades training) or Tardun (if they had particularly interests 
in agricultural work).89 Castledare, Garnett said, should not be used at all, 
despite Prendiville’s assurances about improved conditions there. Although 
there was some variety in training available at the Brothers’ institutions—
compared to Fairbridge—Garnett commented that this was not broad 
enough to consider that education would be provided in ways tailored to 
the interests and ability of the individual child. Garnett had no concerns 
about girls being sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton. He was sceptical 
about the numbers of child migrants suggested by Prendiville, noting that 
Prendiville had suggested a much smaller capacity at the Brothers’ 
institutions when Garnett had discussed this with him the previous 
autumn. Such expansion, Garnett noted, would only be feasible if other 
institutions were being used or it was being proposed that children be 
placed in private households. Both of those options would require further 
scrutiny, however, and Garnett agreed with the Dominions Office’s view 
that child migration should resume only subject to conditions in receiving 
organisations being understood to be satisfactory. Wiseman conveyed 
these views in detail back to Canon Craven.90
Shortly after this, the Catholic Child Welfare Council met to discuss 
Prendiville’s proposal. After this meeting, Fr Denis Murphy, the Council’s 
88 See Telegram Dominions Office to Acting High Commissioner, 4th October 1945, and 
Wiseman to Craven, 6th October 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/2.
89 Telegram UK High Commission to Dominions Office, 15th October 1945, TNA: 
DO35/1139/M1126/2. Although the Dominions Office later described this communication 
to Craven as expressing the views of the acting UK High Commissioner, Walter Hankinson, 
the content of the telegram itself seems to clearly to have been authored by Garnett.
90 Wiseman to Craven, 18th October 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/2.
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Secretary, wrote to Ronald Wiseman explaining that as the Council had a 
number of new members who would benefit from an up-to-date evalua-
tion of institutional conditions in Australia, it would be helpful if the 
Dominions Office would give permission for the Appendix of Garnett’s 
report previously sent to Craven to be circulated to all the Council’s mem-
bers.91 Wiseman agreed on the condition that both the individual institu-
tions named in the Appendix and the Christian Brothers as the receiving 
organisation be anonymised.92
Early in the following spring, Br Conlon began corresponding with 
Arthur Calwell to ask how close assisted migration agreements were to 
being reached between the Commonwealth and UK Governments and 
notifying Calwell of his intention to recruit child migrants from Britain 
from  the following May.93 Conlon also reported his work in visiting 
Australian dioceses whose bishops and representatives were said by him to 
have a keen interest in supporting the Commonwealth’s ambitious plans 
for adult and child immigration.94 Calwell, who had been educated by the 
Christian Brothers, commented later in life that he owed everything, after 
his parents, to the Brothers and liked to keep in touch with them.95 Whilst 
Calwell operated within the constraints of his ministerial role, he also took 
the trouble to correspond with senior figures in the Brothers on compara-
tively minor administrative issues that he would not write to officials in 
other voluntary organisations about.96 Calwell also actively encouraged 
the Catholic Church in Australia to create administrative structures to 
support Catholic immigration, leading in the spring of 1947 to the Federal 
Catholic Immigration Committee by the Australian Catholic Episcopal 
91 Murphy to Wiseman, 29th October 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/2.
92 Wiseman to Murphy, 10th November 1945, TNA: DO35/1139/M1126/2.
93 Conlon to Calwell, 26th January 1946, NAA.C: A445/133/2/8.
94 Conlon to Calwell, 19th February 1946, NAA.C: A445/133/2/8.
95 Colm Kiernan, Calwell: A Personal and Political Biography (Melbourne: Nelson, 
1978), p. 17.
96 See, for example, Memo to Heyes, 28th April 1948, which notes a telephone call that 
afternoon from Fr Stinson about on-going problems with a delayed payment to the Catholic 
Episcopal Migration and Welfare Association of the per capita Commonwealth equipment 
allowance for child migrants and records that the Minister (Calwell) is ‘anxious that you have 
this matter attended to’, NAA.C: A436, 1950/5/5597; also Quirke to Calwell, 24th May 
1947, Calwell to Quirke, 29th May 1947, and Calwell to Quirke, 11th June 1947, NAA.C: 
A445, 133/2/8, about the purchase of a hut for use as a dining room at Tardun.
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Conference.97 In his correspondence with Conlon, Calwell was keen to 
facilitate his work both by providing letters of introduction to officials in 
London as well as arranging Conlon’s shipping.98 Whether or not Calwell 
was already clear by February 1946 that the Commonwealth plan of 
receiving 50,000 war orphans in State-run cottage homes and hostels was 
unlikely to be viable, his support for Conlon’s work suggested both a 
pragmatic willingness to make use of voluntary organisations if they could 
deliver child migrants as well as a degree of partiality towards the Brothers.99 
In a charged sectarian atmosphere in which some Australian Protestant 
groups regarded with suspicion both Catholic representation within the 
Labor Party and the prospect of increasing numbers of Catholic migrants 
with questionable loyalty to the British Empire,100 the work of Calwell’s 
Department was also carefully picked over for any signs of Catholic bias. 
Questions about favouritism to the Catholic Church in immigration mat-
ters—often motivated more by sectarian paranoia than substantial evi-
dence—were raised both in the Australian House of Representatives and 
private correspondence with immigration officials.101 Whilst Calwell’s 
natural affinities were with Catholic organisations, such scrutiny created 
greater pressure for him publicly to display an even-handed approach, and 
strong rebuttals of Catholic bias were made both by him and other 
Government officials.102
Conlon arrived in London in May 1946, with Justin Symonds, the co- 
adjutor Archbishop of Melbourne, who was undertaking a wider tour of 
Europe on behalf of the Australian Catholic Hierarchy to assess the 
97 Frank Meacham, The Church and Migrants, 1946–1987 (Haberfield: St Joan of Arc 
Press, 1991), pp. 18–23.
98 See, for example, Calwell to Conlon, 5th February 1946, Calwell to Conlon, 8th 
February 1946, Calwell to Conlon, 21st February 1946, NAA.C: A445/133/2/8.
99 Calwell certainly alerted Simonds and Conlon to the decision of the Premier’s Conference 
more quickly than the United Protestant Association (see Calwell to Agst, 13th December 
1946, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/50).
100 See, for example, United Protestant Association Pamphlet 1944/45, McArthur to 
Peters, 23rd November 1945, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/50.
101 See, for example, Agst to Chifley, 26th March 1946, Agst to Chifley, 19th June 1946, 
Stevens to Calwell, House of Representatives, Hansard, 18th July 1946, 15th August 1946, 
Agst to Beasley, 11th December 1946, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/50.
102 See, for example, Beasley to Agst, 20th December 1946, Beasley to Calwell, 20th 
December 1946, Heyes to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 6th May 1947, Calwell 
to Chifley, 4th June 1947, Heyes to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 2nd December 
1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/50.
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potential for future child and adult immigration.103 In one press interview, 
Simonds was reported as saying that he felt that child migrants had the 
greatest potential as ‘they soon respond to a new environment and forget 
the old, which is most necessary for the little innocent victims of the 
war’.104 Soon after his arrival, Conlon called upon the Dominions Office 
to present his letter of introduction from Calwell and inform them of his 
intention to begin to recruiting Catholic children for emigration. In a 
meeting with W.G. Head (who had recently replaced Robert Wiseman as 
Assistant Secretary with responsibility for overseas settlement)105 and 
R.L. Dixon, Conlon set out plans for a national Catholic child migration 
scheme in which 5000 children would be received mainly in residential 
schools run by religious orders across Australia and sought clarification on 
whether the Dominions Office would fund this in a comparable way to the 
pre-war parties to Western Australia.106 No further discussion had taken 
place about plans for Catholic child migration since Wiseman’s correspon-
dence with Murphy and Craven six months’ previously. As a consequence, 
the two civil servants, who had relatively little experience with previous 
child migration work, were somewhat surprised to be presented with this 
plan by Conlon without any forewarning by any Catholic officials in 
Britain. Head and Dixon were non-committal about the availability of 
funding and shipping, and in the absence of any clear policy framework to 
support Conlon’s plan, recommended that he not be ‘too hasty’ in initiat-
ing any selection of children for migration.107 They also encouraged him 
to make contact with Craven, as a representative of the Catholic Council 
for British Overseas Settlement, so that Conlon could work with a British 
organisation known to them. Having been made aware of this meeting by 
Head, Walter Garnett again expressed scepticism about the capacity either 
of the United Kingdom to provide, or Catholic institutions to receive, the 
numbers of children envisaged by Conlon. He also repeated his view that 
103 Meacham, The Church and Migrants, pp. 7–22.
104 ‘Churchman to Help Europe’s Children’, British Australian and New Zealand Weekly, 
25th May 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1.
105 Head to Kirkpatrick, 8th May 1946, TNA: DO35/1138/M996.1.
106 Notes of Discussion at Dominions Office, 9th May 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/
M1131/1.
107 Head’s caution was also motivated by him having read the correspondence between the 
Dominions Office and UK High Commission about the Christian Brothers and child 




proper checks would need to be made about the conditions into which 
these children were being received, writing:
It is all very well to talk loosely of Catholic convent boarding schools in all 
parts of Australia, but these schools vary considerably. Some of them are in 
the back of beyond and what would be the quality of the care and education 
the children would receive is a matter which would require investigation. I 
am not in favour of introducing children into schools over which it would 
be impossible to maintain any general supervision; nor am I in favour of 
placing children in private homes unless there is a properly supervised 
Government scheme (as there is in Canada) to keep such placements under 
constant scrutiny.108
Garnett also confirmed with Head, after consulting with the 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration, that his understanding was 
that Conlon’s visit was primarily an exploratory mission to establish the 
numbers of children who might be available for emigration. Whilst the 
Commonwealth Government was keen in principle to support child 
migration, he reported, no firm proposals along the lines described by 
Conlon had been submitted to it and further checks on conditions for 
child migrants would be needed before any such scheme could be 
approved.109
Whilst it appeared to British civil servants that little was likely to develop 
in the near future from Conlon’s visit to the United Kingdom, Conlon 
continued to work towards the resumption of Catholic child migration. 
On 21st May, Conlon and Simonds sent Calwell a four-page proposal for 
5000 Catholic children recruited through the Commonwealth 
Government’s child migration scheme to be placed with Catholic 
residential schools and institutions across the 23 Catholic dioceses in 
Australia.110 Up to 300 of these children, they suggested, could be placed 
in private households although the emphasis of these placements on 
training children for future work (e.g., in training girls to be domestic 
servants) marked them out as significantly different to the understanding 
of foster care in the Curtis report. Such support for the Government’s 
child migration plans would, they argued, only be possible with significant 
capital funding support from the Government to expand institutions’ 
108 Garnett to Head, 22nd May 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1.
109 Garnett to Head, 7th June 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1.
110 Simonds and Conlon to Calwell, 21st May 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1.
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capacity to absorb these children as well as adequate funding for 
maintenance and outfitting costs. Calwell eventually gave a full reply, 
following the Premiers’ Conference and meeting of the Inter-Departmental 
Committee, stating that whilst he would be ‘glad to co-operate and assist 
in every way within my power’, any form of assistance from the 
Commonwealth Government would have to be set at the same level for all 
voluntary organisations.111 Whilst setting out the range of financial support 
that could be offered by the Commonwealth and State Governments, 
Calwell noted that Commonwealth funding was not currently available for 
outfitting costs for child migrants, but noted that sending organisations 
should still recognise that the emigration of children in their care would 
still relieve them ‘of a considerable financial liability in respect of subsequent 
maintenance once they sent their children to Australia’.
Simonds and Conlon also met with Craven and Archbishop Griffin at 
the end of May, at which Griffin agreed to set up an urgent, extraordinary 
meeting of the Catholic Child Welfare Council within two weeks to dis-
cuss their child migration proposals.112 The urgency and comparative 
secrecy of this meeting—whose minutes were unusually for the Council 
marked as ‘Strictly Confidential’—appears to have reflected a wish to 
ensure that Catholic child migration arrangements could be made as expe-
ditiously as possible to ensure that Catholic children were emigrated 
through these rather than through other non-Catholic bodies whose 
planning was not yet as advanced.113 Although some members of the 
Council expressed concern at these migration proposals, given the 
anonymised version of Garnett’s report they had previously received, 
Craven reassured them that any problems with the Brothers’ institutions 
had mainly only occurred because of war-time conditions. Whilst true of 
the over- crowding at Tardun following the requisitioning of Clontarf by 
the Royal Australian Air Force, this was a less accurate assessment of the 
problems that Garnett had noted about the retention of boys’ at Brothers’ 
institutions after school-leaving age without pay or problems with staffing 
111 Calwell to Simonds, 15th September 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1.
112 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes Hearings, 
transcript of Day 15, 17th July 2017, pp. 151–53.
113 A similar concern to avoid dilution of children’s Catholicism through contact with non- 
Catholic organisations may also have underpinned Conlon’s and Simond’s suggestion that 
Catholic child migrants be sent on separately chartered ships or be kept segregated from 




and conditions at Castledare. With Griffin’s support, the Council agreed 
to co-operate with Conlon’s work on the basis that he would only recruit 
children through the relevant Catholic child rescue administrator for each 
diocese and not by direct approaches to residential institutions  run by 
religious orders as Conlon had done before the war.114
It is unclear whether Conlon complied with this request. Although 
Conlon had, by October 1946, reportedly identified 260 children for emi-
gration by agreement with diocesan officials, the residential institutions 
from which these children were being sent from bore little relation to the 
institutions from which children were eventually sent the following 
autumn.115 Conlon’s by-passing of diocesan officials remained a matter of 
complaint from the Catholic Child Welfare Council to subsequent repre-
sentatives of the Australian Catholic Church involved in the administra-
tion of assisted migration.116
Although the Dominions Office were made aware of the Premiers’ 
Conference agreement about child migration by mid-September,117 they 
remained unaware of Conlon’s activities until Conlon contacted Head 
again in early November to see if the UK Government would contribute 
to costs not covered by the Commonwealth Government.118 Even then 
Conlon did not discuss the work he had done by then in any detail, nor 
confirm whether he had followed the Dominions Office’s request that he 
work in conjunction with the Catholic Council for British Overseas 
Settlement. After being notified of this meeting, Garnett advised that if 
any plans were to be implemented to send children to Catholic institutions 
in Australia, prior notification of these should be given so that they could 
be visited and approved for this work by both Commonwealth and State 
Governments and someone on behalf of the UK Government.119 Garnett 
114 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes Hearings, 
transcript of Day 15, 17th July 2017, pp. 160–161.
115 See shipping lists for the 1947 migration parties held on NAA: A436, 1950/5/5597.
116 Western Australia Select Committee into Child Migration, Interim Report, p. 39.
117 Hankinson to Addison, 10th September 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1.
118 Head to Garnett with enclosure, 26th November 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/
M1131/1.
119 Garnett to Head, 13th December 1946, TNA: DO35/1140/M1131/1; Garnett also 
contacted the Commonwealth Department of Immigration to indicate that someone should 
undertake an inspection on behalf of the UK Government to approve institutions prior to 
them receiving child migrants, with subsequent supervision responsibilities reverting to State 
officials under the devolved guardianship arrangements of the 1946 Immigration 
(Guardianship of Children) Act, Garnett to Nutt, 5th December 1946, NAA.C: A445, 
133/2/8.
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also re-iterated his view about Castledare as an example of an institution 
unfit to receive child migrants,120 and added his concern that the State 
official who had visited it with him—McAdam—was sympathetic to the 
Catholic ethos of the institution and could see no problems with it at all.
In January 1947, Canon Craven visited the Dominions Office to explain 
that Conlon had been in touch with him to discuss his plans for child 
migration but that the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement 
could not proceed with this until they were satisfied with conditions in the 
Christian Brothers’ institutions in Western Australia. Until a UK 
representative of the Council had gone to Australia to inspect these 
institutions, Craven reportedly said that Conlon could not be advised to 
undertake any ‘energetic action’ to arrange for children’s migration for the 
time being. Conlon clearly was engaged in ‘energetic action’ to make 
arrangements for children’s migration by that stage, however, as he had 
already written to Calwell the previous month expressing concern that 
shipping arrangements should be made as soon as possible for the children 
he had provisionally selected.121 Whilst initially indicating that these child 
migrants would be given urgent priority when shipping berths became 
available, Calwell subsequently wrote to Conlon to confirm that inspections 
and approvals of receiving institutions would need to take place before 
nominations for these children could be agreed and that the lack of 
available  shipping berths made urgent action difficult.122 However, it 
subsequently transpired that the nominations from the Catholic Episcopal 
Migration and Welfare Association (CEMWA)123 for 340 children to be 
sent to Catholic institutions in Western Australia were approved by State 
officials and sent by them to Australia House in London for final allocation 
of those places to selected children without those inspections having taken 
120 See also this point about the unsuitability of Castledare made in contact between the 
UK High Commission and Commonwealth Department of Immigration in.
121 Referred to in Heyes to Under-Secretary for Lands and Immigration, 8th April 1947, 
NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8. The first berths for migrants travelling under assisted passages 
agreements between the UK and Australian Commonwealth Governments were to become 
available on ships sailing from March 1947.
122 Calwell to Conlon, 23rd January 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
123 A body established under the authority of the Archbishop of Perth whose responsibilities 
included the oversight of Catholic immigration into Western Australia, including 




place.124 On becoming aware of this, Garnett asked Sir Tasman Heyes, 
Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Immigration to arrange 
for inspections to take place.
When these inspections were undertaken by State officials in May, 
significant shortcomings were identified in a number of the receiving 
institutions that the CEMWA had proposed.125 Clontarf—which Garnett 
had previously recommended serve as the initial reception centre—already 
had 135 boys in residence with a reported capacity for only 25 more 
despite CEMWA having asked for 50 boys to be sent there. Accommodation 
at Clontarf was found to be over-crowded, dirty, spartan and in need of 
widespread repairs. With no female staff, and no prospect of this institu-
tion offering anything like a ‘homely’ atmosphere, immigration officials 
concluded that it was not in an appropriate state to receive any British 
child migrants. Although conditions at Castledare were said to have 
improved considerably over the past year or two,126 accommodation was 
still not entirely satisfactory. Although the inspectors judged that the 30 
requested child migrants could be accommodated there, it was recom-
mended that they only be introduced gradually in groups of six to ten to 
make this process manageable. Although no inspection visit was under-
taken to Nazareth House, Geraldton, another recent child welfare inspec-
tion had indicated that dormitory space originally built there for child 
migrants had been occupied during the war by elderly residents, with the 
institution having become the main reception centre for elderly men and 
124 See Garnett to Dixon, 9th May 1947, TNA: DO35/3386; Heyes to Chief Migration 
Officer, 5th June 1947, Wheeler to Heyes, 5th June 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8. The 
fact that the Chief Migration Officer for Western Australia had forwarded this nomination 
directly to Australia House for action without these inspections taking place suggests either 
a lack of understanding of the process that had been set out by Calwell earlier that year or an 
attempt to expedite these migrations without these inspections taking place. As with other 
group nominations, this nomination was given an identifying code number (in this case, 
WG3) against which individual children selected and approved for this nomination would be 
classified.
125 See Gratwick to Heyes with enclosure, 20th May 1947, Gratwick to Heyes with 
enclosure, 26th May 1947, Smith to Heyes, 26th May 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8; a 
copy of the report on Bindoon is included in Garnett to Dixon with enclosures, 12th June 
1947, held on TNA: DO35/3386, DO35/3389 and MH102/1879.
126 Castledare evidently had a longer history of difficulties in maintaining appropriate 
standards of care, with pre-war reports also referring to concerns about lack of female 
staffing, poor physical care of children and lack of suitable play space, see correspondence 
and other documents on WASR: 1031/AN/145/1/366/37.
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women in need of residential care for that area. In the absence of new 
accommodation, there was no capacity for the 50 proposed child migrants 
to be housed there and approval for this was therefore withdrawn. Whilst 
the CEMWA had requested that 100 boys be sent to Bindoon including 
boys under school-leaving age, inspectors found that it currently had no 
school facilities and recommended that this number be reduced to 50 and 
restricted to boys aged 15 and over who had already completed primary 
education. This restriction was also recommended on the grounds that a 
new block of buildings (including dormitories) was still under construc-
tion mainly by a small number of boy trainees and was unlikely to be 
completed in the near future. Only Tardun and St Joseph’s Orphanage, 
Subiaco (run by the Sisters of Mercy), received unqualified recommenda-
tions, although again in these cases, it was advised that they be sent chil-
dren only in small parties of 10–15 over the next year.
On the basis of these recommendations, Heyes advised immigration 
officials at Australia House in London that the total number of child 
migrants to be accepted under CEMWA’s original nomination would be 
reduced from 340 to 175, with it being acceptable for a ‘token booking’ 
of 45 children to be sent to these institutions in the next few months. 
Conlon’s original plan of sending all 340 children in one shipping was 
regarded as entirely impractical.127 Calwell wrote to Conlon notifying him 
of this reduction and indicating that he hoped to meet Conlon when he 
travelled to London later in June, commenting ‘I then hope to renew old 
friendships and shall be looking forward to discussing with you in person 
some of our mutual problems, which are sometimes difficult to explain by 
correspondence’.128 After being sent copies of the inspection reports, and 
notified of the decision to reduce the numbers of children being sent, 
Garnett commented that it was very clear that State authorities had 
approved the original nominations without having undertaken proper 
inspections and that he remained sceptical that Castledare could 
127 Heyes to Chief Migration Officer, 5th June 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8. The 
recommendation of only sending limited numbers of child migrants on each shipping was 
also reinforced by Austin Anderson, a director of the Orient Line shipping company, in a 
meeting with C.W. Dixon from the Dominions Office, see copy of minute, 6th May 1947, 
TNA: DO35/3386.
128 Calwell to Conlon, 11th June 1945, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8. See also Memorandum 
by Maxwell, 26th June 1947, TNA: MH102/1553, which notes that the Dominions Office 
had informed the Home Office that Calwell was coming to London to speed up assisted 
migration, including the migration of around 1000 children.
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 accommodate more than 70 children.129 Without a satisfactory follow-up 
report on Castledare to be submitted in six months’ time, Garnett 
indicated that he would not recommend that the UK Government 
sanction the sending of any children to Castledare.130 He also forwarded 
the critical reports on to the Dominions Office in order to head off any 
attempt by Conlon to have these reductions revised.131
This decision set in motion a number of actions by the Catholic 
organisations involved to attempt to reverse this reduction—efforts 
supported by Western Australian immigration officials. Following the 
purchase of several pre-fabricated buildings previously owned by the Royal 
Australian Air Force as accommodation for girls at Nazareth House, 
Geraldton, State officials recommended that the original nomination of 
50 girls to be sent there be restored.132 On arrival in London on 28th 
June, Calwell had a series of meetings—including with Clement Attlee 
and other members of the Labour Cabinet—intended both to encourage 
emigration to Australia and to make arrangements for increasing the 
availability of shipping berths for migrants.133 Through these meetings he 
succeeded in securing the use of the SS Ormonde as a migrant ship to 
Australia, as well as sailings of the SS Asturias.134 Calwell also met with 
Conlon who requested that the original nomination for 340 child migrants 
be fully restored.135 Whilst still in London, Calwell received notification 
from the Archbishop of Perth that following fresh inspections of Clontarf 
and Bindoon, the State and Commonwealth immigration officials would 
be recommending the re- instatement of the full quota of 340 child 
129 Garnett to Wheeler 9th June 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8; Garnett to Dixon, 12th 
June 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
130 On this, see also Garnett to Dixon, 9th May 1947, TNA: DO35/3386, in which 
Garnett indicates that the UK Government would need to be satisfied that conditions at 
Castledare were now ‘vastly different’ to those he observed in 1944 for it to be acceptable to 
send children there.
131 Garnett to Dixon, 12th June 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
132 Smith to Heyes 11th June 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8.
133 Colm Kiernan, Calwell: A Personal and Political Biography (West Melbourne: Nelson, 
1978), pp. 126–28; Mary Elizabeth Calwell, I am Bound to Be True: The Life and Legacy of 
Arther A. Calwell (Preston, Vic.: Mosaic Press, 2012), pp. 64–65.
134 Colm Kiernan, Calwell: A Personal and Political Biography (Melbourne: Thomas 
Nelson, 1978), pp. 1126–9.
135 Referred to in Garnett to Dixon, 21st July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
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migrants.136 This change of mind had resulted from the acquisition of a 
new building at Clontarf and the promise of A£5000 from the Archbishop 
of Perth for further renovations, as well as the planned transfer of teachers 
and preparation of new classrooms and dormitories at Bindoon.137 The 
fact that Calwell evidently supported this request indicates a willingness 
on his part to give a greater priority to child migration than might have 
been expected at the time given the more urgent need for adult immigrants 
with specific labour skills.138
Garnett gave his support to these approvals, subject to an official from 
the Commonwealth Department of Immigration visiting Castledare to 
confirm its suitability.139 This appears to have come in the form of verbal 
assurances that he received from Reuben Wheeler and there is no indica-
tion of any written report being provided despite the Dominions Office 
making a follow-up request for this in early August given the imminent 
departure of the first planned party of child migrants at the end of that 
month.140 In the absence of such a report, there appears to have been 
some confusion amongst civil servants in London about the exact status of 
Castledare as an approved institution, and the Home Office Children’s 
Department erroneously believed that there was no intention to include 
Castledare as a receiving institution for the time being.141 A note on the 
Dominions Office file for this correspondence also commented that 
nothing had been heard from Canon Craven since his visit to the 
Dominions Office at the start of the year.142 Given Craven’s repeated 
comments about the need for Catholic representatives in the United 
Kingdom to make an independent inspection of institutions in Western 
Australia before sending any more children, the note recorded that it 
would be worth contacting him to assure him that the UK Government 
was now prepared to support the resumption of migration to these 
institutions based on the revised reports on them that it had received that 
summer. The fact, however, that arrangements for these children’s 
136 Cablegrams Gratwick to Armstrong, 9th July 1947, Armstrong to Calwell, 11th July 
1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8.
137 Gratwick to Nutt with enclosure, received 16th July 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8.
138 See, for example, Addison to Bessborough, 27th June 1947, TNA: DO35/3389.
139 Garnett to Dixon, 21st July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386; also note on Peter to Secretary, 
Department of External Affairs, 11th July 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8.
140 Dixon to Garnett, 7th August 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
141 Note by Maxwell, 21st August 1947, TNA: MH102/1879.
142 Note to C.W. Dixon, 29th July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
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migration by the Catholic organisations involved were well-advanced by 
then indicates, however, that the Catholic officials involved had already 
decided to send children to those institutions without such inspections 
having been made.
On the 29th August, the SS Asturias left Southampton with 146 
children sailing under this group nomination, arriving just under a month 
later at the port of Fremantle in Western Australia as part of a larger group 
of over a thousand assisted migrants from the United Kingdom.143 On 
arrival they were welcomed by the Premier of Western Australia, 
Archbishop Prendiville and two Western Australian senators representing 
the Commonwealth Government, with newspaper headlines inaccurately 
describing them as ‘war orphans’.144 A further 88 children under this 
nomination arrived at Fremantle on the SS Ormonde on 7th November, 
and another 100 on the SS Asturias on 10th December. Of the 334 chil-
dren sent in total to Catholic institutions in Western Australia on those 
three sailings, 257 had been sent from institutions run by, or associated 
with, the Sisters of Nazareth. Each of the arrival parties continued to be 
marked by press coverage and messages of welcome from politicians.145 
Despite the recommendations of sending child migrants in small groups 
to ease their assimilation into receiving institutions, virtually the whole of 
the group nomination raised by the CEMWA arrived in Western Australia 
over a period of just over ten weeks.
The demographics and distribution of these children demonstrated a 
lack of detailed monitoring by UK officials. Although Castledare had been 
meant to receive no more than 30 boys, in the event it received 52 because 
Conlon had recruited a larger than expected number of younger boys who 
could not be sent to any of the Brothers’ other institutions.146 Although 
143 Shipping lists for children sent under this WG3 nomination in the autumn of 1947, 
including sending and receiving institutions, are held on NAA.C: A436, 1950/5/5597.
144 ‘Warm Welcome for War Orphans – Big Contingent Arrives Tomorrow’, Sunday Times, 
21st September 1947, p. 6; ‘War Orphans in Geraldton’, The Daily News, 24th September 
1947, p. 5; ‘New Little Australians – Arrival of Orphan Children’, Geraldton Guardian and 
Express, 25th September 1947, p. 2.
145 ‘Ormonde Due Today  – Passengers for W.A.  Total 102’, The West Australian, 7th 
November 1947, p. 11; ‘Thousand Migrants – Many Children Arrive By the Ormonde’, The 
West Australian, 8th November 1947, p. 11. ‘Big intake of Migrants – Asturias to Disembark 
over 1,600’, The West Australian, 8th December 1947, p. 6.
146 See shipping lists in NAA.C: A436, 1950/5/5597; also Assistant Under Secretary for 
Lands and Immigration to Heyes, 12th November 1947, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8.
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Garnett had previously stated that boys should only be sent to Castledare 
if aged seven or over, 32 of the child migrants sent there that autumn were 
aged six or under.147 A similar gap in oversight occurred in relation to 
Nazareth House, Geraldton. Although the 52 girls sent there only slightly 
exceeded the agreed quota of 50, the decision by State immigration offi-
cials to allow this quota to be re-instated after the acquisition of buildings 
to accommodate them did not appear to have been communicated to the 
UK High Commission.148 Although Garnett supported the re-instatement 
of the CEMWA’s request for 340 child migrants, his correspondence 
about this with the Dominions Office implies that he thought that this 
number had been raised again because of more positive reports about 
Christian Brothers’ institutions.149 The issue of whether girls should have 
been sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton whilst elderly residents were still 
accommodated there appears to have been forgotten by Garnett. It was 
only in 1949 that the UK High Commission raised a query with the 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration as to why girls had been sent 
to Nazareth House, Geraldton when it had no record of having given its 
approval to the institution or any information as to whether elderly 
residents had indeed been moved to another institution.150 In response to 
this, the Commonwealth Migration Officer for Western Australia indicated 
that the girls had been sent there because the original suspension had 
‘seriously embarrassed’ the Catholic authorities given that girls from the 
United Kingdom had apparently already been selected and were ready for 
shipping when the suspension was made. In view of this, it had been felt 
that although the continued presence of elderly residents at Nazareth 
House, Geraldton was not ideal, the provision of alternative accommoda-
tion for the child migrants through the buildings purchased from the 
Royal Australian Air Force represented an adequate compromise.151 The 
147 Compare Garnett to Dixon, 12th June 1947, TNA: DO35/3386 with ages of children 
on shipping lists at NAA.C: A436, 1950/5/5597.
148 Garnett comments (in Garnett to Dixon, 12th June 1947, TNA: DO35/3386) that no 
girls could be sent to Nazareth House, Geraldton until alternative accommodation had been 
found for the elderly residents there and there is no archival record of him subsequently 
being notified of the plan to accommodate both children and elderly residents in different 
buildings at the same site.
149 Garnett to Dixon, 21st July 1947, TNA: DO35/3386.
150 See Nutt to Smith, 25th February 1949, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/47.




need for consultation with the UK High Commission about this appears 
to have been overlooked. With elderly residents continuing to be admitted 
to the institution during that year, State officials eventually took the view 
that re-housing them would be impractical and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office gave retrospective approval for child migrants’ admission 
to Nazareth House, Geraldton without any consultation with the Home 
Office.152
Problems with monitoring the profile and destination of child migrants 
sent to Western Australia in the autumn of 1947 was not restricted to the 
Catholic institutions. In May 1948, Garnett spotted that six of the chil-
dren sent to the Swan Homes the previous autumn had been girls despite 
State officials previously reporting that there was no available accommo-
dation for them and the group nomination being restricted to boys only.153 
The fact that immigration officials at Australia House were clearly aware of 
the restrictions of this group nomination,154 yet still allowed girls to be 
sent under it, further suggests both that some latitude was being exercised 
in terms of children emigrated under these nominations and that no effec-
tive monitoring of this was being undertaken by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office. There is no record on file of the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration’s response to Garnett’s query about how 
these girls were allowed to be sent.
The implications of the decision to allow child migrants to these 
Western Australian institutions on the basis of assurances about future 
improvements, and without sufficient oversight from the UK High 
Commission, were to become clear in the months after their arrival. When 
Western Australian State inspectors visited Bindoon on 19th January 
1948, they found ‘large numbers of the boys of all ages at work on and 
152 See Report on Inspection of Nazareth House, Geraldton, 24th November 1949, 
NAA.C: PP6/1, 1949/H/1165; internal minute, 23rd November 1950 and internal 
minute, 24th October 1953, TNA, MH102/1882. When the Home Office received a copy 
of a summary report on developments at Nazareth House, Geraldton, it concurred that the 
presence of elderly residents in an institution for child migrants was ‘undesirable’ but not 
action was taken to prevent any further children being sent there (MacGregor to Palmer, 
15th January 1951, TNA: MH102/1882).
153 See Garnett to Ordish, 5th May 1948, NAA.C: K403, W59/114; also Smith to Heyes, 
26th May 1947, with enclosures, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8, which reported both the lack of 
accommodation for girls and the restriction of the group nomination to boys.
154 See Nulty to Dixon, with enclosure, 22nd August 1947, on both TNA: MH102/1556 
and DO35/3389.
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about the building’, some of whom were undertaking physically arduous 
activities in the heat including quarrying stone and digging holes. Although 
the Superior in charge, Br McGee, claimed that boys under school-leaving 
age only participated in such activities on a voluntary basis, it was also 
acknowledged that those who had worked the hardest in these tasks were 
given priority when children were selected to play in, or watch, cricket 
matches away from Bindoon. Dormitories, although adequate, were spar-
tan and lacked any sense of homeliness. No school desks or equipment had 
yet been delivered, and the recreation room was bare with no play materi-
als and little evidence of use. Some boys over school-leaving age, and 
counted as trainees, were found to be receiving no wages and the level of 
domestic staff appeared inadequate.
State officials were sufficiently concerned about these conditions to 
convene a special meeting to address each of these points with Catholic 
representatives. When Garnett was sent the reports and correspondence 
relating to this, he forwarded these on to Cyril Costley-White, an Assistant 
Secretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office, regarding them as reas-
suring evidence that the child welfare officials were actively addressing any 
problems found in residential institutions to which child migrants were 
being sent.155 However when another inspection visit took place in April 
1948, the boys were found not to be in school again (reportedly because 
two Brothers were temporarily away from the institution) although some 
evidence of work was found in their school books.156 The new Principal, 
Br Keaney, promised inspectors that their education would not be 
neglected and said that if inspectors refrained from ‘pin pricking criticism’ 
and allowed him to have a ‘fair go’, then the institutions could be brought 
up to a good standard.
Reliance on boys’ labour to develop the uncompleted buildings at 
Bindoon was to continue, however. A conference of State officials in the 
autumn of 1949 noted continued evidence at both Bindoon and Tardun 
of ‘boys working [and] not receiving proper education, also that some 
boys acting improperly indicating insufficient control’. It was noted that 
‘If British authorities were aware of conditions may create uneasiness and 
probably cessation of selection of children under the scheme’.157 The use 
of child migrants to undertake this labour whilst they were still in receipt 
155 Garnett to Costley-White, 9th June 1948, TNA: DO35/3386.
156 Report on Bindoon, 9th April 1948, NAA.C: K403, W1959/88.
157 Minute on conference, 20th October 1949, NAA.C: K403, W1959/88.
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of UK Government maintenance funding intended to enable them to 
receive education or training was recognised to be ‘a very delicate one’.158 
Following positive educational and inspection reports, however, no further 
action was taken in relation to this and the UK High Commission was not 
notified of these concerns.159 Whilst the evaluations from later inspections 
varied, the reliance on boys’ labour for building work and slow progress 
on required improvements to dormitories and bathrooms continued to be 
noted.160 Similar problems occurred to Clontarf where problems associated 
with lack of renovation at the site continued to be noted by inspectors 
until the summer of 1951.161
Conditions for the young child migrants arriving at Castledare were 
particularly poor. On 9th July 1948 an unannounced inspection visit by 
child welfare and immigration officials recorded that:
Floors stained under the beds by liquid, which undoubtedly was urine which 
had dropped there through continually saturated mattresses. In several 
instances there was still a quantity of urine on the floor which had not soaked 
away and no effort had been made to mop it up… Many of the wire mat-
tresses of these beds showed a rusty tarnish on the area of contact with urine 
sodden bed mattress. The mattresses were themselves in a deplorable state. 
For instance, one appeared to have been thrown out to dry after continual 
bed wetting and the dirt had become impregnated on the urine affected 
area. The mattress covering, in practically all cases was grimy and dirty. The 
mattresses themselves were torn, and in [one] cubicle… the mattress was 
nearly torn in half, exposing a mass of brown fibre filling. In this case the 
Manager, Brother McGee, admitted that a boy was using this bed … The 
blankets inspected were miserably thin … Two and three blankets to a bed 
are totally inadequate both in quantity and quality to provide necessary 
warmth for children of tender years sleeping on these verandahs subject to 
chill conditions of winter.162
158 Memorandum from Ordish, 21st October 1949, NAA.C: A445, 133/2/8.
159 See Report on Bindoon, 3rd August 1950, NAA.C: K403, W1959/88.
160 See, for example, inspection reports by Denney and Bartley, and by Fogarty, 6th July 
1950, NAA.C: K403, W1959/88.
161 See, for example, inspection reports by Bartley, 12th May 1950, and Alexander, 2nd 
August 1951, NAA.C: K403, W1959/96.
162 Inspection report by McMinn, Denney, Roberts and Paddon, 9th July 1948, NAA.C: 
A445, 133/2/47.
5 ‘AUSTRALIA AS THE COMING GREATEST FOSTER-FATHER OF CHILDREN… 
172
The schoolrooms at Castledare were, the inspectors noted, over- 
crowded, and in the only recreation room, which was the only place with 
heating, the fireplace was blocked off with staging. In addition to the poor 
physical condition of the home, the staffing was wholly inadequate in 
numbers and personnel given that ‘Castledare is catering for children who 
are still little more than babies, who need love, affection, care and atten-
tion which a child of such age would get from a mother’. The unhealthy 
environment of the home, numbers of children accommodated there and 
lack of regular medical checks posed a significant risk of epidemics, 
including the threat of a possible spread of polio. ‘Lacking proper facilities, 
care, attention and opportunity what will be the reaction’, the inspectors 
asked, ‘on their citizenship value’? There is no indication that a copy of 
this report was forwarded on to Garnett. Although improvements were 
made to the dormitories at Castledare later that autumn, inadequate 
staffing, over-crowding and insufficient teaching space continued to be a 
source of criticism in inspection reports for another five years.163 Poor 
staffing and inadequate supervision compounded the fact that Br Murphy, 
since recognised as one of the most prolific sexual offenders within the 
Christian Brothers in Western Australia, was on the staff of Castledare 
from 1944 to 1954.164 Levels of staffing at Castledare were to remain fairly 
consistent for the next ten years with the Home Office eventually 
questioning in 1957 whether the inadequate staffing levels in an institution 
accommodating younger children meant that Castledare should possibly 
have its status as an institution approved by the UK Government 
withdrawn.165 As was to prove to be the case in many other instances as 
well, however, these Home Office concerns were not pressed to the point 
of decisive action and in the face of assurances about further staff 
appointments, the approval of Castledare was maintained.
The failure of oversight of these Catholic migration parties in 1947 by 
UK authorities was starkly demonstrated in the unsanctioned numbers of 
young children being sent to an over-crowded, impersonal institution at 
Castledare, shivering at night in urine-soaked bed clothes and mattresses 
163 See, for example, Heyes to Secretary, Child Welfare Department, 9th February 1953; 
Heyes to Commissioner for Malta, 19th January 1945, NAA: K403, W1959/89.
164 See Coldrey, The Scheme, p. 463; Report of Case Study No.11 Congregation of Christian 
Brothers in Western Australia (Canberra: Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to 
Child Sexual Abuse, 2014).
165 See, for example, Johnson to Fraser, 4th August 1957, TNA: DO35/10247.
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and at risk of serious sexual assault. Boys were also sent under the agreed 
age limit for Bindoon as well, one of whom has since reported being 
targeted for sustained sexual abuse by a number of Brothers there.166 
However, the lack of readiness of Clontarf and Bindoon to receive the 
children sent to them in the autumn of 1947, and the transfer of girls to 
Nazareth House, Geraldton and the Swan Homes in Perth without UK 
Government approval were also indicative of a broader failure in monitor-
ing the placement and welfare of those children.
Complex oRgAnisATionAl sysTems: fAiluRe, soCiAl 
imAginARies And TRusT
This failure in oversight occurred at the intersection of different 
organisational interests and capacities. After the politically sensitive 
decision to suspend the original Labor Government plan quickly to secure 
50,000 ‘war orphans’, the parties of child migrants who began to arrive in 
Australia from Britain 1947 were a politically helpful indication of 
Calwell’s, and Labor’s, continued commitment to securing Australia’s 
interests through the expansion of its population.167 As newspaper coverage 
showed during the autumn of 1947, the arrival of these children for 
Catholic institutions in Western Australia was woven into a political 
narrative about Calwell’s success in making Australia the most attractive 
destination for imperial migration.168 Calwell’s active role in ensuring that 
child migration was given a high priority could also be understood as an 
attempt on his part to achieve some measure of success for a policy to 
which his personal political reputation had become attached. For Catholic 
organisations in Australia, the arrival of these children marked an 
opportunity for the growth of the wider Catholic population as well as a 
means of ensuring that child migrants would be housed in denominational 
institutions rather than the State-run homes originally envisaged in 
Chifley’s scheme. For Catholic organisations in the United Kingdom, it 
offered the possibility of creating space in their residential homes to allow 
new admissions as well as sending children from family backgrounds 
166 See evidence from witness FWS, Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, Transcript of Day 179.
167 On Calwell’s obvious sensitivity about numerical targets for immigration, see Calwell, 
Be Just and Fear Not, pp. 107–10.
168 A similar narrative of success later in Calwell’s tenure as Minister is also evident in 
Statement by the Minister of Immigration, 25th February 1949, TNA: DO35/3370.
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judged undesirable to places far away in which they could be offered new 
lives under Catholic formation. For the Commonwealth Relations Office, 
it formed a continuation of the well- established policy of sending children 
overseas as part of imperial migration intended to reinforce the cultural 
bonds of the Commonwealth and, given reasonable standards of care and 
training, provide children with good opportunities for their futures.
Alongside each of these interests, there were various forms of 
organisational limitation. The sheer scale of the Australian land mass 
meant that, apart from any political considerations of the relationship 
between Commonwealth and State Governments, the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration was largely dependent on the knowledge and 
actions of State officials for the oversight and delivery of this work. 
Catholic organisations in the United Kingdom had little direct experience 
of the institutions in Western Australia to which children were being sent 
and, where concern was expressed about standards, this proved less 
influential than the willingness to participate in a shared project with their 
religious counter- parts in Australia. For the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, there was similarly little direct knowledge of conditions in 
Australian institutions and a reliance instead on information provided by 
Australian authorities and through the UK High Commission. Given that 
staff at the UK High Commission in Canberra had not undertaken any 
direct inspections of institutions that were about to receive British child 
migrants since Garnett’s visit to some of them in 1944, the information 
about these institutions available to the Commonwealth Relations Office 
was even more limited than it might have been.169 The limited oversight 
performed by staff at the UK High Commission also meant that the 
sending of girls to Nazareth House, Geraldton or the Swan Homes in 
Perth despite lack of approval for this from the UK Government were not 
isolated incidents. In September 1949, Harry Bass wrote from the UK 
High Commission to the Commonwealth Department of Immigration to 
check if there were any other institutions to which child migrants had been 
sent of which it was not aware or had not given its approval and received 
169 See, for example, Telegram UK High Commission to Commonwealth Relations Office, 
13th August 1947, TNA: DO35/3379, confirming that no recent visits had taken place by 
the Commission’s staff to Barnardo’s institutions in New South Wales, but that ‘previous 
experience of Barnardo’s justifies every confidence that their reception and settlement 
arrangements will be satisfactory’. The only reports received by the UK High Commission 
about institutions to which child migrants were sent in 1947 related to Catholic institutions 
and the Swan Homes in Western Australia.
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confirmation that there were no other such cases.170 In 1951, however, it 
was discovered that British boys had been sent to the Church of England 
Padbury farm school in Stoneville, Western Australia, when the Swan 
Homes had  insufficient accommodation for child migrants, despite 
Padbury not having gone through any approval process.171 The following 
year, it was also found that Dr Barnardo’s Homes had placed child migrants 
at its residential home at Normanhurst in New South Wales, again without 
this having been an approved institution.172 In both cases, the receiving 
organisation appeared to have assumed that approval of other institutions 
that they ran by the UK Government automatically extended to all 
residential institutions under their control. Whilst the fact that such non-
approved placements were discovered could be seen as indicating that 
some degree of oversight was working, such placements tended to create 
pressures for the post-hoc approval of institutions such as Nazareth House, 
Geraldton and the Padbury farm school which might not have otherwise 
been approved had they not already been in receipt of child migrants.
In the wider context of these organisational interests and limitations, 
Walter Garnett played a focal role in the failure of oversight by the UK 
Government of these initial post-war parties of Catholic child migrants. 
This observation is not made so much to attribute blame to Garnett as to 
focus on the conditions under which an individual’s policy judgements can 
carry particular influence and the processes through which significant 
errors of judgement can occur.
Garnett’s role in decision-making and oversight in relation to these 
Catholic migration parties was notable not only because of the reliance of 
Commonwealth Relations Office staff on his views and advice, but because 
of the stark contrast between his previous emphasis on the need for appro-
priate standards and supervision in receiving institutions and the realities 
experienced by many of those children on arrival. His individual influence 
arose both out of his organisational context—in a governmental office 
specifically tasked with mediating between the UK and Commonwealth 
Governments—and his personal biography. His experience of dealing with 
matters relating to child migration since his participation in the 1924 
Bondfield delegation marked him as having far greater expertise in this 
170 Bass to Ordish, 27th September 1949, NAA.C: A445/133/2/24.
171 Report on Padbury’s Boys’ Farm School, 4th December 1951, NAA: PP6/1, 
1949/H/1145.
172 Dixon to Oates 3rd November 1952, TNA: MH102/1895.
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field than the civil servants who had taken on responsibility for this in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office following the retirement of Ronald 
Wiseman. The practical necessities of relying on Garnett’s judgements as 
the UK Government’s ‘man on the ground’ in Australia was therefore 
reinforced by the sense that policy decisions could only sensibly be made 
in London on the basis of his more experienced advice. The absence of any 
maintenance agreement between the Commonwealth Relations Office 
and a representative Catholic sending organisation—which was not final-
ised until March 1949 when an agreement was finally signed between the 
UK Government and the London office of the Federal Catholic 
Immigration Committee173—meant that the Commonwealth Relations 
Office had no administrative mechanism in place to check the ages or 
institutional destinations of those child migrants. In the absence of such 
an administrative check, reliance on Garnett’s views and knowledge 
became even stronger.
Given the influence that Garnett had over the Commonwealth Relations 
Office’s decisions about the approval of receiving institutions in Australia, 
the process through which he came to accept the proposed migration of 
340 children to Catholic institutions in Western Australia was to have a 
profound effect on many of those children’s lives. His understanding of 
those receiving institutions was inevitably limited by the sheer physical 
distance—more than 2000 miles—between his Canberra office and 
Western Australia. What direct knowledge he did have, based on single 
visits three years before, strongly shaped his perceptions. He continued to 
maintain through the autumn of 1946 that Nazareth House, Geraldton 
was an eminently well-equipped and suitable institution without knowing 
that elderly residents had been occupying the accommodation built for 
child migrants. Similarly, his experience of Castledare as an over-crowded, 
under-staffed institution not designed for the reception of young children 
persisted, despite the attempt by the Archbishop of Perth to persuade him 
otherwise.
In the absence of more up-to-date direct experience of these institutions, 
and there being little prospect of his called-for inspection of these 
institutions by a representative of the UK High Commission, Garnett 
relied instead on his broader assumptions about the organisational struc-
tures with which he was dealing. Although Garnett had argued at the 
173 See agreement between UK Government and Australian Catholic Immigration 
Committee, 7th March 1949, TNA: DO35/3385.
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Commonwealth inter-departmental sub-committee on child migration 
that voluntary and religious organisations were more likely to do their 
work well because of their ethos of vocation and altruism, he was clearly 
unwilling in practice simply to accept that the proposed Catholic migra-
tion scheme was a positive initiative. Garnett was far more prepared, how-
ever, to believe that a system of inspections by State officials, and 
State-based Commonwealth Migration Officers, could offer a sufficient 
safeguard for this work. His evident unhappiness at the failure of State 
officials to undertake appropriate inspections before CEMWA’s initial 
application for 340 child migrants was approved, and his satisfaction at 
records of State officials quickly following up concerns at Bindoon indi-
cated his more fundamental belief that such government inspections 
would be sufficient if undertaken properly. He was clearly aware that such 
systems were not infallible—as his experience of McAdam’s endorsement 
of Castledare had shown him in 1944—but on balance regarded the gen-
eral system of inspections by Australian officials as the best that could be 
done to ensure child migrants’ welfare. His broad trust in the capacity of 
government systems to protect the welfare of children therefore compen-
sated to some extent for any lack of detailed information. There is no 
indication that he pressed for any urgent inspections to be undertaken at 
Castledare after children’s arrival there, despite his long-standing concerns 
about that institution. Instead the existence of a system of inspection func-
tioned more as a proxy of care, providing a more general assurance of 
protection for children rather than a very regular source of information. A 
broad confidence in the safeguards offered by this governmental system 
may have created a context for Garnett’s failure to establish the ages, num-
bers and institutional destinations of the Catholic child migrants who 
arrived in Western Australia in 1947 or to ask more searching questions 
about CEMWA’s fitness as a custodian organisation for child migrants 
despite the fact that it had requested children be sent to institutions that 
inspectors had found to be substantially unsuitable or ill-equipped.
In this regard, similarities can be seen in Garnett’s trust in Australian 
governmental systems—based on his broad sense of collaboration with 
Australian civil servants and the principle of respecting Australian 
autonomy—and the willingness of Catholic officials in Britain to support 
the migration of children to receiving institutions they recognised as 
sharing a common religious mission. Both reflect different social 
imaginaries, a mapping out of the social world around notions of affinity 
and identification with larger social institutions. Such imaginaries create a 
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sense of shared meaning and purpose with particular groups and social 
bonds assumed to be, if certainly not infallible, then broadly reliable and 
worth maintaining. They provide social actors with the means for 
understanding and judging how to act in worlds that they know to be 
imperfect and through their actions, people continually reinforce or refine 
the social imaginaries through which they live their lives. Trust is not 
therefore simply a passive stance of accepting some social relationships as 
being particularly valuable or reliable. Rather, the act of trusting is an 
important means through which a sense of social bond with others is 
reinforced and renewed.
The recursive reproduction of such social bonds through acts of trust 
had particular significance for initiatives such as the child migration pro-
grammes in which monitoring of children’s welfare by British officials was 
primarily reliant on written reports by other people. Overtly challenging 
the adequacy of these reports with Australian authorities could carry con-
notations of mistrust and bad faith which British officials wished to avoid. 
As coming chapters will demonstrate, British officials typically took the 
view that such confrontational interventions would have little practical 
benefit and that it was preferable to maintain bonds with Australian 
authorities whilst trying to work gradually through these relationships to 
improve standards for child migrants.
In a religious context, such acts of trust function as a way of maintaining 
an active sense of shared religious belonging and can acquire the aura of a 
religious virtue or duty. In the context of governmental administration, 
acts of trust within the same department can reinforce a sense of shared 
departmental purpose and identity in the context of periodic conflicts and 
competition with other government bodies over status, power and the 
control of resources. Acts of trust across governmental departments are a 
necessary means through which shared identities and a sense of purpose 
are forged, enabling projects of governance to be possible across complex 
governmental structures. If Garnett was not prepared to accept the 
assurances of the Archbishop of Perth about improvements at Castledare 
in 1944, two and a half years later he was apparently willing to accept 
verbal assurances from Reuben Wheeler, at the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration instead.174 In doing so, Garnett not only 
174 The fact that these assurances may have come directly from Reuben Wheeler, who had 
recently been in Western Australia, and with whom Garnett had previously worked, may have 
added to Garnett’s trust in them.
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acted out from his sense of shared social bonds with other Commonwealth 
administrators, but in accepting these assurances also performed his role in 
a way that reinforced those bonds. The policy and organisational delivery 
of post-war child migration to Australia was thus enabled through  different 
organisational imaginaries which made the migration of children from 
Britain to institutions several thousand miles away seem meaningful, or at 
least tolerable, and which served to sustain different forms of organisa-
tional identity, bond and loyalty.
The home offiCe And Child migRATion AfTeR CuRTis
The Curtis report, and the Cabinet’s decision in the spring of 1947 to 
make the Home Office the lead department for children’s out-of-home 
care in England and Wales, created a significant shift in the administrative 
structures for child migration within the UK Government. Until 1947 
policy and operational decisions about child migration had been almost 
entirely conducted within the Dominions Office, in discussion with the 
UK High Commission in Canberra or the Treasury (where decisions had 
financial implications for government spending). By the summer of 1947, 
officials and ministers within the Commonwealth Relations Office were 
increasingly conscious both of the recommendations of the Curtis report 
in relation to the resumption of child migration and of the need for the 
Home Office to be satisfied with arrangements for child migrants’ care 
overseas.175 From this point on, the already complex administrative systems 
operating between the Commonwealth Relations Office, UK High 
Commission, and Commonwealth and State Governments in Australia 
now had to involve the Home Office as well as the Scottish Home 
Department (for children emigrated from Scotland).176
175 See Dixon to Costley-White, 6th August 1947, TNA: DO35/3389; also minute of 
meeting with Commonwealth Relations Office, 20th August 1947, TNA: MH102/1553. 
Awareness of the Curtis recommendations for child migration is also evident in note, 24th 
October 1946. And Head to Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of 
South Africa, 2nd November 1946, TNA: MH102/1549, when the Dominions Office 
made a general response to a proposed child migration scheme from the South African 
Government.
176 On the comparative lack of involvement of the government in Northern Ireland, see 
Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry, Final Report, Chapter 2, paras 42–65. The role of the 
Scottish Home Department was constrained by the assumption of civil servants in London 
that voluntary societies emigrating children from Scotland fell under their responsibility if 
those organisations had their headquarters in England and Wales. As a consequence, whilst 
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The Home Office had, as noted in Chap. 2, already become involved in 
discussions with the Dominions Office and the Fairbridge Society by the 
end of 1945 about the tensions between the Fairbridge organisations in 
London and Western Australia. After a further meeting between 
representatives of Fairbridge’s London office, the Dominions Office and 
the Home Office in January 1946, it was agreed that the two government 
departments would produce a memorandum setting out their views on 
how this might best be resolved.177 Agreed by the summer, this 
memorandum stated that whilst the Fairbridge organisation in London 
had the right to be informed about standards at Fairbridge farm schools in 
Australia, and to be assured that these reflected ‘up-to-date’ understandings 
of child- care, the powers and responsibility to ensure that these standards 
were maintained should ultimately reside with appropriate State authorities 
in Australia. As an internal note on this memorandum in the Dominions 
Office put it, ‘the Dominions Office will not underwrite the London 
Society’s authority in this matter and it is impelled further to suggest that 
Fairbridge act in line with the larger politic—that of self-government for 
the Dominions’.178 This position was strongly endorsed by Walter Garnett, 
reflecting both his confidence in the ability of State authorities to fulfil 
these responsibilities and his view that close management of Australian 
institutions could not be successfully achieved by Fairbridge administrators 
and committee members some 12,000 miles away back in London.179 The 
memorandum also included what was to prove to be a highly significant 
move away from the principle of representatives from the UK High 
Commission undertaking annual visits to check on conditions at 
institutions receiving child migrants. Whilst the UK High Commissioner 
in Australia was also said to have the ‘right to satisfy themselves by 
inspection if necessary, that proper standards of training and education 
the Scottish Home Department was consulted by civil servants in London on more general 
policy matters such as the drafting of s.33 regulations under the 1948 Children Act, the only 
approved voluntary society considered to fall primarily under the responsibility of the 
Scottish Home Department was the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service.
177 Substantial documentation relating to the drafting of this memorandum and subsequent 
discussions about the revision of the Fairbridge Society’s articles of association is held on 
TNA: DO35/1139/M1102/2, DO35/1139/M1118/1, DO35.1139.M1118.2, 
DO35/3395, DO35/3396, and DO35/3402.
178 Note on the Memorandum of the Dominions Office, 2nd August 1946, TNA: 
DO35/1139/M1118/1.
179 Garnett to Head, 8th November 1946, TNA: DO35/1139/M1118/1, also Garnett to 
Costley-White, 4th November 1947, TNA: DO35/3402.
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were being maintained; … the main task of supervision with a view to 
ensuring the maintenance of such standards … would devolve on the State 
Government’. Direct visits by representatives of the UK High Commission 
in Canberra were therefore to be the exception rather than a regular 
feature of British oversight of these schemes, with faith placed instead in 
the capacity to State authorities to discharge these responsibilities.
Whilst claiming to be broadly happy with this approach, Fairbridge’s 
London officials still felt that more could be done to ensure that it had 
more control over operations in Australia.180 A process began of redrafting 
the charity’s articles of association in an attempt to circumvent challenges 
posed by the incorporation of the Australian farm schools as autonomous 
entities. To secure agreement for this, a Fairbridge delegation led by Sir 
Charles Hambro made arrangements to visit Australia in October 1947 to 
engage in face-to-face negotiations with the Australian committees. In 
preparation for this, meetings were held with staff in the Home Office’s 
Children’s Department in order to produce a document about appropri-
ate standards for child migrants which could help to strengthen the 
London delegation’s position. By the time these meetings took place, offi-
cials in the Children’s Department were already increasingly aware of the 
need to develop a wider policy position in relation to child migration, 
having been approached by Br Conlon, Dr Barnardo’s Homes, the Church 
of England Advisory Council for Empire Settlement, Australia House 
(about possible migration to area schools in Tasmania) and the Save the 
Children Fund with various queries and requests relating to the resump-
tion of child migration.181
In response to these approaches, the Home Office Children’s 
Department had already begun to think about its more general policy 
180 Fairbridge Farm Schools in Australia, 14th August 1946, TNA: DO35/1139/
M1118/1.
181 Note by Maxwell, 28th May 1947, TNA: MH102/1892 (which states that that 
children originally proposed for migration by Barnardo’s would not have been accepted by 
the Home Office as parents would not consent and more information about their home 
circumstances was required)—see also other policy changes suggested to Barnardo’s by the 
Home Office at note by Maxwell, 18th June 1948, TNA: MH102/1892. Also Maxwell to 
Dixon, 19th July 1947, TNA: DO35/3389; note by Maxwell, 24th July 1947, TNA: 
MH102/1553; also notes and correspondence on TNA: MH102/1551, MH102/1552, 
MH102/1554, MH102/1555. The Home Office were originally approached about 
Secretary of State consent for a boy’s migration under the CEMWA nomination in November 
1946, but seem to have had little information about arrangements for this until their meeting 
with Conlon the following summer (see correspondence on TNA: MH102/1550).
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position in relation to child migration. Although its direct knowledge of 
conditions and operational practices in Australia was limited,182 it had 
already received a highly critical report of both standards of care at the 
Middlemore Homes in Birmingham and of selection and preparation of 
children being sent from there.183 In an initial policy memorandum drafted 
by Janette Maxwell in June 1947, it was suggested that an over-arching 
Home Office policy of encouraging or discouraging child migration was 
unlikely to be of practical use as the Home Office only had any powers to 
influence the possible migration of children under ‘fit person’ orders or, 
when the Children Bill was passed into law, children under the care of 
local authorities.184 Nevertheless, given the growing number of approaches 
being made to the Home Office either on matters of general policy, or for 
children requiring Secretary of State consent for their migration, it was 
suggested that a broad view of the relative benefits or risks of child migra-
tion should be developed. Whilst Maxwell noted that the Dominions had 
the potential to offer child migrants significant future opportunities, their 
ability to realise these would often be limited if they were sent to isolated 
residential institutions, as Garnett’s 1944 report had shown. Although 
more general policy objections could be raised against child migration—in 
terms of the need for Britain to retain its young population against the 
demographic trends of an ageing and declining population—the priority 
should be ‘to consider each child’s particular position without undue 
regard for national and wider considerations’. As a general rule, emigra-
tion could be appropriate for a child with no family and no childhood 
prospects other than remaining in institutional care (although as her 
senior, Mary Rosling, noted in the margins, this was precisely the kind of 
child who should be boarded out). Such children were unlikely to be able 
to have a well-informed view of the implications of their emigration, 
182 See, for example, the incorrect assumption that there was a Child Welfare department 
within the Australian Commonwealth Government (note by Maxwell, 24th July 1947) and 
the lack of awareness of ‘bulk’ migration parties before the war and (memorandum by 
Maxwell, 26th June 1947), both TNA: MH102/1553. The Maxwell memorandum also 
notes that staff at Australia House had informed them that the homes to which children were 
to be sent under the CEMWA nomination were ‘particularly good’ and had ‘the best 
reputation in Western Australia’.
183 See ‘Middlemore Homes’, 26th June 1947, TNA: MH102/1553. A more positive 
account of conditions at Middlemore following a change of management was given to the 
Home Office by Vera Grenfell later that year (note by Maxwell, 27th October 1947, TNA: 
MH102/1591).
184 Memorandum by Maxwell, 26th June 1947, TNA: MH102/1553.
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however, given the likelihood that they had been presented with a ‘highly 
glamourized’ view of life in Australia. If a child had any family members or 
relatives with whom there was any chance at all of them returning or being 
boarded out with, then, Maxwell argued, their emigration should be 
actively discouraged.185 Just as the Curtis report had suggested, decisions 
about a child’s welfare needed to be based not only on purely material 
considerations—such as whether material standards in Australian 
institutions were better than a child’s prospective home life in Britain—
but on the importance of their emotional care and continued contact 
where possible with family members. Particular caution should be exercised 
in the emigration of very young children who had only been committed 
to care in this country for a short time, and for whom any decision about 
their emigration would best be delayed for some years. In summary, 
Maxwell concluded, ‘we should tend to be anti-emigration expect where 
we can be fully satisfied that the child can only gain by it’. It is, after all, an 
irrevocable decision. ‘Once done it can only, with the utmost difficulty, be 
undone’.
This policy position was developed further after members of the 
proposed Fairbridge delegation to Australia met with Mary Rosling at the 
Home Office in July and found her to be more supportive of their wish to 
have greater control over operations in Australia than her predecessor, 
Miss Wall.186 In response to a request from the Fairbridge delegation, 
Rosling agreed to produce a memorandum setting out the policy direction 
for children’s out-of-home care in the United Kingdom which the Home 
Office would expect to see reflected in standards of overseas organisations 
receiving child migrants.187 The production of this memorandum was also 
discussed at a meeting between Janette Maxwell and Cyril Costley-White 
and R.L. Dixon in the Commonwealth Relations Office, convened to dis-
cuss the views of the two departments in relation to child migration. 
Maxwell later noted differences between their positions in which ‘we [the 
Home Office] tend to discourage in favour of boarding out or more fam-
ily care in this country, while they [the Commonwealth Relations Office] 
encourage without giving much attention to the individual children 
185 On the implementation of this policy, see Maxwell to Lucette, 13th August 1947, TNA: 
MH102/1892 on the refusal of approval for emigration for three girls put forward by 
Barnardo’s on grounds that some possibility remained that they might be able to return 
home to the care of their mother.
186 Meeting at Home Office, 17th July 1947, TNA: MH102/1403.
187 Note by Maxwell, (exact date obscured) August 1947, TNA: MH102/1403.
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involved’.188 Maxwell was also told about the work of Walter Garnett at 
the UK High Commission, who was said to investigate ‘every home to 
which it is proposed to send children’ and who, despite having little 
knowledge of child-care standards in the United Kingdom, was described 
as having a long experience with receiving institutions in Australia. Costley- 
White and Dixon raised no objections to the Home Office providing the 
Fairbridge delegation being provided with a memorandum and, when 
Maxwell offered to make a copy of this available to Garnett on the basis it 
might help him in judging the suitability of proposed receiving institu-
tions, diplomatically replied that he would certainly ‘appreciate such a 
note’. The meeting also led to the Commonwealth Relations Office shar-
ing with the Home Office the reports it had received about Christian 
Brothers’ institutions in Western Australia. A week after the first party of 
children had left for Western Australia on the SS Asturias, Mary Rosling 
noted on the Home Office file containing the reports that she did not ‘feel 
entirely reassured about these places’.189
In September, Rosling’s memorandum was sent to the Fairbridge 
delegation in draft form for their comments, with Harry Logan, the 
London Society’s new Acting General Secretary replying that they were 
delighted with it and believed that it could not ‘fail to have the utmost 
influence on the success of our visit’.190 Suggested changes from Fairbridge 
added greater caution to the passing on of a child’s case history unless the 
Principal at the receiving institutions was judged to be capable of making 
appropriate use of it and these were incorporated into Rosling’s text. A 
copy was then sent to the Commonwealth Relations Office for Garnett, 
forwarded on to him by Costley-White with a cover letter explaining both 
the memorandum’s wider policy context in the wake of the Curtis report 
and its origins in the July meeting between Fairbridge and Mary Rosling 
at which it was noted the Commonwealth Relations Office was ‘not 
represented’.191 Costley-White suggested that Garnett circulate this to rel-
evant Commonwealth and State contacts before the Fairbridge delegation 
188 Minute on meeting with Commonwealth Relations Office, 20th August 1947, TNA: 
MH102/1553.
189 Note by Rosling, 4th September 1947, TNA: MH102/1879.
190 Rosling to Logan, 15th September 1947 with enclosure, Logan to Rosling with 
enclosure, 16th September 1947, TNA: MH102/1403.
191 Costley-White to Garnett, 2nd October 1947, TNA: MH102/1403.
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arrived so that it could be made clear that the memorandum represented 
the current view of the Home Office rather than the settled position of the 
UK Government and Charles Hambro would not be able to claim to be 
the bearer of Government ‘instructions’ from the United Kingdom.192
The final text of Rosling’s memorandum began by directly quoting 
from the Curtis report about the key principles that should underpin chil-
dren’s out-of-home care: ‘affection and personal interest… respect for his 
[sic] personality and regard for his self-esteem … stability … opportunity 
of making the best of his ability and aptitudes … [and] a share in the com-
mon life of a small group of people in a homely environment’.193 Given the 
importance of these principles it was said that it ‘would be difficult to 
justify’ the emigration of children to receiving organisations who failed to 
implement them. Somewhat diluting the particular wording of paragraph 
515 of the Curtis report, the memorandum stated that child migrants 
should receive care and opportunities overseas that would be as good as if 
that child had remained in the United Kingdom. To this end, some con-
tinued involvement by sending organisations was essential and the Home 
Office would not ‘regard with equanimity any scheme of emigration in 
which the care of the child passed entirely out of the hands of the parent 
organisation in this country’. Such on-going responsibility was necessary 
both for monitoring the care of children already sent and to ensure that 
conditions were appropriate for any children emigrated in the future. This 
should also involve the ‘parent organisation’ in setting the general policy 
for the care and training of children in overseas institutions. A liaison offi-
cer—an idea  originally proposed to the Home Office by Fairbridge—
should be appointed to ensure effective communication between the 
sending and receiving bodies. Staff should be carefully selected to ensure 
that they were able to offer care along the lines of the Curtis principles. 
Selection decisions should involve an experienced social worker, assess the 
impact of emigration on any continued family bonds and be made entirely 
on whether emigration was in the ‘best interests of any particular child’. 
Residential homes should operate on the basis of care in small groups, 
provide opportunities where possible for engaging with the local 
community and provide children with experience of building up their own 
192 See also Garnett to Heyes, 18th October 1947, NAA.C: K403, W59/63.
193 Emigration of Children Who Have Been Deprived of a Normal Home Life, no date, 
copies held on both TNA: MH102/1558 and NAA.C: K403, W59/63.
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possessions and managing pocket money. Education should take place 
in local schools or, if provided in residential institutions, be equivalent to 
standards in  local schools, with children able to develop academically 
 according to their particular ability and interests. Effective after-care from 
a trained worker should be provided. Holiday placements with local 
families through an ‘aunts and uncles scheme’ should be arranged where 
possible. Where new accommodation for child migrants was being 
considered, care should be taken with thinking about the whole needs of 
the child—not just the material standard of their accommodation. 
However beautiful an isolated rural location might be, it would always be 
preferable to find sites that would enable children quickly to integrate with 
local communities both through their schooling and through other 
informal activities.194
Garnett’s response to the memorandum—which was later passed back 
to the Home Office—was tetchy.195 ‘The Home Office’, he wrote, ‘in 
preparing this memorandum appear to have been very largely guided by 
the views of the Fairbridge Society, by whom indeed the memorandum 
might well have been written’. Indeed many of its proposals for control of 
operations in Australia by ‘parent organisations’ in the United Kingdom 
reflected ideas that the Fairbridge Society in London had already discussed 
in meetings with the Commonwealth Relations Office. Aside from the 
issue of control of Australian operations from the United Kingdom, 
Garnett wrote that the other general principles set out Rosling’s memo-
randum re-stated points that he had already made in his 1944 report. Any 
inference that Australian authorities needed to be educated on these points 
drew a defensive and, given his knowledge of problems at receiving insti-
tutions during the war, inaccurate response from him. ‘In general’, Garnett 
wrote, ‘standards of care and aftercare of children brought to Australia by 
voluntary organisations have in the past been satisfactory and well up to 
the standard now laid down in the Curtis Committee’s report as a result 
of the deficiencies found in existing arrangements for the care of under- 
privileged children in the United Kingdom. It must not however be 
assumed that the standard of care which is to be obtained in the future in 
194 Rosling’s understanding of the importance of these standards for child migrants was 
reinforced by an account given to her in December 1947 of previous failures to maintain 
them at Pinjarra by a former Fairbridge employee (see notes and correspondence in TNA: 
MH102/1557).
195 Garnett to Costley-White, 17th November 1947, TNA: MH102/1403.
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the United Kingdom has not hitherto obtained in connection with child 
migration schemes in Australia and I should deprecate any suggestion of 
this nature’. If anything, Garnett added, standards of care were not just as 
good in Australia as in the United Kingdom, but in some cases better and 
one of the main lessons of the Curtis report was how uneven standards of 
care remained in Britain. Rosling’s memorandum, he claimed, reflected 
insufficient knowledge of the differences between the various organisa-
tions involved in sending children to Australia, and in the case of the 
Fairbridge Society, failed to establish why the London office had an inher-
ent right to control local bodies in Australia ‘who do all the work and have 
to cope with the problems on the spot’. ‘I trust’, Garnett concluded, ‘that 
the Mission will exercise discretion in showing this memorandum to the 
local bodies’. Whilst the principles set out in it were reasonable and, he 
claimed, already generally accepted by receiving institutions, the inference 
of being lectured about these standards was something that ‘those who 
have devoted many years to this problem on the spot might not take … 
very kindly’.
To the surprise of officials in the UK High Commission and 
Commonwealth Relations Office, the Fairbridge delegation was successful 
in its negotiations with the Fairbridge committees in Australia about the 
revision of the Society’s articles of association to make it a more integrated 
organisation.196 The Australian bodies agreed to give up their autonomous 
status and to become part of a single new incorporated body that would 
include the London Society and all the overseas farm schools. A number 
of figures associated with past conflicts—including Gordon Green—
retired, resigned or agreed to allow limits on their future influence.197 The 
London office was given the power to appoint Principals at the farm 
schools and to nominate a certain number of members on newly consti-
tuted Boards of Governors, but with day-to-day operational issues left to 
local management overseas. All constituent parts of this new organisation 
agreed to adhere to a common ethos in terms of providing care attentive 
to the needs of the child.
196 The Fairbridge Society: Documents to Accompany 1947 Revision of Memorandum 
and Articles of Association, TNA: DO35/3396; Garnett to Costley-White, 10th December 
1947, TNA: DO35/3402; Fairbridge Farm School Act, 1948 allowing land and assets of the 
Pinjarra farm school to be vested in the new over-arching body, TNA: DO35/3402.
197 See Green’s retirement announced in ‘Fairbridge Farm School’, The Times, 27th April 
1948, TNA: DO35/3395; Stowe’s resignation as Secretary of the Western Australian 
Committee in Stowe to Joyner, 25th November 1947, DO35/3402.
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Whilst Sir Charles Hambro and other senior figures in Fairbridge in the 
United Kingdom could feel satisfied in achieving new arrangements for 
the governance of overseas farm schools, this process had been a divisive 
one for relationships within the UK Government. The decision by Hambro 
to court the Home Office’s support for its attempt to gain greater powers 
in Australia, given the long resistance to this from civil servants in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, was a strategically effective manoeuvre 
of playing off the influence of one government department off over 
another. By emphasising the influence of the Home Office over future 
child migration policy—with the Fairbridge delegation reportedly telling 
the Perth Committee that the Home Office was now the lead department 
on this198—it became easier to create an impression that the further supply 
of children for Australian farm schools was dependent on compliance with 
Rosling’s memorandum.
By allying itself with Fairbridge’s London Society, however, the Home 
Office Children’s Department was now perceived by officials in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and UK High Commission as insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the principle of the autonomy of the Dominions and to 
the political complexities of managing relationships with organisations 
overseas that had to be understood as the equals of their counter-parts 
back in Britain. Senior civil servants in the Commonwealth Relations 
Office such as Sir Charles Dixon and Cyril Costley-White, as well as 
Garnett in Canberra, had by then a long history of immersion in this cul-
ture and from their perspective the Children’s Department’s intervention 
on behalf of Fairbridge was ill-informed, clumsy and risked provoking 
adverse reaction in Australia. From the perspective of the Children’s 
Department, for whom staff such as Rosling and Maxwell were enthused 
by the new policy framework for children’s out-of-home care ushered in 
by the Curtis report, it was important to introduce new ways of thinking 
about child migration to established practices which seemed not attentive 
enough to the needs of the individual child. If the Children’s Department’s 
intervention appeared patronising to Garnett, for Maxwell and Rosling, it 
was a necessary part of their departmental mission to try to ensure that the 
‘reforming spirit’199 of the Curtis report was working its way through all 
198 Telegram Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commission, 27th November 
1947, TNA: DO35/3402.
199 A phrase that Maxwell reportedly used in her meeting with Costley-White and 




forms of children’s out-of-home care. The process of finding an accom-
modation between these contrasting departmental positions was to shape 
the UK Government’s approach to the management of child migration 
programmes in the coming years.
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CHAPTER 6
From Regulation to Moral Persuasion: Child 
Migration Policy and the Home Office 
Children’s Department, 1948–1954
Following the first wave of British child migrants to arrive in Australia in 
the autumn of 1947, and the evident hope of the Commonwealth 
Government for more to follow them, voluntary organisations and reli-
gious orders in Australia became increasingly active in attempts to involve 
themselves in this work. In 1947, 11 residential institutions across Australia 
had been accepted as receiving institutions for British child migrants. By 
the spring of 1952, this number had increased to 40.1
At the same time, in the United Kingdom, the resumption of child 
migration was coming under increased scrutiny from some professional 
and voluntary associations. As noted in Chap. 2, a few individuals had 
made private, critical comments about receiving institutions for child 
migrants in Australia in the pre-war years. However, the post-war period 
saw a noticeable growth in organisations directly contacting the UK 
Government and using other public means to express concern about child 
migration, reflecting a critical re-evaluation of this work in the light of 
recent experience of war-time child evacuation and the approach to child- 
care endorsed by the Curtis report.
In June 1945, following press coverage of the planned Australian 
resumption of child migration, the Provisional National Council for 
Mental Health became the first organisation to submit a memorandum to 
1 Child Migration to Australia: Report by John Moss, CBE (London: HMSO, 1953), 
Appendix 1.
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the Dominions Office, setting out what it considered to be appropriate 
standards for this.2 Assuming, incorrectly, that migration schemes would 
operate on the basis of child migrants being placed in foster homes in 
Australia, the memorandum suggested key measures that would need to 
be in place for the setting up and monitoring of such placements. It also 
outlined need for sending organisations in the United Kingdom to have 
some administrative systems through which contact could be maintained 
between child migrants and any parents or other relatives they still had 
at home.
More co-ordinated public criticism of child migration also began to 
develop. In May 1947, The Liberal Party Organisation Committee on the 
Curtis Report published Nobody’s Children: A Report on the Care of 
Children Deprived of Normal Home-Lives.3 Part summary and part com-
mentary on the Curtis report, Nobody’s Children accepted the view of the 
Curtis Committee that emigration might be appropriate for some children 
under particular circumstances. However, it claimed that ‘deplorable 
notions of child care’ still persisted in some organisations involved in send-
ing and receiving child migrants, and argued that no child should be emi-
grated if they had parents able to make reasonable provision for them in 
this country. It condemned attempts to tempt parents into consenting to 
their child’s emigration on the basis of unrealistically optimistic pictures of 
the life that might be possible for them overseas and argued that no child 
should be allowed to emigrate unless it were in their individual interests 
and that good standards of care, staffing and training would be provided.4 
Children sent overseas should have contact with someone equivalent to a 
Children’s Officer and contact with family remaining in the United 
Kingdom should be supported. On the basis of concerns that old attitudes 
might still prevail in child migration work, Nobody’s Children recommended 
that an inter-governmental inquiry be set up specifically to consider the 
placement of child migrants in work, the after-care provided to them and 
the management of compulsory savings schemes for child migrants by 
2 Niemeyer to Dixon with enclosure, 12th June 1945, TNA: DO35/1133/M803/41
3 A copy of this report is available in TNA: MH102/1562.
4 Critical reference is made to the opening up of a new recruitment office by one child 
migration organisation in the North-East of England apparently anticipating an economic 




receiving organisations.5 On the basis of the report, the Women’s Liberal 
Federation wrote to the Home Secretary to inform him that it had passed 
a motion calling for an inter-governmental commission of enquiry to 
‘examine the whole system of the emigration of deprived children to 
British Dominions and overseas’.6 This call was also endorsed by the 
Young Women’s Christian Association of Great Britain, as well as by MPs 
in House of Commons debates during the passage of the Children Bill.7 It 
found support too from the British Federation of Social Workers, whose 
President, Chair and Secretary wrote to the letters page of The Times 
commenting that they had ‘reason to think that the practices of the various 
agencies for the migration of children oversea vary and that their methods 
of selection of children, their welfare, education, training and after care in 
the receiving countries are not always of a sufficiently high standard’.8 The 
Federation also published a pamphlet recommending that, in future, all 
sending organisations select children through formal selection committees 
involving professional social workers, that care should be taken to ensure 
that emigration was always in the best interests of the individual child and 
stating that ‘it should be borne in mind that it is a very serious matter to 
break a child’s home ties, however slender they may be’.9 Doubt about the 
value of child migration was also expressed more widely in Parliamentary 
debates on the proposed Children Bill, with MPs including Somerville 
Hastings (the former Curtis Committee member) expressing reservations 
about the emigration of any unaccompanied children under school 
leaving age.10
Such criticisms were made at a time in which it was generally assumed 
that the passing of the 1948 Children Act would make possible not only 
5 The fact that the report identified these as specific concerns suggests that it may have 
been aware of criticisms of Fairbridge’s Pinjarra farm school made by Miss Tempe Woods, of 
which Fairbridge and the Dominions Office were also aware (see Green to Wiseman with 
enclosures, 21st April 1944, and Tempe Woods to Wiseman with enclosures, 5th April 1945, 
TNA: DO35/1138/M1007/1/2).
6 Women’s Liberal Federation to Chuter Ede, 27th April 1948, TNA: MH102/1562, 
pp.9-10 on available copy.
7 Curwen to Chuter Ede, 11th May 1948, TNA: MH102/1562, p.8 on available copy; 
House of Commons, Hansard, 7th May 1948, c.1646/47; 28th June, 1948, c.1860/61.
8 The Times, 24th March 1948, p.5.
9 Child Migration: Importance of Careful Selection, British Federation of Social Workers, 
June 1948, copy held on TNA: MH102/1562.
10 See House of Commons, Hansard, 7th May 1948, cc.1627, 1645-6, 1653, 1682/3; 28th 
June 1948, c.1861.
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checks on the emigration of children from the care of local authorities (by 
requiring Secretary of State consent for each case) but would also lead to 
the introduction of regulations to control the child migration activities of 
voluntary organisations.11 Indeed a specific assurance had been given in 
the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Jowitt, that regula-
tion of voluntary organisations would be introduced through the provi-
sions of the Act following representations on behalf of the Fairbridge 
Society that regulations reflecting the Curtis report should be imple-
mented to ensure that the work of any voluntary organisation undertaking 
child migration work should be ‘brought up to the mark’.12 Whilst civil 
servants in the Home Office may have shared some of the reservations 
expressed about past practice in child migration work, any concern about 
its post-war resumption was tempered by a confidence that better stan-
dards could be enforced through these soon-to-be introduced regulations. 
In a letter to the Commonwealth Relations Office about the calls for an 
inter-governmental commission of enquiry, Mary Rosling wrote that the 
Home Office would not support such an initiative because it was already 
actively in touch with sending organisations to clarify their working meth-
ods and that the 1948 Children Act gave adequate powers to the Secretary 
of State to ensure proper standards were maintained in the future.13 
Although Rosling remained open to the possible value of a later 
investigation of post-war standards for child migration, she argued to 
undertake a major inquiry at the present time might serve only to publicise 
past bad practices and discourage people from thinking about the 
emigration of children who might genuinely benefit from it.
Such optimism proved ill-placed, however. This chapter examines how 
attempts to introduce regulations for the child migration work of volun-
tary organisations under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act failed, with the 
Home Office eventually deciding in 1954 not to introduce regulations 
which it had taken nearly five years to develop. In the absence of regula-
tions during this period, the Home Office prevaricated over the extent to 
which it wished to enforce suitable standards for residential institutions in 
Australia that had applied to receive child migrants. Whilst making the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Australian Commonwealth 
Government aware of broad standards that it hoped to be achieved, in 
11 See, for example, House of Lords, Hansard, 9th March 1948, cc.607/608.
12 House of Lords, Hansard, 13th April 1948, cc.36-7.
13 Rosling to Cox, 28th September 1948, TNA: MH102/1562.
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practice the Home Office ultimately failed to insist on these when it came 
to specific decisions about the approval of particular organisations or 
receiving institutions. Combined with continued pressure from the 
Australian Commonwealth Government for more child migrants to be 
sent from the United Kingdom, these failures meant that post-war child 
migration expanded without the effective safeguards in place which were 
anticipated with the passing of the 1948 Act.
Bureaucratic Drag anD the Slow ProceSS 
of Drafting the S.33 regulationS
Despite the pressures of its new role as the lead department for children’s 
out-of-home care, the Home Office Children’s Department identified the 
drafting of regulations for child migration work by voluntary organisa-
tions as one of its early priorities.14 The process was to be conducted in 
consultation with the Home Office’s new Advisory Council on Child 
Care, whose creation had been recommended by the Curtis report and 
made part of the 1948 Act. Membership of the Council included specialists 
in child health, psychiatry, those representing the experience and interests 
of local authorities and voluntary organisations and other individuals, 
including Lady Allen of Hurtwood and Leila Rendel, the founder of the 
Caldecott Community.
At its first meeting on 19th January 1949, the Advisory Council began 
its discussion of how to approach the drafting of these regulations.15 John 
Ross, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Home Office and head of the 
Children’s Department, opened by explaining that the Home Office 
hoped as soon as possible to introduce regulations which could ensure 
that children emigrated by voluntary organisations would receive care 
comparable to what was expected in Britain, be helped to assimilate quickly 
into their new country and be offered training that would prepare them 
for a wide range of employment appropriate to their abilities. This would, 
Ross hoped, be achieved whilst avoiding creating regulations which would 
be impossible to enforce in practice. After hearing from a Council member, 
14 See outline agenda for the first meeting of the Advisory Council, drafted December 
1948, TNA: MH102/1503, pp.17-18; also reference to this as a priority in the Advisory 
Council’s initial work in ‘A happy job in Room 101’, Daily Herald, 20th January 1949, copy 
held on TNA: MH102/1761.
15 Minutes of first meeting of Advisory Council, 19th January 1949, TNA: MH102/1761.
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Mr Kirkpatrick, who served as General Superintendent of Dr Barnardo’s 
Homes, about Barnardo’s experience of this work, the Council decided 
that it needed more information about voluntary organisations’ working 
methods in this field and asked the Home Office to obtain this on 
their behalf.
The Children’s Department began collating this information the 
following month, contacting the seven voluntary organisations in the 
United Kingdom known to the Commonwealth Relations Office to be 
involved in child migration.16 Mr Prestige, the Assistant Secretary in 
charge of the Division of the Children’s Department overseeing the child-
care work of voluntary organisations,17 questioned whether the Council 
needed to generate this additional work and would be better confining 
itself to recommending broad principles that the regulations should follow. 
However, John Ross replied that it was better on balance for the 
Department to provide such memoranda for the Council to set out its 
own understanding of issues and ‘even to suggest the advice that the 
committee might give’.18
A memorandum summarising this information was initially written up 
by a more junior member of staff in the Children’s Department.19 This 
draft presented a generally positive view of current practice and did not 
suggest any areas of immediate concern. Organisations were generally said 
to engage in careful selection of children, informed by full case histories 
and medical reports. Parental consent was also said to be obtained for each 
child migrant by six of the organisations, with written copies of parental 
consent now being said to be required as an attachment to children’s 
16 See notes, correspondence and memoranda at TNA: MH102/2328. The organisations 
contacted by the Home Office were the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire 
Settlement, Dr Barnardo’s Homes, the Big Brother Movement (which specialised in juvenile 
migration), the Catholic Council for British Overseas Settlement, the Fairbridge Society, the 
Southern Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College and the Northcote Trust.
17 The Children’s Department, at this time, was structured into four Divisions, each 
overseen by an Assistant Secretary: D1 (covering approved schools and remand homes), D2 
(covering the juvenile court system and juvenile delinquency more generally), D3 (led by 
Mary Rosling, which dealt with local authorities and the Central Training Council in Child 
Care) and D4 (led by Prestige, which was responsible for the overseeing the work of 
voluntary organisations, child migration and liaison with the Advisory Council on Child 
Care), in addition to the Children’s Department Inspectorate (see Note accompanying the 
notice of the meeting of the Council to be held on 25th April 1951, TNA: MH102/1781).
18 See notes 3rd and 4th Februrary, 1949, TNA: MH102/2328.
19 ‘Emigration of Children’, TNA: MH102/2328.
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immigration applications by officials at Australia House in London. 
Organisations were also understood to have systems of three or six monthly 
monitoring reports sent for each child back to parents/guardians, local 
authorities or other organisations who had sponsored the child’s emigra-
tion, or to have regular reports sent from the receiving institutions back to 
the sending organisation.
The overall impression given in this initial memorandum was much 
better than the reality of some organisations’ work since the resumption of 
child migration in 1947, reflecting a perhaps unsurprising attempt by vol-
untary organisations to present as positive an image of their work as pos-
sible to government officials.20 The text of the final memorandum that the 
Children’s Department eventually submitted for discussion by the 
Advisory Council for its monthly meeting in March 1949 struck a more 
critical tone, however, reflecting John Ross’s view that the Department 
should seek to steer and not simply inform the Council’s discussions.21 A 
number of clear underpinning principles for future regulations were clearly 
set out, reflecting Mary Rosling’s memorandum that had previously been 
circulated in the autumn of 1947. Voluntary organisations involved in 
child migration should be financially sound, adequately staffed and capa-
ble of continued supervision of children they had sent overseas. Selection 
should be made carefully on the basis of complete educational, family and 
medical histories of the child; a report of a home visit to parents or guard-
ians; and an interview with the child themselves in which the implications 
of emigration were clearly explained to them. A trained social worker 
should also be involved in selection decisions. Care should be taken to 
ensure a child’s proper consent was obtained, and where a child was too 
young to give meaningful consent, other safeguards should be in place. A 
period of pre-emigration training should be given to prepare the child for 
life overseas. Organisations should ensure that the care, training and social 
integration of child migrants overseas ‘should be as high as that aimed at 
in this country’, in other words compliant with the standards of the Curtis 
report. Children who did not settle or progress well should be subject to 
a process of independent review which could determine whether it might 
be in their best interests to return to the United Kingdom.
20 See, for example, systemic failures in Catholic and Anglican child migration schemes in 
Lynch, ‘The Church of England Advisory Council’, and Lynch ‘Catholic child migration’.
21 ‘Note by the Home Office on questions for consideration in connection with the 
emigration of children’, TNA: MH102/1763.
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Whilst the memorandum noted variations in standards between 
voluntary organisations, it was clear that significant improvements needed 
to be made more generally. Particular areas for attention included making 
selection processes more rigorous, changing institutional accommodation 
overseas to make it more in line with Curtis standards of smaller residential 
units housing children of mixed age and gender, improving the range of 
education and training for child migrants and ensuring regular after-care 
visits of children by trained workers after they had left institutional care. 
Other areas identified for future improvement included the need to ensure 
that proper case records were sent with child migrants to heads of receiving 
institutions so that they had appropriate information to provide individual 
care, the appointment of liaison officers to ensure effective communication 
between sending and receiving bodies and sending organisations taking 
on the responsibility for seeing that appropriate managerial appointments 
were made in receiving institutions. Whilst showing that the Home Office 
was developing a better understanding of sending organisations’ practices 
than it had two years before, the memorandum still reflected some 
continued gaps in understanding. Its suggestion of greater administrative 
control of overseas receiving institutions by sending bodies, for example in 
areas such as the appointment of senior staff and provision of training for 
residential workers, better fitted organisations such as the Fairbridge 
Society or Dr Barnardo’s Homes who were working with affiliated parts of 
their own organisation overseas. It was far less relevant, as was to become 
clearer in coming years, to religious organisations such as the Catholic 
Child Welfare Council or Church of England Advisory Council which sent 
children to institutions run by religious orders or other diocesan bodies 
over which they had no formal control at all.
The Advisory Council’s discussion of this memorandum was, however, 
crowded out by other businesses, in particular the development of a 
national system of reception centres recommended by the Curtis report to 
assess and provide initial interventions for children needing out-of-home 
care. As a consequence, the Children’s Department’s memorandum had 
still not been properly discussed by the Council’s meeting in June, when a 
member of the Council, Philip Dingle, apparently impatient with progress 
on this issue, tabled his own proposals.22 These included the compulsory 
registration of all voluntary organisations emigrating children with the 
22 Paper by Mr Dingle, Town Clerk of Manchester, on regulations controlling emigration 
by voluntary organisations, TNA: MH102/1765.
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Secretary of State (with approval only given to well-managed and resourced 
organisations), the prohibition of advertising to raise funds for child 
migration, a requirement for voluntary organisations only to be able to 
send a child overseas with the consent of that child’s local authority and 
the development of a national register to record all child migrants. Dingle’s 
scepticism about current standards in child migration work was also 
reflected in his suggestion that ‘even more drastic regulations’ might be 
needed to be set in place as soon as possible to protect children until more 
detailed, final regulations were eventually drawn up. Dingle’s views elicited 
a more cautious response from John Ross, who suggested that the terms 
of the 1948 Children Act did not give the Secretary of State power to 
prohibit all child migration, or to make decisions about the cases of 
individual children whom voluntary organisations wished to emigrate, but 
only to give approval to an organisation’s general policies and procedures 
without which that organisation would not be able to send children 
overseas.23
The Children’s Department’s memorandum finally received a full 
discussion at the Council’s meeting in July 1949,24 where its principles 
and concerns were generally endorsed. Members of the Council expressed 
particular concern about child migrants being sent to foster placements or 
residential institutions in isolated areas where monitoring of their welfare 
might be difficult and opportunities for engagement with the local com-
munity limited. Rather than sending children to such places, the Council 
took the view that voluntary organisations should be encouraged to 
develop scattered homes in urban areas, unwittingly reflecting the model 
initially proposed in Ben Chifley’s ‘war orphans’ scheme.
Following the Council’s broad endorsement of the principles for 
regulations suggested by the Children’s Department, John Ross indicated 
that another memorandum would be prepared in due course where the 
Council would be invited to consider how these would be developed into 
specific regulations. Whilst the initial urgency of this task might have 
suggested that this matter would return to the Council soon, two and a 
half years elapsed before these draft regulations were presented to it. Part 
of this delay was caused by time taken for the Home Office to produce a 
23 Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Advisory Council, 15th June 1949, TNA: 
MH102/1765.
24 Minutes of the sixth meeting of the Advisory Council, 6th July 1949, TNA: 
MH102/1766.
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copy of draft regulations—first filed on 5th October 1950—which were 
believed to be ready for sending out for consultation.25 It was then not 
until the end of December that the Children’s Department wrote to the 
Commonwealth Relations Office for their views, asking that these be 
returned as soon as possible so that the draft regulations could be pre-
sented to the Advisory Council early in the New Year.26 As the Secretary 
of State for Scotland had responsibility, under the 1948 Children Act, for 
children emigrated from Scotland the Scottish Home Department was 
also contacted for its views on the draft to ensure that common regula-
tions could be developed across England, Wales and Scotland.27 In April 
1951, nearly four months after receiving the draft regulations, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office forwarded them on to Walter Garnett at 
the UK High Commission in Canberra for comments from both him and 
the Australian Commonwealth Government.28 A June deadline for feed-
back from Australia was requested by the Commonwealth Relations Office 
as they informed Garnett that the Home Office hoped to introduce these 
regulations early in the following year.
Whilst the consultation process for the draft regulations continued to 
drag on, new pressure for their introduction came with the publication of 
a major report, Child Emigration, by the influential Women’s Group on 
Public Welfare.29 Having previously produced widely read reports on 
other aspects of child welfare30, the Women’s Group on Public Welfare 
convened a sub-committee in 1948 to review current practices of child 
migration organisations with the specific intention of producing recom-
mendations that would inform future regulation of this work. Involving 
representatives of the National Association for Mental Health, the Church 
of England Moral Welfare Council, the Women’s Liberal Federation, the 
Family Welfare Association, the YWCA and the British Federation of 
Social Workers, the report was published in conjunction with the National 
Council of Social Service, marking it as a substantial evaluation of child 
25 Proposals for regulations under section 33(1) and (2) of the Children Act, 1948, 
provisional draft, 5th October 1950, TNA: MH102/2038.
26 Prestige to Gibson, 30th December 1950, TNA: MH102/2038.
27 Prestige to Rowe, 4th January 1951, TNA: MH102/2038.
28 Sedgwick to Garnett, 24th April 1951, TNA: MH102/2038.
29 Child Emigration, Report by the Women’s Group on Public Welfare, London: National 
Council of Social Service, 1951.
30 Our Towns: A Close Up, London: Oxford University Press, 1943; The Neglected Child 
and His Family, London: Oxford University Press, 1948.
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migration work by a number of key voluntary organisations. The fact that 
three of the organisations represented on the sub-committee for this 
report had been involved in the unsuccessful attempt to call for an inter- 
governmental inquiry into child migration further suggested that this 
report was attempting to provide the public review of this work which the 
UK Government had refused to undertake.
Whilst the authors of the report did not visit any of the countries to 
which child migrants were sent, they sought to build as detailed a picture 
through eliciting information from some child migration organisations. 
Dr Barnardo’s Homes, the Fairbridge Society and the Northcote Trust 
were noted as being particularly helpful in terms of giving access to their 
written records, although it appears that (at least in the case of the 
Fairbridge Society) access to recent case material consisted of three case 
study summaries being sent to the report committee rather than them 
undertaking any direct or extensive review of the sending organisations’ 
records.31 The writers did obtain access to information held by Fairbridge 
and Dr Barnardo’s Homes for children emigrated to Australia between 
1920 and 1929 in order to establish what jobs they were able to take up 
after completing their overseas training.32 An attempt to access case records 
held by the National Children’s Home was refused by the charity’s Vice- 
Principal.33 A number of social service organisations in countries to which 
British child migrants were sent also provided written responses to ques-
tions about their overall impressions of child migration work. Detailed 
work was also done to try to understand the legal and policy context of 
this work. After examining case records in an attempt to understand the 
routes through which child migrants came to be sent overseas, the report 
went on to consider current practice in sending relevant information about 
children on to receiving institutions, pre-emigration training, the condi-
tions into which child migrants were received, and the current standards 
of education, training and after-care.
Given the second-hand and partly out-of-date knowledge on which the 
report drew, the report added little to what was already known in the 
Home Office about child migration to Australia (although it did provide 
31 Assistant Secretary to Wimperis, 3rd November 1949, ULSCA(F): D296/H6/2/37, 
enclosing three case histories, two of which made up the nine cases referred to in the final 
text of the report.
32 See Ponsonby to Logan, 23rd June 1949, ULSCA(F): D296/H6/2/37. Analysis of 
this material was presented in Child Emigration, pp.52-54.
33 Memorandum for Mr Irwin, 10th September 1949, ULSCA(F): D296/H6/2/37.
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greater insight into post-war child migration to New Zealand in which the 
UK Government had no formal involvement). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the prevalence of Curtis standards in framing post-war discussions of 
child-care standards, there was also little in the report’s 38 recommenda-
tions that differed from the standards already advocated in the memoran-
dum presented to the Home Office Advisory Council on Child Care by 
the Children’s Department two years before. However, given that discus-
sions of the draft s.33 regulations had, up to that point, taken place pri-
vately within Government, the publication of the Women’s Group on 
Public Welfare’s report was seen as potentially shaping the public recep-
tion for any proposals about the content of the s.33 regulations. Writing 
to the Commonwealth Relations Office in July 1951 to chase up their 
feedback on the draft regulations, Prestige also noted that the publication 
of the report had also made voluntary organisations involved in child 
migration ‘restive’ and ‘very anxious to know what we propose to do 
about some of the recommendations made in the report’.34
Recognising the potential risks of greater Government regulation of 
their work, voluntary organisations involved in child migration liaised 
with each other to form a new body, the Council of Voluntary Organisations 
for Child Emigration, which would share information between its con-
stituent members and try to present a common front in representing their 
views to policy-makers.35 In the words of Cyril Bavin, who chaired the 
meeting at which the decision to form the Council was agreed, it should 
be a source of pride for all those involved that they had come together ‘so 
that—with one voice—a reply might be made to those who would seek to 
34 Prestige to Gibson, 17th July 1951, TNA: MH102/2038. The Fairbridge Society, if not 
other voluntary organisations, had been sent a pre-publication draft of the report by the 
Women’s Group on Public Welfare during the autumn of 1950 to correct any factual 
inaccuracies in the text, and so there may well have been some awareness of the report’s 
recommendations prior to its publication in spring 1951. In addition to providing the 
report’s writers with access to case records, the Fairbridge Society also provided photographs 
for reproduction as illustrations in the report (see Vaughan to Ponsonby, 17th July 1950, 
and Homer to Vaughan, 30th November 1950 and 18th December 1950, ULSCA(F): 
D296/H6/2/37).
35 The formation of the Council was also supported by Prestige who saw it as a potential 
means for voluntary organisations to liaise on improving standards and potentially collaborate 
in using overseas staff for monitoring the welfare of child migrants (note by Prestige, 14th 
November, 1950, TNA: MH102:2037).
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obstruct child emigration’.36 Meeting formally for the first time in March 
1951, constituent members of the Council were the Australian Catholic 
Immigration Committee, the Catholic Child Welfare Council, Dr 
Barnardo’s Homes, the Big Brother Movement, the Church of Scotland 
Committee on Social Service, the Fairbridge Society, Middlemore 
Emigration Homes, the National Children’s Home, the Northcote Trust, 
the Over-Seas League, the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College and 
the YMCA.37
An early focus of the Council’s meetings was to formulate a common 
response to recommendations set out in the Women’s Group on Public 
Welfare report—as well as discussions of how best to respond to what was 
regarded as sensationalist coverage of the treatment of child migrants in 
one newspaper in the wake of the report’s publication.38 The Council was 
also given early informal assurances by the Home Office that it would be 
consulted about the draft s.33 regulations before they were finalised, and 
was led to understand (via the Fairbridge Society), that although the 
Home Office would take some notice of the Women’s Group on Public 
Welfare’s report, they ‘did not seem unduly worried about it’.39 This assur-
ance reflected an internal Home Office memorandum which analysed rec-
ommendations from the report and concluded that there were either 
already included within their draft regulations, beyond the powers of the 
Government or the Children Act, or impractical.40 The Conservative 
Home Secretary, David Maxwell Fyfe, later rejected a request from the 
Women’s Group on Public Welfare for him to meet with a delegation from 
the Group to discuss the draft s.33 regulations on the basis that their 
report had already been sufficiently taken into account in this process.41
In August 1951, the Home Office finally received comments on 
proposed regulations from Walter Garnett and Tasman Heyes, via the 
36 Note on meeting on 30th January 1951 at the invitation of Sir Charles Hambro to 
discuss the formation of an association of voluntary bodies concerned with child emigration, 
ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1.
37 Minutes of meeting of 6th March 1951, ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1.
38 Minutes of emergency meeting, 19th March 1951, ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1.
39 Minutes of meeting, 3rd April 1951, ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1.
40 See Memorandum on Child Emigration, Report of a Committee of the Women’s Group 
on Public Welfare, 12th April 1951, TNA: MH102/2038.
41 This request and refusal occurred in February 1952, see correspondence on TNA: 
MH102/2045.
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Commonwealth Relations Office.42 Comments from both were defensive, 
with the potential new regulations regarded as an unnecessary layer of 
administration for a system which, Heyes and Garnett argued, was 
regarded by the UK High Commission and the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration as ‘highly organised’. The suggestion that the 
Secretary of State might need to be provided with information by sending 
organisations about standards of care in receiving institutions would, they 
observed, duplicate the independent information already provided by 
State Government officials which was shared (after passing through the 
Commonwealth Government and UK High Commission) with the Home 
Office by the Commonwealth Relations Office. This information was 
already, Garnett noted, being produced in accordance with standards sug-
gested by the Home Office, and would be more accurate than that given 
by sending organisations whom—Garnett noted—might only be recruit-
ing agencies for overseas organisations and not have detailed or up-to-date 
knowledge of conditions at overseas institutions. Concern was also noted 
by Garnett and Heyes that the addition of any further requirements 
through these regulations might have the effect of seriously disrupting 
child migration work. Heyes, in particular, was unhappy at any suggestion 
that sending organisations’ selection committees for child migrants might 
contain members who were generally opposed in principle to child migra-
tion and who could stifle that organisation’s work in this field altogether. 
Garnett also gave a clear hint that any greater role for other Government 
departments back in the United Kingdom had the potential to upset the 
‘very close and friendly’ contact that the UK High Commission had with 
receiving organisations, State officials and the Commonwealth Department 
of Immigration. Child migration, Garnett implied, was better managed 
through these informal, ad hoc contacts, than through a regulatory system 
which would alter the dynamics of these relationships without any 
significant additional benefit. The Home Office was eventually to come to 
a similar view.
Following an initial meeting at the Home Office between Prestige and 
a delegation from the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child 
Emigration in July, the Children’s Department also formally sent a copy of 
their draft regulations to the Council at the end of August.43 In the July 
42 Gibson to Prestige with enclosure, 7th August 1951, TNA: MH102/2038.
43 Minutes of meeting, 6th June 1951, and Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child 
Emigration, delegation to Home Office, 11th July 1951, ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1; note by 
Savidge, 27th August 1951, TNA: MH102/2038.
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meeting, the Council’s delegation raised concerns about some of the rec-
ommendations in the Women’s Group on Public Welfare report. Both 
Cyril Bavin (on behalf of the Over-Seas League) and Enid Jones (repre-
senting the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire Settlement) 
demurred against the proposal for children to be given pre-emigration 
training in the United Kingdom. Bavin objected that such an initiative was 
unnecessary for children being sent to private households overseas, with 
Jones complaining that her Advisory Council would be unable to meet the 
costs of such a requirement given that it had no reception centre at which 
such training could be provided. Fr William Nicol, on behalf of the 
Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, also complained that any 
regulation requiring child migrants to be housed in smaller residential 
units overseas would be highly problematic for the religious orders 
involved in this work. In response, Prestige again gave broad assurances 
that draft regulations would not be introduced in the very near future and 
that a further opportunity would be given to the Council’s members to 
comment on them.
After being sent the draft regulations, the Council subsequently gave 
their formal written response to the Home Office in the following 
November, indicating their broad support for them.44 It accepted the 
principle of convening selection committees to review the cases of indi-
vidual children, informed by relevant case histories provided by an experi-
enced worker based on interviews with both the child and their parent or 
guardian. Where necessary a specialist psychological report should also be 
provided. The Council regarded it as an ‘accepted fact’ that no child 
would be selected for emigration without the consent of their parent or 
guardian. The need to ensure the effects of emigration were understood 
both by the child and their family members was accepted as was the need 
to avoid breaking any significant emotional connection that the child still 
had with relatives who remained in the United Kingdom. The Council 
noted that overseas receiving institutions were already subject to approval 
processes and accepted the need to use suitable staff but without making 
any commitment on standards of training that should be expected. It also 
gave much stronger weight than the draft regulations to the principle that 
‘religion should play a vital part in the child’s life, with every facility being 
given to the child to be brought up in its own faith’, and argued that 
44 Hall to Under-Secretary of State, 9th November 1951, TNA: MH102/1784.
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‘members of staff should, by example, as well as precept, be fitted to 
undertake this obligation’. An attempt by Fr Nicol to include an insistence 
in this letter that children be placed in institutions with staff of the same 
religious denomination was rejected by other members of the Council as 
potentially unworkable.45 The Council concurred with the expectation 
that sending organisations should remain well-informed about children 
they had sent overseas, noting that ‘regular and comprehensive reports on 
the progress of each child should be sent to the Emigration Society con-
cerned’. Areas in which the Council expressed less enthusiasm for regula-
tion were any age requirements for child migrants—as the Council claimed 
that their members had successfully placed children overseas of all ages in 
accordance with their needs—and any requirement for extended pre- 
migration training for children which the Council argued would only 
needlessly unsettle children as they waited to go overseas.
Whilst its formal response to the Home Office suggested a general 
unanimity in views and standards across the Council’s constituent 
members, the reality was more varied. Despite endorsing the principle of 
selection by committee and the need to ensure parental consent, there is 
little evidence that children emigrated by the Australian Catholic 
Immigration Committee or Catholic Child Welfare Council before or 
after 1951 often experienced such standards. The majority of children sent 
from institutions run by the Sisters of Nazareth, for example, had consent 
signatures on their LEM3 migration application forms signed by the 
Mother Superiors in charge of those institutions rather than parents or 
other guardians.46 In many cases, Catholic child migrants were selected by 
direct approach by Australian Catholic administrators—Br Conlon, Fr 
Nicol and Fr Stinson—in liaison with individual heads of institutions run 
by religious orders with no formal selection committee convened or case 
papers for review produced. The practice of sending children’s case records 
with them overseas was not usually adhered to by Catholic sending 
organisations nor, generally, by the Church of England Advisory Council 
on Empire Settlement. These organisations, as well as the Over-Seas 
League, also failed to establish any consistent monitoring of children 
emigrated under their auspices.
Given that Canon Flint (of the Catholic Child Welfare Council), Cyril 
Bavin and Enid Jones made up half of the six members of the Council’s 
45 Minutes of meeting, 16th October 1951, ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1.
46 Copies of LEM3 forms are held at NAA: MP210/2, MP765/1 and PP93/10.
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sub-committee convened to discuss the Council’s formal response to the 
draft s.33 regulations, a clear gap existed between the principles that were 
espoused on behalf of the Council and the practice of at least some of its 
constituent members. Although Bavin, Jones, Flint and Nicol objected in 
the Council meetings to some specific elements of the Women’s Group on 
Public Welfare recommendations and the Home Office draft s.33 regula-
tions, the gap between their organisations’ practices and the principles 
being discussed were never fully disclosed. Gaps between their practices 
and the principles they supported during the Council’s discussions were 
nevertheless obvious to at least some other members of the Council. At a 
later meeting of the Home Office Advisory Council on Child Care, the 
new General Superintendent of Dr Barnardo’s Homes, Mr E.H. Lucette, 
commented that the views expressed by the Council of Voluntary 
Organisations for Child Emigration did not reflect the actual policies of all 
of its constituent members, in part because of the diverse aims and struc-
tures of the organisations involved. This gap between the principles that 
some voluntary organisations were prepared to endorse in contact with 
the Home Office and their actual practices can be seen as a reflection of 
the threat that they perceived s.33 regulations might entail for their work. 
In later discussions of these draft regulations at the Council of Voluntary 
Organisations for Child Emigration, representatives of some of these 
organisations were increasingly explicit about how they viewed this. Fr 
Nicol commented that they would ‘limit the activities of the Voluntary 
organisations and the Authorities concerned failed to appreciate that the 
organisations were only interested in emigration with a view to giving 
children a chance in life which would not otherwise be available to them’. 
His Committee, Nicol continued, ‘would be reluctant to carry on with 
their child emigration activities if they were bound by such regulations’. 
Cyril Bavin expressed the view that ‘the introduction of further regulations 
might cause the New Zealand Government to abandon child emigration 
altogether’. Canon Flint added, rather dismissively, that ‘the regulations 
merely followed on from the Curtis Committee’s report and… there was 
a general feeling against child emigration by the “powers that be”’.47 In 
the context of this perceived threat, organisations who recognised that 
their practice fell short of the requirements of likely regulations sought to 
avoid drawing the Home Office’s attention to this, possibly in the belief 
that if the Home Office became aware of them, s.33 regulations might be 
47 Minutes of meeting, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F:H6/1/2/1
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introduced more quickly and more strictly. Instead, the safer course 
seemed to be to continue broadly to support Home Office standards in 
principle, whilst hoping that regulation of their work based on these would 
not come too soon.
Alongside this consultation process, the Home Office had also been 
receiving legal advice throughout 1951 about the scope and content of 
any proposed regulations. One view given in response from a Government 
legal officer was that the very language used in s.33 of the 1948 Children 
Act showed the ‘characteristic woolliness of compromises’ over the kind of 
powers to be allowed to the Secretary of State. Whilst the Secretary of 
State’s powers were inevitably limited to those which could be enforced 
through British courts—which constrained the degree of control that 
could be exercised over organisations based overseas—the specific lan-
guage used in s.33 of the Act also added further constraints. By empower-
ing the Secretary of State to control only the ‘arrangements’ of voluntary 
societies, this meant that regulations could only control the stated policies 
and working practices of voluntary organisations, but not have any powers 
over failure to adhere to those standards once a child was no longer in the 
care of that sending organisation.48 As a result the legal drafting of the 
regulations continued to pose considerable difficulties in terms of what 
could, and could not, be introduced through the s.33 regulations in terms 
of the on-going treatment of a child after leaving the care of the sending 
organisation. Even those sending organisations who sent children to insti-
tutions which were they ran overseas might not be held responsible by a 
British court for breaches of s.33 regulations if they had acted in accordance 
with the laws of the receiving country.49 Another set of legal advice 
suggested that whilst it would be intra vires for the Secretary of State to 
introduce regulations relating to ensuring that suitable arrangements were 
made for the care of a child overseas, it would be ultra vires to require that 
a voluntary organisation based overseas produce regular reports on that 
48 Note by Shelley, 13th February 1951, TNA: MH102/2040.
49 See note 26th February 1951, TNA: MH102/2040, which also recognises the difficulty 
in establishing what could, and could not, be regulated in terms of work by voluntary 
organisations relating to the care of children overseas. This view appears to have been 
expressed particularly in relation to requirements of sending organisations to repatriate 
children who did not settle overseas, where the ability of voluntary organisations to do this 
would necessarily be constrained by the laws of the country to which the child had been sent.
 G. LYNCH
209
child’s progress.50 Despite these apparent impediments, the Home Office 
Children’s Department continued to work on the draft regulations, even 
including clauses which this legal advice appeared to rule out as being 
beyond either the scope of the legislation or the powers of the UK 
Government in relation to overseas organisations. Internal disagreements 
continued within the Home Office as well as to whether the s.33 
regulations should be phrased in a minimal form—requiring sending 
organisations to provide the Secretary of State with information described 
in more detailed in an accompanying memorandum—or whether the 
regulations should try to circumscribe voluntary organisations’ work in 
more detailed ways.51
As a result of this protracted drafting and consultation process, the 
Home Office Advisory Council on Child Care was only given a draft of 
the proposed s.33 regulations for discussion at its 23rd meeting in January 
1952 and completed its discussion of them at its next meeting the follow-
ing month.52 The draft regulations submitted to the Advisory Council by 
the Children’s Department consisted of 15 clauses covering details of 
policies to be provided for approval by the Secretary of State by sending 
organisations regarding the selection, preparation and post-emigration 
care of children, and the need for annual statements by sending organisa-
tions about child migration work they had undertaken in the past year. 
Other clauses gave powers to the Secretary of State to prohibit the emigra-
tion of individual children under the age of five or in cases where a child 
had decided that they no longer wished to emigrate, set out standards 
expected of selection committees and made a requirement for children 
emigrated by organisations to be gathered together in advance to get to 
know others in their migration party and be prepared for life overseas. 
Requirements were also set out for good practice for escorting children 
during their voyage, transferring any relevant information on children to 
their receiving organisation, ensuring annual post-emigration reports were 
50 Note by Harvey, 18th January 1951, TNA: MH102/2040. Earlier advice had also 
suggested that the wording of s.33(2) of the 1948 Act, was ‘inept for ensuring continued 
supervision by the exporter, where—as I understand is normally the case—the importing 
country has “suitable arrangements” with which the S. of S. is “able” to be “satisfied”’, note 
by Shelley, 7th January 1950, TNA: MH102/2040, pp.10-11 on available copy.
51 Note by Prestige, 6th January 1952, MH102/2047.
52 Minutes of the 23rd meeting of the Advisory Council, 24th January 1952, TNA: 
MH102/1784; Minutes of 24th meeting of Advisory Council, 21st February, 1952, TNA: 
MH102/2047.
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made on each child’s welfare and allow penalties to be introduced in rela-
tion to specific regulations. The Advisory Council largely endorsed this 
draft, suggesting only that voluntary organisations not be allowed to 
emigrate children against the advice of their selection committees, that the 
regulations made stronger references to the use of trained workers and 
that the first post-migration report on a child be received within six 
months of their first arrival. The Home Office agreed to provide the 
Advisory Council with a revised draft in the light of their suggestions, also 
taking into account further consultations with Government legal officers.
StalleD regulation: Policy DeciSionS 
anD the PercePtionS of State Power
Work on the regulations progressed slowly in the coming months. By 
July 1952, a revised draft was sent to the Council of Voluntary Organisations 
for Child Emigration for their further comments. Despite the reservation 
of some members that the regulations could completely curtail their 
organisation’s involvement in this work, the Council’s official response 
was to accept this draft subject to an amendment that a prospective child 
migrant would need to be interviewed by just one member of the selection 
committee and not by the whole committee.53 In correspondence with the 
Scottish Home Department, an official in the Home Office Children’s 
Department expressed surprise that the Council had not resisted these 
regulations more strenuously—‘perhaps because they had expected more 
drastic proposals’.54 After sending a representative to meet with the 
Council in October, the Children’s Department agreed to accept the 
Council’s amendment about the interviewing of children.55 Further delays 
occurred as fresh legal advice was sought on the revised draft. After being 
chased by the Scottish Home Department about progress with the draft-
ing, a Children’s Department official replied in January 1953 that the 
Home Office had ‘just received a tentative first draft from our Legal 
Adviser which it is clear will need a good deal of tinkering’ and that ‘it may 
therefore be some little time before we can let you have a copy which will 
53 Minutes of the meeting, 8th July 1952, ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1.
54 Hall to Boys-Smith, 11th July 1952, TNA: MH102/2043.
55 Notes dated 27th October 1952, and Notes of meeting with Council of Voluntary 
Organisations for Child Emigration, 23rd October 1952, TNA: MH102/2043
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represent anything approaching final form’.56 One cause of delay appears 
to have been the slowness of John Ross in dealing with this issue when it 
came back to his desk—with Ross only replying in February 1953 to a 
note from Prestige written more than a year before.57 Drafting of the 
regulations continued through 1953, competing for staff time with the 
need to draw up regulations for the boarding out of children in England 
and Wales. In October, the Commonwealth Relations Office eventually 
added its voice to those asking when the regulations would finally be 
introduced. In a letter to R.L. Dixon in November, John Ross re-iterated 
that other demands on the Home Office Advisory Council’s time had 
prevented the revised regulations being put before them again and that 
whilst the regulations had nearly been finalised, the Advisory Council’s 
view would be sought on whether it would be worthwhile introducing 
these regulations at all in the near future.58 With no prospect of time being 
found on the Advisory Council’s agenda for discussion of the regulations 
until the following spring, progress was further delayed.
A final draft of the regulations was eventually completed on 16th March 
1954.59 Consisting of 16 clauses, these regulations specified that a child 
could not normally be emigrated under the age of seven, without their 
consent, without having been interviewed by and recommended for emi-
gration by a selection committee or without the consent of their parents 
or guardian (unless it was not practical to obtain this). Exceptions to this 
were only to be allowed for individual children with the approval of the 
relevant Secretary of State. Details were given of how selection commit-
tees should operate—and the case reports needed for them to make their 
decisions. Transfer of relevant information about each individual child to 
the receiving organisation was made a requirement. Annual welfare and 
progress reports were to be made on each child after their arrival overseas. 
A description was given of the information that sending organisations 
needed to provide about their working methods and standards of care and 
training overseas to the Secretary of State for approval, with organisations 
unable to continue their work until such time as the Secretary of State was 
satisfied with their arrangements. Sending organisations were also required 
56 Oates to Martin, 16th January 1953, ED11/306.
57 Note by Ross, 7th February 1953, TNA: MH102/2047.
58 Ross to Dixon, 4th November 1953, TNA: MH102/2047.
59 Statutory instruments, Child and Young Persons, The Emigration of Children 
Regulations, MH102/2047.
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to keep a register of the details of all children they had emigrated, as well 
as provide annual reports of their migration work to the Secretary of State. 
Finally, a requirement was introduced that sending organisations should 
make any records referred to in the regulations available to inspectors 
acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, thus bringing their work under 
a comparable system of inspection to other forms of out-of-home care for 
children undertaken by voluntary organisations in the United Kingdom.
This final draft very much reflected the view that the 1948 Children Act 
primarily empowered the relevant Secretary of State to make regulations 
in relation to sending organisation’s ‘arrangements’, rather than any more 
direct forms of control. Focusing primarily on types of documentation and 
information required from sending organisations, this final version drew 
little enthusiasm from the Government legal officer who reviewed it, com-
menting ‘I have no love or amour proper for this brain child. The enacting 
provisions are … thin and vague … [I]t appears to me that the main result 
of the Regulations would be merely to increase the paperwork of the vol-
untary organisations and the Home Office’.60 Uncertainty about the value 
of the regulations continued to be expressed within the Children’s 
Department, although Prestige noted that even the limited requirements 
about the constitution of selection committees would be helpful. As he 
noted, in his experience some emigration societies tended to operate 
‘selection committees’ consisting of a single worker and that it would be 
helpful to move away from ‘leaving a decision of much moment in relation 
to the child’s whole future in the hands of a single person’.61 Despite this, 
though, Prestige concurred with the most recent Government legal advice 
that the value of introducing these regulations was unclear and suggested 
that it might be better not to bring them again before the Advisory 
Council for the time being as ‘some members will no doubt press for the 
Regulations to be made’. It would be better, he suggested, to lay the regu-
lations by until the Children’s Department was pressed further on them. 
The following day, on 30th June 1954, John Ross noted his agreement 
with the simple note ‘Lay by, as above’. Five and a half years after the 
Home Office Advisory Council first considered the issue, the Children’s 
Department had eventually decided quietly to shelve the draft s.33 regula-
tions and take no further action on them.
60 Note by H. Wollaston, 17th March 1954, TNA: MH102/2047.
61 Note by Prestige, 29th June 1954, TNA: MH102/2047.
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The stalled process of producing these regulations—once imagined by 
Mary Rosling and John Ross as the necessary basis on which future good 
practice in child migration could be assured—reflected the complex organ-
isational processes operating both within and between the Government 
and voluntary organisations. In part, the slow pace of progress in producing 
the regulations reflected limitations in the capacity of the Children’s 
Department as it adjusted to its new central role in the oversight of 
children’s out-of-home care in England and Wales. Although the drafting 
of regulations for child migration had initially been given a high priority 
by the Children’s Department in the wake of calls for an inter- governmental 
inquiry, other pressures soon crowded in. The numbers of children 
affected by the prospect of emigration were a small fraction of those 
remaining in different forms of out-of-home care in the United Kingdom, 
for whom the development of children’s reception centres, boarding out 
regulations and principles for better forms of institutional care were more 
pressing issues. Whilst these pressures (and the need to put the regulations 
out for consultation) doubtless contributed to the slow progress in the 
drafting of the s.33 regulations, there were also inherent problems in this 
task. The phrasing of s.33 of the 1948 Children had left it unclear as to the 
precise extent of the powers allowed to the Secretary of State under it, and 
any attempt to regulate the work of overseas organisations who did not fall 
under the authority of British courts was clearly problematic. If the 
problems with Molong, Pinjarra and Northcote since the 1930s had 
demonstrated the challenges of organisational governance of trans-
national welfare initiatives, the process of drafting the s.33 regulations had 
shown the additional challenges of developing an adequate regulatory 
system for this by the UK Government. The slow pace of progress in 
developing these regulations appears to have reflected not simply the 
pressures of alternative demands, but a waning belief about the viability 
this project amongst Home Office staff. Yet alongside this growing disil-
lusionment remained a desire to retain control of this process. The use of 
the Advisory Council on Child Care was carefully managed throughout, 
with the intention that its work did not generate outcomes that the man-
agement of the Children’s Department considered undesirable. Relations 
with voluntary organisations were also carefully handled, with Prestige 
assuring members of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child 
Emigration that regulations would not be introduced in a way that was 
confrontational or inattentive to their concerns.
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If the process of drafting these regulations was a deliberate deferral of 
the use of power by the Home Office, the prospect of regulations elicited 
very different responses amongst the voluntary organisations who expected 
to be affected by them. Although consolidated into a single representative 
body to express their views to Government, in reality the constituent 
members of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration 
were diverse in their aims, structures and resources and as a consequence 
perceived the prospect of regulation in quite different ways. For organisa-
tions such as Dr Barnardo’s Homes, Fairbridge and the Northcote Trust, 
who had not always had very satisfactory experiences of their affiliated 
receiving institutions in Australia, the introduction of s.33 regulations had 
the potential to be a mechanism through which they could exert greater 
administrative or moral authority over them. Delays to the introduction of 
the regulations were also perceived as dampening interest in the option of 
child migration for local authorities who felt unclear on what basis this 
work might proceed in the future.62 For organisations such the Over-Seas 
League and the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire 
Settlement, whose child migration work was largely managed by a single 
person, the regulations threatened an onerous new administrative burden 
which they would struggle to meet. For Catholic organisations, tighter 
regulation risked bringing an end to the more ad hoc culture through 
which they managed children’s emigration. Despite very different organ-
isational perceptions, these voluntary organisations took care to present a 
positive face to Government. Sometimes this was because they saw the 
broad direction of policy as genuinely constructive, or aspired to meet it 
in principle whilst failing to do so in practice—or because they sought to 
conceal the gap between espoused policy and actual practice to protect 
their interest in continuing this work with as minimal regulatory interfer-
ence as possible.
The episode of the stalled drafting of the s.33 regulations also 
demonstrated how the exercise of statutory power could be perceived very 
differently by those inside and outside the machinery of Government. For 
those within the Home Office, their understanding of their power was 
framed in terms of its legal and practical constraints. What did the terms 
of the 1948 Children Act specifically empower them to be able to do and 
what legal constraints effected the regulation of children’s care and 
training overseas? Similarly, within these legal constraints, what would be 
62 See Wheeler to Moss, 29th April 1952, NAA.C: A446/133/3/8.
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the practical effects of any regulations that were introduced, and would 
their benefits outweigh the additional administrative burden they would 
create? In this sense, civil servants within the Home Office understood 
their statutory power in this situation as much in terms of its limits and 
costs as its potential for safeguarding children.
By contrast, the voluntary organisations who would be affected by 
these regulations were far more conscious about the potential of the regu-
lations to restrict their work—particularly in the case of those organisa-
tions who, for varying reasons, were unlikely to adhere to expected 
standards. From this perspective, the regulations were perceived far more 
in terms of their powers of constraint than their limits.
As a consequence of these different perspectives, the decision within 
the Children’s Department to hold the draft regulations back was made in 
the context of very different assessments of their efficacy by civil servants 
and voluntary organisations. The anxiety of some voluntary organisations 
about the prospect of the introduction of these regulations was better 
grounded in reality than the diffidence of the civil servants. The 
requirement in the regulations for the constitution of formal selection 
committees drawing on written case reports would have involved 
significant changes to the emigration practices of the Sisters of Nazareth, 
the Australian Catholic Immigration Committee, the Catholic Child 
Welfare Council and the Church of England Advisory Council of Empire 
Settlement. Systemic failures by these Catholic organisations and the 
Church of England Advisory Council to send family and medical histories 
of individual child migrants would also have become a breach of these 
regulations, as would the failure of these organisations (as well as the 
Over-Seas League) to provide regular post-emigration reports on children 
sent overseas. As Flint and Bavin told the Council of Voluntary 
Organisations for Child Emigration, the introduction even of these rela-
tively limited regulations would probably have meant that their organisa-
tions’ involvement in this work would  have ceased. When, as will be 
discussed further in the next chapter, a more informal regulatory system 
was finally introduced by the UK Government in 1957, this coincided 
with Catholic organisations almost entirely ending their child migration 
activities. The child migration work of the Over-Seas League ended in 
1956 following the death of Cyril Bavin—reflecting its reliance on him as 
a single administrator—but it is difficult to imagine that it could have 
continued beyond the introduction of the new informal regulations in 
1957. The Church of England Advisory Council did try to continue its 
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work after this, only for it to be strongly censured by Home Office inspec-
tors who discovered the poor standards of its administration and record- 
keeping when undertaking a direct inspection visit to its office in 1958.
Whilst the decision by the Children’s Department not to pursue the 
introduction of the s.33 regulations might appear to have been grounded 
in a simple lack of knowledge of cases where voluntary organisations were 
failing to adhere to these standards, the reality was more complex. This 
point is illustrated by discussions within the Home Office about the pro-
posed approval of the Over-Seas League as a recognised sending organisa-
tion for child migrants. By 1953, there had been on-going problems with 
the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service failing to provide 
sufficient numbers of boys to be sent to Dhurringile. Turning to contacts 
with Cyril Bavin that had been developed with the emigration of children 
to the Burnside Homes in the inter-war period, Presbyterian authorities 
proposed to the Commonwealth Government that the Over-Seas League 
be allowed to recruit children for Dhurringile from England and Wales.63 
The Commonwealth Department of Immigration expressed caution about 
this proposal as it was already aware, from previous correspondence with 
the UK High Commission in Canberra, that the UK Government did not 
consider the Over-Seas League to be a suitable sending organisation 
because it lacked adequate resources both for the appropriate selection of 
child migrants and their post-emigration monitoring.64 Under pressure 
from Presbyterian authorities, and conscious of the Commonwealth 
Government funding already spent on enabling Dhurringile to open, 
Tasman Heyes wrote again to the UK High Commission in July 1953, 
asking that the current refusal to approve the League as a child migration 
organisation be reversed.65 In making the case for this, Heyes noted both 
that the League was in no worse a position to manage children’s migration 
than the Church of England Advisory Council—which had similarly lim-
ited administrative resources—and the substantial investment that the 
Australian authorities had already made in making the ‘fine’ scheme at 
Dhurringile available for British children.
After receiving notice of Heyes’ request from the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, an internal debate began within the Home Office 
Children’s Department about how best to respond. Views ranged from 
63 Challinor to Heyes, 8th July 1953, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/106.
64 Castle to Assistant Secretary, National Archives of Australia, A445, 133/2/106.
65 See Crook to Dixon with enclosures, 29th July 1953, TNA: MH102/2049.
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the suggestion that the League might be allowed to advertise the 
Dhurringile scheme if another approved organisation undertook the selec-
tion to a stronger position of simply telling the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration and the League that this arrangement was 
not acceptable because the League would not be able to meet required 
standards.66 Ultimately, Prestige found a compromise which would avoid 
any overt confrontation. In a note on 9th September 1953 he observed 
that the League was already well aware of the content of the current draft 
of the s.33 regulations through Bavin’s involvement in the Council of 
Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration.67 On that basis, he 
recommended that the League be approved as a sending organisation 
given that Bavin understood the standards for selection and post-migration 
monitoring that would be required when the s.33 regulations were 
introduced. Either the League would have to start complying with those 
standards—in which case the UK Government could have no objections 
to their involvement in this work—or the League would have to stop its 
work as soon as the regulations were introduced. Whilst this might have 
appeared a well- crafted compromise when it was imagined that the 
regulations were about to be introduced, it fell apart nine months later, 
when Prestige agreed that, on balance, it was better for the regulations to 
be held back. By then, the Over-Seas League had already been approved 
as a sending organisation on the basis of Prestige’s suggestion and had 
started to send children to Dhurringile without any evidence of it adhering 
to the standards required if the s.33 regulations had been introduced. In 
one case, the LEM3 form for a boy in local authority care who was sent to 
Dhurringile by the League in August 1954 shows that the necessary 
consent from the Secretary of State to his migration was not obtained 
under s.17 of the 1948 Children Act.68 This individual later provided the 
Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse with a harrowing account 
of sustained sexual and physical abuse he experienced there.69
It seems unlikely that when Prestige agreed the deferral of the s.33 
regulations in June 1954 he had entirely forgotten his earlier recommen-
dation about the League based on the view that these regulations were 
66 See notes 6th August, 11th August and 1st September 1953, TNA: MH102/2049.
67 Note by Prestige, 9th September 1953, TNA: MH102/2049.
68 See NAA: PP93/10, 450.
69 Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, Child Migration Programmes 
Investigation, Day 4 transcript, 2nd March 2017, p.4.
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about to be introduced. The fact that he had also referred in an earlier 
departmental note to more than one organisation operating selection 
committees consisting of a single individual also indicated that Prestige 
knew that the League was not an isolated case in terms of failing to adhere 
to expected standards. Given such knowledge, the decision to withhold 
the regulations seems to have been made not in the belief that all sending 
organisations were conducting their work to expected standards but more 
on the basis of a balancing of costs and risks. The Children’s Department 
understood that the introduction of these regulations might well stop the 
child migration work of an organisation like the League. But the scale of 
the League’s work was small, and the value of bringing it to an end had to 
be weighed against other factors such as the administrative burden the 
regulations would cause more generally not only for all voluntary organ-
isations involved in this work but the Children’s Department too.70 The 
judgements made by Prestige in this period exemplified how a civil servant 
could, at times, regard their powers as too limited to be useful and also, in 
some contexts, recognise that whilst their powers might have some effi-
cacy, their use would create more difficulties than benefits. The failure to 
introduce regulations in this case was not simply an exercise in recognising 
the limits of government but in coming to a view on how much risk and 
imperfection could be tolerated in children’s care.
limiteD overSight anD the route 
to the moSS rePort
Another factor also played a significant role in shaping views within the 
Home Office about the balance of these risks in relation to the s.33 regu-
lations. In 1953, an unofficial report was published about standards of 
care for child migrants in Australia by John Moss, which provided a 
broadly positive assessment of this work and gave sufficient assurance to 
the Home Office for John Ross to feel that the need for the introduction 
70 Concern about administrative burden on the Home Office were also a grounds for its 
lack of enthusiasm for John Ross’s later recommendation that the emigration of all 
unaccompanied children be subject to Secretary of State consent (see Chap. 6), as well as the 
Children’s Department’s rejection of the proposal by the Parliamentary Select Committee 
on Estimates that it review periodic submissions from all local authorities on why specific 




of s.33 regulations might be less urgent than first thought.71 A later fact- 
finding mission to Australia, led by John Ross in the spring of 1956, was 
to return a far more damning view of many receiving institutions and the 
system of child migration as a whole than that presented by Moss. Until 
then, however, Moss’s intervention played an important role in allaying 
some concerns about child migrants’ experiences overseas.
Prior to Moss’s report, the Home Office had little detailed knowledge 
of conditions at receiving institutions in Australia. Although Mary Rosling 
and Janette Maxwell had seen copies of inspection reports by State officials 
of institutions to which child migrants were sent to Western Australia in 
1947, the Home Office was not routinely consulted about the approval of 
receiving institutions by the Commonwealth Relations Office until 1950. 
This lack of consultation became increasingly clear to the Home Office, 
and in a private departmental note in 1951, Miss Northover, a Principal 
Officer in the Children’s Department, commented that several children’s 
homes on the Commonwealth Relations Office’s approved list for child 
migrants had received approval without any discussion with them.72 On 
hearing of an informal inspection visit of institutions receiving child 
migrants to be undertaken by Miss Harrison, an inspector working in the 
Scottish Home Department, who was undertaking a personal trip to 
Australia in the spring of 1950, Prestige wrote to the Scottish Home 
Department asking for a copy of her report when it was completed as the 
Home Office was ‘very short of first hand information about the arrange-
ments for the reception and welfare of children who emigrate’.73
What information the Children’s Department did receive was usually in 
the form of reports from State officials in Australia submitted in the con-
text of applications for other receiving institutions to be added to those 
approved by the UK Government. Information in these was often sparse. 
As one Departmental official noted, information on the standard of child- 
care was limited and the reports were often written by Australian immigra-
tion officials with limited experience of children’s out-of-home care.74 The 
71 See Ross to Dixon, 4th November 1953, TNA: MH102/2047.
72 Note by Northover, 27th March 1951, TNA: MH102/1889; see also lack of consultation 
with the Home Office on institutional approvals before 1950 acknowledged in Report of 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, TNA: DO35/4881, para 84.
73 Prestige to Rowe, 20th September 1950, TNA: MH102/2335.
74 Note by MacGregor, 13th June 1950, TNA: MH102/2032. Correspondence and notes 
on the same file show an attempt by the Home Office to get better information from 
Australian authorities on standards of care at institutions seeking approval for receiving child 
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Home Office was invited to give initial approval to a new wing to 
accommodate 150 female child migrants at Nazareth House, East 
Camberwell in Victoria in the autumn of 1950 before the construction 
work on this had been completed.75 Earlier that autumn, a similar situation 
arose in which the Home Office was invited to indicate its approval for the 
Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, which, like Nazareth House, East 
Camberwell, had begun to be developed for the reception of child 
migrants with Australian Commonwealth capital funding before approval 
had been agreed with UK authorities. Given that no staff had even been 
appointed when the Home Office’s approval was sought, its approval (and 
that of the Scottish Home Department) was made on the basis of more 
general assurances about the standards that would be maintained at 
Dhurringile in the future.76 Similarly, in 1950, conditional approval had 
been given to the Riverview Training Farm run by the Salvation Army in 
Queensland on the basis that satisfactory reports would be received about 
the first party of child migrants to be sent there.77 In 1952, despite no 
detailed information having been provided about conditions at Riverview, 
the Home Office accepted that unconditional approval for it as a receiving 
institution be granted.78 Despite this limited information, concern 
remained in the Children’s Department about the sensitivity of pushing 
for more detailed information if this was perceived by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government as calling its own judgement and 
recommendations into question.79
Throughout these discussions, it was common for the reservations of 
staff in the Children’s Department either not to be expressed strongly to 
the Commonwealth Relations Office (and through them to the UK High 
migrants by producing a standard questionnaire. Whilst the Commonwealth Department of 
Immigration was not averse to providing more detailed information, State child welfare 
officers reportedly complained that this would entail too much work on their staff (see 
Garnett to Walsh Atkins, 30th November 1950, same file).
75 Note by Ratcliffe, 23rd November 1950, TNA: MH102/1882.
76 See Martin to MacGregor, 11th September 1950, NRS: ED11/386.
77 Bass to Wheeler, 27th March 1950, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052; 
Marjoribanks to Secretary, Commonwealth Department of Immigration, National Archives 
of Australia, J25, 1958/3052.
78 See Heyes to Longland, 15th October 1951; Smith to Heyes, 7th November 1951; 
Davey to Heyes, 5th February 1952, National Archives of Australia, J25, 1958/3052.
79 See note by Prestige, 15th June 1950, TNA: MH102/2032. John Ross, nevertheless, 
took the view at that point that if it would still be some time before s.33 regulations would 
be introduced, then better information should still be sought from Australian authorities.
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Commission and Australian Commonwealth Government) or when 
expressed, not to be followed through by refusal to give approval to a 
particular institution. In the case of Nazareth House, East Camberwell, 
considerable reservations were privately expressed in notes within the 
Children’s Department about the unsuitability of a large impersonal insti-
tution, run by a religious order with at best only a partial openness to 
current thinking on good child-care practice, in which the accommodation 
of child migrants in an institution also housing elderly residents appeared 
to be more about the management of overheads than best practice for the 
children.80 However, whilst the Children’s Department’s initial response 
to the Commonwealth Relations Office indicated that the institutional 
accommodation to be provided at East Camberwell ‘does not strike us 
favourably’, the only issue on which change was initially pressed was that 
a wider age range of children might be considered to avoid the 
institutionalised nature of caring for large numbers of younger children of 
similar ages.81 This was subsequently extended to an attempt to ensure 
that any children sent to East Camberwell would have opportunities to 
engage with the local community (including attending local schools) and 
receive adequate after-care.82 Despite receiving far from complete assur-
ances on these specific points, the Home Office did not object to final 
approval of Nazareth House, East Camberwell as a receiving institution in 
the autumn of 1951.83
Between 1949 and 1953 it appears that the Home Office took the view 
that until the s.33 regulations were introduced it had no formal powers to 
intervene to prevent the approval of any receiving institutions in Australia 
and its comments on requests for approvals forwarded to it from the 
Commonwealth Relations Office could only be regarded as advisory.84 
Although the passing of the 1948 Children Act gave the Home Office 
80 See notes 23rd November, 1950; 25th November 1950; 5th December 1950; 3rd 
January 1951; 5th January 1951; and 8th January 1951, with John Ross initially his reading 
of these on 11th January 1951, TNA: MH102/1882.
81 MacGregor to Palmer, 25th November 1950, TNA: MH102/1882.
82 MacGregor to Palmer, 15th January 1951; Savidge to Palmer, 16th July 1951, TNA: 
MH102/1882.
83 See Heyes to Crook, 22nd March 1951; Crook to Dixon, 28th September 1951, TNA: 
MH102/1882.
84 See, for example, Notes of meeting on Emigration of Children, 28th June 1950, TNA: 
MH102/2032; MacGregor to Dixon, 4th August 1950, NRS: ED11-386; Chuter Ede to 
Mellish, 25th January 1951, TNA: MH102/1883.
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greater moral authority as the lead Government department for children’s 
out-of-home care, in the absence of s.33 regulations, the Home Office 
believed it had no formal veto over such approvals. Cautious comments 
from the Children’s Department on approval requests passed on by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office also seem to have reflected a wider 
culture within the Department of often phrasing its criticisms to external 
stakeholders in very mild ways.85
There were a small number of cases in which the Home Office were, at 
least for a time, willing to press its objections more strongly. When pre-
sented with the request for the approval of St John Bosco Boy’s Town in 
Hobart, Tasmania, the Children’s Department indicated that the institu-
tional character of this home—whilst typical of many other Catholic chil-
dren’s homes—was exacerbated by an organisational culture in which boys 
were subject to a policy of continual monitoring for their moral discipline 
by the Salesian Brothers staffing it. The Children’s Department appears to 
have accepted that initial placement of child migrants in overseas 
institutions (with a view to them later being boarded out) might well be 
preferable to the risks of placing children immediately with individual 
foster carers.86 However, its staff evidently had reservations more generally 
about whether the institutional character of large, congregate Catholic 
children’s homes encouraged children’s healthy social development, and 
the particularly controlling ethos of the Salesians was seen as going beyond 
what could be accepted for child migrants.87 John Ross took the view that 
it would potentially place the UK Government in a very difficult position 
if this institution were approved at this stage, given that it would be 
deemed an unsuitable destination for child migrants as soon as the s.33 
regulations were introduced.
The Home Office’s objection faced a number of challenges from Fr 
Nicol (who complained that it ran contrary to the Government’s accep-
tance of Salesian institutions in the United Kingdom), the Australian 
Commonwealth Government (who had already provisionally agreed a 
capital grant to enable St John Bosco Boys’ Town to receive child migrants) 
and Walter Garnett (who complained that implied criticism of Catholic 
85 ‘Inspectors are outspoken enough in their reports, written for Home Office consumption 
only. But when Home Office inspectors and administrators meet local authority representatives 
to discuss a particular problem … which is worrying them, they become much less direct’ 
(J.A.G. Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, p.425).
86 This view is noted, for example, in Note, ref: 942833/13(S), TNA: MH102/1883.
87 On this, see also Memorandum, 26th February 1951, TNA: MH102/1883.
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teaching methods would be perceived by some in Australia as an attack on 
the Catholic faith itself). Despite this, the Children’s Department refused 
to retract its objections.88 With this approval delayed, the Labour MP, 
Robert Mellish, privately contacted the Home Secretary, James Chuter 
Ede, on behalf of Catholic contacts of his to ask for an explanation for the 
Home Office’s view. Chuter Ede sent a lengthy reply, noting that during 
the Parliamentary debates during the passage of the Children Bill, he had 
given assurances that consent to children’s migration would in future be 
conditional on them receiving standards of care overseas comparable to 
those recommended in the Curtis report. Whilst not ruling out the pos-
sibility of child migrants being placed in institutional care overseas, or 
commenting on the suitability of Catholic institutional care in the United 
Kingdom, Chuter Ede argued that the particularly restrictive ethos of St 
John Bosco Boys’ Town would make it particularly unsuitable for children 
trying to adjust to life in a new country and integrate into their local 
community.89
Far from calming matters, Chuter Ede’s response was passed from 
Mellish on to Fr Nicol who wrote a lengthy rebuttal and requested that no 
final decision be made until he had been able to consult on this matter 
with the Catholic Hierarchy of Australia. Evidently anxious about the 
wider implications for Catholic child migration of Home Office’s inter-
vention, Nicol also asked that any further action in finalising the s.33 regu-
lations be delayed until the views of the Australian Catholic bishops were 
known. Forwarding Nicol’s letter with a covering letter, Mellish asked 
Geoffrey de Freitas, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the 
Home Office, to meet a small delegation to discuss this matter further, 
noting that he would doubtless ‘appreciate how Catholics regard this 
matter’.90 This meeting was deferred, with de Freitas informing Mellish 
88 A summary of these discussions during 1950 is given in Memorandum, 27th November 
1950, TNA: MH102/1883. R.H. Wheeler specifically raised the point about the 
Commonwealth Government funding for St John Bosco Boys’ Town in a meeting with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office at which he commented that delay in approving an 
institution to which Commonwealth funding had already been given was an ‘awkward one’ 
(Note of meeting, 22nd August 1950, TNA: MH102/2032).
89 Chuter Ede to Mellish, 25th January 1951, also Gibson to Prestige, 18th January 1951 
(where the Commonwealth Relations gave its response to the Home Office’s invitation to 
comment on a draft of this letter), TNA: MH102/1883.
90 Mellish to de Freitas with enclosure, 16th February 1951, TNA: MH102/1883.
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that Nicol should receive the views of the Australian Catholic bishops in 
advance.91
Two months later, in July 1951, Nicol replied, saying that the bishops 
had left these matters ‘in my hands as their official representative and 
spokesman’. He also complained about delays with the approval of eight 
Catholic residential institutions, some of whom had been granted 
Commonwealth Government funding to enable them to receive child 
migrants and all of whom were struggling with problems of unfilled 
vacancies.92 When de Freitas met with Mellish and Nicol, though, de 
Frietas explained that in seven of these cases approval had been delayed 
only because requested information had not been provided from Australia, 
and no adequate response had still been given to concerns about the other 
remaining case of St John’s Bosco Boys Town.93 A further meeting was 
arranged between Fr Nicol and Prestige to address those concerns. Nicol 
argued that any failure to approve of this institution would logically have 
to be extended to all Catholic receiving institutions in Australia. 
Furthermore, the Home Office’s concerns were based on a misunder-
standing of the ‘preventive system’ of discipline practised by the Salesians 
which, Nicol claimed, was in practice no different to teachers normally 
watching over children in their care. Facing this challenge about the con-
sistency of the Home Office’s views, and given reassurances that the ethos 
of the Boys Town was no worse than many Catholic children’s homes in 
the United Kingdom, Prestige relented. Indicating that the Home Office 
would now support the approval of this institution, Prestige added the 
consolatory note that Fr Nicol would soon be going to Australia and 
would doubtless ‘convey to the Superior of St John Bosco Boys’ Town the 
English conception of child care for immigrant children’.94 The wider pat-
tern of the Children’s Department withdrawing its concerns about the 
91 De Freitas to Mellish, 8th May 1951, TNA: MH102/1883.
92 Nicol to de Freitas, 4th July 1951, TNA: MH102/1883.
93 Note of a meeting between Mr de Freitas, Mr Mellish and Fr Nicol, undated, TNA: 
MH102/1883.
94 Note by Prestige, 13th August 1951; Savidge to Dixon, 16th August 1951, TNA: 
MH102/1883. John Moss also endorsed the use of St John Bosco Boys’ Town on the basis 
that more female staff were likely to be added in some form in the future, but his letter 
arrived at the Home Office after the decision had already been made to accept its approval 
(see Moss to Ross, 10th October 1951, TNA: MH102/2041). John Ross forwarded it on 




approval of specific institutions  on the basis of limited information or 
under challenge from other organisations, was once again evident.
The Home Office’s limited knowledge of institutional conditions in 
Australian institutions accommodating child migrants was compounded 
by the lack of independent inspections by British visitors. In 1950, Muriel 
Welsford, a Children’s Welfare officer for the Women’s Voluntary Services 
sent the Home Office brief notes on her impressions from visiting a small 
number of institutions in Australia as well as her conversations with con-
tacts in New Zealand about child migration there. Her comments about 
the Australian institutions were wholly positive, with her only criticisms 
reserved for the Over-Seas League, whom she believed should open a 
reception centre in New Zealand for its child migrants. Children’s 
Department notes on the file containing her report—and Prestige’s 
response thanking Welsford for it—did not suggest that her observations 
were regarded as carrying any particular weight.95 Although more hope 
seemed to have been placed in Miss Harrison’s informal inspection visits 
to 18 institutions in Australia, which also took place during the summer of 
1950, her eventual report was only three pages long, mostly containing a 
very general overview of organisational policies and systems and with no 
detailed information about individual institutions.96
During that same summer, the Home Office was approached by John 
Moss, the retiring County Welfare officer for Kent County Council and 
former member of the Curtis Committee, who proposed making informal 
visits to Australian institutions accommodating child migrants whilst he 
was on holiday there. John Ross welcomed this as an opportunity for gain-
ing more detailed information from a trusted British source.97 Whilst Ross 
and Moss would have already been aware of each other through their 
involvement in national child-care policy work, contact between them 
may also have been further cemented by the fact that both were members 
of the same club—the Reform Club—in London.98 Moss’s proposal 
appealed not only because of his experience of wider debates on child-care 
practice in Britain—including his involvement in the Central Training 
Council in Child Care—but because he had previously undertaken what 
95 See notes and correspondence on TNA: MH102/2334.
96 See report, notes and correspondence on TNA: MH102/2335.
97 Memorandum from Ross to Prestige, 20th June 1950, TNA: MH102/2034.
98 See, for example, Wheeler to Moss, 28th February 1952, ML: MLMSS/9025/Box12; 
Ross to Garnett and Wansbrough-Jones, 25th June 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
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was seen as a valuable informal inspection of Fairbridge’s Prince of Wales 
farm school in British Columbia whilst on a lecture tour of Canada.99 The 
Commonwealth Relations Office expressed greater caution, fearing that 
such a visit by Moss soon after that undertaken by Harrison might elicit a 
negative reaction from Australian governmental and voluntary bodies who 
might object to ‘overdoing the frequency of such tours of inspection’.100 
On this occasion, the Home Office chose to press its point, however, and 
the Commonwealth Relations Office agreed to contact the UK High 
Commission in Canberra to ask them to provide Moss with any required 
assistance for this.101 From this point on, what was originally envisaged by 
the Home Office as a low-key informal information-gathering exercise 
quickly gained momentum, not least through Moss’s own description to 
others of having been commissioned by the Government to write a com-
prehensive report on conditions for child migrants in Australia.102 With 
planning for Moss’s trip during the spring of 1951 coinciding with the 
Home Office continuing to raise concerns about the approval of St John’s 
Bosco Boys’ Town, relationships between the Home Office and Catholic 
authorities continued to be sensitive. When asked to co-operate with 
Moss’s visit, Fr Nicol responded in a way which implied  that his co- 
operation would be conditional on him being able to see reports by any-
one undertaking semi-official inspections of Catholic institutions so that 
his organisation could offer its comments on them.103 The Home Office 
also noted that they considered it a priority for Moss to visit Catholic 
institutions in Western Australia. They were, at the same time, conscious 
that focusing on Catholic institutions—of which their knowledge was 
particularly ‘scanty’—could create an unfortunate impression that their 
attention was focused disproportionately on Catholic activities.104
99 See notes and memorandum on TNA: MH102/2332, in which it is noted that Moss’s 
information should be borne in mind when the draft s.33 regulations were to be drawn up; 
also documents and correspondence on TNA: MH102/2253, including Ross to Moss, 16th 
July 1949, where Ross thanks him for his valuable insights. After his visit to Australia, Moss 
completed his visits to countries receiving child migrants funded under the Empire Settlement 
Act, by visiting the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College in January 1954, see notes and 
correspondence on TNA: MH102/1898.
100 Walsh Atkins to Prestige, 11th August 1950, TNA: MH102/2034.
101 Memorandum to Ross, 5th October 1950: TNA: MH102/2034.
102 See Prestige to Gibson, 16th January 1951, TNA: MH102/2034.
103 Nicol to Prestige, 7th February 1951, TNA: MH102/2034.




Moss’s nine month tour of Australia began in May 1951, and included 
briefing meetings with the UK High Commission, Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration and State officials on policy and operational 
practices, as well as visits to receiving institutions for child migrants in 
New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia and Western 
Australia.105 Moss himself described this mix of discussions with officials 
and institutional visits as comparable to his experience of serving on the 
Curtis Committee.106 Far from being low key, however, Moss’s visit 
attracted media coverage in both State and national press in Australia, and 
included him giving both local lectures and a talk on ‘Australian and 
British Social Services’ broadcast on Australian Broadcasting Commission 
radio in which he said that he hoped far more children in institutional 
homes in Britain would be emigrated to Australia.107 The growing public-
ity for Moss’s visit was something not at all intended by the Home Office 
and was to prove important in creating a context in which the Home 
Office ultimately had little choice in supporting the publication of his 
final report.
the moSS rePort: finDingS anD influence
By October 1951, Moss had prepared a detailed summary of his initial 
impressions based on conversations with officials, responses to a question-
naire which he had submitted to State bodies and receiving organisations, 
and notes from visits to institutions in New South Wales, Queensland and 
Tasmania.108 In general, he concluded, ‘I believe the Homes in Australia 
are of good standard and that many British children deprived of a normal 
home life in the United Kingdom would ultimately have a better chance 
in this country’. Moss did raise areas of concern. Improvements could be 
made in pre-emigration preparation for children, the transfer of relevant 
information about individual children from sending to receiving institu-
tions did not take place in many cases, and it was disappointing that more 
child migrants had not been placed out with foster parents (possibly 
105 Heyes to Calwell, 4th September 1951, ML: MLMSS/9025/Box 12.
106 Moss to Ross, 13th June 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
107 ‘Britain wants families to aid child migrants’, 5th October 1951, The Mercury, copy 
held on ML: MLMSS/9025/Box 12; Molesworth to Heyes, with enclosure, 6th March 
1952, NAA.C: A446/133/3/8.
108 Notes on discussion between Mr J. Moss and Mr R.U. Metcalfe, 24th and 25th October 
1951, ML: MLMSS/9025/Box 12.
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because of lack of available placements or the prospect of increased costs 
to State Child Welfare departments). More could also be done to ensure 
that child migrants were successfully assimilated into local families and 
communities. However, Moss also declared himself to be ‘very much 
impressed by the thoroughness in which the interests of migrants are safe-
guarded under existing procedure’ and (with a small number of excep-
tions) generally satisfied with standards in receiving institutions some of 
which were ‘excellent and some very good’.
In contrast to the reports produced by Harrison and Welsford, which 
were less detailed and painted broad, positive pictures, Moss’s observa-
tions seemed more credible to British authorities precisely because they 
combined endorsements of existing practices along with criticisms and 
recommendations for improvement. Comments on specific institutions 
that he had visited by October 1951 included a number of positive obser-
vations but also criticisms of institutions which provided too few opportu-
nities for children to build outside contacts or offered poor standards of 
accommodation. Institutions in Queensland criticised by Moss included 
St George’s Church of England Home, the Methodist Queen Alexandra 
Home for Children and Margaret Warr Home, and St Vincent’s Roman 
Catholic Children’s Home in Nudgee (which he described as ‘the worst 
Roman Catholic Home I have seen in Australia’109). He also criticised St 
Joseph’s Roman Catholic Orphanage in Hobart, Tasmania, as well as the 
‘Dalmar’ Methodist Home for Children in New South Wales. In the case 
of St Vincent’s, Nudgee and St Joseph’s in Hobart, and two Methodist 
homes in Brisbane which were about to request child migrants, Moss 
explicitly recommended that approval for them be withheld. In a separate 
letter to the UK High Commission, two months later, Moss also 
commented that he thought that standards of selection of children for 
Methodist children’s homes in Australia were generally worse than any 
other organisation he had observed.110 Moss was also critical of some of 
the previous approvals of receiving institutions by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government and UK High Commission, noting both 
the speed with which some unsuitable Methodist homes had been 
approved (whilst approvals for more suitable institutions had taken 
109 Moss to Ross, 28th June 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
110 Moss to Crook, 10th December 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
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longer), and also regretting the approval of another Anglican children’s 
home in Queensland.111
As he continued his institutional visits in Western Australia on his way 
back to Britain, Moss also began to send confidential interim reports to 
the UK High Commission which were then shared both with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office in London, as well in 
at least some cases with the Commonwealth Department of Immigration.112 
Some of these contained specific criticisms which Moss felt needed to be 
addressed. On visiting the Anglican Swan Homes near Perth, Moss dis-
covered that some boys sent by the Church of England Advisory Council 
had been transferred to the Padbury Boys’ Training Farm outside the city 
despite it not having been formally approved as a receiving institution by 
the UK Government. Noting its basic accommodation, isolated location 
and reliance on boys resident there for the construction of the site and 
cultivation of the land, Moss observed that this was not an institution that 
for which approval would have been likely to have been granted.113 The 
Benmore Children’s Home, run by the Presbyterian Church in Western 
Australia, which had the previous year received a positive report by Miss 
Harrison, was seen as unfit for receiving child migrants by Moss on the 
grounds of its poor management, understaffing and limited facilities.114 
Whilst not as critical of conditions generally at Castledare, Moss 
recommended that no further child migrants be sent there until additional 
classroom space was built (unknowingly repeating concerns about over-
crowded teaching space previously noted by State inspectors in their 
highly critical report on Castledare in July 1948).115
After visiting Pinjarra in December 1951, Moss produced a report in 
which he criticised the lack of fly-wiring to provide protection from mos-
quitoes in the cottage homes (noting that the Principal’s house had this 
facility), the apparent institutional policy of boys not wearing shoes despite 
the obvious discomfort this caused to new arrivals, and the use of single 
sex cottages which meant that brothers and sisters could not be kept 
together. Organised activities outside school were limited, too few 
111 See Moss to Ross, 13th June 1951; Moss to Ross 27th July 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
112 See, for example, Crook to Metcalfe, 8th May 1952, NAA.C: A446/133/3/8.
113 ‘Report on Padbury’s Boys’ Farm School’, 4th December 1951, NAA: PP6/1, 
1949/H/1145.
114 Note by Miss Harrison, 17th September 1951, NRS: ED11/306; Reports on Benmore 
and Burnbrae, 8th February 1952, TNA: MH102/1889.
115 Report on Castledare; Moss to Crook, 10th December 1951, NAA: K403, W1959/89.
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opportunities were available to enable children to make contacts with 
outside families and the holiday camp to which children were moved 
during the long summer vacation was primitive and probably unsanitary. 
Noting the institution’s difficulty in finding suitable cottage mothers, 
Moss noted that Pinjarra seemed to have to take whoever it could in these 
roles and that some of those appointed were not suited to this role. Given 
these concerns, Moss noted, better supervision of the cottage mothers was 
needed to mitigate the inadequate attention that some of them gave to 
children in their care—thus unwittingly repeating the same recommenda-
tion that Walter Garnett had made in his report, to little effect, seven years 
before. Better care also needed to be paid to house mothers’ practices in 
punishing children. More effective supervision of the cottage mothers 
was, Moss concluded, a matter requiring urgent attention if children’s 
interests at Pinjarra were to be safeguarded.116
In the event, Moss’s objections had little ultimate effect. The Home 
Office conceded to pressure from the Commonwealth Department of 
Immigration to continue to allow boys under school age to go to Padbury 
and the Christian Brothers failed to honour a commitment to build the 
additional teaching space at Castledare for another two years, despite 
receiving more child migrants in the intervening period.117 After receiving 
a dismissive response from the Western Australia Department of 
Immigration about Moss’s criticisms of Pinjarra—which included an 
observation that the State Child Welfare Department considered the 
existing staff perfectly adequate—children continued to be sent there with 
the hope that conditions might improve under the new Principal.118 
However, despite the failure to follow through on his criticisms, Moss’s 
willingness to make them—and in some cases recommend withholding of 
approval of specific institutions—lent greater credibility to his comments 
as an independent observer of the child migration system.
116 See Crook to Dixon with enclosure, 12th March 1952, TNA: DO35/3403.
117 On the eventual approval of Padbury, see notes and correspondence in NAA: PP6/1, 
1949/H/1165 and TNA: MH102/1890; on the Castledare case, see notes and 
correspondence on NAA: K403, W1959/89.
118 Crook to Dixon, 26th June 1952 with enclosure, TNA: DO35/3403; also report by 
Bartley, 16th June 1953, NAA: K403/W1959/101 (note that a report from the 
Commonwealth Migration Officer for Western Australia which was more supportive of 
Moss’s criticisms did not appear to have been passed on to the UK High Commission, see 
report by Membery, 22nd April 1952, same file).
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Whilst the Home Office welcomed the more detailed insights that 
Moss provided them on individual institutions, staff in the Children’s 
Department also had concerns about his work. Before Moss left for 
Australia, a dispute had arisen between the Fairbridge Society’s London 
office and the New South Wales committee for Molong over the number 
of children that it was acceptable to have cared for by a single cottage 
mother—with the New South Wales committee wanting a higher number 
than the maximum of ten that the London office wished to implement. 
Moss had been specifically advised by Fairbridge’s London office not to 
involve himself in this dispute whilst in Australia, but had reportedly ended 
up doing so by telling those at Molong that then aim of having only ten 
children cared for by a cottage mother was ‘quite uneconomical’ and that 
the UK Government could not expect to impose restrictions of this kind 
which it could not achieve in its own institutions back home.
Sir Charles Hambro subsequently wrote to John Ross to complain 
about Moss’s intervention, noting that although Moss did not have any 
official status as a representative of the UK Government, his visit to 
Molong had the effect of reinforcing attempts by the local management at 
Molong to resist directions from London.119 A note within the Children’s 
Department expressed bemusement that Moss could have said this—given 
it contradicted his previous known views on staff ratios—but also 
commented that his visit to Molong had certainly caused an unnecessary 
problem and that little was known by British civil servants about the 
specific itinerary he planned to take for the rest of his tour.120 John Ross 
formally replied to Hambro, regretting the apparent misunderstanding 
that had arisen and confirming that the Home Office endorsed the attitude 
to staff- child ratios held by the Fairbridge Society’s London office.121 On 
hearing about the dispute, though, Walter Garnett made his own contact 
with the New South Wales committee. The UK High Commission 
subsequently wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office complaining 
that attempts to limit the number of children cared for by cottage mothers 
by UK authorities wishing to impose ‘ideal conditions’ on overseas 
institutions failed to appreciate the implications of such requests on these 
119 Hambro to Ross, 23rd July 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
120 Note by Northover, 31st July 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
121 Ross to Hambro, 2nd August 1951, TNA: MH102/2041. Moss later confirmed that 
his was indeed a misunderstanding and that the New South Wales committee had 
misrepresented his comments (see Moss to Ross, 14th August 1951, same file).
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institutions’ running costs or difficulties in recruiting staff. In the margins 
of a copy of this letter passed on to the Home Office,122 Prestige wrote 
‘Are the children or the expenses more important? The Australian approach 
is not encouraging!’. Elsewhere in the same file, Prestige added, ‘the High 
Commission’s Office seems to adopt automatically an attitude more 
Australian than that of the Australians’.123 By contrast, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office wrote to Garnett expressing regret that the Home Office 
was only belatedly passing on copies of Moss’s progress reports to them 
and that they were aware that Moss was not copying in the UK High 
Commission in to all of these.124 This incident in relation to Molong dem-
onstrated the continued sensitivities of administering trans-national child 
migration programmes, in which the wider conflicts of interests and con-
cerns between the various governmental and voluntary organisations 
involved in this work could find themselves played out through anything 
that Moss said and did in Australia.
Moss’s role as a semi-official rapporteur on conditions in Australia was 
further blurred by him speaking directly to representatives of some organ-
isations in Australia about his views on whether specific institutions—or 
requests for particular ages of children—should be approved or not. In 
doing this, Moss inserted himself into policy discussions in which he had 
no formal place to be involved.125 The Children’s Department was aware 
of this from Moss’s own periodic reports of his activities and did not dis-
courage him from doing this.126 The Commonwealth Relations Office 
were, however, far less happy about this, noting that any withholding of 
approvals for specific institutions in Australia could only take place through 
the usual formal process involving them and the UK High Commission 
once Moss’s formal report had been submitted.127 Tensions between the 
122 Crook to Dixon, 20th August 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
123 Note by Prestige, 18th September 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
124 Gibson to Garnett, 8th October 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
125 See Moss to Ross, 28th June 1951; Moss to Bishop of Rockhampton, 27th July 1951, 
TNA: MH102/2041. In the latter of these, Moss comments that both he and his wife (who 
was accompanying him on the trip) felt ‘very strongly’ that it would not be appropriate to 
migrate some older children being proposed by the Church of England Advisory Council on 
Empire Settlement.
126 See, for example, Moss to Ross, 30th July 1951; Ross to Moss, 13th August 1951, 
TNA: MH102/2041.
127 Gibson to Garnett, 8th October 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
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Home Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office/UK High 
Commission in Canberra were, once again, being played out.
The ways in which these competing views collided in relation to Moss’s 
work became clearer as he began the process of finalising his report. 
Although there was some anxiety within the Commonwealth Department 
of Immigration about whether Moss’s eventual report might harm child 
migration work, the Departmental officials who had regular contact with 
him both during and after his trip felt sufficiently reassured about his views 
to press for the Department to write to the UK High Commission to 
encourage the UK Government to publish it.128 Reuben Wheeler 
subsequently wrote directly to Moss to offer any assistance from the 
Commonwealth Government in expediting its publication, and Moss 
himself recognised that the Department of Immigration hoped to use his 
report to push for greater numbers of children to be sent.129 Indeed 
contact between John Moss and Reuben Wheeler appears to have been 
sufficiently warm for an understanding to develop between them that 
Moss would actively support the recruitment of child migrants for 
particular institutions struggling with unfilled vacancies on his return to 
the United Kingdom.130
Moss submitted the draft of his report to Sir Frank Newsam, Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, on 18th July 1952.131 Whilst 
identifying areas for improvement (including better care in selecting child 
migrants, more integration of children in  local Australian communities 
and families, supervision of cottage mothers and greater sharing of rele-
vant information on individual children by sending organisations), Moss 
also warmly endorsed child migration and recommended that the pro-
gramme be extended further with more children recruited from the care 
128 See memorandum from Metcalfe to Ordish, 5th June 1952; Heyes to Crook, 13th June 
1952, NAA.C: A446/133/3/8. After Moss had left Australia, the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration were clearly at pains to show that any concerns he had raised 
were being addressed before he came to write his final report (see, e.g., Wheeler to Moss, 
18th June 1952; Wheeler to Moss, 24th July 1952 same file).
129 Wheeler to Moss, 22nd January 1953, NAA.C: A446/133/3/8; see also Prestige to 
Dixon, 12th December 1952, TNA: MH102/2046.
130 See, for example, Wheeler to Moss, 22nd April 1952; Wheeler to Moss, 5th September 
1952; Moss to Wheeler, 24th September 1952, Moss to Wheeler, 10th November 1952, 
NAA.C: A446/133/3/8.
131 Moss to Newsam, 18th July 1952, TNA: MH102/2046.
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of local authorities.132 The Commonwealth Relations Office were delighted 
with this outcome when the draft report was shared with them, with 
R.L. Dixon writing in return that ‘the conclusion reached by Moss after 
his extensive tour should be gratifying to the Australian Authorities’ and 
that he hoped the report would be printed for wider readership.133
The position for the Home Office was more complex, however. In a 
memorandum setting out possible ways of proceeding with Moss’s 
report,134 John Ross noted that although the Home Office had agreed to 
meet the costs of Moss’s additional travelling and subsistence expenses 
(which had become more extensive than originally envisaged), his offer to 
undertake inspections of the child migration system had been accepted 
explicitly on the basis that it was ‘in no sense an official one’. It was not 
clear at the point that this agreement was initially made with Moss that he 
would even be making his comments in a formal report. The publicity 
given to his tour, however, meant that his review of the child migration 
system was well-known and his comments to the UK Government on this 
were much anticipated by governmental and voluntary organisations 
involved in this work. Whilst Ross recognised that the report would be of 
interest to organisations involved in child migration and so merited wider 
circulation, he also argued that it would be highly problematic if it were 
perceived that the Home Office were actively endorsing a policy of emi-
gration for children in local authority care. Any publication would there-
fore require a clear disclaimer that it was an entirely independent piece of 
work and did not in any way represent the official view of the Home 
Office. Such caution should extend to the Home Office not sending cop-
ies of the report to local authorities or voluntary organisations—for fear 
that this would an imply an endorsement of it—with the Children’s 
Department merely sending out a circular letter to them drawing their 
attention to the existence of the report if they wished to purchase their 
own copies.
The response by Sir Frank Newsam was even more cautious. Newsam 
suggested that it might be preferable not to publish the report in the 
United Kingdom at all, but to pass it on to the Australian Commonwealth 
132 Note of a report made to the Secretary of State by John Moss, 1st August 1952, TNA: 
MH102/2046.
133 Dixon to Taylor, 17th September 1952, TNA: MH102/2046.
134 Child migration to Australia, report by John Moss: Note by the Children’s Department 
on publication, TNA: MH102/2046.
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Government on the basis that they could publish it in Australia and make 
it available for sale in the United Kingdom if they wished to do so.135 The 
Commonwealth Relations Office rebutted this proposal when it was pre-
sented to them, suggesting that neither their department nor the Australian 
Commonwealth Government would find it appropriate for Australian 
authorities to be asked to publish ‘a report of ours’.136 Prestige noted that 
their response also seemed to imply that the Commonwealth Relations 
Office believed that the Home Office wanted to keep the report entirely 
confidential, which was not the case.137 The eventual resolution proposed 
by John Ross was for the report to be printed by the HMSO as document 
independent of the UK Government, distributed by the Home Office to a 
limited number of interested parties and with others able to purchase their 
own copies. Whilst this provided a means of Moss’s report being brought 
into the public domain in a way that satisfied the different needs of the 
various governmental bodies concerned with child migration, it still faced 
a challenge from the HMSO as to why it was felt necessary for such a spe-
cialist report with little wider public interest to be published through 
them.138 Using the Home Secretary’s authority, the Children’s Department 
insisted that it be published in this way, and the report—with its disclaimer 
that it was ‘an independent record of Mr Moss’s impressions and is not to 
be taken as expressing the views of the Home Office or of any Australian 
authority’—was eventually published in September 1953.139 Limited pub-
licity of its launch was sent to national press, and a circular with the same 
disclaimer posted to local authorities and the constituent members of the 
Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration providing infor-
mation of its availability for sale.140
The publicity that Moss’s work received in the United Kingdom was 
not as great as he had personally hoped. On his return from Australia, 
none of the major national newspapers expressed any interest in publish-
ing a letter from his about his tour. The only publications in which he was 
able to print articles about it were the periodical, British Weekly, in which 
Moss criticised Protestant churches for being insufficiently committed to 
135 Note by Newsam, 9th December 1952, TNA: MH102/2046.
136 Gibson to Prestige, 27th December 1952, TNA: MH102/2046.
137 Note by Prestige, 31st December 1952, TNA: MH102/2046.
138 Jefford to Clerk of Stationery, 19th May 1953, TNA: MH102/2046.
139 Child Migration to Australia: Report by John Moss.
140 Circular letter by John Ross, 3rd October 1953, TNA: MH102/2046.
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supporting child migration, and the County Councils Association Official 
Gazette, in which Moss sought to encourage local authorities to make 
more use of child migration schemes.141 Two other newspapers picked up 
his comments encouraging local authorities to make more children in 
their care available for emigration, and the eventual release of his report in 
the autumn of 1953 did receive brief coverage in The Times and on national 
television news.142
Its impact, however, was far greater on organisations which already had 
existing involvement or concerns about child migration programmes. 
Whilst irritated by his allegations of Protestant churches’ lack of support 
for this work, the members of the Council of Voluntary Organisations for 
Child Emigration were nevertheless very pleased with his broad endorse-
ment of the value of child migration and hoped that this could be used to 
extend its members’ work.143 The fact that John Moss’s tour—which was 
understood to be an entirely unofficial one when he first contacted mem-
bers of the Council before leaving for Australia—appeared to have taken 
on a more official standing was also recognised as being potentially helpful 
to their cause.
The view of the Association of Social Workers of Great Britain (which 
had changed to this name from the British Federation of Social Workers in 
1951) was far less positive. In a review of the Moss report in its quarterly 
periodical for spring 1954, the Association’s Care of Children Committee 
noted the care with which Moss had gathered his information and the 
level of detail he had provided on policies and conditions in Australia.144 
However, whilst commending it as ‘important source material for anyone 
interested in this subject’, the review also observed that social workers 
141 ‘Migration of Children to Australia’, British Weekly, no.3427, 17th July 1952; ‘Child 
Emigration to Australia by John Moss’, County Councils Association Official Gazette, no 
date, copies of both held on NAA.C: A446/133/3/8.
142 On coverage of his comments to local authorities, see minutes of meeting of Council of 
Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration, ULSCA(F): H6/1/2/1; ‘Child migration to 
Australia’, The Times, 6th October 1953 and Extract from TV news bulletins for 5th October 
1953, TNA: MH102/2046.
143 See minutes of meetings on 30th April 1952, 28th May 1952 and 8th July 1952, 
ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/1. The Council had an early briefing about Moss’s broadly positive 
impressions of how child migration schemes worked in Australia from Fr Nicol who had, by 
chance, travelled to the United Kingdom on the same ship on which Moss and his wife were 
returning.
144 Review of ‘Child migration to Australia, by John Moss’, Association of Social Workers 
of Great Britain News, January-March 1954, copy held on ML: MLMSS9025/Box 12.
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reading the report ‘will probably come to other conclusions than those 
reached by the author himself’. The overall impression gained of conditions 
in Australian institutions was, it noted, that approaches to child-care were 
less progressive than in the United Kingdom. In constrast to Australia, there 
was greater emphasis in Britain  on caring for children in home-like 
environments or small groups within institutions, in maintaining their 
contacts with relatives with a view to them being able to return to family 
members’ homes where possible, and on enabling children in institutions 
to feel part of their local communities. Whilst these standards might not 
always be achieved in practice by Children’s Officers—particularly in 
relation to children with disabilities or challenging behaviour—the 
emphasis placed on them by Officers seemed much stronger than in many 
of the Australian institutions described by Moss.
Noel Lamidey, the Chief Migration Officer at Australia House in 
London, was alarmed that views expressed in this review were probably 
representative of local authority Children’s Officers and forwarded it on to 
the Commonwealth Department of Immigration back in Canberra. 
Tasman Heyes replied with a lengthy rebuttal of the Association’s criti-
cisms.145 Whilst lacking Moss’s direct experience of visiting these institu-
tions, Heyes argued that the Association’s views were also wrong in 
important respects. As far as Heyes understood, child migrants were only 
sent from the United Kingdom in cases where parents no longer had an 
interest in the care of the child, whether because of illegitimacy or the 
breakdown of the family home. Whilst there was no doubt that care in a 
private household was preferable to that in an institution, Heyes noted 
that there were considerable risks in placing child migrants directly with 
long-term foster parents with whom they had not been able to have any 
previous contact at all. Institutions could provide a base from which a 
child migrants’ relationship with potential foster parents could be tested 
out, and even if no placement could be found, the institution could com-
pensate for the lack of something resembling a family home.
Arguably the most important effect of Moss’s work, however, was on 
decision-making in the Home Office. Whilst uneasy about the way in 
which an unofficial information-gathering exercise had snowballed into a 
more quasi-official report, and unwilling to be seen to support Moss’s call 
for an expansion of child migration schemes, the Children’s Department 
145 Lamidey to Heyes, 14th June 1954, with enclosure; Heyes to Lamidey, 5th July 1954, 
ML: MLMSS9025/Box 12.
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nevertheless treated his comments as the most substantial insights they 
had yet received on conditions in Australia. In a letter to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in November 1953, John Ross noted that the ‘reassuring 
nature of Moss’s report on what he saw in Australia’ was inclining the 
Children’s Department to question the need to introduce their s.33 regu-
lations in the near future. Whilst this might appear to have been an entirely 
passive approach by the Home Office, it is better understood as a judge-
ment made on the basis of how its staff balanced their desired policy out-
comes with their perceptions of the limits of their powers through statutory 
regulation. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Children’s Department 
had become sceptical as to whether regulations were the most effective 
mechanism for safeguarding British child migrants in Australia. The limi-
tations imposed by the phrasing of the 1948 Children Act, the limits of 
the UK Government’s legal control of overseas organisations and the risk 
of unwanted administrative burdens, all made the introduction of the s.33 
regulations a less appealing approach than it had previously appeared when 
the Children’s Bill was under discussion. By contrast, the Moss report had 
shown another way in which policies and organisational practices in 
Australia might be influenced without the limitations or bad feeling associ-
ated with regulation. Whilst the public and organisational attention given 
to Moss’s tour was not what the Home Office had originally wanted, an 
unintended consequence of this was that it placed a degree of moral pres-
sure on Australian governmental and voluntary organisations to comply 
with Moss’s recommendations for improvements if they were to continue 
this work. The fact that the Australian Commonwealth Department of 
Immigration generally saw Moss’s recommendations as standards which 
organisations were already aware of and striving to achieve was seen in the 
Children’s Department as evidence that it might be possible to nudge 
overseas organisations towards better practice through means other than 
regulation. On noting correspondence from the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration about their response to Moss’s recommenda-
tions, one Children’s Department official commented that ‘we are glad to 
see that many of them have had good results’.146 By abandoning direct 
regulation of child migration in favour of trying to exert pressure for 
change through more advisory exchanges, the Children’s Department 
adopted an approach to this field which already characterised its relation-
ship with local authorities and voluntary societies more generally in the 
146 Northover to Dixon, 16th June 1954, TNA: MH102/2046.
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United Kingdom.147 At home, the Children’s Department sought to exert 
pressure for change in out-of-home care provided by local authorities and 
voluntary societies through advice and critiques provided through its 
inspectorate. Overseas, in relation to child migration, the Children’s 
Department came to hope that this approach could be replicated through 
its interactions with Australian authorities and the UK High Commission, 
mediated through the Commonwealth Relations Office. The flaws in this 
strategy were, however, to become increasingly clear.
moSS, the curtiS rePort anD Differing 
interPretationS of a common Policy framework
Given what was subsequently to emerge from the fact-finding mission led 
by John Ross in the spring of 1956, one of the remarkable aspects of the 
history of post-war child migration is why John Moss gave such a broadly 
positive endorsement of child migration in his private notes and public 
report. Some personal factors were doubtless at play. Moss’s correspon-
dence suggests that his trip to Australia (which was also extended to New 
Zealand) was an enjoyable experience for him. Accompanied by his wife, 
his tour enabled them to see much of Australia, and alongside the respect 
shown to him by organisations keen to impress him as a semi-official rep-
resentative of the UK Government, Moss’s correspondence in this period 
also contains regular references to his enjoyment of the Australian cli-
mate.148 His relationship with officials in the Commonwealth Department 
of Immigration, particularly Reuben Wheeler, also became very cordial 
with Wheeler increasingly perceiving him as someone willing to act in 
ways that would broadly help his Department. Moss’s building up of his 
role suggests that, for him, this work was of national significance and con-
stituted the culmination of his career. His perceptions of life in Australia 
therefore seem to have been shaped, at least in part, by his enjoyment of 
this role in a country that he liked. His work at Kent County Council—a 
local authority which had tended to make substantial use of voluntary 
homes for children in its care149—also probably inclined him to view sym-
pathetically similar uses of voluntary homes for child migrants in Australia.
147 See Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, p.424.
148 See, for example, Moss to Ross, 4th September 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
149 Grier, ‘A spirit of “friendly rivalry”?’, p.250.
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More generally, though, Moss’s evaluation of conditions for child 
migrants in Australia suggests the diverse ways in which people can operate 
within a broadly shared framework of policy standards. Moss did not 
contest any of the basic child-care principles underpinning the Curtis 
report—principles which were also shared by others, like the Association 
of Social Workers, who took a far more critical view of child migration 
than him. John Moss was able to make certain accommodations in accept-
ing broad conditions that he observed in Australia whilst still accepting 
these principles. Conditions in Catholic children’s homes in Australia 
might be institutionalised, but were generally no worse, he noted, than 
conditions he had observed in Catholic homes in the United Kingdom for 
the Curtis report.150 If some children would still be growing up in such 
institutionalised conditions in the United Kingdom, there was no harm, 
Moss reasoned, in sending them overseas to similar kinds of institutions if 
their longer-term prospects in Australia would be better.151 Residential 
institutions in Australia might be less adequately staffed, and expect more 
in terms of children’s labour for the running and maintenance of homes, 
but this reflected different ‘prevailing conditions’ in Australia rather than 
any evidence of neglect or ill-will on the part of receiving organisations.152 
If one took the view, as Moss did, that there were wider benefits for a child 
growing up in Australia compared to post-war Britain, then such organisa-
tional limitations had to be accepted alongside that. Moss did not disagree 
that care for a child in something resembling a ‘normal family home’ was 
better than them growing up in an institution, but if institutions were a 
necessary stepping stone to safeguard child migrants on arrival in Australia 
before their eventual boarding out, then this again could be tolerated. 
Where Australian institutions failed in other ways to adhere to Curtis stan-
dards—such as children’s lack of integration into local families and com-
munities—Moss argued that these were areas in which improvements 
needed to be made. Gaps between Curtis standards and conditions for 
child migrants in Australia could either therefore be accepted, in the con-
text of the wider benefits that emigration might give children, or nar-
rowed through pressure for improved standards which Moss had assumed 
would be applied through the introduction of s.33 regulations. In contrast 
to Moss, the Association of Social Workers understood these same Curtis 
150 Moss to Ross, 13th June 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
151 Moss to Ross, 27th November 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
152 Moss to Ross, 13th June 1951, TNA: MH102/2041.
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principles as more exacting limits. Regardless of the attractions of future 
prospects in Australia, if the emigration of a child caused him or her to 
weaken their bonds with other members of their family, involved placing 
them in the kind of institution that Curtis had deemed unacceptable or 
left them with significant challenges in assimilating into local communities, 
then this was not an acceptable policy—regardless of any imperfections of 
the care system still operating in the United Kingdom.
Similar complexities in the interpretation of Curtis principles were 
evident amongst staff in the Children’s Department. There was evident 
disquiet within the Department about the institutional character of many 
large, congregate Catholic children’s homes. But whilst it was recognised 
that such homes did not meet the ideals of the Curtis report, there was 
equally no enthusiasm at this point for wholesale refusal of approval to 
Catholic receiving institutions in Australia. The experience of the delayed 
approval of St John Bosco had demonstrated that even limited withhold-
ing of approvals could elicit strong responses from supporters of the 
Catholic Church. To push for a wider suspension of approval more gener-
ally for Catholic children’s homes in Australia would have been even more 
controversial given the perception that this would have constituted an 
attack on the basic principle of independent Catholic education. However, 
the degree of control of children that was understood to be in place with 
the Salesians’ policy of ‘preventive discipline’ was a threshold beyond 
which staff in the Home Office felt it was not possible to cross. Within the 
Children’s Department, Curtis principles therefore operated as ideals to 
which the failure to adhere could, in some situations, be tolerated as a 
practical necessity, and in other circumstances, be seen as a breach of fun-
damental standards which could not be accepted.
Whilst the standards for children’s out-of-home care set out in the 
Curtis report were very clear in principle, in practice such policy standards 
did not therefore necessarily operate as a rigid set of proscriptions. Rather 
they functioned as a framework of values and beliefs—a set of ideals—
against which Home Office policy-makers, child-care professionals and 
many voluntary organisations made sense of their decisions and actions. 
Not all of those associated with child migration work had a strong affinity 
for all of the Curtis standards, which some negatively associated with the 
centralisation of care in the state and others saw as a secular assault on the 
primary importance of the religious formation of the child. But even 
amongst those who saw their work as upholding these principles, signifi-
cant differences could occur in terms of how they were interpreted. The 
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ways in which these principles were used and understood in specific situa-
tions could be shaped by an individual’s biography and role, the profes-
sional groups and organisations whom they trusted or felt emotionally 
connected with, and their aims, perceptions of their context and judge-
ments about potential risks that might be faced. The decision within the 
Home Office Children’s Department to withhold s.33 regulations did 
not, therefore, imply a lack of commitment to Curtis principles, but a 
particular set of judgements about how best to deploy them in the context 
of a trans-national welfare initiative in which there were inevitable imper-
fections, competing organisational interests and various limits on their 
statutory powers. As was to become clear, however, the Home Office’s 
pursuit of a softer exercise of power in this instance was to have significant 
implications for the conditions in which many British child migrants grew 
up in Australia.
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CHAPTER 7
‘If We Were Untrammelled by Precedent…’: 
Pursuing Gradual Reform in Child 
Migration, 1954–1961
With the Moss report endorsing the expansion of child migration, and the 
threat of tighter regulation through s.33 regulations dissipating, there 
were good grounds for voluntary organisations supporting child migration 
to feel more confident about the future. The rate of assisted child migra-
tion in the early 1950s had recovered to levels approaching those of the 
autumn of 1947, partly because of recruitment work done by Australian 
representatives of the Federal Catholic Immigration Committee, Fr Nicol 
and Fr Stinson, and partly because of a particularly high number of child 
migrants sent to Australia by the Fairbridge Society in 1950.1 In 1954, 
there was no indication that the UK Government was likely to make any 
policy intervention that would hinder the continuation of child migration 
work, and the Fairbridge Society felt sufficiently confident to ask for an 
increase in the Government’s contribution to maintenance payments for 
child migrants so that it could build up sufficient capital to open new farm 
schools.2 Although not particularly dramatic in scale, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office also estimated that the positive recommendations in the 
1 See Constantine, ‘The British Government’, pp. 126–7, 411 assisted child migrants had 
been sent to Australia in 1947. After a drop in numbers to 165 and 129 respectively for 1948 
and 1949, recruitment increased with 388 children sent in 1950, only 161  in 1951, but 
323 in 1952 and 305 in 1953.
2 See notes and correspondence on TNA: DO35/6377.
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Moss report might lead to between 200 and 300 more assisted child 
migrants being sent to Australia in 1954/1955 compared to 
other recent years.3
However, despite these positive signs for child migration at a policy 
level, there were increasing signs that child migration was not operating in 
practice as well as some of its supporters would have hoped. In the sum-
mer of 1954, the Commonwealth Department of Immigration asked Noel 
Lamidey to convey its frustration to the Commonwealth Relations Office 
at the rate of children being sent from the United Kingdom. At a meeting 
at the Commonwealth Relations Office Lamidey was recorded as saying 
that ‘the Commonwealth Government, who had sunk £400,000 in insti-
tutions for immigrant children, were dissatisfied with both the quantity 
and the quality of the children they were now getting’.4
This frustration had arisen in part in relation to the cohort of children 
sent by Catholic organisations in 1947, many of whom were judged not to 
be progressing well. This was, arguably, unsurprisingly given the very sparse 
information that had been sent with them about their previous back-
grounds, educational standards or medical histories and the unwarranted 
assumption that transfer from large residential institutions in one country 
to another would be not disruptive for them.5 Despite 1882 child migrants 
arriving in Australia from the United Kingdom from autumn 1947 until 
the end of 1953, this fell considerably short of the numbers which the 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration believed could be sent, with 
Tasman Heyes claiming that it would not be unreasonable to expect 
Australia to receive 10% of the 125,000 children identified by the Curtis 
report as living outside a ‘normal family home’. As a minimum, Lamidey 
told the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1954, Australia should be 
receiving ‘a steady 600 child immigrants a year’, something that had never 
been achieved since assisted migration to Australia had resumed in 1947.6
There had also been some notable failures in recruitment for individ-
ual residential institutions to which the Australian Commonwealth and 
State Governments had made substantial capital grants. The Dhurringile 
3 Memorandum Dixon to Costley-White, 25th March 1954, TNA: DO35/10253.
4 Memorandum to Dixon, 6th August 1954, TNA: DO35/10253. This Australian com-
plaint was also noted in the 1954 Interdepartmental Report on Migration Expenditure, TNA: 
DO35/4877, part IV, para 5.
5 See Interdepartmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, TNA: DO35/4881, para 
71, which notes that the 1956 fact-finding mission received a number of complaints from 
receiving institutions about unsatisfactory selection of children sent, particularly in 1947.
6 Memorandum to Dixon, 6th August 1954, TNA: DO35/10253.
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Rural Training Farm had been opened for child migrants by the 
Presbyterian Church in Victoria through a grant of A£23,562 from the 
Commonwealth and State Governments to cover two-thirds of the total 
building and refurbishment costs.7 Recruitment to Dhurringile through 
the Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service proved slow, how-
ever, leading to the Commonwealth Government’s successful efforts, 
discussed in the previous chapter, to pressure the UK Government into 
allowing the Over-Seas League to be recognised as a recruiting body for 
Dhurringile as well. Despite the League being allowed to undertake this 
work, however,  available spaces at Dhurringile were never close to 
being filled.
An even more notable failure had occurred in relation to Nazareth 
House, at East Camberwell in Melbourne, which had received an 
A£90,000 capital grant to build a new wing alongside its existing accom-
modation for elderly residents to house and educate child migrants. This 
building work created space for 150 girls from the United Kingdom, but 
initial recruitment efforts by Fr Stinson to recruit girls specifically for East 
Camberwell in the spring and summer of 1953 had led to only 20 arrivals 
there by August 1953. Stinson later reported to the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration that he had only managed to secure nomina-
tions for this many girls from the Sisters of Nazareth by threatening the 
order’s Superior General in Hammersmith that this capital grant would 
have to be paid if the order did not make arrangements for more girls in 
their care in the United Kingdom to be emigrated there.8 The 
Commonwealth Government’s dissatisfaction with this outcome arose not 
only from the scale of investment that had been made in East Camberwell, 
but also from the fact that this investment seems to have been made on the 
basis of specific assurances that sufficient numbers of child migrants would 
indeed be available.9 In the wake of disappointing recruitment for East 
Camberwell, Tasman Heyes wrote to the Federal Catholic Immigration 
7 See, for example, Heyes to Secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 6th April 1950, 
NAA: A445, 133/2/25.
8 Report by Fr Stinson, 1st October 1953, NAA: A445, 133/2/124.
9 See Calwell to Agst, 2nd June 1948, NAA: A445, 133/2/50, in which Calwell replied 
to an enquiry from the United Protestant Association about possible Commonwealth 
Government capital funding which had made specific reference to the East Camberwell 
grant, saying that such grants had only been approved when ‘both Commonwealth and State 
authorities [were] satisfied that a steady flow of child migrants was available from an assured 
source’.
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Committee to say that current levels of Catholic child migration meant 
that the priority was now for filling existing vacancies in Catholic residen-
tial institutions rather than funding any further new building work.10 Such 
circumstances, Heyes emphasised, showed the need for ‘very close inves-
tigation’ of future funding requests. By spring 1954, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office estimated that of the 2000 places created to receive 
British child migrants in Australian residential institutions, probably just 
under a third remained unfilled.11
In response to what they perceived as the disappointing flow of children 
from the United Kingdom, and the problems of voluntary organisations 
in even maintaining existing rates of child migration, the Australian 
Commonwealth Government resumed attempts in spring 1954 to get the 
Home Office to encourage local authorities to send more of the children 
in their care.12 Whilst there were a small number of exceptions, the com-
parative lack of involvement of local authorities in child migration pro-
grammes was stark. The Home Office’s own statistical reporting showed 
that local authorities had, at the end of November 1952, responsibility for 
the care of 64,682 children in foster care as well as in residential homes 
run by themselves or by voluntary organisations. In the preceding 12 
months, however, only 20 children had left local authority care through 
emigration.13 The picture was little different the following year with 
65,309 children in local authority care at the end of November 1953, but 
only 41 children having left their care by emigration in the previous year.14 
In total, the Home Office calculated that from the start of 1950 until June 
1954, only 177 children had been sent from the care of local authorities.15 
During this period, only three local authorities had allowed more than half 
10 Heyes to Crennan, 22nd October 1953, NAA: A445, 133/2/124.
11 Memorandum Dixon to Costley-White, 25th March 1954, TNA: DO35/10253, which 
estimated 600 unfilled vacancies for British child migrants in Australian institutions. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office later estimated that by November 1958, just under a thou-
sand of the 1846 places for British child migrants in approved institutions in Australia were 
unfilled (Analysis of sailings under the auspices of the voluntary organisations, 1948–1958, 
same file).
12 Lamidey to Newsam, 18th January 1954, TNA: DO35/10253.
13 See Children in the Care of Local Authorities in England and Wales, November 1952, 
cmd.8910, London: HMSO, 1953.
14 See Children in the Care of Local Authorities in England and Wales, November 1953, 
cmd.9145, London: HMSO, 1954.




a dozen children in their care to be sent overseas: Surrey County Council 
had given up 8 children, London County Council 14 and Cornwall 
County Council 28. Cornwall seemed to be an exceptional case because of 
its Children’s Officer, Dorothy Watkin’s previous association with the 
Fairbridge Society.16 These very small numbers of children were all the 
more striking given that the total number of children in  local authority 
care had increased by 18% between 1949 and 1953.17
There was little enthusiasm for the Commonwealth Government’s 
request in the Home Office. As had been the case with the Moss report, 
the Home Office Children’s Department did not consider it appropriate 
for it to advocate the emigration of children in care as a matter of public 
policy and doubted that there would be much further interest in child 
migration amongst local authorities either.18 At the same time, the Home 
Office had no wish to appear obstructive to the Commonwealth 
Government’s request and agreed to arrange a meeting between local 
authorities and immigration officials at Australia House on the basis that 
it would be much better for Australian officials to hear any objections to 
child migration directly from local authorities themselves rather than the 
Home Office or Commonwealth Relations Office having to act as the 
bearer of unwanted news. Clear lines of policy demarcation between the 
Home Office and Commonwealth Relations Office were also reinforced, 
with the former recognising that matters of emigration policy ultimately 
resided with the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office agreeing that it could not by-pass the Home Office by 
trying to contact local authorities directly to encourage child migration.
With arrangements delayed by the replacement of Noel Lamidey as 
Chief Migration Officer at Australia House, this meeting between repre-
sentatives of the County Council’s Association and the Council of 
Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration (with staff from Australia 
House acting as observers) eventually took place in June 1955.19 Little 
16 For a professional autobiography by the Children’s Officer for Cornwall which discusses 
this connection, see Dorothy Watkins, Other People’s Children: Adventures in Child Care 
(Penzance: Patten Press, 1993).
17 Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, p. 390.
18 Oates to Dixon, 19th March 1954; note by Costley-White, 3rd April 1954, TNA: 
DO35/10253.
19 Notes of Meeting between the County Council’s Association Representatives and 
Members of the C.V.O.C.E., 9th June 1955, copies held on both TNA: DO35/10253 and 
ULSCA.F: H6/1/2/2.
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agreement arose from this. Representatives from the local authorities 
made it clear that they thought it was eminently unsuitable to consider the 
40% of children in their care who were boarded out as possible candidates 
for emigration. Of the remaining 60% who were in residential care, most 
were either only in residential care on a temporary basis or had special 
needs which made them unsuitable for emigration. The remainder of 
physically and mentally able children in long-term residential care were, 
the local authorities argued, still needed in Britain given that the economy 
was running at near full employment. Furthermore, they noted that 
Moss’s report had observed the need for more child migrants in residen-
tial institutions in Australia to be boarded out, and that even the receiving 
institutions based on grouped cottage homes were more institutionalised 
and less well-staffed than was increasingly the case in scattered homes in 
Britain. Responding on behalf of the migration societies, Mr Vaughan 
from the Fairbridge Society argued that emigration could protect children 
from exploitative relatives, had been supported by both the Curtis 
Committee and 1948 Children Act, and that his organisation was aware of 
cases where local authorities had failed to provide suitable interventions 
with problem families. An agreement was reached to circulate more infor-
mation about the migration societies’ work but, as a note on the 
Commonwealth Relations Office record of the meeting observed, whilst it 
might lead to local authorities having some greater understanding of 
migration societies’ working methods, ‘it will take a great deal to break 
down [their] prejudices about child migration’.20 In practice, there was 
little or no change in the willingness of many local authority Children’s 
Officers to change their views on this issue, and between March 1955 and 
March 1959, only 73 more children left the care of local authorities 
through emigration.21
20 Note by Johnson, 1st July 1955, TNA: DO35/10253; see also note by Hill. 11th 
August, 1955, TNA: MH102/2053, which records both this meeting and unsuccessful 
attempts by Australia House to make direct approaches to town clerks in Manchester and 
Birmingham who reportedly gave ‘even more emphatic replies’ in rejecting child migration.
21 See Children in the Care of Local Authorities in England and Wales, March 1956, 
cmd.9881, London: HMSO, 1956; Children in the Care of Local Authorities in England and 
Wales, March 1957, cmd.411, London: HMSO, 1958; Children in the Care of Local 
Authorities in England and Wales, March 1958, cmd.632, London: HMSO, 1959; Children 




From the mid-1950s, child migration to Australia began to dwindle as 
a result of the resistance of many local authorities, the difficulty of volun-
tary organisations in providing a continuing supply of children from their 
own care, and the decision by some sending organisations—particularly 
the Catholic Child Welfare Council—largely to withdraw from this work. 
Alongside this gradual decline, however, the most intensive post-war pol-
icy discussions about this work took place within the UK Government as 
the competing pressures of assisted migration and child-care policies 
became increasingly clear.
Towards Policy comPromise: The syers and Garner 
inTer-deParTmenTal commiTTees on miGraTion Policy
One of the significant factors to drive policy discussions of child migration 
through the 1950s was the cyclical process of reviewing the Empire 
Settlement Act, built into the Act’s original requirement that it was sub-
ject to renewal every 15 years.22 With the Act’s first renewal agreed in 
1937, discussion began in the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1950 as 
to what its policy should be towards the renewal of both the Australian 
Assisted Passage Scheme (due to expire in March 1951) and the Empire 
Settlement Act (due to expire in May 1952). The Australian scheme was, 
at that point, the only major assisted migration agreement to have been 
made under the terms of the Act since the end of the war, and made up 
around 95% of spending authorised by the Act.23
With questions about the renewal of the Australian scheme and the Act 
itself seen as closely connected, there was some scepticism within the 
Commonwealth Relations Office about renewing either. A memorandum 
prepared by Richard Sedgwick, the Assistant Under-Secretary in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office with responsibility for political and con-
stitutional affairs, argued that there were a number of factors suggesting 
22 On the complexity of political and social processes of decolonization in this period, 
including their relationship to the emergent welfare state, see, for example, Jordana Bailkin, 
The Afterlife of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); David Edgerton, The 
Rise and Fall of the British Nation; Sarah Stockwell, The British End of the British Empire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
23 Assisted migration, memorandum by Sedgwick, 5th May 1950, TNA: DO35/3424. On 
political pressure within the House of Commons for continued support for imperial migra-
tion, see House of Commons Hansard, 13th June 1950, cc.48–105, copy held on TNA: 
DO35/3394.
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their renewal was unnecessary.24 The economic and demographic factors 
which had made assisted migration an appealing policy in the pre-war era 
were no longer present for an ageing British society nearing full employ-
ment which needed to retain its younger, working citizens. Assisted migra-
tion had primarily been taken up by industrial workers who would end up 
working in secondary industries in Australia rather than supporting pri-
mary production of food for export to the United Kingdom. Increased 
public spending in Britain on education and child welfare would also be 
wasted if its beneficiaries left the country before contributing back to the 
economy through their working lives. There was also little merit in the 
argument that assisted migration was needed to sustain the ‘British ele-
ment’ of the population of Commonwealth countries. Canada and South 
Africa—whose British population was fast becoming a minority—were 
unable to establish assisted migration schemes with the United Kingdom 
for political reasons, and Australia and New Zealand—with whom such 
schemes had been set up—were already predominantly British. Perversely, 
then, the encouragement of British emigration to Australia and New 
Zealand through assisted migration thus directed British emigrants to 
Commonwealth countries where there was little strategic or political need 
for British citizens and away from countries where such need existed.
Whilst Segdwick argued that there were no economic or immediate 
strategic grounds to justify the renewal of the Australian scheme or the 
Empire Settlement Act itself, he noted that political sensitivities around 
their closure would be far harder to manage. The UK High Commission 
had already warned that even simply placing a cap on the number of 
assisted passages to Australia would elicit ‘acute political controversy’ in 
Australia, be interpreted as a cooling of relations between the United 
Kingdom and Australia, and be used by the Australian Labor Party as 
grounds for attacking the new Liberal-Country Party coalition 
Government, led by Robert Menzies, for mis-managing Anglo-Australian 
relations.25 There was also some sentimental attachment to the idea of 
24 See note by Sedgwick and Assisted migration, memorandum by Sedgwick, 5th May 
1950, TNA: DO35/3424.
25 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Migration Policy, 12th December 1950, 
TNA: DO35/3424, para 14 also noted that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, Patrick Walker, had already had concern expressed to him by Robert Menzies and 
his Minister of Immigration, Harold Holt, that any weakening of the British commitment to 
assisted migration would both hamper Australian efforts to set up similar schemes with other 
countries in continental Europe and also harden Australian public opinion against much 
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imperial migration in the House of Commons and the House of Lords 
which could cause political problems at home as well. Such adverse politi-
cal reaction could be managed however, Sedgwick argued, by presenting 
the expiry of the scheme and the Act in the context of wider measures to 
show that emigration to the Commonwealth was still supported by the 
British Government. The exception to these closures was the compara-
tively small amount spent on supporting the assisted migration of chil-
dren, juveniles and single women through the work of voluntary 
organisations, about which Sedgwick observed ‘the odium incurred by the 
withdrawal of our support would be out of all proportion to the saving’. 
The assisted migration of children did not have the same adverse eco-
nomic implications as the emigration of people of working age, and the 
continuation of funding for such work by the Treasury could be presented 
as ‘a token of our goodwill to Commonwealth migration’, perhaps help-
ing to make cuts to the assisted migration for adults more palatable.
Sedgwick’s argument was supported by the Deputy Under-Secretary, 
Cecil Syers, and Labour’s Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Lord Holden, who was less enthusiastic about 
continuing to fund the migration work of voluntary organisations.26 
Leonard Walsh Atkins, head of the Commonwealth Relations Office 
General Department, was, however, unconvinced that giving up the 
potential levers over emigration provided by the Act was wise. Walsh Atkins 
pointed out that Australia’s political investment in immigration—with the 
Commonwealth Minister of Immigration recently suggesting that they 
might over-pay for a British warship to compensate the UK Government 
for continued spending on assisted migration—meant that the political 
fall-out from any policy change would be considerable.27 Furthermore, he 
noted, although majority white and non-white countries were now being 
incorporated into the shared body of the Commonwealth, there was a 
continuing need to preserve the strongest links with the old ‘white 
Dominions’. ‘We know what the hard core of [the Commonwealth] is’, he 
commented, ‘and also I think the necessity of keeping it hard’. A similar 
argument was also made by Walter Garnett, who agreed that whilst there 
needed ‘alien’ immigration from Europe if this was not counter-balanced by comparable 
levels of immigration from Britain.
26 See notes by Syers, 9th May 1950, and Lord Holden, 13th May 1950, TNA: 
DO35/3424.
27 Telegram, Walker to Syers, 28th August 1950; Memorandum by Walsh Atkins, 31th 
August 1950, TNA: DO35/3424.
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was no pressing economic case for assisted migration, there was a strategic 
need to recognise that ‘the United Kingdom must depend upon the 
strength of the Commonwealth, that a better distribution of the white 
population of the Commonwealth is an essential factor in building up its 
strength, and that State-aided migration assists this redistribution’.28
Alongside these disagreements, a clear consensus was reached in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office that the sensitivity of any such policy 
decisions meant that it would be helpful for them to be aired fully in an 
inter-departmental committee, chaired by Syers, which could bring for-
ward formal proposals. Sedgwick also argued that the increasing intransi-
gence of the Home Office in laying down ‘a priori and dogmatic principles 
and conditions’ in relation to child migration, following the 1948 Children 
Act, was having ‘the effect of ruling out schemes regarded by the receiving 
Government as entirely satisfactory’, and that ‘if this goes on we shall be 
likely to come into collision both with the Australian State and Federal 
Governments and also with the churches and voluntary organisations 
affected’.29 The inter-departmental committee, he suggested, could be a 
useful forum for ‘thrashing out this matter’. The committee should, he 
added in another note, explore ‘what steps should be taken to ensure a 
more satisfactory control over child migration than we have in the past 
possessed without involving the present intolerable and irritating delays in 
arriving at decisions on schemes’.30
The committee’s confidential report was formally submitted for 
Government consideration on 12th December 1950.31 The committee 
agreed to the Commonwealth Government’s request not to make any 
changes to the existing assisted passage scheme until sensitive discussions 
between Australia and other countries over the creation of similar schemes 
had been concluded. An extension to this scheme to March 1952 was 
therefore recommended to provide time for further negotiations. It did 
not, however, reach a unanimous view on the renewal of the Empire 
Settlement Act, with representatives from the Commonwealth Relations 
Office, Home Office and the Treasury opposing its extension, representa-
tives from the Ministry of Labour and National Service and the Ministry 
28 See Garnett to Sedgwick, with enclosure, 25th July 1950, TNA: DO35/3424.
29 Note by Sedgwick, 22nd June 1950, TNA: DO35/3424.
30 Note by Sedgwick, 1st September 1950, TNA: DO35/3424.




of Transport supporting its continuation. Arguments made in favour of 
retaining the Act included its symbolic and practical value in maintaining 
a sense of shared bonds between Commonwealth countries, its strategic 
value for the Australian Commonwealth Government and the economic 
value of assisted migration to the British shipping industry. Arguments 
against included the economic and demographic arguments previously 
made by Sedgwick, the failure of governments other than in Australia to 
make use of the Act, and the growing economic prosperity of former 
Dominions through rising commodity prices which made them more able 
to bear the entire cost of assisted migration.
Despite disagreeing over the future of the Act, the Committee did, 
however, give its unanimous approval to the continuation of assisted child 
migration. With Prestige representing the Home Office on the Committee, 
the report concluded that as long as conditions in receiving institutions 
were satisfactory, child migrants were able to participate fully in Australian 
communities and they were provided with education and training suitable 
to their abilities, then assisted child migration have much to commend it. 
Reflecting Sedgwick’s earlier point, the Committee also noted that ‘con-
tinued participation by the United Kingdom Government in schemes of 
child migration would do something to counteract the unfavourable 
impression in Australia of a decision not to continue the Assisted Passage 
Agreement or Empire Settlement Acts’.32 Whilst the Committee recom-
mended in principle that assisted child migration be continued, regardless 
of whether the Empire Settlement Act was renewed or not, it also noted 
Moss’s pending visit to Australia and stated that a final decision of future 
policy should be made when there had been time to consider his report. 
Even if the Australian assisted passage scheme and the Empire Settlement 
Act were allowed to lapse, and no new funding agreements for child 
migration authorised, both the Commonwealth Relations Office and 
Home Office argued that the UK Government would be under a moral 
obligation to continue maintenance payments for existing child migrants 
until they reached school-leaving age.
In the absence of any determined move to end either the Australian 
assisted passage scheme or the Empire Settlement Act—and despite some 
strong disagreement within the Cabinet33—both were continued beyond 
32 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Migration Policy, 12th December 1950, 
TNA: DO35/3424, para 33(iii).
33 See note by Costley-White, 2nd December 1954, TNA: DO35/10212.
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1952. The Australian scheme was extended for another two years until 
1954, and the Empire Settlement Act renewed until 1957. The short 
extension of the Australian scheme, and lack of any clear view on how to 
proceed with its longer-term renewal, led to the creation of another inter- 
departmental committee on migration expenditure in 1954, chaired by Sir 
Saville Garner, the Deputy Under-Secretary for Commonwealth 
Relations.34 Its report rehearsed the same broad arguments—although in 
less detail—than the report of the inter-departmental committee on migra-
tion policy four years previously.35 The committee found no strong eco-
nomic case for the United Kingdom Government to continue funding 
assisted migration, and the principle of treating Australia as an ‘equal part-
ner’ with the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth suggested that 
there was no strong grounds for Australia to expect a financial contribu-
tion to assisted migration from Britain when the primary economic bene-
fits of such a scheme fell to Australia. However, as with the 1950 
inter-departmental report, whilst the economic arguments for continuing 
to contribute to an assisted migration scheme to Australia were weak, the 
report noted that the ‘political case is overwhelming’.36
In 1953, the UK Government has proposed to continue to reduce its 
contribution to this scheme from £500,000 to £150,000 per annum on 
grounds of wider economic pressures. This had already elicited a strong 
response from the Commonwealth Government which noted that any 
continued pulling back from substantial financial contributions would be 
regarded as ‘not in keeping with the real spirit of partnership which has 
existed hitherto’. In addition to an immediate adverse reaction in Australia 
to any attempt to end this scheme altogether, the Garner committee 
report noted that more serious longer-term risks would be a weakening of 
social and cultural bonds with Australia as the proportion of non-British 
immigrants to Australia increased. Lasting damage would also most likely 
be caused to the political relationship between the two countries which 
might cause ‘intangible results in a far wider sphere’. At this point, the 
‘wider sphere’ for which Anglo-Australian relations were significant 
34 A short extension to the Australian assisted passage scheme to March 1955 was agreed 
to allow the inter-departmental committee time to meet and present its recommendations.
35 Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Expenditure Report, 19th October 1954, 
TNA: DO35/4879 (drafts and other papers held on TNA: DO35/4877, DO35/10213-16).
36 On this, see, for example, Memorandum from UK High Commissioner to Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, 20th August 1954, Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Migration Expenditure Report, Appendix 2, TNA: DO35/4879.
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included not just Australia’s importance as a British trading partner, but 
the Commonwealth Government’s willingness to allow nuclear testing to 
take place on its soil in the context of Britain’s efforts to develop its inde-
pendent nuclear weapons programme.37 With complaints already report-
edly being made in Australia that the United Kingdom did not regard 
Australia as a proper partner and even as ‘expendable’, the termination of 
the UK Government’s financial contribution to assisted migration would 
have a symbolic significance far greater than its practical effects, leaving 
Australia more susceptible to American influence and a weaker strategic 
partner for Britain in the Far East.38 Although the report’s recommenda-
tion that the UK Government’s financial contribution to the Australian 
assisted migration scheme remained capped at £150,000 would not be 
popular in Australia, it would be a sufficient gesture to take the matter ‘out 
of politics’ for the time being, and by renewing this arrangement until 
1957, it was hoped that by then political opinion in Australia might be 
more sympathetic to British funding being withdrawn altogether.
As in 1950, the case for continuing assisted child migration seemed far 
more straightforward when judged primarily through the prism of the 
politics and economics of Commonwealth migration. Well-selected child 
migrants had, since the war years, been seen as a particularly attractive class 
of immigrant in Australian Commonwealth policy, reflected in the finan-
cial investment made by Commonwealth and State Governments into the 
creation of new vacancies in receiving institutions. With the UK 
Government’s annual contribution to assisted child migration to Australia 
and the Rhodesia Fairbridge Memorial College in Southern Rhodesia 
totalling £43,600 at the time of the 1954 report,39 such schemes had the 
political virtue of appealing to Australian political opinion and the 
37 See, for example, documents on file TNA: DEFE16/779. Staff at the UK High 
Commission, including Anthony Rouse, had been actively involving in negotiating arrange-
ments for this nuclear testing programme between the UK and Commonwealth Governments. 
Arrangements about the Maralinga tests were at an advanced, and sensitive stage in the sum-
mer of 1956 (see, e.g., Rouse to Acting Secretary, 7th June 1956, same file), when the Ross 
Fact-Finding Mission’s report was being discussed within the Commonwealth 
Relations Office.
38 On the threat of growing American political and economic interest in building alliances 
with Australia, particularly given Australia’s substantial natural resources, see, for example, 
Viscount Bruce of Melbourne, House of Lords Hansard, 17th November 1954, vol. 189, cols 
1609–11.
39 See Interdepartmental Report on Migration Expenditure, 1954, TNA: DO35/4879, 
part IV, para 3.
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 economic virtue of being comparatively cheap in relation to the costs of 
assisted adult and family migration.
Having turned to a policy of trying to influence standards of care for 
child migrants in Australia by persuasion rather than regulation, the Home 
Office used the 1954 report as another mechanism to press for further, 
incremental change.40 The Children’s Department was cautious—as it had 
been in relation to the Moss report—of being seen to have anything other 
than an impartial view of children migration given the statutory responsi-
bility of the Home Secretary to arbitrate on individual children’s cases 
under s.17 of the 1948 Children Act.41 However, the negative reaction to 
the Moss report from child-care professionals, as well as the evident 
unwillingness of local authorities to give over children for emigration for 
whom they had a statutory duty of care under the 1948 Act, gave the 
Children’s Department stronger grounds for arguing that the future pros-
pects for child migration were likely to be negligible without further reform.
Whilst having to assert its position more generally in the inter- 
departmental committee’s meetings, the section of the committee’s final 
report dealing with child migration was substantially shaped by input on 
the Home Office on the growing consensus about good practice in child- 
care following the Curtis report.42 This understanding of good practice 
was, it argued, not only increasingly prevalent in the United Kingdom but, 
with the publication of John Bowlby’s report on Maternal Care and 
Mental Health for the World Health Organisation, a standard that was 
increasingly recognised internationally as well.43 Whilst the voluntary sec-
tor accepted these ideas in principle, some voluntary organisations had 
struggled to achieve these in practice because of a lack of trained staff. As 
a consequence, whilst demand for children for adoption was greater than 
the supply of available children, some organisations, such as the Roman 
Catholic Church, were still retaining children in residential institutions 
because insufficient foster placements with Catholic families had been 
40 See note by Hill, 30th July 1954, TNA: MH102/2055.
41 See Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Expenditure, Emigration of 
“deprived” children, Note by the Home Office, para 6, TNA: MH102/2055.
42 See Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Expenditure, Emigration of 
“deprived” children, Note by the Home Office, and Supplementary note by the Home 
Office; Hill to Dixon, 22nd September 1954, TNA: MH102/2055.
43 John Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health: A Report Prepared on Behalf of the 
World Health Organization as a Contribution to the United Nations Programme for the 
Welfare of Homeless Children (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1951).
 G. LYNCH
257
found—a matter which the report noted the Home Secretary had recently 
raised with Bernard Griffin, the Archbishop of Westminster. The marked 
trend, it was argued however, was for children to be placed in the care of 
local authorities—partly because of the expansion of their services and 
partly because of declining contributions to voluntary societies. As a con-
sequence, between 1949 to 1953, the number of children in local author-
ity care had risen from 55,525 to 65,309, whilst the number in the care of 
voluntary societies had fallen from 28,760 to 20,461.44 With local author-
ities generally unwilling to send children in their care to residential institu-
tions in Australia, and the Home Office objecting to the idea that children 
in residential institutions in the United Kingdom could easily be moved to 
comparable institutions in Australia given that it was precisely such chil-
dren who relied on the fragile networks of care they had with local com-
munities and other relatives in Britain, child migration seemed to have 
little future unless standards were reformed.
Whilst the Home Office’s contribution to the report appeared to be 
setting the scene for a much stronger policy intervention on standards, 
once again punches were largely pulled. It was unrealistic, the report sug-
gested, to expect voluntary organisations in the United Kingdom ‘to 
accept forthwith that their methods are based on obsolete conceptions 
and have failed to move with the times’.45 Training staff in these organisa-
tions in new approaches to child-care would take time, and the UK 
Government had a moral obligation to continue to pay the maintenance 
of child migrants already sent overseas regardless of whether the Empire 
Settlement Act was renewed in 1957 or not. Continued financial support 
of child migration also gave the UK Government a stake in the process by 
which it could attempt to influence standards overseas—something which 
had not, for example, been possible with regard to child migration to New 
Zealand. Sudden withdrawal of financial support for voluntary societies 
would also run against the principle that the voluntary sector still had an 
important role to play in children’s out-of-home care, not only because 
their services reduced economic pressures on the State, but because of the 
good work done through their ‘undoubted… public spirit and good will’. 
44 The Home Office also privately acknowledged that the fall in the statistic for children in 
the care of voluntary homes was also affected in part because certain types of institution, such 
as mother and baby homes, were no longer included on their register of voluntary homes 
(see note by Hill, 22nd September 1954, TNA: MH102/2055).
45 Interdepartmental Report on Migration Expenditure, 1954, TNA: DO35/4879, part 
IV, para 13.
7 ‘IF WE WERE UNTRAMMELLED BY PRECEDENT…’: PURSUING GRADUAL… 
258
Political factors within the Commonwealth Relations Office also inclined 
its civil servants to be careful in discussions of the Fairbridge Society—
with both the Secretary of State, Viscount Swinton, and Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Douglas Dodds-Parker (whose wife, Aileen, was 
later to become the Society’s chair), known to support its work.46 Any 
suggestion from the Home Office that the Fairbridge Society needed to 
move towards placing its child migrants with families, just the same as 
other voluntary societies, was thus met with the view that this would need 
to be taken up as part of a gradual consultation process with voluntary 
societies over the next few years.47
As a consequence of the weighing up of these different factors, the 
approach advocated by the report was that assisted child migration should 
continue to be funded, regardless of any decision over the renewal of the 
Empire Settlement Act, for a period of up to five years after 1957. The 
intervening period was to be used for on-going consultation with volun-
tary organisations and Australian authorities to try to ensure that during 
that period they moved further towards a policy of placing child migrants 
to Australia in family homes. As an incentive to voluntary organisations, 
the report recommended that Fairbridge’s request for increased mainte-
nance funding from the UK Government should be approved if both it 
were genuinely to be used on children’s maintenance rather than for capi-
tal building projects (given the number of vacancies already unfilled in 
receiving institutions) and any organisation seeking this increase agreed to 
develop new plans for placing their child migrants in family homes.
Financial constraints meant that the Treasury was not prepared to 
accept the report’s recommendation that funding for new child migrants 
be agreed beyond 1957 and thus required that the longer-term future of 
assisted child migration be reviewed again in 1956 alongside wider dis-
cussion of assisted migration to Australia and the possible renewal of the 
Empire Settlement Act.48 Whilst the Treasury hoped that this 1956 
review would be able to propose a clear long-term policy on assisted 
migration, based on careful demographic analysis, civil servants in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office took the view that assisted migration to 
46 See, for example, reference to Swinton’s very positive account of Fairbridge’s work fol-
lowing a recent visit to Australia in Minutes of the fifth meeting of the Oversea Migration 
Board, 29th March 1954, TNA: DO35/6375.
47 See Garner to Swinton, 8th November 1954, Swinton to Garner and Dodds-Parker, no 
date, TNA: DO35/10212.
48 See Drake to Morley, 29th October 1954, TNA: DO35/4879.
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Australia would remain for the foreseeable future an intractably political 
issue.49 The fact that the announcement of the general policy recom-
mended by the inter- departmental committee elicited no strong political 
or public criticism in Australia—despite the UK Government’s contribu-
tion to the assisted passage scheme still being capped at £150,000 
per annum—suggested that its careful balancing of these political con-
cerns had, for the time being, been successful.50 However, any future 
withdrawal of United Kingdom funding in this area was seen as some-
thing that would require very careful political handling, involving starting 
an immediate ‘softening up’ campaign with Australian officials to prepare 
them for such a recommendation in the 1956 review.51 Political manage-
ment at home was still needed as well, with Viscount Swinton forced to 
defend the Government’s approach to assisted migration in a debate 
in the House of Lords in November 1954 on a motion which had urged 
for a rapid acceleration of emigration to Australia in the face of the grow-
ing threat of communism, exemplified by the recent creation of the com-
munist State of North Vietnam.52
Although its recommendations on funding new child migrants after 
1957 were not fully implemented, the 1954 Garner report nevertheless 
marked a growing accommodation between the Commonwealth Relations 
Office and the Home Office.53 The Commonwealth Relations Office had 
broadly accepted that further reform in provision for British child migrants 
in Australia would be needed, although Viscount Swinton prevaricated on 
this point in the House of Lords’ debate. In a fairly typical display of 
Parliamentary management of voluntary organisations’ sensibilities, 
Swinton had argued that whilst it was probably right that children fared 
better in a family home than an institution, he doubted whether ‘a hard 
and fast rule can be laid down’ and praised the cottage mothers of 
Fairbridge who were ‘as good to their foster-children as any real mother 
49 See Drake to Morley, 24th December 1954; note by Morley, 30th December 1954; 
Morley to Drake, 15th February 1955, TNA: DO35/10212.
50 Tory to Costley-White, 5th January 1955; Dixon to Costley-White, 21st January 1955, 
TNA: DO35/10212.
51 Costley-White to Morley, 27th January 1955; Garner to Holmes, 14th February 1955, 
TNA: DO35/10212.
52 See debate on emigration to Australia, House of Lords Hansard, 17th November 1954, 
vol. 189, cols 1600–34.
53 See Garner to Liesching, 19th October 1954, TNA: DO35/10212.
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could be’.54 Whilst the Home Office took the view that child migration 
need to be run more consistently according to good standards of child- 
care practice, its Children’s Department accepted that such reform could 
only realistically be achieved through a gradualist approach.55 In the con-
text of the political sensitivities around any perceived weakening commit-
ment on the part of the UK Government to continued funding for assisted 
migration to Australia, a working agreement appeared to have been 
reached  between these two government departments about seeking to 
improve standards whilst avoiding sudden policy interventions which 
might antagonise the opinions of voluntary organisations and Australian 
officials.
comPromise Under PressUre: The overseas 
miGraTion Board
In January 1955, the UK High Commissioner in Canberra, Sir Stephen 
Holmes, wrote to Saville Garner acknowledging the outcomes from the 
inter-departmental committee’s recommendations.56 Holmes expressed 
particularly interest in the report’s discussion of child migration. Whilst 
Holmes noted that he had ‘never been particularly happy about child 
migration’, he was somewhat alarmed at the prospect of the reaction of 
‘very public spirited and benevolent people here, as of course in the United 
Kingdom, … when it has to be explained to them that in the official view 
the whole system which they have so generously supported with their time 
and money is considered so out of date that it must be brought to an end’. 
Ending the practice of institutional care for child migrants in Australia 
would raise complex issues, he noted, not only about how such a system 
based around foster placements would work and be monitored, but also 
leave open the question of how voluntary organisations would use the 
physical infrastructure of buildings and land which they have developed 
54 Viscount Swinton, House of Lords Hansard, 17th November 1954, vol. 189, cols 
1631–2. This prevarication was not apparently shared by civil servants in his department, see, 
for example, note by Garner, 4th August 1955, TNA: DO35/6380.
55 See note by Hill, 30th July 1954, TNA: MH102/2055. Also note by Hutchinson, 11th 
January 1955, TNA: MH102/2056, in which the Deputy Under-Secretary for the Home 
Office comments that ‘we do not contemplate an embargo {emphasis original) on the emi-
gration of children to institutions and must develop more fully the difficulties involved in 
arranging the necessary tests to ensure the compatibility of foster parents and children’.
56 Holmes to Garner, 4th January 1955, TNA: DO35/10212.
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for this work. Holmes’s concern about these issues was brought into 
sharper focus by his regular contact with people involved in the Fairbridge 
committee for New South Wales, in which he feared he would soon be 
challenged again about the UK Government’s policy intentions. Whilst 
Holmes’s view might accurately have anticipated the views of some sup-
porters of particular voluntary organisations, there was also some indica-
tion of a loss of institutional memory in his response. Walter Garnett had 
retired as the Deputy High Commissioner in Canberra in 1951. Holmes’s 
concern showed little awareness of the fact that the recommendations of 
the Curtis report had already been known to voluntary societies and the 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration for several years  now and 
the importance of boarding children out had also been discussed in the 
report by John Moss.
Replying to Holmes the following month, Garner recognised that some 
further reforms of child migration were inevitable, and noted that discus-
sion of this policy was now being referred on to the Oversea Migration 
Board. With the Board’s support it would be possible, Garner hoped, to 
begin conversations with the voluntary organisations about their 
approaches to child-care when their annual funding agreements came up 
for renewal that spring.57 Immigration officials at Australia House were 
already aware of the drift of Government thinking about need for gradual 
reform of child migration, and Garner noted that the forthcoming meet-
ing which had been arranged between Australia House, the Council of 
Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration and representatives of local 
authorities, would doubtless further reinforce this message about current 
thinking about child-care practice in Britain. As Garner noted, though, 
attention would have to be given to the particular circumstances of each 
individual voluntary society, adding sardonically that ‘we do, of course, 
recognise that the Fairbridge Society is in this matter nearest to the angels, 
if indeed not already among them’.
With rates of post-war emigration rising to levels not seen since 1929, 
the Oversea Migration Board had been established in February 1953 as a 
body convened by the Commonwealth Relations Office to provide advice 
to its Secretary of State on schemes of emigration from the United 
Kingdom to other Commonwealth countries. This reflected similar work 
done by its predecessor bodies in the inter-war period, the Oversea 
57 Garner to Holmes, precise date not given, February 1954, TNA: DO35/10212; see also 
Garner to Hill, 23rd November 1954, TNA: MH102/2056.
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Settlement Committee and the Oversea Settlement Board.58 Whilst the 
obvious forum for continued discussion of a matter of assisted migration 
policy, the Oversea Migration Board was not the easiest mechanism 
through which to take forward the spirit of gradual reform endorsed by 
the inter-departmental committee report. Unlike the Home Office 
Advisory Council on Child-Care, whose membership consisted mainly of 
representatives of interested statutory, professional and voluntary organ-
isations, the Oversea Migration Board had a majority of members who 
were MPs and less malleable than civil servants in the Commonwealth 
Relations Office might wish. Another member, Sir Colin Anderson, 
Director of the Orient Line shipping service, had a direct commercial 
interest in public funding being continued for migrant travel to Australia. 
Attempts in 1954 by the Commonwealth Relations Office to prevent the 
Board discussing the sensitive issue of the future of the Australia assisted 
passage scheme had been thwarted when one of its Parliamentary mem-
bers threatened to raise a question in the House of Commons if the Board 
were not allowed to do so.59 In the event, its first report, published in July 
1954,60 did not take a radically different view to that which was recom-
mended by the Garner report later that autumn and suggested that there 
were strong strategic and political reasons for the UK Government con-
tinuing to contribute financially to this scheme for the time being. Unlike 
the Garner committee, however, there was no indication in the Board’s 
first report that such a financial commitment might reasonably be ended 
in the coming years.
The task of developing policy specifically on child migration through 
the Board was also made more complex by the fact that it took a far more 
positive view of current provision in child migration than the inter- 
departmental committee had. Members of the Board who were particu-
larly sympathetic to this work included not only Douglas Dodds-Parker, 
but also by the Countess of Bessborough,61 the wife of the chairman of the 
Church of England Council for Empire Settlement and the economist, 
58 On the Board’s formation in 1953, see TNA: DO35/6373.
59 See note 31st March, 1954, TNA: LAB13/836.
60 First Annual Report of the Oversea Migration Board, July 1954, cmd.9261, (London: 
HMSO, 1954). Minutes and other documents relating to the Board’s work in 1953 and 
1954 are held on TNA: DO35/6375 and DO35/6379.
61 The Countess of Bessborough had been appointed to the Board as a representative of 




Roy Harrod.62 The Board’s first report noted that the Moss report had 
indicated that ‘the societies maintain a high standard in their homes and 
institutions in Australia and produce remarkably successful results’.63 Its 
members also met with Moss, who suggested that very rapid expansion in 
child migration was impractical, but that he remained convinced that 
‘child migration was the best form of migration’.64 It was also aware, from 
a meeting of its members with the Commonwealth Minister for 
Immigration, Harold Holt, that it was still the opinion of his Government 
that children made ‘very satisfactory immigrants’.65 There was, it argued, 
potential to expand this good work if more financial resources could be 
provided to develop the work of organisations such as the Fairbridge 
Society and the Church of England Council for Empire Settlement and if, 
as Moss had suggested, local authorities were more willing to give over 
more children in their care. This expansion could be made possible, the 
Board suggested, by increasing the UK Government’s maintenance pay-
ments to child migrants and by offering grants-in-aid to support the 
administrative costs for small organisations (something for which the Earl 
of Bessborough had been unsuccessfully pressing civil servants and minis-
ters on behalf of the Church of England Council for a number of years).66 
Indeed, the Board took it upon itself to invite voluntary societies to sub-
mit costed proposals for increased funding which it could consider for 
recommendation to the Secretary of State. No reference was made by the 
Board to any discrepancy between child migration and wider standards of 
child-care in the United Kingdom, and the only reference the Board’s first 
report made about the Home Office was in the context of recommending 
62 The Commonwealth Relations Office had, however, successfully refused a request from 
the Council of Voluntary Organisations for Child Emigration to have one of its members 
appointed to the Board as a representative of the Council (see Hall to Secretary, 
Commonwealth Relations Office, 16th April 1953; Mills to Hall, 21st April 1953, TNA: 
DO35/6373).
63 First Annual Report of the Oversea Migration Board, secn (d), para 9 (and on child 
migration more generally, see secn (d), paras 1–12).
64 See Minutes of the third meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 26th November 
1953, TNA: DO35/6375.
65 See Note of a Meeting Between Members of the Board and the Rt. Hon. Mr H.E. Holt, 
10th June 1953, TNA: DO35/6375.
66 See correspondence on requests to restore the grant-in-aid to the Church of England 
Council for Empire Settlement on TNA, DO35/1139/M1125/1 and DO35/1139/
M1125/2.
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that the Home Office might consider how opportunities for child migrants 
overseas might best be advertised to local authorities.
Following the circulation and approval of the inter-departmental com-
mittee report in the late autumn of 1954, the Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Home Office submitted a joint paper to the Oversea Migration 
Board which attempted to steer its discussion of child migration more in 
terms of how child migrants’ care overseas compared to expected stan-
dards in the United Kingdom.67 An underlying aim, more implicit in the 
document, was to encourage the Board to support an inquiry into condi-
tions of care for child migrants overseas which it would not insist on 
undertaking by itself.68 Rehearsing arguments already made in the inter- 
departmental committee report, the submission noted that whilst it would 
not be possible to place child migrants directly from the United Kingdom 
to foster homes in Australia, there was no reason why a wider system of 
boarding out for British child migrants should not operate once children 
had been initially received in residential institutions overseas. Given the 
improving material conditions of many families, and the absence of ‘sur-
plus’ children in the United Kingdom, it was unlikely, it noted, that sub-
stantial numbers of children would be made available for emigration in the 
future, even if appropriate reforms were made in Australia. To assist future 
policy in this area, the two departments suggested that the Oversea 
Migration Board might want to reflect on any advice it might wish to give 
to the UK Government with regard to child migrants’ selection in the 
United Kingdom and the arrangements for their overseas reception 
and care.
The Board subsequently discussed both this submission and a survey of 
sending organisations which confirmed that most were struggling to 
67 Child Migration, Note by the Joint Secretaries, 16th February 1955, TNA: DO35/6376; 
also note by Northover, 22nd February 1955, TNA: MH102/2053. Copies of relevant 
paragraphs from the Curtis report on child migration were appended to this submission to 
reinforce this point. On the preparation of this document between the two departments, see 
also note by Hill, 11th January 1955, TNA: MH102/2056.The process was made some-
what more complex within the Home Office by the intervention of the Deputy Under- 
Secretary, Sir Arthur Hutchinson, who did not initially share the view that family placement 
was better than institutional care for child migrants in Australia, but the Children’s 
Department maintained its position despite his reservations (see memorandum from 
Hutchinson to Ross, 25th November 1954; Hutchinson to Garner, 7th December 1954, 
TNA: MH102/2056.
68 See note by Hill, (date missing) February 1955, TNA: MH102/2056.
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recruit children for emigration.69 Some scepticism was expressed about the 
submission from the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office. 
The Countess of Bessborough argued that approved residential homes in 
Australia were of ‘as high standard as anything to be found in the U.K.’ Sir 
Colin Anderson noted that the exacting standards of the Curtis report 
would make even the Fairbridge cottage home system unacceptable and 
that the problem lay more with the insular attitudes of local authorities. 
Roy Harrod added that he fundamentally disagreed with the Curtis 
report’s conclusions on child migration and observed that this seemed to 
be a topic to which the Curtis Committee had not given very thorough 
consideration. To take this discussion forward, the Board agreed that it 
would be a helpful meet with representatives of local authorities and the 
Association of Social Workers. In part this was intended as an information- 
gathering exercise, but the Board was also sympathetic to the suggestion 
by one of its Parliamentary members, Harmar Nicholls, that ‘as the only 
body to make a detailed study of child migration in recent years’, the 
Board should also press its views on these representatives in an effort to 
get them to adopt a more positive view of child migration. That the Board 
should believe that its work constituted the most thorough recent review 
of child migration reflected either how little knowledge it had of other 
recent policy discussions of this subject, such as the report by the Women’s 
Group on Public Welfare, or how much its members over-estimated their 
expertise in this field.
When the Board subsequently met representatives from local authori-
ties the following June (by which time Hamar Nicholls had resigned from 
it after taking up another Government appointment), there was little evi-
dence of them being persuaded by the Board’s views on child migration.70 
Officials from London County Council explained that they had only 
allowed for the emigration of 12 boys from their care in recent years 
because their Children’s Committee was generally unenthusiastic about 
this option. Apart from those under court orders, the Council were only 
legally able to keep children in their care through the permission of their 
parents or guardian and emigration could only be considered in cases 
69 Child Migration: Details of Voluntary Societies, Note by the Joint Secretaries, 25th 
March 1955; Minutes of the eleventh meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 29th March 
1955, TNA: DO35/6375.
70 Minutes of a meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 7th June 1955, TNA: 
DO35/6376.
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where there was no prospect at all of children being returned to their fami-
lies. Even then the Council would only consider emigration for very young 
children, or children old enough to know their minds and who actively 
raised the possibility of emigration. Given difficulties in finding suitable 
Catholic foster homes, the Council was considering the possibility of 
allowing some very young Catholic children to go to residential institu-
tions in Australia, but would only do so after one of their welfare officers 
had visited them first-hand. The Children’s Officer from Essex County 
Council, Miss Gwyneth Wansbrough-Jones,71 was even more robust, giv-
ing a strong account of why her Council had little interest in emigration 
as an option. Of the 1600 children in her Council’s care, she noted, 950 
were already boarded out, and fewer than 50 were not in close contact 
with one or both of their parents. Of the 339 children admitted to her 
Council’s care in the first quarter of 1955, up to 284 would only be in care 
for a short time, and of the 36 most likely to be in longer-term care, half 
would probably be taken back by relatives at some point in the future. The 
rest were either too young to emigrate or had already been boarded out. 
The importance of keeping open the possibility of re-uniting a child with 
his or her family, and the good prospects for finding suitable foster homes 
for those with no family contacts, meant that there were few, if any, chil-
dren for whom emigration would be an appropriate option. When pressed 
by Sir Colin Anderson as to whether the prospect of a better life, in mate-
rial terms, overseas might prove more beneficial to a child than living close 
to their parents, Wansbrough-Jones replied that ‘even the most ideal 
material conditions might leave the child deprived to some extent of affec-
tion and security’. She also received some support for her views on the 
importance of maintaining children’s parental contacts from another 
Board member, the Conservative MP, William Aitken. Any lack of enthu-
siasm for child migration was, the local authority representatives argued, 
not because they were unaware of the emigration services provided by the 
approved voluntary societies but because they believed that options for 
children in their care were good enough so as not to need to consider them.
Following this meeting, the Commonwealth Relations Office contin-
ued to press the Board to focus its attention on future recommended 
71 Wansbrough-Jones was also well-connected to wider debates on child welfare policy 




standards for child migration work.72 Writing to the Board’s members, its 
then chair, Douglas Dodds-Parker, commented that whilst there was 
clearly ‘misunderstanding on both sides’ between local authorities and 
voluntary societies, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
would welcome their views on whether any future funding arrangements 
for the voluntary societies’ work should be linked to their ‘willingness to 
discuss certain modifications in their system, such as an increase in 
boarding- out arrangements’. At its next meeting, Board members were 
unwilling to accept any immediate conditions being put on future funding 
arrangements for child migration.73 Roy Harrod argued that the Curtis 
Committee lacked sufficient evidence on which to base its view of child 
migration and that it could well be that emigration ‘might be of great 
psychological benefit to a deprived child’. Building on his intervention, 
the Board generally agreed that there was insufficient information avail-
able on which to make any recommendations about voluntary societies’ 
future practice. Finally reaching the decision towards which the 
Commonwealth Relations Office had been gently steering it, the Board 
recommended that a small fact-finding mission be established, including a 
representative from the Board, from a local authority and possibly from 
the Home Office and UK High Commission, which could produce ‘an 
authoritative report on conditions in homes run by the approved societies, 
which would be acceptable to local authorities and welfare workers in this 
country’. Whilst the Board recognised Wansbrough-Jones’s point about 
the limited availability of suitable children, a belief still appears to have 
persisted amongst its members that local authorities and social workers 
would be more amenable to supporting child migration if they were better 
informed about the standards of care actually provided overseas.74 This 
recommendation was approved by Alec Douglas-Home, who had suc-
ceeded Viscount Swinton as Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations earlier in the year. It was planned that the mission would under-
take its work in the early spring of 1956 and produce a report in time for 
72 Future Assistance to Voluntary Societies, Note by the Chairman, 1st July 1955, TNA: 
DO35/6375. It was noted in the Home Office Children’s Department that whilst the word-
ing of the paper was not ideal from their point of view, it might still serve its purpose of 
‘edging’ the Board towards supporting the position of the 1954 inter-departmental commit-
tee (see note by Hill, 4th July 1955, TNA: MH102/2058).
73 See minutes of meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 7th July 1955, TNA: 
DO35/6376.
74 See, for example, note from Morley to Garner, 2nd August 1955, TNA: DO35/6380.
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it to inform any recommendations that the Board wished to make about 
child migration in its second report which had been scheduled for publica-
tion in the early autumn of 1956. The Board’s second report would then, 
in turn, be a point of reference for policy discussions during the autumn 
about the question of whether the Empire Settlement Act and assisted 
migration programme to Australia should be renewed in 1957.75
Throughout this process, the Home Office Children’s Department had 
been on the distribution list for the Board’s agendas, minutes and tabled 
papers, and maintained a watching brief on the discussions of child migra-
tion.76 Whilst generally content to observe the developing discussion, a 
number of notes were recorded by Children’s Department officials critical 
of evidence presented to the Board by Canon Flint about the child migra-
tion work of the Catholic Child Welfare Council. Mr C.P. Hill, who had 
replaced Prestige as the Assistant Secretary with primary responsibility for 
child emigration, commented that Canon Flint’s contributions were ‘not 
likely to be very helpful so far as child care is concerned’.77 In the copy of 
minutes of a meeting that Flint had with the Board in which he had 
claimed that the Catholic Council sought as a matter of policy ‘to see that 
their children were settled as soon as possible into Australian families’, one 
sceptical Children’s Department official had underlined his comment and 
placed an exclamation mark next to it in the margins.78 Its staff were also 
critical of the Board’s attempts ‘to dispute child care policy’ and satisfied 
with the evidence by the representatives of local authorities which ‘com-
fortably supports, and indeed goes further than, the views expressed by 
the Home Office to the Garner committee’. The Children’s Department 
expected the proposed fact-finding mission would achieve little, given its 
limited focus on standards of child-care in Australia, but was happy to 
leave it to the Commonwealth Relations Office to lead on the organisation 
75 See minutes of meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 22nd February 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6376.
76 See TNA: MH102/2053; MH102/2054; MH102/2056; MH102/2057; 
MH102/2058.
77 See notes by Hill, 19th February 1955, 24th February 1955, 14th March 1955, 29th 
March 1955; note by Ross, 24th February 1955; note by Oates, 15th March 1955, TNA: 
MH102/2053.
78 See minutes of meeting of Oversea Migration Board, 1st March 1955, copy held on 
TNA: MH102/2053, compare with that on TNA: DO35/6376.
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of this.79 In correspondence with the Scottish Home Department about 
the mission’s imminent trip to Australia a more positive spin was put on its 
work. It would , Hill wrote, provide an opportunity for a closer review of 
the standards of care overseas than that done by Moss. It would also, he 
suggested, be a means for setting up agreed standards with Australian 
authorities which could then be introduced as s.33 regulations given that 
‘it is clearly impracticable to lay down requirements by regulation about 
what is to happen in Australia unless the Australian authorities are pre-
pared to co-operate’.80 This reflected Hill’s wider view that the Children’s 
Department still knew very little of how child migration was operating in 
practice—a view which may have reflected some growing scepticism in the 
Home Office as to whether Moss really was the most rigorous rapporteur 
on conditions of care overseas.81
Policy crisis: The 1956 FacT-FindinG mission
The Children’s Department’s low expectations of the impact of the fact- 
finding mission’s report proved to be well wide of the mark. Far from 
being another anodyne review, the public and private views of the fact- 
finding mission were to place great strain not just on relations between the 
Home Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, but created the most 
serious tensions over child migration between the United Kingdom and 
Australian Commonwealth Governments since the resumption of assisted 
migration in 1947.
When proposing the final membership of the fact-finding mission,82 the 
Commonwealth Relations Office also failed to anticipate the problems 
that its work would cause. John Ross, now recently retired from the Home 
Office, was appointed to chair the mission and was obviously known to 
79 See note by Hill, 26th April 1955; note by Hill, 28th June 1955; note by Hill, 11th 
August 1955, TNA: MH102/2053.
80 Hill to Watterson, 15th October 1955, TNA: MH102/2056.
81 See Hill to Rowe, 27th October 1954, TNA: MH102/2056.
82 See minutes of meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 1st December 1955, TNA: 
DO35/6376. See also notes and correspondence on this process held on TNA: DO35/6380. 
Myra Curtis was herself someone that was initially considered as a possible member for the 
mission, but the list of possible names in which she was included was rejected within the 
Commonwealth Relations Office as being too senior for a mission whose primary function 
was simply to gather facts about current conditions in Australia (see list of proposed names, 
no date, TNA: DO35/6380).
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have supported the gradualist approach to reform on which the Children’s 
Department and Commonwealth Relations Office had previously agreed. 
For the Commonwealth Relations Office having Ross as chair also had the 
attraction of making it harder for the Home Office to refuse to endorse 
the mission’s findings, as they had done with the Moss report, thus ensur-
ing that the mission’s report would have greater authority as a basis for 
future policy discussions about child migration.83 Although well-known to 
be sceptical of the value of child migration, Gwyneth Wansbrough-Jones 
was appointed as a second member of the mission, on the assumption that 
direct experience of conditions in Australia might modify her views and 
that these would also carry greater weight with other local authority 
Children’s Officers.84 With no MP able to make the extended visit to 
Australia, the chosen ‘enthusiast’ for child migration was Walter Garnett, 
who was still resident in Australia and brought back from retirement to 
serve on the mission to provide some context and ‘balance’ to any criti-
cisms that the other two members might wish to make.85 Such a combined 
membership appeared well-chosen to enable the mission to draw up pro-
posals for reform which members of the Oversea Migration Board would 
have to accept as the basis for any renewal of funding from 1957 onwards. 
Anticipating that any decisions about future child migration policy would 
also be likely to upset either child-care specialists or those supportive of 
voluntary societies’ migration work, the Commonwealth Relations 
Office’s selection of members of the mission seemed carefully calibrated to 
be able to present its work as balanced and impartial to these competing 
interest groups.86
Little has survived in the archives about the process through which the 
members of the mission reached an agreed position on what they observed 
in the 26 receiving institutions that they visited across Australia.87 Although 
83 See, for example, note by Morley, 7th July 1955, TNA: DO35/6380.
84 See, for example, note by Wimble, 29th September 1955, TNA: DO35/6380. See also 
Garnett to Noble, 18th February 1956, same file, in which Garnett expresses the hope that 
receiving organisations in Australia would provide sufficient reassurance about conditions for 
child migrants to encourage local authorities to give greater support to this work.
85 See, for example, Noble to Garnett, 30th January 1956, TNA: DO35/6380.
86 Note from Morley to Garner, 2nd August 1955, note by Morley, 7th December 1955, 
TNA: DO35/6380.
87 John Ross, though, did later write that whilst Garnett had initially held very different 
views on child-care standards to Ross and Wansbrough-Jones at the start of their work, by 
the end of the process they were all in agreement with the report’s content and nothing had 
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their institutional visits rarely lasted more than half a day and did not 
reveal underlying problems in some institutions, it was clear that John 
Ross was disturbed by what he found and that Walter Garnett’s ‘modify-
ing’ influence on the child-care specialists in the mission ended up being 
less than the Commonwealth Relations Office had anticipated. Even so, 
the UK High Commissioner, Stephen Holmes, wrote in a letter to Saville 
Garner, ‘if Garnett had not been on the Mission, and if I [Holmes] had 
not had two longish talks with Ross, I have no doubt that the report 
would be a great deal more critical of Australian institutions and practice 
than it is’.88 The mission’s report, received by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office at the end of March 1956, was produced on the assump-
tion that it would be publicly available.89 In addition to this, however, 
Ross also forwarded on a series of confidential addenda which provided 
more detailed summaries of the visits that the mission had made to each 
individual institution.90
What became clear from the confidential addenda was that Ross now 
rejected the generally positive picture of Australian institutions provided 
by John Moss, which Ross had previously been willing to trust when he 
had decided to suspend the draft s.33 regulations. At some places, such as 
the Burwood and Normanhurst homes run by Dr Barnardo’s and the 
Methodist Home at Burwood, standards were in line with the smaller resi-
dential units encouraged by the Curtis and their suburban location made 
it possible for the child migrants to build up contacts in the local commu-
nity. In a small number of cases, such as the Murray Dwyer Roman 
Catholic orphanage in New South Wales, more institutionalised or geo-
graphically isolated homes were seen as making considerable efforts to 
support children and encourage their autonomy.91 At most, however, the 
mission found serious failings in either standards of education and training 
been omitted because of internal disagreements between them (see Ross to Shannon, 5th 
July 1956, TNA: DO35/6382).
88 Holmes to Garner, 12th April 1956, TNA: DO35/6381. Holmes added that he regret-
ted that Ross did not follow his suggestion to soften the blow of the report by including in 
it ‘an appreciative acknowledgment of the many kindnesses show the children and the money 
raised in this country’.
89 Telegram, Johnson to Costley-White, 19th March 1956, TNA: DO35/6380.
90 Copies of the confidential addenda are held on TNA: BN29/1325 and DO35/6382.
91 See also confidential addenda on Northcote School, VA; St John’s Church of England 
Home, Canterbury, VA; Burton Hall Farm School, Tatura, VA; Hagley Area Farm School, 
T, TNA: BN29/1325.
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for children,92 the suitability of staff (including institutional managers),93 
poor preparation of children for life after their residential institution,94 
spartan and inadequate accommodation,95 and children experiencing dis-
ruptive transfers within or between institutions on reaching a particular 
age.96 Concerns were also raised about the standards of selection methods 
and transfer of case records for individual children by some sending 
organisations,97 with some children reported to be confused about why 
they had been sent to Australia. Criticism about poor provision of case 
records appears to have related particularly to the work of the Church of 
England Council for Empire Settlement, the Church of Scotland 
Committee on Social Service, the Over-Seas League, the Sisters of 
Nazareth and the Catholic Child Welfare Council. Only a small minority 
of cases were found of children being boarded out, with managers of some 
receiving institutions declaring themselves actively opposed to such a poli-
cy.98 The repeated effect of seeing the effects of children growing up in 
highly institutionalised environments appears to have unsettled the mis-
sion’s members just as much as that experience had disturbed members of 
the Curtis Committee a decade before.99 Many of the worst cases of 
92 See confidential addenda on Fairbridge Farm School, Molong, NSW; St Joseph’s 
Orphanage, Lane Cove, NSW; TNA: BN29/1325.
93 See confidential addenda on Melrose, Pendle Hill, NSW; Riverview Training Farm, 
QLD; Castledare Junior Orphanage, WA; Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, VA; St Joseph’s, 
Neerkol, QLD; Clontarf Boys’ Town, Perth, WA; St Joseph’s Farm School, Bindoon, WA; 
Methodist, Home Victoria Park, WA; Fairbridge Farm School, Pinjarra, WA; St John Bosco 
Boys Town, Glenorchy, T, TNA: BN29/1325.
94 See confidential addenda on Fairbridge Farm School, Molong, NSW; Goodwood 
Orphanage, Adelaide, SA; Nazareth House, East Camberwell, VA; St Joseph’s, Leederville, 
WA; Clontarf Boys’ Town, Perth, WA; Fairbridge Farm School, Pinjarra, WA; St John Bosco 
Boys Town, Glenorchy, T, TNA: BN29/1325.
95 Confidential addenda on St Joseph’s Orphanage, Lane Cove, NSW; Riverview Training 
Farm, QLD; Methodist Home, Magill, SA; Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, VA; St Joseph’s 
Farm School, Bindoon, WA; Swan Homes, Midland Junction, WA; St John Bosco Boys 
Town, Glenorchy, T, TNA: BN29/1325.
96 See confidential addenda on St Joseph’s, Leederville, WA; Methodist, Home Victoria 
Park, WA; also Swan Homes, Midland Junction, WA, TNA: BN29/1325.
97 See confidential addenda on Melrose, Pendle Hill, NSW; Murray Dwyer Orphanage, 
Mayfield, NSW; St John’s Church of England Home, Canterbury, VA; Dhurringile Rural 
Training Farm, VA; Nazareth House, East Camberwell, VA; St Joseph’s, Neerkol, QLD; 
Clarendon Church of England Home, Kingston Park, T, TNA: BN29/1325.
98 See, for example, Fairbridge Farm School, Pinjarra, WA, TNA: BN29/1325.
99 See, for example, confidential addenda on St Joseph’s Orphanage, Lane Cove, NSW; 
Castledare Junior Orphanage, WA; Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, VA; St Joseph’s, 
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 institutionalisation were noted in residential homes run by Catholic reli-
gious orders—homes which John Moss had previously told the Oversea 
Migration Board should be praised for the ‘excellence of their methods’.100 
In sum, the confidential addenda suggested that only around a third of 
those institutions visited by the mission gave confidence that children 
would not be disadvantaged by being sent to them.101
The public report which the mission submitted to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office did not name individual institutions—although in some 
cases sufficient detail was given about institutional practices to make it 
possible to guess which institution was being referred to. However, it did 
not hold back from making substantive criticisms based on the observa-
tions made in the confidential addenda. Selection of children for emigra-
tion was said to be unsatisfactory with too many children sent overseas 
with inadequate records about their backgrounds, despite Moss’s clear 
recommendation on this. Little appreciation was sometimes shown in 
Australia that children with difficult early experiences might find the 
upheaval of emigration a further strain rather than a positive opportunity. 
Cases were noted in which siblings were emigrated but sent to institutions 
too far apart for them to be able to maintain contact. Claims that child 
migrants settled down quickly and well into their new residential homes 
appeared too optimistic. Care was taken in not criticising staff too strongly, 
though it was noted that not all were suited to this work and that there 
appeared to be no specialist child-care training available in Australia com-
parable to that developed in the United Kingdom after the interim Curtis 
report. Specific examples of harmful institutionalisation were noted (draw-
ing on anonymised examples from Castledare and St John Bosco Boys 
Town). Although the report somewhat underplayed the number of such 
institutions that it saw, its comment that progressive ideas had been 
observed in ‘three or four’ medium sized institutions implied that good 
practice was not as pervasive as it might hope. Whilst training and educa-
tion were good in some cases, the practice of one institution (anonymised 
Neerkol, QLD; St Joseph’s Farm School, Bindoon, WA; Methodist, Home Victoria Park, 
WA; St John Bosco Boys Town, Glenorchy, T, TNA: BN29/1325.
100 See Minutes of the third meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 26th November 
1953, TNA: DO35/6375.
101 A Home Office letter to the Commonwealth Relations Office later noted that the con-
fidential addenda suggested that ten institutions were clearly unsuitable for child migrants, 
including both Fairbridge Farm Schools, Castledare, and St Joseph’s, Neerkol (Whittick to 
Shannon, with enclosure, 22nd June 1956, TNA: DO35/6382).
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from the visit to Molong) of requiring most boys to undertake farm train-
ing and girls training in domestic work was seen as inappropriately limit-
ing. The geographical isolation of many institutions was also seen as a 
significant impediment to children’s ability to develop greater indepen-
dence and assimilate successfully into Australian communities, although 
this was mitigated to some extent in those institutions which allowed child 
migrants to attend local schools.
Although often critical in tone about standards that it had found in 
receiving institutions, the report’s greatest impact came in its recommen-
dations. The mission recognised—in line with the Garner committee 
report—that policies of boarding out could only gradually be introduced 
for child migrants. However, the report suggested that if child migrants 
needed to be sent to residential institutions in the future they should be 
small, residential units in or near urban areas, which could serve as recep-
tion centres prior to children being fostered with local families. The list of 
institutions approved for receiving child migrants should be reviewed to 
take into account institutions’ adequacy of staffing, provision for assimilat-
ing children into local communities (including use of holiday family place-
ments), and their standards of accommodation. In future, the mission 
recommended, the emigration of all unaccompanied children from the 
United Kingdom should be subject to the consent of the Secretary of 
State—not just those sent from the care of local authorities.
In his covering letter submitting the report to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, Ross also noted that he had considered making the rec-
ommendations in the report even stronger. The proposed review of insti-
tutions’ approvals could, he suggested, reasonably categorise institutions 
into those which would or would not be allowed to receive more child 
migrants, institutional approvals could be made subject to periodic review 
every three years and no new approvals could be given to large residential 
institutions or institutions that were geographically isolated from sizeable 
local communities.102 More specifically, Ross suggested, those institutions 
which should be considered unsuitable to receive any more children were 
the Riverview Training Farm, the Dhurringile Rural Training Farm, St 
John Bosco Boys’ Town, Methodist Children’s Home Magill, and St 
Joseph’s Farm School, Bindoon.
The strength of these recommendations had not  been anticipated 
by any of the Government departments involved nor by the 
102 Ross to Home, 28th March 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
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Oversea Migration Board. In sum, they represented proposals for a signifi-
cant tightening of control of all forms of assisted child migration by the 
UK Government. Strikingly, given prior discussions of available powers 
under s.33 of the 1948 Children Act, these recommendations did not sug-
gest that s.33 regulations now be introduced, presumably because Ross 
recognised that there was insufficient commitment to expected standards 
in Australia for these to be effective. Instead, the fact-finding mission was 
recommending a major review of approvals for residential institutions in 
Australia which, given the criteria they proposed should be used for this, 
would in practice mean that several of these institutions would have their 
current approval withdrawn. The proposal that the requirement for 
Secretary of State consent now be extended to all children sent overseas 
from the care of voluntary organisations also constituted a stronger con-
trol than those which had been proposed in the s.33 regulations drafted in 
the Home Office. The fact that John Ross had previously ruled out such 
an extension of Secretary of State powers when the content of s.33 regula-
tions had previously been under discussion suggested that he had been 
sufficiently troubled by what he saw in Australia to have become con-
vinced that this stronger measure was now needed.
As soon as the draft report was received by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office in London, it was seen as having gone much further into 
recommendations on future policy than had been expected and plans for 
its wider circulation within Government and to members of the Oversea 
Migration Board were initially delayed. Viscount Swinton and Douglas 
Dodds-Parker had both been replaced during 1955 as Secretary of State 
and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State by Alec Douglas-Home and 
Commander Allan Noble respectively. Both were soon involved in consul-
tations with civil servants about how best to proceed, with Noble particu-
larly involved through his associated role as chair of the Oversea Migration 
Board. Although the report’s policy recommendations were not, in them-
selves, ruled out of hand, its strong intervention was recognised as likely 
to cause exactly the kind of controversy in Australia and amongst support-
ers of assisted child migration in the United Kingdom which the gradualist 
approach to reform had sought to avoid. The fact that the work of the 
Fairbridge Society could clearly be seen in some of the anonymised criti-
cisms made in the report also gave rise to some concern about the political 
reaction this might cause, as did the fact that the report implicitly criticised 
the rigour of approval inspections previously conducted by Australian 
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officials.103 Supporters of voluntary societies in Australia were expected to 
be upset by its findings and the criticism of conditions of care which fell 
under the legal guardianship of the Commonwealth Minister for 
Immigration could also be seen as crossing a line in terms of what the UK 
Government could reasonably comment on.104
Although there was disagreement within the Commonwealth Relations 
Office about whether or not the mission had exceeded its brief,105 it was 
seen as having put the Commonwealth Relations Office in an extremely 
difficult position. Public knowledge of the mission’s work—including 
press coverage in Australia which suggested that the future of assisted 
child migration was dependent on its findings—meant that it was not an 
option simply not to publish it.106 The submission of the confidential 
addenda created an additional problem in making the Commonwealth 
Relations Office aware of significant failings in specific institutions which 
would give grounds for not sending more child migrants to them, but 
where the confidential communication of this material made it difficult to 
explain publicly the grounds on which any refusal for further migration to 
specific institutions might be based. Furthermore, it was anticipated that 
its strong recommendations would re-open conflict with the Home Office 
as to whether the proposed extension of Secretary of State powers should 
be supported or not.107
The Oversea Migration Board was predictably unhappy with the 
report’s contents, arguing that the mission’s members had approached 
their subject with rigid pre-conceptions which ‘they had refused to alter in 
the face of evidence on the spot’.108 The possibility that the views of the 
mission’s members—including Walter Garnett who had long supported 
103 See, for example, Fact-Finding Mission to Australia, Departmental Note, no date; note 
by Costley-White, 7th April 1956; note by Costley-White, 14th May 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6381.
104 See Holmes to Garner, 12th April 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
105 See, for example, the argument by Ian Maclennan, who had replaced Alexander Morley 
as Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the CRO’s Political Division, that the mission had 
not produced a report that was significantly at variance from what might have been expected 
from its brief (note by Maclennan, 10th April 1956, TNA: DO35/6381).
106 See, for example, Fact-Finding Mission to Australia, Departmental Note, no date; note 
from Garner to Douglas-Home, 20th April 1956; note by Noble, 23rd April 1956; note by 
Douglas-Home, 24th April 1956; TNA: DO35/6381. On attempts to maintain a low pro-
file for the mission’s work in Australia, see Holmes to Garner, 12th April 1956, same file.
107 Note by Maclennan, 18th April 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
108 Minutes of meeting of the Oversea Migration Board, 9th May 1956, TNA: DO35/6376.
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the child migration schemes—might have been shaped by concern at what 
they had seen first-hand was not considered, nor was the fact that the 
Board’s members themselves had no direct experience of conditions in 
receiving institutions in Australia. Some on the Board, including Sir Colin 
Anderson,109 asked for it not to be published at all. Lady Bessborough also 
pressed, unsuccessfully, to see an annotated copy of the mission’s report 
which identified specific institutions and voluntary societies which were 
being criticised.110 The report’s recommendation that Secretary of State 
consent might be required in all cases of child migration was also leaked to 
Douglas Dodds-Parker, who privately lobbied the Home Secretary, 
Gwilym Lloyd-George, on behalf of the Fairbridge Society saying that he 
hoped that ‘a Conservative Government will encourage voluntary (empha-
sis original) child welfare organisations’.111 If such requirements for con-
sent were extended, Dodds-Parker argued, someone sympathetic to the 
voluntary societies should be in post at the Home Office to ensure that 
child migration work was not disrupted through consultations about indi-
vidual cases with local authority Children’s Officers.
Despite the Board’s unhappiness with the report, the issue of its publi-
cation proved comparatively straightforward to resolve, with its public 
release delayed so that it would be possible for the Board to comment 
critically on it in its second report that would be published around the 
same time.112 Ian Maclennan, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the 
Commonwealth Relations Office’s Political Division, observed that this 
approach also had the advantage of allowing their department to note 
disagreements between the two reports without seeking to align itself 
immediately with either of their views.113
The confidential addenda submitted by Ross presented a more complex 
problem. In early June, Cyril Costley-White wrote from the Commonwealth 
109 See Anderson to Noble, 4th June 1956; note by Shannon, 9th June 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6381.
110 See note by Costley-White, 25th May 1956; note by Shannon, 28th May 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6381. The annotated copy of the mission’s report is held on the same file.
111 See Whittick to Shannon, with enclosure, 9th July 1956, TNA: DO35/6381. There 
was evident concern within the Commonwealth Relations Office that Lady Bessborough was 
likely to be a source of leaks from the Oversea Migration Board to those sympathetic to child 
migration (see note by Costley-White, 25th May 1956, same file).
112 On this, see note by Garner, 4th May 1956; note to Costley-White from Ewans, 10th 
May 1956; note from Costley-White to Maclennan, 11th May 1956; note by Garner, 14th 
May 1956; note by Ewans to Laithwaite, 18th May 1956.
113 Note by Maclennan, 12th May 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
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Relations Office to Richard Whittick, who had replaced C.P. Hill as the 
Assistant Secretary responsible for child migration in the Home Office, to 
seek his advice about the addenda.114 Whilst, Costley-White noted, his 
department had decided not to share the confidential addenda with the 
Commonwealth Government, the voluntary organisations or the Oversea 
Migration Board, they did however contain highly critical information 
about Dhurringile and Riverview to which five further child migrants were 
about to be sent. This information would normally be grounds for sus-
pending emigration to those institutions. But if such a suspension to those 
specific institutions were put in place, voluntary organisations would natu-
rally ask on what grounds that decision had been made, raising the ques-
tion as to whether a wider, temporary suspension of all assisted child 
migration on the grounds of ‘administrative delay’ might be one way of 
avoiding this bind. The position was made more complicated by the fact 
that the Commonwealth Relations Office had never previously refused to 
give approval for any individual children being sent to Australia through 
the assisted passage scheme.115
Knowledge of the confidential addenda also posed a problem for the 
Home Office who also had to judge how to use this unreleased informa-
tion when considering approval requests for children to be emigrated 
from local authority care under s.17 of the 1948 Act. To try to find a way 
forward, Whittick spoke with Ross to try to understand why he had 
focused only on five specific institutions for ‘black-listing’ in the cover let-
ter accompanying his submission of the mission’s report when the confi-
dential addenda suggested that a larger number of receiving institutions 
were unsuitable.116 Ross’s response indicated that, however controversial 
the reception of the mission’s report might be, he still considered its con-
tents to be a compromise rather than a very frank expression of his views. 
‘Practical politics’ had prevented other institutions (notably the Fairbridge 
Farm Schools) from being included on the ‘black-list’ proposed by Ross, 
and Ross noted that if the mission had been more forthright in its views 
then ‘the battle would be lost from the start’. Given ‘Australian suscepti-
bilities’ (including both those of the Australian Government and the 
Catholic Church), Ross thought that it was better on balance to continue 
114 Costley-White to Whittick, 9th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6381; also note by Costley- 
White, 14th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6382.
115 See note by Oates, 11th June 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
116 See note by Whittick, 23rd June 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
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to send children to institutions that he had strongly criticised until a for-
mal review of all receiving institutions could be set in place after the mis-
sion’s report had been published. The suggestion that the confidential 
addenda be circulated more widely to make clear the grounds of refusals 
of emigration to particular institutions was one against which Ross 
objected very strongly.117 The solution on which both departments settled 
was to put into place an informal suspension of any further approvals until 
the autumn, justified to any enquiries by voluntary societies as being 
caused by ‘administrative delay’. Some compromise had to be accepted 
even on this, though, as the Fairbridge Society successfully pressed the 
Commonwealth Relations Office to agree to fund the emigration of 16 
children to Pinjarra and Molong that summer, with the threat that any 
delays might lead to questions being raised in Parliament.118
It was soon recognised, however, that whilst delaying publication of the 
mission’s report might mollify members of the Board, it would not deal 
with all of its public and political consequences. Godfrey Shannon, 
Assistant Under-Secretary for the General Division in the Commonwealth 
Relations Office had taken over the management of this process from 
Maclennan and noted that divergent opinions in reports published from 
the Board and the mission would not necessarily be seen as equally author-
itative.119 The Board had no members with expertise in child-care and, 
unlike members of the mission, had not directly observed conditions in 
Australian institutions themselves. It was almost inevitable, Shannon 
anticipated, that questions would be asked on the basis of the mission’s 
findings as to whether the UK Government considered current 
117 Ross confirmed these views with Shannon and objected to him that records of Home 
Office inspections were never directly shared with criticised institutions and that normal 
practice was to use these notes as a basis for letters to those institutions requiring particular 
improvements (see note by Shannon, 28th June 1956; Ross to Shannon, 28th June 1956, 
TNA: DO35/6382).
118 See note by Johnson, 2nd July 1956; note by Shannon, 5th July 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6382. Two children were also approved for emigration to Riverview at the same 
time, on the basis that child migrants were only resident there for a relatively short period of 
time (note by Shannon, 27th July 1956, same file).
119 Shannon was evidently not always well-briefed on the background to the mission’s 
work, suggesting in one note that the voluntary societies might question the qualifications of 
the mission’s members and asking for more information on this, only to be told by another 
member of his department that little information was available (see note by Shannon, 18th 
July 1956; note by Costley-White, 19th July 1956; note by Shannon, 19th July 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6381).
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 arrangements for the child migration work it was funding to be suitable. 
To mitigate this challenge, Shannon suggested, it would be advisable for 
the Australian Commonwealth Government to initiate some kind of 
review before publication of the mission’s report to demonstrate that 
these questions were already receiving serious further attention and to tie 
Australian authorities into supporting any necessary changes.120 Such an 
initiative would only be meaningful, Shannon noted, if engaged with seri-
ously by the Australian authorities and they did not seek a review which 
simply gave ‘a smug finding that all is well and that the mission’s criticisms 
are unjustified’. Shannon later noted that this might suggest a further 
delay to publication of the mission’s report might be advisable, both to 
give Australian authorities time to initiate such a review and to avoid the 
report causing unhelpful tensions prior to important imminent economic 
discussions between the United Kingdom and Australian Governments.121 
It would also, another senior official agreed, give the Australians time ‘to 
get their house in order’.122 Such a delay, it was also realised, could have 
the political advantage of allowing publication during the Parliamentary 
recess in August so that questions about the mission’s work could not 
immediately be raised in Parliament.123
Whilst the Commonwealth Department of Immigration agreed, after 
further urging, to initiate such a review, Shannon’s plan received strong 
private criticism from Whittick who tried to pressure Shannon into accept-
ing that the Australian review would include a member of the Home 
Office Children’s Inspectorate.124 Without such representation on the 
review, Whittick argued, it would lack appropriate expertise in standards of 
child-care in the United Kingdom and there was a risk that if the Australian 
review exonerated all of the criticised institutions, the Commonwealth 
Relations Office would have to choose between accepting the less expert 
Australian view or the views of the experts that the Commonwealth 
Relations Office had itself selected to undertake the fact-finding mission. 
120 See note by Shannon, 29th May 1956; note by Garner, 29th May 1956; Telegram 
Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commission, 6th June 1956; Telegram 
Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commission, 9th June 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6381.
121 Note by Shannon, 9th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
122 Note by (name unclear, possibly Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-Secretary), 11th 
June 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
123 Note by Shannon, 12th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
124 Note by Whittick, 10th July 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
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Citing the urgency of setting up the review —given the need to get it 
underway before publication of the mission’s report—and the delay that 
would be caused by negotiating the involvement of a Home Office offi-
cial, Shannon refused. Whilst Whittick accepted that no more could be 
done to influence a matter that fell simply within the Commonwealth 
Relations Office’s responsibility, he also found little support from Edward 
Gwynn,125 who had replaced Ross as the Assistant Under-Secretary in 
charge of the Children’s Department. Whittick, Gwynn noted, had made 
the doubtful assumption that Home Office involvement in the Australian 
review would produce a clear consensus between the United Kingdom 
and Australian officials when, in reality, it would probably embroil the 
Home Office in an even more contentious argument with Australian offi-
cials than the mission’s report would already cause. Seeing little benefit to 
that course of action, Gwynn decided that the Home Office’s responsibili-
ties to the Australian review would best be limited to the offer of the 
Home Office providing ‘general advice’ to the Australian authorities about 
child-care standards with the Australians being left to take their own 
responsibility about how to use this advice. The Commonwealth Relations 
Office also took a similar line to Gwynn, refusing Australian pressure to 
make a member of the UK High Commission a formal member of their 
review team, on the basis that such involvement could become an unhelp-
ful source of tension in the future.126 Instead, the Official Secretary to the 
UK High Commissioner, Anthony Rouse, was attached to the Australian 
review as an observer.
Whittick’s concerns proved prescient.127 Tasman Heyes agreed to the 
Commonwealth Department of Immigration undertaking a review only 
on the basis that his department would be able to see in advance the con-
fidential addenda on the five institutions that Ross had identified for par-
ticular censure. Having been pressed to prioritise reviews of these particular 
institutions by the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Department of 
Immigration declined to visit the Methodist Magill Home (as it was not 
proposed that any more child migrants would be received there) or the 
Riverview Training Farm (on the basis that child migrants sent there were 
very close to school-leaving age and only normally lived there for three 
125 Note by Gwynn, 12th July 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
126 Note by Shannon, 11th July 1956, TNA: DO35/6382.
127 Documents relating to this Australian review were compiled in Fraser to Johnson, 20th 
September 1956, with enclosures, TNA: DO35/6382.
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months before being sent into work placements). Of the remaining three 
institutions, St John Bosco Boys’ Town was judged by the Australian 
review team to provide adequate care for children who had previously 
lived in Catholic residential homes in the United Kingdom, and Bindoon 
and Dhurringile were judged only to need relatively superficial improve-
ments to their accommodation which it was claimed could comfortably be 
completed within three months. As the mission had apparently only raised 
serious concerns about 3 institutions out of the 26 it had visited, which 
the Australian review team felt were either ungrounded or easily rectified, 
the Australian Commonwealth Government took the view that there were 
no reasonable grounds for any further delays to the normal resumption of 
the child migrant programme.
The credibility of the Australian position was, however, weakened by a 
further set of confidential notes about the inspection visits undertaken by 
the review that were compiled by Rouse and sent from the UK High 
Commission back to the Commonwealth Relations Office. Far from 
endorsing the Australian review’s conclusions, as the Australian 
Government claimed, Rouse broadly endorsed the mission’s criticisms and 
added further examples of the poor management and oversight of the 
institutions. As the Australian review had extended its visits to a wider 
range of institutions, Rouse was also able to comment on other institu-
tions not immediately included in the ‘black-list’. He endorsed the mis-
sions’ comments on receiving institutions, both positive and critical, 
noting that the head of the Western Australia State child welfare depart-
ment, Mr McColl, was ‘hardly on speaking terms’ with the Principal of 
Clontarf Boys’ Town, Br Doyle, since McColl ‘had reprimanded him for 
beating one of the boys unnecessarily severely’.128
Although the correspondence about the Australian review (including 
Rouse’s notes) were received by the Commonwealth Relations Office in 
late September, they were not passed on to the Home Office Children’s 
Department until early November. The correspondence elicited a strong 
response from a number of staff, including Whittick and the head of its 
Children’s Inspectorate, Miss A.M. Scorrer. They noted that the Australian 
Government’s understanding of child-care was clearly far removed from 
their own, that there was little hope that Australian authorities would be 
receptive to pressure to change from the Home Office and that there were 
128 Rouse note on Clontarf Boys’ Town, Perth, TNA: DO35/6382.
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no grounds for accepting the Australian conclusion that child migration 
should resume without any further constraints or delay.129
Again, though, Edward Gwynn ruled out any action from the Children’s 
Department that might attract too much controversy. In a meeting with 
Shannon, Gwynn commented that the Home Office were not comfort-
able sending children to institutions like Molong or Castledare about 
which the mission and Rouse had made negative comments, and sug-
gested that the Commonwealth Relations Office might want to try to 
delay any further approvals until the new assisted passage agreements had 
been finalised.130 Shannon took the view that further delays were not 
‘politically practicable’ and Gwynn conceded that, ‘political consider-
ations, which were the province of C.R.O., might well override merits’ 
and that the Home Office would not press its concerns any further. 
Instead, the Children’s Department privately implemented a policy, for 
the time being at least, of not giving consents under s.17 of the 1948 for 
children to be sent from local authority care to particular receiving institu-
tions about which it had concerns. From the perspective of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, the understanding taken from this 
meeting was that that Home Office would ‘prefer not to be embarrassed 
by being consulted [on the emigration of more children] and are prepared 
not to object to our disposing of the applications on our responsibility’.131
Whilst the Australian review was taking place, the process of reviewing 
assisted migration to Australia was, once again, set in motion. The report 
of the fact-finding mission, and the second report of the Oversea Migration 
Board, were published on the same day in mid-August, whilst Ross was 
away on a long, pre-arranged trip to Scandinavia.132 The Board’s report 
reviewed its discussion of child migration policy since its first report in 
1954, noting reasons presented to it as to why numbers of children emi-
grated from the care of local authorities were so low. Whilst recognising 
the changing social conditions that reduced the wider demand for child 
migration, the report nevertheless took the view that child-care policies 
129 See joint note by Northover, Lake and Whittick, 21st November 1956; note by Scorrer, 
21st November 1956; note by Whittick, 27th November 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
130 Note by Whittick, 5th December 1956, TNA: BN29/1325.
131 Note by Gibson, 13th December 1956, TNA: DO35/6382.
132 Second Report of the Oversea Migration Board, cmd.9835, London: HMSO, 1956; 
Child Migration to Australia: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, cmd.9832, London: HMSO, 
1956. See also discussion of report’s text on child migration in minutes of meeting of the 
Oversea Migration Board, 16th May and 13th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6376.
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that were ‘too dogmatic’ and based on ‘rigid principles’ should not be 
allowed to dissuade local authorities from making use of such schemes. 
Noting its decision to recommend a fact-finding mission be undertaken to 
reassure local authorities and provide evidence to support the case for 
increased funding for voluntary societies involved in this work, the report 
went on to note that the Board were not in ‘complete agreement’ with a 
number of its assumptions.
Privately, the Board maintained the view that conditions in Australia 
were acceptable, that the problem lay not with those conditions but with 
the fixed opinions that the members of the mission had brought to their 
work, and that they wished to be able to express their ‘extreme disfavour’ 
with the mission’s report when it was published.133 In public, its criticisms 
were only slightly more muted. The Board’s report criticised the mission 
for not considering whether child migrants successfully settled into work 
after leaving their residential institutions, for insisting on standards of care 
in Australia that were not always achieved in the United Kingdom and for 
not believing assurances made by receiving institutions that children set-
tled down quickly into their new lives overseas. Whilst accepting a number 
of the mission’s more specific recommendations about standards of care, 
the Board objected to the idea that receiving institutions should be in or 
near urban areas, arguing that children could assimilate into local rural 
communities and that getting used to isolation was important if a child 
were to become a farm worker in the future. The Board—in line with the 
views of the Australian Commonwealth Government134—rejected the mis-
sion’s recommendation that Secretary of State consent be required for all 
cases of child migration, arguing that reviews of all individual cases by 
government officials would cause delays which would make recruitment of 
children even harder.
Whilst accepting some areas for improvement in this work, the Board 
therefore took the view that the voluntary societies undertaking child 
migration work still had its confidence and that UK Government fund-
ing for this work should be renewed when current arrangements expired 
in 1957. Although the publication of the Board’s and mission’s report on 
the same day had the desired effect of distracting initial press attention 
133 See note by Ewans, 10th May 1956, TNA: DO35/6381.
134 Heyes to Rouse, 25th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6382, in which Heyes also commented 
that the review of the bona fide nature of child migrant’s cases through immigration officials 
at Australia House had always worked well in the past.
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away from the mission’s report,135 the mission’s views had the opposite 
effect on local authorities’ views than that hoped by the Board when it 
originally recommended that a fact-finding mission be set up. Rather than 
reassuring local authorities that conditions for child migrants in Australia 
were much better than they had previously recognised, the report rein-
forced most Children’s Officers’ views that there were no good grounds 
for significantly increasing the number of children being sent to Australia.136 
Such was the perceived harm done by the mission’s report to the prospects 
of expanding child migration that the Conservative MP, Archer Baldwin, 
wrote to the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Cuthbert Alport, in the summer of 1957, to 
say that he had been asked by the Fairbridge Society to raise a Parliamentary 
question to Alport asking what the Commonwealth Relations Office could 
do to counter this.137 Baldwin, who was also at that point a member of the 
Oversea Migration Board, used one of its meetings to raise the same con-
cerns, with Alport, as chair, suggesting that it might be useful to send one 
or two members of the Board to Australia to undertake another tour of 
institutions which could provide a more positive report.138 With support 
from Tasman Heyes, Alport sought the opinion of his civil servants on this 
idea, including a suggestion from him that one of the members of this 
inspection team should be Lady Bessborough. Led by Shannon, their 
response was that the mission’s report had made less of an impact on pub-
lic opinion than had been expected, that another review so soon after the 
mission risked causing further irritation and conflict with the 
Commonwealth Government and that it would not be advisable to have 
someone closely associated with a child migration organisation such as 
Lady Bessborough to undertake this work. Alport accepted this advice, 
and whilst still wanting to present it to the Board as something still under 
135 See press cuttings held on TNA: DO35/6381.
136 See extract from the County Councils Association Gazette, October 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6381; also Dacey to Gwynn, 31st January 1957, TNA: DO35/6383, which stated 
that the Association’s Children and Welfare Committee had approved a motion stating that 
in view of the fact-finding mission’s report it was unwilling to recommend increasing the 
number of children being sent overseas.
137 Baldwin to Alport, 15th June 1957, TNA: DO35/6382. A copy of Baldwin’s written 
Parliamentary Question is held on TNA: DO35/10273. See also the defensive response to 
this by the Commonwealth Minister for Immigration, Athol Townley (Press statement by 
the Minister for Immigration, 25th July 1957, TNA: DO35/6383).
138 See notes and correspondence on TNA: DO35/6384.
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active consideration, the suggested inspection visit by Board members 
never took place.
comPromise resTored: The 1956 inTer-deParTmenTal 
commiTTee on miGraTion Policy and Beyond
Alongside preparations for publication of the Board’s and mission’s 
reports, and with discussions about the mission’s report with the volun-
tary societies underway, a new inter-departmental committee had already 
been set up to make recommendations about the possible renewal of the 
Empire Settlement Act and the Australian assisted migration pro-
gramme.139 Including representatives from five government departments, 
the committee was chaired by Godfrey Shannon, with Costley-White rep-
resenting the Commonwealth Relations Office and Whittick, the Home 
Office.140 With its text finalised by early September141—before news had 
been received of the outcome of the Australian-led review—the confiden-
tial report reinforced the broad policy direction of the 1954 Garner com-
mittee. Whilst there was support for the UK Government continuing to 
encourage emigration to other Commonwealth countries, there was still 
no great enthusiasm for continuing to contribute financially to the 
Australian assisted migration programme. The committee recommended 
that the assisted migration programme continue with the existing capped 
contribution of up to £150,000 per annum from the UK Government, 
but with this renewal not being actively initiated by the UK Government 
and only put into place if the Australian Commonwealth Government 
requested it.142 Such a request from the Australian Government was 
understood to be almost inevitable, however, as Tasman Heyes had already 
informed the UK High Commission that any withdrawal of this funding 
‘would make a very bad impression on the Australian Government and 
public’ and that many people in Australia, including Heyes himself, did 
139 See notes and correspondence on TNA: DO35/6368. Early drafts of the inter- 
departmental committee’s report prepared by early August 1956 are held on TNA: 
DO35/4880.
140 Although the Scottish Home Department was consulted on its contents, it had no for-
mal representative on the inter-departmental committee, reflecting a wider trend for the 
Scottish Office to have a more peripheral role in shaping child migration policy.
141 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, TNA: 
DO35/10217.
142 Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, paras 43–54.
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not think that the United Kingdom took a sufficient interest in their 
country.143
The same weighing up of strategic interests and economic costs144 
informed the committee’s recommendation that the Empire Settlement 
Act should be renewed again, on the basis that failure to do so would be 
interpreted as an active policy shift by the UK Government against 
Commonwealth emigration with all that would entail for political opposi-
tion at home and overseas strategic relations.145
Although child migration represented only a small fraction of 
Commonwealth emigration,146 the tensions that had arisen over the fact- 
finding mission’s report meant that the committee gave almost as much 
attention to future child migration policy in its report as to all the other 
policy issues it discussed combined.147 Its central working premise was the 
pragmatic acceptance that, whilst the need for assisted child migration was 
at best limited, the interests vested in this work made a complete with-
drawal of support from the UK Government impractical. The report com-
mented that:
If we had been untrammelled by precedent, we might not recommend the 
establishment of a system of subsidised child emigration, or the existing 
methods of operating it. But we have to deal with a well established system 
which has existed with Government support both in Australia and in the 
United Kingdom for over 30 years, has influential support from churches 
and prominent laymen in both countries, and, by most accounts, has bene-
fitted the children who have made use of it. Methods and amenities may, 
and probably do, need to be overhauled and to be brought up to date; but, 
as long as there is a demand, we think (emphasis original) that the system 
can be allowed to continue. Our conclusion on this point is, however, sub-
ject to public reaction to the Fact-Finding Mission’s report. If there were a 
143 Holmes to Garner, 29th June 1956, TNA: DO35/6368.
144 See Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, paras 
4–28, 48–50.
145 See Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1956, paras 49, 120–136. In 
the event, the committee’s recommendation that the Act be renewed for a further 15 years 
from 1957 was not taken up, and the pattern of five-year renewals continued, with 
Commonwealth Settlement Acts subsequently passed in 1962 and 1967.
146 The total of assisted passages for child migrants in the period 1950–1955 made up less 
than 0.1% of all assisted passages to Australia in that period, see Inter-Departmental Report 
on Migration Policy, 1956, paras 45, 60.
147 Inter-Departmental Report on Migration Policy, 1956, paras 57–97.
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strong public demand that the system should be ended, there would be no 
compelling Governmental reason for allowing it to continue. The wishes of 
people in Australia and of the voluntary organisations in the United 
Kingdom might have to give way to public opinion here.148
Although the report noted that there was little strategic value in ending 
child migration, unless public opinion demanded it, such programmes 
should only operate on the basis of the interests of the individual child 
rather than the demand for young immigrants from receiving countries. 
Appropriate selection of children for emigration was clearly crucial for 
ensuring this, but the committee did not support the mission’s recom-
mendation that such selections for all child migrants be made subject to 
Secretary of State consent. The mission’s proposal on this clearly lacked 
support even from the Home Office, who argued that they had insuffi-
cient administrative resources to deal with the increased casework that this 
would require and would prefer such cases be dealt with by the courts if 
some additional level of oversight were needed. The committee’s view, 
however, was that such additional scrutiny, under the authority of the 
Secretary of State, had significant drawbacks and little obvious benefit. It 
would require fresh legislation (with the likely Parliamentary challenges 
this would involve) and would be the focus of strong opposition both 
from voluntary organisations (and ‘their influential supporters’) and the 
Oversea Migration Board. Furthermore, the Shannon committee took the 
view that the number of unsuitable children being sent overseas was prob-
ably now lower than it had been in the past and that the kind of additional 
oversight proposed by the mission might not succeed in identifying these 
remaining cases anyway (an argument which implicitly questioned the 
apparent safeguard of Secretary of State’s consent for children sent from 
local authority care).
The report endorsed the fact-finding mission’s call for a fresh review to 
be undertaken of the approvals of individual receiving institutions, but 
proposed that the current review that had been started by the Australian 
Commonwealth Government would be a sufficient means of achieving 
this. Recognising, as the Garner committee had done, that further reforms 
were needed to make receiving homes in Australia less ‘institutional’, the 
148 Inter-Departmental Report on Migration Policy, 1956, para 69. The phrase ‘untram-
melled by precedent’ was one that Whittick himself had added (see Whittick to Costley- 
White, with enclosure, 21st August 1956, TNA: DO35/4881.
 G. LYNCH
289
report noted that the introduction of s.33 regulations would probably be 
of limited value in achieving this without the support of Australian author-
ities for required standards and their introduction would, again, only serve 
to antagonise the voluntary societies involved.
In conclusion, the report proposed that the best approach would be to 
try to ensure Australian agreement both on basic principles of child-care 
standards and on the need for government officials to ensure that these 
were adhered to by voluntary organisations. Alongside this, rather than 
introducing formal s.33 regulations, it was proposed that the 
Commonwealth Relations Office would use the renewal of funding agree-
ments with voluntary organisations in 1957 as an opportunity to secure 
their agreement to Home Office inspections of their working practices in 
the United Kingdom and to them providing information about the stan-
dards of care provided for their child migrants overseas. For the Home 
Office, this solution had the attraction of bringing voluntary organisa-
tions’ child migration activities under its inspectorate on comparable terms 
to its existing inspections of other forms of child-care by local authorities 
and voluntary societies in England and Wales. Such an arrangement would 
also create the conditions in which voluntary organisations would feel 
obligated to co-operate with informal inspections whilst allowing the 
Home Office to avoid the burden and limitations of introducing and 
enforcing s.33 regulations. In short, after the disruption caused by the 
fact-finding mission, the Shannon committee report re-instated the previ-
ous gradualist approach to reform for child migration rather than moving 
towards the more dramatic intervention recommended by the mission. 
The policy impact of the mission’s direct observation of conditions in 
Australian institutions had now all but faded.
Despite the outcome of the Australian review demonstrating that there 
was little prospect of Australian authorities either being willing to enforce 
suitable standards, the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office 
agreed to continue this gradualist approach. With the Cabinet agreeing to 
the proposed renewal of what was now to be the Commonwealth 
Settlement Act at a meeting in late October,149 Conservative whips con-
tacted the Commonwealth Relations Office to ask that it meet with 
149 See notes and correspondence on TNA: DO35/10217, including Whittick to Costley- 
White, 9th October 1956, which indicates the Home Office view that the criticisms of the 
fact-finding mission were not enough to warrant complete discontinuation of child migra-
tion but that ‘the voluntary organisations must mend at least some of their ways’.
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 voluntary organisations before the introduction of the legislation in 
December. It was anticipated that the introduction of this Bill would elicit 
Parliamentary questions about future child migration policy, and the 
whips wanted to ensure that the voluntary organisations had been fully 
briefed about the new measures in advance of this.150 Lord John Hope, 
who had replaced Allan Noble as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations, chaired the meeting and set out the pro-
posed new arrangements linked to the 1957 funding renewals.151 Whilst 
seeking to strike a collaborative tone, emphasising that the Government 
wished to continue to work in a constructive partnership with the volun-
tary organisations, Hope also implied that if the organisations were not 
prepared to sign up to the new ‘voluntary’ agreements then the 
Government might find itself under irresistible pressure to introduce for-
mal regulations and hinted that broadening requirements for Secretary of 
State consent might not be quite as impractical as the voluntary organisa-
tions had claimed. Once again, the threat of regulation seemed a more 
useful tool for Government officials than the actual introduction of regu-
lations themselves. Whilst successfully objecting to a Home Office pro-
posal that its officials be allowed to observe selection interviews with 
prospective child migrants and their parents, the voluntary organisations 
duly agreed to Home Office inspections of their records in the United 
Kingdom and to ensure information was provided about standards of care 
overseas.152 The proforma documents drawn up by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office and Home Office on the range of information to be 
required from voluntary societies did not explicitly prescribe expected 
standards in the same way that the draft s.33 regulations had done.153 
However, by requesting information about voluntary societies’ selection 
methods, pre-emigration preparation of children, arrangements for 
escorts, transfer of records overseas, and the training, staffing, after-care 
and arrangements for boarding out for child migrants once overseas, the 
implication was that voluntary societies would now be more actively 
150 Shannon to Lintott, 30th November 1956, TNA: DO35/6383.
151 See Child Migration, verbatim report of meeting with representatives of voluntary 
organisations, 14th December 1956, TNA: DO35/6383.
152 See Sudbury to voluntary societies, with enclosures 27th December 1956; Child migra-
tion, Replies of Voluntary Organisations, TNA: DO35/6383.
153 Compare Sudbury to voluntary societies, with enclosures 27th December 1956, TNA: 
DO35/6383, with Statutory instruments, Child and Young Persons, The Emigration of 
Children Regulations, TNA: MH102/2047.
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 monitored to check their compliance with standards that had already been 
discussed with them for a number of years.
Whilst this increased monitoring of voluntary societies’ work appeared 
to be an approach that would further nudge voluntary societies towards 
reform of their child migration work, its effects in reality were at best 
mixed. It had been assumed in the Shannon report that the review of all 
approvals of receiving institutions prior to the renewal of funding agree-
ments would be undertaken by a direct inspection of each institution by 
Commonwealth and State officials, accompanied by an observer from the 
UK High Commission.154 In reality, however, the Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration insisted that these approvals should be based 
on short reports produced only by State officials,155 replicating the same 
process for providing information on receiving institutions that the fact- 
finding mission had shown to have failed in a number of cases. The 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office also generally pre-
ferred to use this review process to encourage voluntary organisations to 
improve conditions in receiving institutions in Australia rather than refus-
ing outright to renew their approval, with Whittick showing little inclina-
tion to engage in this process in any detail.156 Having received the fresh 
reports from the Commonwealth Department of Immigration, there was 
still some discomfort in the Commonwealth Relations Office at the pros-
pect of children being sent to unsatisfactory institutions. It did raise spe-
cific concerns about five institutions which had been criticised by the 
mission: Riverview, Dhurringile, Castledare, Bindoon and St John Bosco 
Boys’ Town, although the head of its General Department discouraged 
suspension of approval from St John Bosco Boys’ Town, as he judged it 
‘not… bad enough to warrant a quarrel with the Catholics’.157 Recognising 
that the point of making new funding agreements was a moment of greater 
leverage over voluntary societies, the UK High Commission was asked to 
approach the Commonwealth Department of Immigration to establish 
whether it felt it would be possible to press the relevant voluntary organ-
isations for improvements on these five specific institutions before the 
154 On this expectation, see also Telegram Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High 
Commissioner, 6th December 1956, TNA: DO35/6383.
155 See, for example, Heyes to Official Secretary, 3rd May 1957, TNA: DO35/10273.
156 See, for example, note by Johnson, 13th June 1957, TNA: DO35/10247.
157 Note by Gibson, 17th June 1957. TNA: DO35/10247.
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agreements were signed.158 In reply, the UK High Commission confirmed 
that the Australian authorities saw no need to do this. The Commonwealth 
Department of Immigration did agree to check on whether staffing levels 
at Castledare were any more adequate than those observed by the mission, 
with approval later agreed for Castledare on the basis of small staff increas-
es.159 However, it otherwise re-stated its view from the previous summer 
that, given that minor physical improvements required at Bindoon and 
Dhurringile had now been made, there was no reason for approval of any 
of these other institutions to be suspended.160 Ultimately, although the 
approvals of a small number of institutions were allowed to lapse because 
there were no plans to recruit more British child migrants to them, no 
approvals were actively refused by the UK Government and sending 
organisations in the United Kingdom were simply encouraged to work 
with their partners in Australia to improve conditions in particular institu-
tions instead.161 The problem of trying to influence conditions in receiving 
institutions in Australia—short of full suspension of approvals—once again 
proved intractable.
Inspections of voluntary societies’ operations proved somewhat more 
productive. A visit to the offices of the Church of England Council for 
Commonwealth and Empire Settlement by Home Office inspectors raised 
a number of concerns.162 The Council’s administrator, Enid Jones, was 
found to have been undertaking the Council’s child migration work virtu-
ally by herself and without any effective oversight. Full case histories had 
not been produced for children being sent to Australia under the Council’s 
auspices, the Council had no effective means of checking whether children 
had changed their minds about emigrating before they were placed on 
ship, children’s records had not been properly transferred to receiving 
institutions in the past, and monitoring of children it had placed overseas 
158 Telegrams, Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner, 21st June 
1957, TNA: DO35/10273.
159 See correspondence on NAA: K403, W1959/89.
160 Telegram, UK High Commissioner to Commonwealth Relations Office, 28th June 
1957, TNA: DO35/10271.
161 Renewed funding agreements and associated approvals of receiving institutions are held 
on TNA: DO35/10242 (Northcote), DO35/10247 (Federal Catholic Immigration 
Committee), DO35/10251 (Fairbridge), DO35/10261 (Dr Barnardo’s Homes), 
DO35/10269 (Church of England Council for Commonwealth and Empire Settlement), 
DO35/10271 (Salvation Army), DO35/10272 (National Children’s Home), DO35/10275 
(Church of Scotland Committee on Social Service).
162 See Whittick to Jones, 22nd April 1958, TNA: DO35/10268.
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was ineffectual. The failings were judged sufficiently serious for Whittick 
to suggest that if the Council did not take appropriate remedial action, 
then this might constitute a failure to uphold its funding agreement with 
the UK Government, and any further approval for emigration of children 
by the Council under the agreement might need to be suspended.163 No 
comment appears to have been made at this point about Lady Beesborough’s 
close relationship to the Council or her endorsement of its work. By the 
autumn of 1960, Home Office inspectors were satisfied that the Council’s 
working practices were sufficiently improved for the threat of suspension 
to be withdrawn, but from this point on the Council only sent another 
three child migrants to Australia under this agreement.164 Similar criti-
cisms were also made about the administrative arrangements of the 
Catholic Child Welfare Council’s emigration sub-committee which almost 
entirely ended its child migration activities when the ‘voluntary’ inspec-
tion regime came into effect in 1957.
The Commonwealth Relations Office still judged it politically expedi-
ent to offer public statements of support for the voluntary societies still 
undertaking this work—particularly the Fairbridge Society—and the 
Oversea Migration Board continued its efforts to promote child migra-
tion.165 In reality, though, any lingering enthusiasm for supporting this 
work within the UK Government was fading. When the Prime Minister, 
Harold MacMillan, met with the Australian Commonwealth Cabinet dur-
ing a tour of Australia in spring 1958, the need to fill a thousand existing 
vacancies for British child migrants in Australian receiving institutions was 
directly raised with him.166 Despite this being discussed with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office on MacMillan’s return to Britain, no 
initiative was taken to address this. When its civil servants and ministers 
became aware of a crisis surrounding Dr Barnardo’s Homes’ farm school 
at Picton in the summer of 1958, in which a number of men were con-
victed of sexual offences against boys in their work placements, serious 
consideration was given in the Commonwealth Relations Office to ending 
163 Whittick to Clearly, 4th February 1959, TNA: DO35/10268.
164 Note by Peters, 8th September 1960, TNA, DO35/10269. On the potential removal 
of the Council from the agreements renewed in 1960, see note by Peters, 21st April 1960, 
TNA: DO35/10255.
165 See, for example, the publicising of child migration organisations’ work in Fourth 
Report of the Oversea Migration Board, cmd.619, London: HMSO, 1958.
166 Record of meeting between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the 
Australian Prime Minister and Cabinet, 11th February 1958, TNA: CAB21/3153.
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immediately the department’s funding agreement with the charity.167 An 
adjournment debate in the House of Commons initially proposed by the 
Conservative MP, Nigel Fisher, in support of child migration in July 1958 
was postponed until the following February when Alport contacted Fisher 
to suggest the timing could be unhelpful if the debate gave any publicity 
to the scandal at Picton.168 When it was eventually held on 9th February 
1959, Alport gave a glowing account of the value of this work.169 However, 
his private briefing notes from civil servants suggested that the primary 
drivers for post-war child migration had been Australian Commonwealth 
immigration policy and the interest of voluntary organisations in this 
work, and identified no particular value in it from the perspective of the 
UK Government.170
By the start of the 1960s, child migration was in significant decline. 
The Oversea Migration Board no longer discussed it in its meetings or 
annual reports.171 From 1961 onwards, only the Fairbridge Society and Dr 
Barnardo’s Homes continued this work to any degree, with Quarriers’ 
Orphan’s Homes also briefly sending small parties of children to 
Dhurringile. The total number of assisted child migrants going to Australia 
each year now regularly fell below a hundred. A Commonwealth Relations 
Office analysis suggested that, by 1960, of the 1914 places available for 
British child migrants in Australia, 1347 were vacant.172 Despite several 
hundred British children still being in residential institutions in Australia, 
the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office seemed to give up 
any hope of being able to influence conditions for child migrants once 
they arrived in Australia. Correspondence between the Scottish Home 
Department and the Home Office in the spring of 1960 indicated that the 
Home Office had received no reports from Australian authorities about 
conditions in receiving institutions since the reports provided for the 
renewed funding agreements in 1957.173 Although Whittick generally 
167 See note by Johnson, 15th July 1958, and other notes and correspondence, TNA: 
DO35: 10260.
168 See Fisher to Alport, 24th October 1958, TNA: DO35/10252.
169 House of Commons Hansard, 9th February 1959, vol. 599, cols 949–970.
170 See Child Migration, Brief for Parliamentary Secretary, no date, TNA: DO35/10252.
171 See, for example, notes and minutes on TNA: DO35/10282; The Sixth Report of the 
Oversea Migration Board, cmd.1243 (London: HMSO, 1960); The Seventh Report of the 
Oversea Migration Board, cmd.1586 (London: HMSO, 1961).
172 Peters to Whittick, with enclosure, 15th February 1960, TNA: DO35/10255.
173 See Whittick to Walker, 3rd February 1960, NRS: ED11/386.
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seemed satisfied with the periodic visits that Home Office inspectors made 
to sending organisations in the United Kingdom, there seemed little inter-
est in trying to force greater collaboration from Australian Commonwealth 
or State officials. The Commonwealth Relations Office was also aware that 
no reports on individual institutions had been received since 1957 when it 
came to consider the renewal of funding agreements with voluntary soci-
eties at the start of 1960, but no action was taken to chase the Australian 
Government for this information and funding agreements with voluntary 
societies were renewed without them.174 By this stage, even the 
Commonwealth Department for Immigration seemed resigned to writing 
off the investment made in trying to attract British child migrants in any 
significant numbers. When it commissioned a major review of the assimila-
tion of child immigrants to Australia, published in 1960, its programme of 
assisted migration for unaccompanied child migrants was not even 
mentioned.175
Despite this growing apathy, the influence of precedent continued. 
Discussion of child migration policy in the report of 1961 Inter- 
Departmental Committee on Migration Policy was far terser than in the 
Shannon report five years before.176 Noting the wider social trends—and 
changing attitudes to child-care—which had made child migration an 
increasingly unattractive option, the report noted that the societies under-
taking this work ‘have virtually outlived their usefulness and the Home 
Office has considerable reservations about their standards of child care in 
such work as remains to them’. However, given that societies such as 
Fairbridge still had considerable political support, including on the 
Oversea Migration Board, there was little point in failing to renew child 
migration agreements under the Act given the controversy this would 
entail. As the report bluntly put it, ‘it would be particularly unfortunate to 
rouse fruitless controversy when the amount of money involved is so small 
and the societies themselves are likely to die a natural death before long for 
lack of child migrants’. The renewal could be used, however, to ask the 
Australian Commonwealth Government to take responsibility for the 
174 See Peters to Claydon, 20th January 1960; Claydon to Peters, 21st January 1960; 
Peters to Cleary, 28th January 1960; Cleary to Shannon, 2nd February 1960, TNA: 
DO35/10255.
175 The Progress and Assimilation of Migrant Children in Australia, Canberra: 
Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council, 1960.
176 See Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Migration Policy, 1961, TNA: 
DO175/33, section III.
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entire costs of assisted child migration—in return for a larger United 
Kingdom contribution to the larger Australian assisted migration pro-
gramme. This would have the benefit of removing the administrative bur-
den from these schemes from the Commonwealth Relations Office, but 
would be proposed on the basis that the Australians would be willing to 
withdraw this funding from voluntary organisations if they did not keep 
up the existing ‘voluntary’ arrangements in place with the UK Government 
in relation to their standards. The gradualist approach to reforming child 
migration had, in this policy judgement, run as far as it could, and the best 
that could be hoped for was to try to constrain bad practice until such time 
as the schemes wound down through lack of available children.
That process took somewhat longer than might have been expected. 
The assisted migration of British children without their parents to Australia 
continued until 1970, but the work of the Fairbridge Society carried on 
after this. In 1957, recognising the growing pressures in finding children 
for emigration without their parents, the Society had instituted one-parent 
and two-parent schemes in which children would be sent to their farm 
schools in Australia on a more temporary basis until their parent had also 
emigrated, successfully set up home and could receive them back into 
their care.177 This scheme continued after the last unaccompanied child 
migrants had gone to Australia in 1970 and attracted far larger numbers 
of children than their original work with children sent without their par-
ents.178 Child migration to Australia ended, as it had begun, at the 
Fairbridge farm school at Pinjarra, gradually fading from public awareness 
until the experiences of the early post-war child migrants began to receive 
greater attention later in the 1980s.179
177 See, for example, notes and correspondence on TNA: DO35/10250. The Home Office 
were reported to be unhappy about the period of separation between parents and children 
on this scheme, with the Fairbridge Society offering in 1960 to amend it so that children 
sailed out on the same ship as their parents rather than before them (see Peters to Cleary, 
28th January 1960; Peters to Vaughan, 18th July 1960, TNA: DO35/10255).
178 See Sherington and Jeffrey, Fairbridge, p. 363, which indicates that 1900 children were 
received at Pinjarra between 1960 and 1980. The vast majority of these would have been 
sent under the one- or two-parent scheme.
179 See Murray and Rock, ‘Child migration schemes to Australia’.
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CHAPTER 8
‘Avoiding Fruitless Controversy’: UK Child 
Migration and the Anatomy of Policy Failure
My job teaches me always to remember that history consists, so to 
speak, of men and women, and not of Archangels. In thinking out a 
solution for any of the problems with which I have to deal, I have 
always to ask myself not only “Is this the right solution?” but also, “Is 
it, under our existing form of government, a practicable solution?”… 
And that difficulty runs, in a greater or lesser degree, right through 
history; so that we must remember that the reason why wrong things 
are done is not always, or even often, because the people concerned 
were wicked or stupid, but possibly because they seemed to them  
to be, in all the circumstances, the best things that could be  
done at the moment.
—Geoffrey Whiskard, UK High Commissioner to 
Australia, 1936–41
One of the notable features of former child migrants’ accounts of trau-
matic aspects of their experience is that they are, for the most part, unsur-
prising given what appears in archival records. Their recollections of their 
lack of clarity about the reasons for their emigration, or their lack of 
informed consent to it, find echoes in repeated references to some volun-
tary organisations’ poor selection methods and insufficient preparation of 
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children they were sending overseas. Child migrants’ lack of knowledge 
about their family origins in the United Kingdom, and the effects on their 
lives of false claims that they were orphans, is reflected in the frequent 
concerns expressed about failures to send child migrants’ case histories 
with them. Other traumatic aspects of child migrants’ experiences related 
to their time in residential institutions, of which many have since com-
plained as being rigid, impersonal and over-dependent on their labour. Yet 
all of these elements of residential institutions had been critiqued in some 
detail by the Curtis report and were the subject of numerous policy discus-
sions about the suitability of large, socially and geographically isolated 
institutions as places for accommodating child migrants. The extent of 
exploitation and physical and sexual abuse of child migrants at the Western 
Australian institutions run by the Christian Brothers would doubtless have 
come as a shock to the British policy-makers who oversaw this work, even 
though standards at these institutions had at various times been a source 
of concern. But given what was known about the importance of regular 
inspections of residential homes, the failure of the UK Government to 
implement any such monitoring and the growing evidence of the unreli-
ability of oversight by Australian officials, it is unsurprising that such cul-
tures of abuse were able to persist in those institutions for so many years.
The harms to which child migrants were exposed, and the failures of 
systems to protect their welfare, were thus far from unpredictable given 
expected standards of child-care and child protection in the early post-war 
period. Furthermore, although child migration programmes to Australia 
had, by 1939, come to be seen as one of the most effective parts of assisted 
migration policy by officials in the Dominions Office, British policy- 
makers’ enthusiasm for this work grew substantially cooler in the post-war 
period. The harms to which many post-war child migrants to Australia 
were exposed therefore took place in the context of programmes which 
British policy-makers saw as having limited national strategic value.
We therefore return to the question with which this book began of why 
post-war child migration from the United Kingdom to Australia resumed 
and continued against the grain of child-care standards reflected in the 
Curtis report and the 1948 Children Act. How was it that the policy aim 
of improving standards of children’s out-of-home care in this period failed 
to be implemented effectively in these programmes?
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Policy Failure and Policy-Makers’ PercePtions 
oF the liMits oF their Powers
The answer to this question lies partly in conflicting policy timetables and 
priorities. Although policy discussions between the Home Office and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office were limited during the initial resump-
tion of child migration to Australia from 1947 onwards, from 1950 they 
evolved into protracted attempts to negotiate between the competing 
demands of assisted migration policy and the drive to improve standards 
of care for children. Given the United Kingdom’s political, economic and 
military interests in good relations with Australia, and the Commonwealth 
Government’s ambitious immigration policy, child migration became a 
means for managing wider political and economic tensions surrounding 
the Anglo-Australian assisted migration programme. This found its most 
instrumental expression in discussions around the 1950 Syers committee 
report which suggested that maintaining the UK Government’s compara-
tively small financial commitment to child migration could sweeten the pill 
of substantial cuts to the larger budget for other forms of assisted migra-
tion to Australia. Whilst this was never understood as an explicit sacrificing 
of children’s welfare for the national interest, British policy-makers’ dis-
cussions of post-war child migration remained shrouded in a sense that 
safeguarding child migrants’ welfare had to be pursued in ways that took 
account of the sensitivities of Australian policy-makers, voluntary organ-
isations and wider public opinion. The policy of gradualist reform of child 
migration which was to become the basis of a, sometimes fragile, consen-
sus between the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office from 
1954 was forged in the spirit of managing these competing interests.
Whilst the influence of such ‘high politics’ on post-war child migration 
to Australia is already recognised in both academic and public discussions 
of this history,1 there is value in developing a more fine-grained analysis of 
the ways in which civil servants and government ministers in Britain made 
sense of these compromises. It would be relatively easy to understand the 
resumption and continuation of post-war child migration to Australia if 
those policy-makers had coldly regarded risks to child migrants’ welfare as 
a necessary evil in managing diplomatic relations with Australia. This was 
not the case, however. From when the first critical accounts of Australian 
1 See, e.g., Constantine, ‘The British Government’; Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual 
Abuse, Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report.
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receiving institutions began to be received back in London in the late 
1930s, civil servants and ministers typically reacted with concern to 
accounts of poor selection, care, training and after-care. Their responses 
were clearly not usually effective in producing better safeguards for child 
migrants and there were evidently occasions when they failed to treat reas-
surances about improving standards in Australia with sufficient scrutiny. 
But their response was never one of pure indifference.
Nor was it the case that British policy-makers lacked sufficient informa-
tion about shortcomings in child migration work. The failure of the UK 
Government to establish annual, independent inspection visits to receiv-
ing institutions in Australia certainly meant that it was over-dependent on 
systems of reporting from Australian officials which were compromised by 
their wider policy interest in maintaining and increasing child migration as 
well as informal reports, such as the one produced by John Moss, which 
were not as critical as direct inspections by the Home Office were likely to 
have been. Despite this, though, British officials had sufficient knowledge 
of problems in the working methods of some sending organisations in the 
United Kingdom and at some receiving institutions in Australia to have 
taken more decisive action in response to this—and had numerous oppor-
tunities when they could have done so.
Rather than being the result of ignorance or indifference, the attitudes 
and decisions made by British policy-makers in relation to post-war child 
migration are better understood in terms of the ways in which they per-
ceived their power to be limited. Whilst the development of the post-war 
welfare state created anxieties amongst some supporters of voluntarism 
that the British state would become more centralised, impersonally 
bureaucratic and over-controlling, in government, civil servants and min-
isters experienced their power as being far more constrained than this.
In the context of child migration, some of these constraints related to 
limitations of resource. Whilst discussions between the UK High 
Commission in Canberra and the Dominions Office in 1945 were, for 
example, clearly sympathetic to the idea of regular monitoring visits to all 
receiving institutions in Australia, lack of staff resources at the High 
Commission meant that this was never made a priority. Similarly staff in 
the Home Office Children’s Department also periodically rejected admin-
istrative measures that would have allowed greater oversight over child 
migration and other forms of out-of-home care on the grounds that they 
would add too great an administrative burden on its staff.
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Another perceived constraint on power—sometimes as much assumed 
by civil servants as consciously reflected on—was precedent. In 1945, 
there had been considerable discussion within the Dominions Office 
about the problems that had emerged in relation to Australian receiving 
institutions during the war, future standards that might be expected and 
even the possibility of children no longer being sent to the Fairbridge 
Farm School at Pinjarra. However, when the Australian Commonwealth 
and State governments set out their plans for the resumption of assisted 
child migration in August 1946, the unquestioned assumption within the 
Dominions Office was that the pre-war precedent of the UK Government 
also giving financial support to this work would be followed. Such per-
ceived constraints were made particularly explicit in the 1956 Shannon 
committee report which stated that ‘if we were untrammelled by prece-
dent’ then the Government would not choose to support child migration 
programmes of this kind. The report noted, however, that precedents for 
this work had, by then, become such an assumed part of the relationship 
between the UK and Australian Governments and influential churches and 
voluntary organisations that it could not be ended unless there was a suf-
ficient public outcry against this policy.
Far from simply being the expression of intellectual laziness or passivity, 
such deference to the principle of precedence had positive value in the 
decision-making worlds of civil servants.2 Precedent had the value of 
establishing policy frameworks in which civil servants could operate, and 
helped to set limits on what needed to become a matter for fresh decision- 
making. Precedent made possible stable collaborations with other institu-
tions on which the day-to-day running of the machinery of government 
depended. Precedent also served as a means by which government officials 
could present themselves as taking an even-handed approach to external 
bodies who wished to make claims on government resources (even if, in 
reality, some preferential treatment was privately shown). Clearly prece-
dent could be over-turned by economic necessity (as in the push towards 
decreasing the UK Government’s financial contribution to the Australian 
assisted migration programme) or a sudden crisis which demanded an 
2 Recognising the role of precedence for policy-makers can helpfully broaden concepts of 
policy-making as a series of decisions in relation to perceived policy problems (see FitzGerald 
et al, ‘Policy success/policy failure’, 3–4) and draws attention to the ways in which policy-
making may, in some contexts, involve a presumption against implementing new policy 
positions.
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urgent response (such as the discussion of possible cessation of funding for 
Dr Barnardo’s Homes when the sexual scandal at Picton became known).3 
However civil servants’ investment in the principle of precedent meant 
that any radical alteration to a policy was only contemplated when it was 
judged that the reasons for change were sufficiently compelling to out-
weigh any anticipated adverse reactions.
Underpinning this caution was a wider sense amongst both British civil 
servants and ministers that the exercise of power in government was con-
strained by the interests and sensitivities of powerful organisational stake-
holders.4 This did not mean, in the context of the mixed economy of the 
post-war welfare state, that policy-makers simply ceded power to volun-
tary societies. There are many instances in the history of post-war child 
migration in which demands by voluntary organisations—and even the 
Australian Commonwealth Government—were politely declined or 
received only very minimal assistance. From refusals of the post-war resto-
ration of the government grant-in-aid to the Church of England Advisory 
Council of Empire Settlement or for increased funding requested by the 
Fairbridge Society, to the lack of any active support for demands that local 
authorities to be encouraged to give over more children for emigration, 
civil servants and ministers in the Commonwealth Relations Office and 
Home Office never allowed their policy decisions simply to be dictated by 
the requests of external bodies. Those demands would always be courte-
ously heard and receive at least the impression of serious attention, but 
were never acceded to if they did not fit with policy-makers’ existing views 
or priorities. Whilst there seemed to be far greater co-working between 
the Dominions Office and Fairbridge Society during the inter-war years, 
this had later cooled as the Dominions Office sought to distance itself 
from the demands of Fairbridge’s London committee for greater control 
over the operation of Fairbridge farm schools in Australia. By the post-war 
period, some ministers such as Douglas Dodds-Parker still  actively sup-
ported child migration organisations. However, in general, civil servants 
and ministers displayed a greater sense of institutional distance from the 
voluntary organisations with whom they worked, seeing them more as 
3 On the role of crisis in challenging default forms of policy inertia, see Thomas Birkland, 
Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2006).
4 On the role of interest groups in policy-makers’ perceptions of constraints on their deci-




organisations whose working practices and sensitivities had to be managed 
rather than as close collaborators in a shared policy project. The warmth 
of ministerial tributes in Parliamentary debates to the work of voluntary 
societies involved in child migration increasingly contrasted with the more 
reserved, and increasingly critical, tone of private notes and memoranda in 
government files.
However, whilst British policy-makers generally maintained a sense of 
institutional distance from voluntary organisations involved in post-war 
child migration, and were quite willing to refuse requests from them, they 
were also averse to creating tensions in those relationships through ‘fruit-
less controversy’. Within both the Home Office and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, decisions about post-war child migration were consis-
tently characterised by the wish to avoid overt conflict with other stake-
holders with interests in this work—whether the Australian Commonwealth 
Government, voluntary organisations or local authorities. From the deci-
sion to give approval to St John Bosco Boys’ Town or the Padbury Boys 
Training Farm as receiving institutions despite the Home Office’s initial 
concerns, the approval of the Over-Seas League as a sending organisation 
under pressure from the Commonwealth Government, and the agreement 
to allow the Fairbridge Society to send children to Australia during the 
summer of 1956 when an unofficial suspension of child migration was 
meant to be in place, civil servants consistently showed an unwillingness to 
press their concerns to the point where it might provoke conflict. Although 
the case of St John Bosco Boys’ Town seemed to be one in which the 
Home Office did, at first, seem willing to face down lobbying from sup-
porters of the Catholic Church, it eventually conceded in the face of broad 
reassurances about the institution and a faint hope that Catholic officials 
had understood what standards of child-care were expected of them.5 
Government ministers, on occasion, seemed more willing to contemplate 
bolder measures, but for civil servants, a common thread in their work was 
to avoid their department becoming embroiled in conflict with external 
bodies which they saw as having no benefit in furthering their policy aims. 
Within the Home Office Children’s Department, this sense of the limits 
of their power in the face of concerted opposition also extended to its 
5 It is notable in this case that the initial strong stand by the Home Office against the 
approval of St John Bosco Boys’ Town was helped by the fact that it was explicitly supported 
by the Home Secretary, James Chuter Ede, rather than a position taken by civil servants alone.
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experience of pressing for policy and operational changes in some local 
authorities in England and Wales.6
A different and more complex picture of policy negotiations between 
government officials and voluntary organisations therefore emerges from 
the idea of the latter having to ‘converge’ with government policy if it 
were to continue to receive public resources,7 or of policy-makers instru-
mentally using voluntary organisations as the informal means of meeting 
the Commonwealth Government’s demand for child migrants.8 The post- 
war history of child migration was one of policy-makers’ increasing doubts 
about the working methods of voluntary organisations and the wish for 
them to undergo gradual reform, alongside a wariness of forms of control 
which might prove too controversial and have insufficient practical bene-
fit. Where there was pressure for convergence with standards expected by 
the state, this pressure was, for the most part, only slowly and cautiously 
exerted. In the case of the Home Office Children’s Department, this argu-
ably reflected a wider culture of timidity in enforcing standards in chil-
dren’s out-of-home care. One later academic review was to go on 
to criticise its staff for being ‘unnecessarily restrained in their attitude to 
[other] authorities whose departments are inefficient or who are acting 
against the spirit of child care legislation or the general consensus of pro-
fessional opinion on what is good child care practice’.9
In discussions within government, this aversion to conflict also some-
times translated into civil servants’ unwillingness to trespass into the pow-
ers and responsibilities of other government departments with whom they 
were liaising.10 This was exemplified in the Children’s Department’s reluc-
tance to contemplate complete refusal of requests for approvals of receiving 
6 See, e.g., Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, p. 398, on the Children’s 
Department’s experience of limited influence over improving standards in established resi-
dential homes in the face of concerted opposition within a local authority.
7 Finlayson, ‘A moving frontier’.
8 Grier, ‘Voluntary rights and statutory wrongs’.
9 Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, p. 425.
10 Similar caution was, at times, evident within the Home Office Children’s Department in 
terms of encroaching on the policy remit of local authorities, although where the Home 
Office had clear statutory powers over local authorities (e.g. in terms of powers of veto over 
appointment of specific individuals as Children’s Officers) it was more willing to use these, 
see Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, pp.  376–8, 380, 385. On well-
established departmental resistance to the possible transfer of power and responsibilities to 
other departments as an impediment to reform, see Richard Chapman and J.R. Greenaway, 
The Dynamics of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 132–3.
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institutions forwarded to it by the Commonwealth Relations Office in 
the early 1950s because the Home Office had no formal regulatory pow-
ers in this context. With the Home Office’s role in this approval process 
only an advisory one, its civil servants showed considerable caution over 
the extent of influence they sought to exert over decision- making within 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, at the same time as some civil ser-
vants within the Commonwealth Relations Office found the delays caused 
by consultation with the Home Office tiresome.11 Similar deference to 
departmental lines of responsibility was also reflected in Edward Gwynn’s 
decision in 1956 that the Children’s Department should not challenge the 
Commonwealth Relations Office on how best to manage political rela-
tions with the Commonwealth Government over the increasingly obvi-
ous disagreements about appropriate standards of care for child migrants. 
Aversion to straying into other department’s policy remits also had its 
advantages. The Home Office’s desire, in December 1956, to avoid ‘being 
embarrassed’ by further consultation from the Commonwealth Relations 
Office on the emigration of children to unsatisfactory Australian institu-
tions reflected an attempt by its civil servants to insulate themselves from 
difficult and uncomfortable policy decisions by placing responsibility for 
them firmly in another government department.
The belief that conflictual organisational relationships could make the 
process of government impossible doubtless made civil servants keen to 
avoid any overt confrontation with influential voluntary societies. 
However, there were even more obvious limits to their powers when it 
came to governmental and voluntary bodies in Australia. A recurring chal-
lenge for British policy-makers in the post-war period was that beyond the 
selection and preparation of child migrants in the United Kingdom, the 
most significant impact of emigration on children’s lives was likely to arise 
from the standards of care and training they received once overseas. Yet it 
was precisely over these overseas matters that the UK Government had no 
legal power. The only meaningful sanction which the UK Government 
could apply was to threaten to end its financial contribution to these child 
migration programmes, but as discussions from the Syers Committee 
onwards showed, such a measure both risked a hostile response from the 
Commonwealth Government and would remove the only contact with 
11 See, e.g., on pressure from the Commonwealth Government to speed up Home Office 
responses to requests for institutional approvals see MacGregor to Walsh Atkins, 25 August 
1950, TNA: MH102/2032.
8 ‘AVOIDING FRUITLESS CONTROVERSY’: UK CHILD MIGRATION… 
308
these schemes through which British policy-makers could exert any influ-
ence over them.12 To attempt to employ any strong influence over the 
working practices of organisations in Australia also smacked of the old 
colonialism which officials in the Dominions Office and Commonwealth 
Relations Office saw as no longer tenable or desirable.
The lack of ability to exert any controls over children once overseas 
played a significant role in the Children’s Department’s decision to aban-
don regulations for child migration by voluntary organisations. The pre-
ferred alternative option was to try to exert moral persuasion on Australian 
government officials through inter-governmental channels, or on 
Australian voluntary societies via the sending organisations in Britain who 
provided them with children. However, when the events of 1956 showed 
that trust in Australian systems to maintain appropriate standards of care 
had been misplaced and that the Commonwealth Department of 
Immigration had a very different understanding of suitable standards of 
care for child migrants to the Curtis Committee, a central policy bind that 
had run through the entire post-war programme became all too stark. The 
Commonwealth Government clearly wanted child migrants and had made 
significant financial investments to create space for them in residential 
institutions across Australia. Furthermore, any cessation of child migration 
would, it was feared in London, be perceived in Canberra as a sign not 
only of British indifference towards assisted migration, but towards its 
strategic commitment to Australia more generally. Yet, British officials 
came to realise, the Commonwealth Government had neither the inclina-
tion nor the systems to ensure that standards of care advocated by the 
Curtis report would be implemented in the institutions to which British 
child migrants were being sent. In the absence of any legal or other con-
trol over those Australian institutions, the UK Government was reliant on 
the willingness of the Commonwealth Government to insist on particular 
standards of care and had no means of addressing this when such willing-
ness was absent.
When the Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office agreed to 
introduce closer monitoring of the working methods of voluntary societ-
ies sending children from the United Kingdom in 1957, this could only 
12 Civil servants involved in these policy discussions would generally have been aware of the 
child migration programme to New Zealand, operated by the New Zealand Government and 
the Over-Seas League, over which the UK Government had little formal control because it 
did not rely on any form of UK Government funding.
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effectively address problems occurring in the United Kingdom and not in 
Australia. The bind of feeling compelled to continue official support for 
child migration, whilst feeling disquiet about the inability to ensure ade-
quate standards in Australia, was one that was never resolved by British 
policy-makers. When they became aware of the prosecutions for sexual 
offences against boys from the Picton farm school in 1958, British officials 
once again hoped that the Commonwealth Department of Immigration 
might institute some wider investigation of whether similar sexual offences 
had occurred at other institutions receiving British child migrants. Yet 
again, though, they found Commonwealth officials to be unobliging. By 
the end of the 1950s, the privately expressed hope of civil servants in the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and Home Office was that this bind 
could ultimately be resolved through child migration programmes dying a 
quiet death through declining numbers of available children. Those chil-
dren who had already sailed to Australia were beyond the powers of their 
intervention and became the forgotten subjects of a policy problem that 
they had found too difficult to resolve.
Policy delay, coMPlex systeMs 
and MisPlaced assuMPtions
Whilst policy-makers’ various perceptions about the limits of their powers 
doubtless constrained their decisions about child migration, other causes 
of policy failure can be found in the over-complicated policy and adminis-
trative systems through which it operated.
The slow progress in developing policies for safeguarding child migrants 
in the post-war period is, in one sense, not surprising given that assisted 
child migration was a very small part of both the wider assisted migration 
brief of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the responsibilities for 
children’s out-of-home care for the Home Office Children’s Department. 
This process was made yet more protracted through processes of discus-
sion which involved two government departments and two government 
advisory bodies in London, the UK High Commission in Canberra, the 
Australian Commonwealth Government, and professional bodies, local 
authorities and voluntary societies in Britain. The fact that these processes 
took place in the context of the wider re-organisation of children’s out-of- 
home care in the emerging post-war welfare state, and of wider, conten-
tious, reviews of assisted migration policy, was also a source of further 
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delay. The first post-war child migration parties to Australia had sailed in 
1947 when the Home Office Children’s Department was still in the very 
early stages of adjusting to its new role as the lead government department 
for children’s out-of-home care and devising a wider range of new policies 
in the wake of the Curtis report. With the Home Office’s Advisory Council 
only meeting to discuss regulations for the child migration work of volun-
tary societies in 1949, and its discussions then delayed by other business 
and trans-national consultation over proposals, it was only in 1952 that 
the Advisory Council had a clear set of regulations to discuss. Subsequent 
consultation on the regulations created further delays, exacerbated by 
Home Office officials’ apparent fatigue with this process. By the time the 
Children’s Department eventually reached the decision not to introduce 
these regulations in 1954, the Home Office and Commonwealth Relations 
Office were already beginning to work towards a consensus on the value 
of a gradualist approach to reform in place of regulation. With attempts to 
implement this gradualist policy through the Oversea Migration Board 
hindered by the enthusiasm of some of the Board’s members for child 
migration, a further resolution on how to pursue this approach was only 
found through the  Shannon committee report in the early autumn of 
1956. By 1957, the informal agreement that voluntary organisations 
sending children from the United Kingdom should allow Home Office 
officials to monitor their working practices as a condition for receiving 
Government funding finally meant that some mechanism for oversight of 
their work had eventually been achieved.
Whilst, in terms of the administrative and political processes involved, 
it is possible to see why this policy process could take so long, for child 
migrants such periods of time constituted their entire childhoods. The 
slow progress of policy development in this context meant that child 
migrants’ lives were lived through a system maintained by the momentum 
of precedent and policy-makers’ aversion to overt conflict, with concerns 
about their standards of care generally assuaged with the hope that things 
would improve in the future. It was never the case, then, that standards for 
child migration were ignored by British policy-makers after 1947, or that 
the aspirations of the Curtis report for high standards of care for child 
migrants were forgotten or rejected. Failures to protect the welfare of 
British child migrants occurred, instead, because the ways in which British 
policy-makers’ perceptions of the limits of their powers hindered their 
ability to undertake more effective and decisive action.
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More robust policy positions could certainly have been taken. Approval 
of residential institutions or sending organisations, about which Home 
Office officials had concerns, could have been withheld. As John Ross later 
suggested, more exacting criteria for these approvals could also have been 
agreed to prevent children being sent to large, impersonal and isolated 
institutions. Despite their limitations, the introduction of regulations for 
the work of voluntary societies sending child migrants from the United 
Kingdom would almost certainly have discouraged some of the organisa-
tions with the worst practices from continuing their work. Policy tensions 
with the Australian Commonwealth Government may well have been dif-
ficult to resolve, but British policy-makers still had much greater scope for 
pressing for better safeguards in this work than were actually, in practice, 
pursued.
Other causes of policy failure can also be seen embedded in the dynamics 
and limitations of organisational systems. The Australian Commonwealth 
Government’s enthusiasm for post-war child migration was, well into the 
late 1950s, premised on an unrealistic assessment of the number of British 
child migrants that might be available. Initially, this involved a gross over- 
estimate of the numbers of ‘war orphans’ in Britain who might benefit from 
new homes overseas once peace was restored. Then, when that mistake was 
realised, Commonwealth ministers and immigration officials continued to 
over-estimate what proportion of the 125,000 children identified by the 
Curtis report as being ‘deprived of a normal family home’ could be avail-
able for assisted migration. An important consequence of these mistakes 
was the Australian policy decision to provide grants to voluntary organisa-
tions to enable the opening of new residential institutions—or the expan-
sion of existing ones—to accommodate this anticipated supply of children. 
Once this investment had been made, and children were not forthcoming 
in the numbers that had been expected, the policy imperative to press 
British officials for more children was strengthened. This pressure led, in 
turn, to the approval of the Over-Seas League as a sending organisation by 
the UK Government—despite concerns about its resources and working 
practices—as well as the active recruitment of British children to fill insti-
tutional vacancies, as happened, for example, with girls sent by the Sisters 
of Nazareth to the Nazareth House at East Camberwell in Melbourne. 
Irrespective of the flawed understandings on which a policy was based, this 
process showed that, once established, a programme could generate its 
own demands for the resources it needed (in this case, children) in order 
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to sustain itself, regardless of whether the consequences of these demands 
were ultimately beneficial or not.
Child migrants were also poorly served by the complex and fragmented 
system of administration and oversight through which the programmes 
operated.13 The risks of poorly co-ordinated systems for children’s out-of- 
home care were well-known at the birth of the post-war welfare state and 
had been a central concern of the Curtis and Clyde reports. In this con-
text, the child migration programmes were an exceptional case in that they 
were a form of children’s out-of-home care where administrative and pol-
icy decisions fell outside the primary control of the Home Office. The 
more coherent administrative system encouraged by Curtis and imple-
mented through the 1948 Children Act was, of course, no guarantee of 
effective delivery of child-care services. By the early 1960s, Home Office 
inspectors were still complaining of cases in which local authority child- 
care officers in England and Wales were failing to adhere to boarding out 
regulations, placing children in foster homes which had not previously 
been visited and failing to undertake sufficiently regular checks on their 
welfare.14 However, the complex governmental systems for the adminis-
tration of child migration—operating between different departments in 
both the United Kingdom and Australia—created even worse conditions 
for competing interests, failures in the sharing of information and anxiety 
about others’ reactions to policy decisions. These systemic problems were 
further exacerbated by the failure of the Home Office to introduce the 
controls over voluntary organisations’ work which it did have available to 
it under the 1948 Act.
Tensions within this complex administrative system were also shaped by 
policy-makers’ perceptions of which organisations within the system were 
closer to, or further from, their own views or trusted networks. Walter 
Garnett, whose work at the UK High Commission in Canberra was so 
important for these programmes, had for example clearly come to identify 
far more strongly with parts of the Commonwealth and State Governments 
in Australia than with the Home Office, whose interventions he saw as 
often ill-informed, overly rigid and insensitive. Home Office civil servants, 
equally, at times expressed frustration with High Commission officials 
whom they saw as trying to be ‘more Australian than the Australians’. 
13 On the significance of contingent systems of governance in impeding effective policy 
development and delivery, see also Birkland, Lessons of Disaster, p. 157.
14 Griffith, Central Departments and Local Authorities, p. 396.
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Such bonds of trust and mistrust shaped the working of this policy system. 
When overlaid over the vast geographical spaces of Australia, it was unsur-
prising that this fragmented system failed to meet the need for the effec-
tive monitoring of British child migrants and hindered attempts to improve 
the standards of care and training they received.
Alongside these organisational factors, policy-makers’ assessment of 
how child migration was working in practice was significantly influenced 
by their prior beliefs as to whether the fundamental policy underlying this 
work was a good one or not.15 When reviewing the catalogue of short-
comings in Australian receiving institutions of which the Dominions 
Office had become aware during the Second World War, Sir John 
Stephenson had noted that whilst more careful monitoring and govern-
ment controls were needed, the ‘original idea’ of the child migration 
schemes was ‘a sound one’. Having received the information that it had 
about poor management, accommodation, standards of care, training and 
after-care, it would have been equally possible for policy-makers in the 
Dominions Office at that point to conclude that the project of sending 
British children thousands of miles away to remote, often poorly run, 
institutions, entailed too great a risk to their welfare for it to be sensible to 
continue. Policy-makers’ belief in what constituted ‘good’ policy was not, 
therefore, based simply on the evidence available to them—as Whiskard’s 
image of the rational civil servant carefully weighing up their limited 
options suggests—but on whether the policy provided a meaningful nar-
rative for political action. The idea of the isolated child, with limited pros-
pects in the United Kingdom, being offered an opportunity for a better 
life as a citizen of the Commonwealth, whilst consolidating the broader 
cultural, economic and political bonds between Britain and her former 
Dominions, had enduring appeal. Even in 1956, after the Ross report and 
its confidential addenda, had shown the various ways in which the current 
system was failing, the Shannon committee report went on to argue that 
although policy-makers would probably not choose to establish such 
programmes from scratch today, most child migrants appeared to benefit 
from this work. When a policy was seen as fundamentally sound, numer-
ous examples of its shortcomings could be interpreted as exceptions or 
temporary failures that could be improved with gradual reform, rather 
15 On the role of ideological assumptions or other pre-conceptions in policy failure, see, 
e.g., Richard Grossman, Wrong: Nine Economic Policy Disasters and What We Can Learn 
from Them (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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than as evidence that the policy was, at root, unsafe. Assumptions about 
the basic ‘soundness’ of a policy idea—despite evidence of its failings—
could therefore persist for many years and require either a significant shift 
in knowledge (as occurred when John Ross finally saw conditions in 
Australian receiving institutions for himself) or the fresh perspective of a 
new generation of policy-makers for such perceptions to change. In this 
regard, Walter Garnett’s shift from his often defensive attitude to criti-
cisms of child migration systems to his apparent acceptance of the need for 
far greater controls in the report of the 1956 Fact-Finding Mission is an 
interesting case example of the process of change in a policy-maker’s 
thinking.
history, Policy Failure and redress
On 1st March 2018, the United Kingdom Independent Inquiry into 
Child Sexual Abuse published its report for its Child Migration Programmes 
investigation. Whilst identifying failures in a number of the voluntary 
organisations involved sending child migrants overseas, the Inquiry com-
mented that:
[I]t is the overwhelming conclusion of the Inquiry that the institution pri-
marily to blame for the continued existence of the child migration pro-
grammes after the Second World War was Her Majesty’s Government 
(HMG)… The policy itself was indefensible and HMG could have decided 
to bring it to an end, or mitigated some of its effects in practice by taking 
action at certain key points, but it did not do so… We concluded that the 
main reason for HMG’s failure to act was the politics of the day, which were 
consistently prioritized over the welfare of children… We have made a small 
number of recommendations, focusing on the need for HMG to institute 
immediately a financial redress scheme for surviving child migrants.16
The Inquiry’s criticism of the UK Government was based on a number 
of issues addressed in this book, namely the failure to introduce s.33 regu-
lations or requirements for Secretary of State to consent for the emigra-
tion of children by voluntary societies, the failure to ensure child migration 
programmes ran according to the standards advocated by the Curtis 
report, and the tendency for policy-makers to act in ways calculated to 
avoid conflict with the other organisational stakeholders. As has been 
16 IICSA, Child Migration Programmes Investigation Report, pp. viii–ix.
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argued in this conclusion, however, these failures are better understood 
not as the result of purely instrumental decisions to prioritise political 
interests over the welfare of children, but of policy-makers’ perception 
that their powers were limited and that a policy of gradualist reform was 
the best option available to them. The Inquiry was, however, quite correct 
in arguing that the UK Government did in reality have far greater powers 
to act to protect child migrants’ welfare than it was willing to deploy, and 
that the lack of more effective action on its part left child migrants vulner-
able to harm which, for many, had life-long effects.
The UK Government subsequently agreed to accept the Inquiry’s rec-
ommendation and establish a redress scheme to former child migrants that 
provided a flat payment of £20,000 to all eligible applicants. The UK child 
migration schemes have therefore become part of the international phe-
nomenon of historic child welfare provisions that have become the focus 
of public critique, investigation and redress, and part of the even wider 
phenomenon of contemporary debates about how historic injustice might 
best be understood and addressed.
One element of these debates is the role that historical research can, 
and should, play in these processes.17 Historical research into policy and 
organisational failures and abuses of rights can generate a more nuanced 
framework for thinking about different kinds of historic wrongs inflicted 
on vulnerable citizens. Alongside studies of state-sponsored violence or 
other policies that knowingly contravened legal or moral standards of the 
day, a case example such as the UK child migration programmes demon-
strates that traumatic consequences can result not just from the intention-
ally violent exercise of state power, but from poor policy decisions and 
failing organisational systems.18 By developing fine-grained historical 
accounts of how the workings of the machinery of government could 
cause profound suffering, it becomes possible to have a clearer under-
standing of forms of organisational responsibility for past wrong which go 
17 On this see, e.g., Gordon Lynch, Pirjo Markkola, Eoin O’Sullivan, Johanna Sköld and 
Shurlee Swain, The Uses of Historical Research in Child Abuse Inquiries, History and Policy 
policy paper, published 7 May 2020, http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/
papers/the-uses-of-historical-research-in-child-abuse-inquiries.
18 Thinking about patterns of failure in organisational systems and cultures can be another 
way of connecting historic and contemporary injustices, distinct from, but potentially com-
plementary with, the interest in how long-term social structures underpin historic and con-
temporary injustices (on this see, Alasia Nuti, Injustice and the Reproduction of History: 
Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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beyond broad notions of the nation as a moral community responsible for 
harms inflicted through its history.19 Such historical analysis can also pro-
vide more careful accounts of past trauma which challenge more popular-
ised versions that over-simplify the organisational processes and cultures 
involved.20
In this sense, historical research can provide a strong basis for wider 
public discussions of past organisational wrongs and inform more careful 
debates about the nature of apologies and redress. Historical research is 
not, however, simply a precursor to the ‘real’ process of considering resti-
tution and redress, but an integral part of it. One principle that has come 
to be associated with transitional justice is that proper restitution for his-
toric wrongs can be shown, in part, by guarantees of non-recurrence of 
such abuses in the future. In many instances, however, historic wrongs 
take forms that are unlikely to be replicated directly in contemporary soci-
ety. The notion that the UK child migration programmes should be stud-
ied so that such policies are never implemented again is, for example, 
rendered redundant in the face of wider policy and social changes that 
have already made any such recurrence unthinkable. The principle of non- 
recurrence can have much wider significance than this, however. Some 
factors underlying the dynamics of policy failure in a case such as the UK 
child migration programmes are clearly specific to this particular history 
(such as the politics of early post-war Anglo-Australian assisted migra-
tion). Cultures of policy-making also change over time, with the current 
emphasis on learning from past crises and social trauma (reflected in the 
IICSA process and subsequent redress scheme), being very different to 
the early post-war context in which policy-makers were more willing to 
take the view that there was little benefit in raking over previous failures if 
there were reasonable grounds for hoping that things would improve in 
the future.21 Other factors evident in this case can, however, have wider 
19 For debates about the relative significance of the state or the wider moral community of 
the nation in redress for historic injustice, see, e.g., David Miller, National Responsibility and 
Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jacob Levy, ‘National and statist 
responsibility’, in (eds) Helder De Schutter and Ronald Tinnevelt, Nationalism and Global 
Justice: David Miller and His Critics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 113–27; also Elazar 
Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co, 2000).
20 For a very effective study of this kind, see Kim Wagner, Amirtsar 1919: An Empire of 
Fear and the Making of a Massacre (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019).
21 On the the current policy-making culture of learning lessons from dramatic instances of 
past failures, see Jonathan Sher, John Frank, Lawrence Doi and Linda Caestecker, ‘Failures 
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relevance for other policy failures in the care of children and vulnerable 
adults such as over-complex administrative systems, conflicting policy 
agendas operating to different timetables, poor lines of communication, 
delays in policy decision-making, commitment to the soundness of a pol-
icy idea in the face of contradictory evidence and over-cautious avoidance 
of adverse reaction to policy decisions.22 The history of post-war child 
migration to Australia therefore raises questions not only about whether 
similar factors might have been at play in failures in other health and social 
welfare systems of that period, but how such structural and cultural flaws 
in government can continue to harm the lives of vulnerable citizens today.
in reproductive health policy: overcoming the consequences and causes of inaction’, Journal 
of Public Health, 41(2), 2019, 209–15.
22 This study therefore concurs with the argument by Bovens and ‘t Hart, ‘Revisiting policy 
failures’ that explanations of policy failures based on single causes are unlikely to be helpful, 
and invites further reflection on whether certain clusters of factors may be particularly perti-
nent to specific policy areas, periods or systems of government; see also Grossman, Wrong, 
on the inter-play of intersecting factors such as ideology, delay and interest groups in eco-
nomic policy failures.
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